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Abstract 
This  thesis  examines  Anglo-Greek  relations  during  1947-1952;  the  era  of  the 
Greek  civil  war  from  the  British  announcement  to  withdraw  aid  from  Greece  until  the 
end  of  the  civil  war  and  Greece's  entry  into  NATO.  A  comprehensive  treatment  of  the 
crisis  of  the  civil  war  focuses  on  British  imperial  defence,  the  politics  and  society  of 
Greece  and  bilateral  relations  as  formulated  by  Cold  War  needs.  During  the  rift  between 
the  Rigbt  and  the  Left  in  Greece,  the  main  issue  addressed  by  this  work  is  the 
continuation  of  British  influence  in  Greek  affairs  and  the  extension  of  British  interest  in 
bolstering  the  a  nti-Communist  fight  of  the  Greek  government.  In  1947  Britain,  being 
itself  on  the  verge  of  economic  collapse,  opted  to  discontinue  financial  support  to  the 
Greek  right-wing  government,  which  boosted  the  enunciation  of  the  Truman  Doctrine  in 
March  1947.  In  t  he  w  ake  ofA  merican  i  nterference  inG  reece,  A  nglo-Greek  r  elations 
remained  close  and  intense,  as  the  Greek  governments  maintained  their  trust  in  the 
British.  For  the  British,  Greece  remained  a  destitute  country,  in  need  of  assistance  to 
defeat  the  communists. 
This  study  emphasises  the  diplomatic  and  military  co-operation  between  the 
British,  the  American  and  the  Greek  governments  in  trying  to  defeat  the  communist 
forces,  while  attention  is  given  to  the  policy  and  aims  of  the  Greek  Communist  Party. 
The  communist  attempts  to  take  over  power  along  with  the  policies  of  the  Greek 
governments  and  their  allies  are  examined,  with  particular  emphasis  on  the 
counterinsurgency  operations  of  the  Greek  government  developed  from  1947  until  the 
final  defeat  of  the  communist  forces  in  1949.  The  British  role  in  these  operations  is 
considered  to  be  important  and  influential  in  training  and  equipping  the  Greek  armed 
forces. 11 
In  the  first  post-civil  war  period  of  1950-1952,  the  main  issues  examined  are  the 
attempts  made  by  the  Greek  governments  and  the  allies  to  establish  a  strong  democratic 
cabinet  and  to  strengthen  the  security  of  Greece  within  the  context  of  international  Cold 
War  policies.  Due  to  anti-Communist  perceptions,  precipitated  by  the  Korean  War, 
Greece  became  a  quasi  NATO  member  in  1950  and  full  member  in  1952,  which 
brought  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  Military  Mission  from  Greece. iii 
Contents 
ABSTRACT  I 
CONTENTS  III 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
LIST  OF  ABBREVIATIONS  AND  ACRONYMS  Vil 
NOTE  ON  TRANSLITERATION  x 
I  SETTING  THE  STAGE:  1941-1946  19 
From  Resistance  to  Civil  War  19 
The  December  Events  32 
The  Development  of  a  Full  Scale  Civil  War  36 
11  IN  SEARCH  OF  SECURITY:  1947  43 
The  Maximos  Government:  The  Test  of  the  Centre  43 
The  Truman  Doctrine  50 
The  War  in  Greece  54 
The  Sofoulis  Government:  A  New  Centre  Experiment  63 
Counter-insurgency  Operations  in  Greece  66 
III  THE  DENOUEMENT:  1948-1949  78 
Military  Preparations  78 
The  Battles  of  1948  81 
Stalemate  in  Late  1948  88 
The  End  of  the  Civil  War  94 
IV  POST-CIVIL  WAR  POLITICS,  THE  KOREAN  WAR  AND  NATO 
SECURITY  CONSIDERATIONS:  1950  108 
The  Period  of  Unstable  Coalitions  108 
The  Venizelos  Governments:  A  Marginal  Stability  119 iv 
Greece  Joins  NATO  124 
V  STABILISATION  ERA:  1951-1952  130 
Papagos  Enters  Politics  130 
The  Plastiras  Government  144 
The  Rally  Wins  the  Election  149 
VI  GREECE'S  ACCESSION  TO  NATO:  1952  154 
Greece  and  NATO's  Southern  Flank  154 
The  Defence  Burden  Debare  161 
The  British  Military  Mission  and  the  NATO  Framework  165 
UNSCOB  and  Balkan  Cold  War  Policy  171 
CONCLUSION  174 
APPENDICES  180 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  196 V 
Acknowledgments 
This  study  has  been  made  possible  by  the  kindness  of  many.  The  official  debts 
go  tomys  upervisor,  DrS  imon  B  all.  His  suggestions  have  enlarged  the  scope  of  my 
research  and  broadened  the  limits  of  the  thesis.  He  unwaveringly  offered  me  much  of  his 
time  during  and  off  term  to  comment  upon  the  chapters  and  the  thesis  as  a  whole. 
Special  thanks  are  due  to  Dr  Richard  Aldous,  University  College  Dublin,  and  Dr  Phil 
O'Brien,  Glasgow  University,  for  their  discerning  comments,  apt  remarks  as  well  as 
constructive  criticism  during  my  viva.  They  both  offered  me  insight  on  their  particular 
area  of  interest  and  made  the  exam  a  particularly  fruitful  experience.  I  am  warmly 
appreciative  of  the  professionalism  of  the  staff  at  the  PRO,  Liddell  Hart  Archives, 
Churchill  Archive  and  National  Library  of  Scotland;  without  their  competence  and 
wholehearted  assistance  the  research  of  this  work  would  have  been  extremely 
frustrating.  I  shall  always  be  indebted  to  the  staff  of  the  DDS  of  the  Glasgow  University 
Library  for  making  every  possible  effort  to  offer  me  access  to  all  books  needed.  I  also 
owe  particular  dept  of  gratitude  to  the  staff  of  King's  College  Library  for  their 
exceptional  professionalism,  which  firmly  was  offered  to  me,  even  in  the  form  of 
personal  contact  whenever  needed.  Last  but  not  least,  my  special  thanks  are  extended  to 
Ms  Alison  Peden,  the  Secretary  of  the  Department  of  History,  for  her  personal  and 
secretarial  support,  for  finding  solution  to  practical  problems  and  sorting  out  all  kinds  of 
administrative  difficulties. 
The  pleasant  duty  of  unfolding  the  roll  of  personal  debts  begins  with  my  family 
without  whose  support  the  completion  of  this  work  would  have  been  much  more 
comp  icated  and  difficult.  They  all  have  always  been  generous  and  reassuring  during  the 
very  many  trying  moments  involved  in  the  lonely  adventure  of  developing  this  thesis. 
Their  belief  in  me  has  given  me  strength  to  go  on.  Their  understanding  and vi 
encouragement  has  made  the  burden  of  this  study  much  easier.  Thus,  it  has  been  my 
great  pleasure  to  dedicate  the  thesis  to  them.  My  grateful  thanks  go  also  to  my  friends  in 
Athens  and  Glasgow  for  their  support  along  the  way  and  especially  to  Eleftheria 
Daleziou,  who  has  been  sharing  part  of  the  difficulties. 
I  owe  special  thanks  to  my  friends  and  colleagues  at  the  Glasgow  University 
Library  for  their  support  and  understanding  during  all  these  years.  Being  a  member  of 
staff  my  self,  working  in  such  a  friendly  environment  has  often  made  work  an  enjoyable 
break  from  study  and  academic  commitments.  I  thank  them  for  their  kindness  and  above 
all  for  making  me  feel  at  home  in  Glasgow.  For  warm  hospitality  as  well  as  unfailing 
care,  special  thanks  are  due  to  Sir  Roddy  and  Lady  Ma&rie  MacSween.  Their 
acquaintance  has  been  great  honour  to  me.  Their  generosity  exceeded  my  expectations. 
For  his  solid  advice  and  personal  interest  in  my  work,  my  special  thanks  also  go 
to  Dr  Alex  Zervoudakis  for  suggesting  lines  of  enquiry,  which  have  greatly  enriched  the 
scope  of  my  research.  I  am  indebted  to  Dr  Fotini  Konstantopoulou,  Service  of  Historical 
Archive-  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  who  gave  me  access  to  the  archive  and  Ms  Efi 
Pashalidou,  who  allowed  me  to  consult  the  documents  of  the  Greek  General  Staff 
FEVAIE-GES/DIS.  Although  this  work  has  been  made  possible  by  the  assistance  of 
those  mentioned  above,  its  weaknesses  are  my  own. vii 
List  of  Abbreviations  and  Acronyms 
AMAG  American  Mission  for  Aid  to  Greece 
AMFOGE  American  Mission  for  Observing  Greek  Elections 
ASEA  Supreme  National  Defence  Council-AvCOTaro  luýtpol)kto  EOvwýq  A[wva; 
BLO  British  Liaison  Officer 
BLU  British  Liaison  Units 
BMM  British  Military  Mission 
CAB  Cabinet  Papers 
CIGS  Commander  of  Imperial  General  Staff 
Cos  Chiefs  of  Staff 
DA  Democratic  Army-  AijýtoKpawc6q  Erp=6; 
EAM  National  Liberation  Front-EOvtlco  AnckcuftpamO  MF.  T(JD7[0 
EDA  United  Democratic  Left-Evcop-',  vjj  AijgoicpwrtKý  APICTEP6 
EDES  National  Republican  Greek  League-EMO;  Ail[toicpaTtic6;  Milwco; 
E-Mwgo; 
ELAS  National  Popular  Liberation  Army- 
EOvtic6q  A(xtic6q  Anc%ci)OcpcoTtYOq  ETpar6q 
EPE  National  Political  Union-Rvwý  flo%tmý  Email 
EPEK  National  Progressive  Union  of  the  Centre-  EOvtxý  I-Ipooku=i  Evcoaq 
K&rpou 
FO  Foreign  Office 
FRUS  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  States 
GES  General  Staff-FFviK6  E7nTF,?  £io  7,  TpctTolý 
GES/DIS  General  Staff  /Directorate  of  History  of  the  Army-  ]Fmico  EmTEW'o 
ITP(ITOi)  /At601.  wail  IGTOPiaq  ETPaTOI)  (GES/DIS  in  the  text  stands  for  the 
published  sources  of  the  General  Staff/Directorate  of  History  of  the  Army. 
]FEE/AlE  is  used  in  the  text  to  illustrate  the  primary  sources  of viii 
the  General  Staff/  Directorate  of  History  of  the  Army) 
HCDeb  House  of  Commons  Debates 
HQ  Headquarters 
ics  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff 
JUSMAG  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  Group 
JUSMAPG  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and  Planning  Group  Greece 
IDEA  Sacred  Bond  of  Greek  Officers-Icp6q  Acaýt6;  EXXývcov  AýtcogaTtic& 
is  Internal  Security 
KKE  Greek  Communist  Party-Koggowtowco  Kogga  EXX68a; 
LEK  Populist  Unity  Party-  Aatk6  EvarvK6  Kogga 
LOK  Commandos  Units  -A6Xot  OpFtv(bv  KaT(x8po[L(bv 
MAD  Units  of  Pursuit  Detachments-  Mova8eq  Anoanaaýtkcov  &64ccoq 
MAY  Units  of  Rural  Defence-Movd5c;  Acyakciag  YnaiOpoi) 
MEA  Units  of  National  Guard  Defence-Movd8c;  EOvixýq  Apwaq 
MEDO  Middle  East  Defence  Organisation 
NA  National  Army-EOvtic6q  ITpar6q 
NEA  Office  of  the  Near  East  and  African  Affairs 
NSC  National  Security  Council 
PDG  Provisional  Democratic  Government-  llpo(Ycoptvý  AiToicpauldl  Kuptpilan 
PEEA  Political  Committee  of  National  Liberation- 
llo%utký  E7nTpo7M'  Uvwýq  AnckcuOE'  pcoaTI; 
PRO  Public  Record  Office 
SACME  Supreme  Allied  Commander  Middle  East 
SACEUR  Supreme  Allied  Commander  Europe 
SHAPE  Supreme  Headquarters  Allied  Powers  Europe 
SHDM  Headquarters  of  Epirus  and  Western  Macedonia-  E-rpaTilysio  Hacipoi)  Kat 
Alnwýq  Malcc8oviaq ix 
UNGA  United  Nations  General  Assembly 
UNSC  United  Nations  Security  Council 
UNSCOB  United  Nations  Special  Committee  on  the  Balkans 
USAGG  United  States  Anny  Group  Greece 
wo  War  Office 
YIA  Service  of  Historical  Archive  (Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs) 
-Y7njpF,  a!  (x  Ic;  ToptKoUApXdou  (Ynoupyct'Ou  E4(OTCPIIC6)V) x 
Note  on  Transliteration 
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version  of  names  and  regional  place  names  would  serve  the  articulation  and  aesthetics  of 
the  Greek  language  as  well.  Conventions  such  as  ph  or  kh  have  been  simplified  tof  and 
h  for  reasons  of  convenience  to  the  non-Greek  reader.  So  Sophoules  and  Zakhariades 
have  been  given  as  Sofoulis  and  Zahariadis. xi 
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(21-  23  September).  Venizelos-Tsaldaris-Papandreou  takes  the  oath  (13  September). 
New  cabinet  Venizelos-Papandreou  (3  November). 
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Creation  of  Populist  Unity  Party  -LEK  (6  January).  Papagos  resigns  from  the  position  of 
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Venizelos  g  overnment  (27  0  ctober).  C  hurchill  g  overnment  (27  0  ctober).  New  Greek 
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Accession  of  Greece  and  Turkey  into  NATO  as  full  members  (18.2).  American 
intervention  towards  simple  majority  electoral  system  (14  March).  The  Parliament  votes 
for  simple  majority  (12  September).  The  Parliament  dissolves,  new  elections  (10 
October).  Caretaker  government  Dimitris  Kiousopoulos  (I  I  October).  Eisenhower  wins 
the  elections  (2  November).  General  elections-Greek  Rally  wins  (16  November). I 
Introduction 
This  work  is  a  study  of  Anglo-Greek  relations  during  the  period  1947-1952.  The 
thesis  surveys  British  policy  during  the  resistance  years  and  the  immediate  post-war 
period.  Its  main  focus,  however,  is  the  climax  of  the  civil  war  and  the  post-civil  war 
years.  The  post-civil  war  period  ended  when  Greece  joined  NATO  in  1952;  the  thesis 
too  terminates  at  that  pivotal  moment. 
The  aims  of  this  study  are  threefold.  Firstly,  to  examine  British  policy  towards 
Greece  during  the  crucial  years  of  1947-1952.  Secondly,  to  understand  the  Greek 
domestic  developments  which  influenced  policy-making.  Thirdly,  to  analyse  Greek 
foreign  policy  and  the  demands  Greece  made  on  Britain.  The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to 
contribute  to  a  better  understanding  of  both  British  and  Greek  foreign  policies.  The 
study  also  aims  at  providing  a  framework  for  the  understanding  of  diplomatic  and 
military  developments  in  civil  war  and  post-civil  war  Greece. 
Most  works  on  Anglo-Greek  relations  have  suggested  that  the  relationship 
disintegrated  after  1947.1  This  thesis  demonstrates  that  bilateral  relations  remained  close 
throughout  the  whole  period  under  examination.  A  combination  of  Greek  and  British 
sources  are  deployed  to  support  this  argument.  One  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  this 
thesis  is  the  variety  of  sources  upon  which  it  is  built.  On  the  Greek  side,  the  records  of 
the  Service  of  Historical  Archive  of  the  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (Ynilpecia 
IuTopucol)  ApXeiou,  YIA)  and  the  General  Staff/  Directorate  of  History  of  the  Anny 
1  According  to  the  traditionalist  historians  of  Greece,  after  1947  the  United  States  took  over  the  fight 
against  the  Soviet  Union's  plan  for  global  domination.  See:  St.  Xydis,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers 
1944-1947  (Thessalokini,  1963).  Revisionist  historians  of  Greece  emphasise  the  financial  limitations  of 
Britain,  which  led  to  British  withdrawal  and  American  involvement  in  Greece.  D.  Eudes,  The  Kapetanios 
(London,  1972).  Other  historians  of  Greece  stress  that  1947  signified  'the  changing  of  the  guard  from 
Britain  to  the  United  States'  in  Greece.  Th.  Veremis,  The  Military  in  Greek  Politics  (London,  1997),  p. 
15  1.  Vlavianos  argues  that  Britain  decided  'to  end  its  own  military  and  financial  support  to  Greece'  in 
February  1947.  H.  Vlavianos,  Greece,  1941-1949  (Oxford,  1992),  p.  236. 2 
(I'mm  E7rtTF,  4io  Zrparof)/Atcf)Oi)vaij  I(;  TOpia;  ETPaTOf),  ]FEVAIE)  are  used  for  the 
first  time.  These  records  were  released  under  Greece's  fifty-year  rule  just  as  research  for 
this  thesis  began.  When  combined  with  the  more  familiar  British  primary  sources  these 
records  furnish  insights  into  both  diplomatic  and  military  relations.  Thus,  the  thesis 
contains  the  first  detailed  analytical  coverage  of  the  battles  of  1947-1949  and  the 
operations  of  the  British  Military  Mission  in  Greece.  In  particular,  new  light  is  shed  on 
Greek  counter-insurgency  operations  carried  out  with  British  and  American  support. 
The  interrelation  of  diplomatic  and  military  components  is  an  important  element  in 
determining  relations,  which  is  underplayed  by  the  existing  literature. 
In  addition  to  the  newly  available  Greek  government  archives,  memoirs, 
monographs  and  Greek  newspapers  from  various  political  backgrounds  have  also  been 
consulted.  The  analysis  of  British  policy  is  based  upon  official  British  papers  and 
documents  regarding  Greece.  Research  has  been  conducted  on  documents  from  the 
Foreign  Office,  the  War  Office,  the  Ministry  of  Air,  the  Admiralty,  the  Ministry  of 
Defence,  the  Treasury  and  the  Cabinet.  The  papers  of  Anthony  Eden,  Winston 
Churchill,  Brigadier  Godfrey  Pennington  Hobbs,  General  Harold  English  Pyrnan, 
Admiral  Robert  Kirk  Dickson  and  Admiral  William  Halford.  Selby  regarding  Greece 
have  also  been  consulted,  the  last  four  for  the  first  time  in  this  context.  British 
parliamentary  debates  and  press  records  have  also  been  used.  One  of  the  most  difficult 
challenges  in  studying  both  the  public  and  official  documents  of  the  period  is  the  critical 
evaluation  of  their  unspoken  assumptions.  An  attempt  has  been  made  to  examine  and 
evaluate  sources  from  all  sides  of  the  polarised  political  debate  in  and  on  Greece  in 
order  to  cut  through  the  prejudices  and  propaganda  which  bedevils  the  proper  study  of 
this  subject. 
The  chronological  definition  of  the  subject  is  straightforward:  February  1947 
marked  the  British  note  to  the  Americans  announcing  British  intention  to  withdraw  aid 3 
from  Greece.  In  March  1947  the  American  government  announced  that  it  intended  to 
keep  Greece  within  the  western  sphere.  In  February  1952  Greece  joined  NATO  and 
began  its  integration  into  the  system  of  western  collective  security.  In  the  same  year  the 
acute  political  instability  that  had  haunted  Greece  since  1944  was  brought  to  an  end  by 
the  election  of  a  strong  conservative  government.  It  was  in  1952  that  the  British  Military 
Mission  concluded  its  activities  in  Greece. 
The  evolution  of  the  Greek  civil  war  and  the  impact  it  had  in  both  Britain  and 
Greece  is  examined.  Special  attention  is  paid  to  conflicting  interests  and  attitudes.  At 
various  times,  on  the  British  side,  the  Prime  Minister,  the  Foreign  Office,  the  Treasury 
and  the  War  Office  had  differing  policies  towards  Greece.  The  issue  of  the  timing  of  the 
withdrawal  of  British  troops  from  Greece  constituted  a  typical  example  of  friction. 
Within  American  circles,  there  was  often  a  considerable  variance  between  the  views  of 
the  President  and  the  State  Department;  as  the  case  was  over  the  dispatch  of  American 
army  toG  reece.  T  he  Greek  Communist  Party  (KKE)  followed  a  series  of  conflicting 
policies.  Whilst  members  of  the  KKE  were  serving  in  governments  of  national  unity,  the 
KKE  Politburo  was  planning  military  operations  to  topple  those  governments.  On  the 
Greek  government  side,  personal  ambitions,  party  friction,  power  politics  and 
international  Cold  War  developments  each  played  ar  ole  inap  rocess  of  rn  aking  a  nd 
dissolving  goverranents.  An  understanding  of  these  internal  differences  is  essential  to  an 
explanation  of  how  policy  was  developed  and  of  the  difficulties  in  its  implementation. 
In  these  years  intervention  was  the  central  issue  in  Greek  history.  Both  the  Greek 
government  and  the  Greek  communists  called  for  foreign  intervention.  The  former  was 
privileged  in  that  its  allies  were  ready  to  fight  communism.  The  latter  was  less  fortunate. 
Albania,  Yugoslavia  and  Bulgaria  provided  limited  source  of  assistance.  The  Kremlin 4 
2 
was  not  interested  in  the  fight  of  the  Greek  Communist  Party  (KKE).  Intervention  was 
also  the  constant  theme  of  Anglo-Greek  relations.  3  What  the  Greek  Communist  Party 
denounced  as  'monarcho-fascist  intervention  A  was  also  the  central  pillar  of  both 
Churchill  and  Labour's  Cold  War  policy.  Intervention  was  instrumental  in  furthering 
Britain's  two  main  objectives  in  Greece:  the  security  of  routes  to  and  from  the  Middle 
East  and  the  contaimnent  of  CommuniSM.  5  Yet  intervention  has  all  too  often  been 
interpreted  as  the  sole  determinant  in  developments  in  Greece.  6  The  form  and  degree  of 
British  intervention  oscillated  in  the  post-war.  7  It  was  constant  neither  in  form  nor  in 
intensity.  Intervention  was  a  complex  phenomenon. 
Not  only  do  many  accounts  of  Anglo-Greek  relations  fail  to  take  the  complexity 
of  intervention  into  account  but  also  they  fail  to  note  that  foreign  intervention  was  far 
from  being  the  sole  determinant  of  developments  in  Greece.  The  very  fact  that 
intervention  occurred  unevenly  in  time,  location  and  form  gave  Greek  participants  in  the 
2  Chiclet  claims  that  Stalin  used  the  KKE  as  his  Cold  War  strategy.  Ch.  Chiclet,  Les  Communistes  Grecs 
dans  la  Guerre-Histoire  du  Parti  Communiste  de  GrOce  de  19410  1949  (Paris,  1987).  Iatrides,  on  the 
contrary  although  a  left-wing  sympathiser,  puts  the  blame  on  the  KKE  itself  for  the  way  it  has  interpreted 
Soviet  policy.  latrides,  'Perceptions  of  Soviet  Involvement  in  the  Greek  Civil  War  1945-1949',  in  L. 
Baerentzen,  J.  0.  Iatrides,  0.  L.  Smith  (eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War  (Copenhagen, 
1987),  pp.  225-248;  Similarly,  in  0.  Smith,  'The  Greek  Communist  Party,  1945-1949',  in  D.  Close  (ed), 
The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  129-155.  A  detailed  account  of  the  KKE's  policy  is  of  P.  J.  Stavrakis,  Moscow 
and  Communists,  1944-1949  (London,  1989). 
3  For  a  left-wing  account  on  foreign  intervention  in  Greece  see:  H.  Richter,  British  Intervention  in  Greece: 
From  Varkiza  to  Civil  War.  February  1945  to  August  1946  (London,  1985);  B.  Kontis,  Anglo-American 
Policy  and  the  Greek  problem  1945-1949-HAy7Ao-Aycpwaviký  HoAmK4  Kai  To  EUqVIK6  ffp6fl2qya- 
(Thessaloniki,  1984);  J.  0.  Iatrides,  'Britain,  the  United  States,  and  Greece,  1945-1949',  in  D.  H.  Close, 
(ed.  ),  The  Greek  Civil  War,  1943-1950  (London,  1993);  J.  0.  Iatrides,  'Civil  War,  1945-1949:  National 
and  International  Aspects',  in  J.  0.  Iatrides  (ed),  Greece  in  1940s,  pp.  195-219;  J.  Iatrides,  'Britain,  the 
United  States  and  Greece',  in  D.  Close  (ed),  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  190-213.  For  non  pro-KKE 
accounts:  L.  Stavrianos,  Greece:  American  Dilemma  and  Opportunity  (Chicago,  1952);  L.  S.  Wittner, 
American  Intervention  in  Greece  1943-1949  (New  York,  1982).  Hereafter  cited  as  American  Intervention. 
A.  Nachmani,  'Civil  War  and  Foreign  Intervention  in  Greece:  1946-1949',  Journal  of  Contemporary 
History  25  (1990),  pp.  489-522;  R.  Ovendale,  'Britain,  the  United  States  and  the  European  Cold  War, 
1945-19481,  History  67  (1987),  pp.  217-236. 
4  KKE  Official  Documents  -E7r!  aqua  KE[pcvavol.  6  (Athens,  1987). 
5  F.  Northedge,  British  Foreign  Policy  (London,  1962);  E.  Bullock,  The  Life  and  Times  ofErnest  Bevin, 
vol.  II  (London,  1967);  T.  Howarth,  Prospects  and  Reality.  Great  Britain  1945-1955  (London,  19  8  5). 
6  For  a  right-wing  view  see  Xydis,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers.  For  the  left-wing  orthodoxy,  History  of 
the  KKE  1918-1949-,  40KIUIO  Iaroplaq  Tov  KKE-  (Athens,  1996). 
'  On  the  contrary,  historian  Eudes  interprets  the  civil  war  as  a  monolithic  political  and  social  conflict  with 
no  change  of  character  throughout.  Eudes,  Les  Kapetanios.  La  guerre  civile  grecque  de  1943-1949 
(Paris,  1970). 5 
post-war  events  a  wide  d  egree  of  latitude.  This  study  is  based  on  the  perception  that 
Greek  political  forces  were  responsible  for  developments  in  Greece.  Quite  often, 
however,  accounts  of  Greek  relations  with  a  foreign  power  are  based  on  a  series  of  a 
priori,  over-simplified  value  judgements,  whose  purpose  is  to  condemn  or  exonerate  the 
policy  of  a  great  power  or  one  of  the  Greek  political  parties.  Although  the  literature  on 
the  period  of  the  occupation  and  the  civil  war  is  extensive,  the  great  majority  of  these 
studies  are  violently  prejudiced  and  disappointingly  unwilling  to  comprehend  the 
interests  or  rationale  of  the  'other'  side.  8  These  conspiracy  or  one-sided  accounts  ascribe 
primary  responsibility  for  developments  in  Greece  to  the  foreign  factor  -  thus  turning 
Greek  internal  forces  into  powerless  puppets.  Developments  in  Greece,  to  a  large  extent, 
should  be  explained  on  the  basis  of  power  relations  within  Greece  itself.  In  other  words, 
at  various  points,  such  as  the  outbreak  of  the  civil  war  or  the  prolonged  political 
instability  of  1950-1952,  the  conflicting  Greek  forces  are  to  be  blamed.  Consequently, 
internal  politics  must  also  be  taken  into  account  whenever  foreign  intervention  is 
judged. 
The  i  nterpretation  oft  he  G  reek  c  ivil  w  ar  a  nd  f  oreign  i  nvolvement  h  as  b  een  a 
matter  of  dispute  between  the  schools  of  thought  from  1950s  onwards.  The  excesses  of 
the  Cold  War  led  both  right-wing  and  left-wing  traditionalist  historians  of  Greece  to 
argue  that  Stalin  instigated  the  KKE  insurgency  as  part  of  his  plan  for  global 
domination.  The  role  of  the  foreign  powers  has  been  emphasised,  as  well  as  American 
predominance  after  March  1947.  Traditionalist  historians  of  the  Right  of  Greece  tended 
to  focus  on  the  KKE  and  the  'bandit'  war  and  sought  to  blame  the  civil  war  on  the  threat 
8  For  a  right-wing  view  see  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe;  Xydis,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers.  In  these 
accounts  it  is  claimed  that  the  KKE  was  preparing  a  revolution  by  the  occupation  years.  From  the  opposite 
perspective  is  Psyroukis  who  puts  the  blame  of  the  Greek  civil  war  on  Britain  and  the  United  States.  N. 
Psyroukis,  History  of  Contemporary  Greece,  1940-1967-  Iaropia  Tqq  Ev7Xpovqq  EU66aq,  1940-1967 
(Athens,  1970);  Richter  writes  that  'the  civil  war  did  not  come  as  a  result  of  the  decision  or  the  acts  of  the 
KKE,  it  was  rather  the  outcome  of  a  process  set  in  motion  by  the  terrorist  acts  of  the  extreme  right'.  H. 6 
of  'EAM-Bulgarians'.  The  Left  denounced  the  'white  terror'  measures  applied  by  the 
Greek  government  to  defeat  the  Communists  or  British  and  American  'monarch-fascist' 
policy-makers.  9  A  serious  drawback  of  this  school  of  thought  is  the  lack  of  academic 
proof  in  their  accounts.  British  back  to  the  'white  terror'  was  also  the  main  argument  of 
the  revisionist  historians  of  Greece  developed  during  the  1970s.  10 
By  the  1980s,  however,  some  historians  of  Greece  had  reached  a  more  critical 
analysis  of  the  Greek  govenunent,  the  role  of  the  allies  and  the  Left.  John  latrides 
underlined  both  the  KKE's  commitment  to  revolution  as  well  as  the  provocative  effect 
of  the  'white  terror'.  David  Close  stressed  the  responsibility  of  the  Right,  which  gave 
rise  to  an  apparatus  of  terror  and  repression,  whilst  praising  the  decisive  role  of  British 
and  American  intervention.  "  According  to  these  historians,  the  civil  war  resulted  from  a 
domestic  struggle  for  power  aggravated  by  Cold  War  conflict. 
These  accounts  were  based  upon  American  and  British  primary  sources. 
Unavoidably,  h  owever,  t  hey  s  uffered  from  aI  ack  ofp  rimary  s  ources  d  rawn  from  the 
archives  of  either  the  Greek  government  or  the  Greek  Communist  Party.  For  instance, 
the  British  determination  to  maintain  Greece  within  its  sphere  of  influence  is  very  well 
examined  by  Procopis  Papastratis.  The  author  provides  a  scholarly  account  of  British 
policy  in  Greece  and  British  strategies  to  contain  the  Communist  threat.  However,  the 
Richter,  'Varkiza  Agreement  and  the  Origins  of  the  Greek  Civil  War',  in  J.  0.  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the 
1940s  (London,  198  1),  p.  179. 
9  Among  the  right-wing  historians  see:  E.  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe-ocoTld  Kai  TacKo6pi  (Athens,  1974); 
D.  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat  (London,  195  6).  For  an  account  of  left-wing  historians  see:  the 
publications  of  the  Greek  Communist  Party;  J.  Meynaud,  Les  Forces  Politiques  En  GrOce  (Etudes  De 
Science  Politique,  1965).  White  terror  is  the  term  used  by  the  Left  to  defline  the  government  measures  to 
defeat  the  communists. 
10  Eudes,  The  Kapetanios  (London,  1972);  0.  L.  Smith,  'Self  Defence  and  Communist  Policy  1945-1947', 
in  L.  Baerentzen,  J.  0.  Iatrides,  0.  L.  Smith  (eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War 
(Copenhagen,  1987),  pp.  159-179;  N.  Alivizatos,  'The  "Emergency  Regime"  and  Civil  Liberties,  1946- 
1949',  in  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  220-228;  latrides,  'Civil  War  1945-1949',  in  H.  0.  L. 
Smith,  'Self  Defence  and  Communist  Policy  1945-1947,  in  L.  Baerentzen,  J.  0.  latrides,  0.  L.  Smith 
(eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War  (Copenhagen,  1987),  pp.  159-179.  H.  Fleischer, 
Crown  and  Swastika:  Greece  under  Occupation  and  Resistance-ETtypa  Kai  EP60TIKa:  H F-UMa  KaTic 
Tjv  Karqý  Kai  &TIoTao-q,  vols.  1-  2,  (Athens,  1988,1995). 7 
author  relies  mainly  on  Foreign  Office  documents  to  analyse  British  and  Greek  policy.  12 
The  'December  Events'  and  the  Warkiza  Agreement'  are  analysed  in  great  detail  by 
Heinz  Richter.  The  author's  interpretation  is  based  on  Foreign  Office  files,  Greek 
newspapers  and  KKE  official  publications.  The  author  condemns  British  policy  makers 
'Tories  as  well  as  Labourites'  for  the  prolongation  of  the  civil  war  because  they  did  not 
prevent  the  Greek  government  from  'white  terror'  practises.  13  George  Alexander's  study 
of  British  policy  in  Greece  takes  the  opposite  view.  Alexander  provides  a  thorough 
analysis  of  British  policy  and  its  struggle  to  contain  communists'  attempts  to  take  over 
power.  Like  Richter,  however,  Alexander's  primary  sources  on  decision-making  are 
almost  exclusively  Foreign  Office  documents.  As  a  result,  his  analysis  is  limited  mainly 
to  the  British  point  of  view.  14  Lawrence  Wittner's  important  study,  American 
Intervention  in  Greece,  1943-1949  (New  York,  1982),  is  based  mainly  on  American 
governmental  sources  and  British  Foreign  Office  documents.  Wittner  thoroughly 
examined  American  policy  regarding  Greece  on  the  eve  of  the  Cold.  He  himself 
acknowledges,  however,  the  limitations  imposed  on  him  by  lack  of  work  in  Greek 
archives.  Robert  Frazier  casts  his  net  wide  to  write  his  seminal  study  Anglo-American 
Relations  with  Greece.  Frazier's  book  was  based  on  sources  from  the  Foreign  Office, 
the  Ministry  of  Defence,  the  Treasury,  the  office  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  private 
papers  of  Hugh  Dalton,  Myers  and  Woodhouse.  The  author  also  reads  widely  in  the  US 
National  Archives  and  a  variety  of  American  private  papers.  Perhaps  as  a  result  of  this 
wide  coverage  Frazier  became  convinced  of  the  pivotal  importance  of  the  British  role  in 
11  Iatrides,  'Perceptions  of  Soviet  Involvement  in  the  Greek  Civil  War  1945-1949',  in  Baerentzen, 
Iatrides,  Smith  (eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War  1945-1949,  pp.  225-249;  D.  Close 
(ed.  ),  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  156-185. 
12  p.  Papastratis,  British  Foreign  Policy  towards  Greece  during  the  Second  World  War  1941-1944 
(London,  1984). 
13  H.  Richter,  British  Intervention  in  Greece:  From  Varkiza  to  Civil  War,  February  1945  to  August  1946 
(London,  1986);  H.  Richter,  'The  Varkiza  Agreement  and  the  Origins  of  the  Civil  War',  in  Iatrides  (ed.  ), 
Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  176-177. 
14  G.  M.  Alexander,  The  Prelude  to  the  Truman  Doctrine:  British  Policy  in  Greece  1944-1947  (Oxford, 
1982). S 
the  Cold  War  and  developments  in  Greece.  He  argues  that  'the  only  motivation  for  the 
British  withdrawal  from  Greece  was  Bevin's  fervent  desire  to  bring  the  United  States  to 
the  defence  of  Europe  in  the  face  of  a  Soviet  threat'.  Frazier  stresses  that  mutual  Anglo- 
American  perception  of  a  Soviet  threat  to  world  peace  'gave  a  new  basis  for  joint 
15  Anglo-American  policies'.  The  book  was  once  again  based  solely  on  British  and 
American  documents. 
In  drawing  attention  to  the  shortcomings  of  previous  studies,  one  acknowledges 
how  much  historians  have  been  impeded  by  the  lack  of  Greek  sources.  Even  though  this 
thesis  marks  a  step  forward  in  integrating  Greek  and  British  sources,  archival 
impediments  a  re  s  till  e  xtant.  A  Ithough  t  he  I  ong  I  asting  p  roblem.  oft  he  f  ifty-year  rule 
restriction  regarding  documents  on  the  Greek  civil  war  was  solved  in  1999  it  is,  even 
now,  still  applied  to  the  post-civil  war  era  and  documents  referring  to  NATO.  An 
additional  obstacle  is  the  underdeveloped  state  of  the  Service  of  Historical  Archive  of 
the  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  (Ynqpcciu  la'ropticoi)  ApXct'Oi),  YIA)  that  renders 
research  extremely  slow.  As  a  result  of  cataloguing  and  filing  there  are  still  many 
restrictions  on  viewing  even  those  documents  that  should  be  made  available.  Similar 
difficulties  hamper  research  in  the  Greek  General  Staff/  Directorate  of  History  of  the 
Army  (]Fcvtic6  Earrekdo  l'rpaTol)/AtF,  -60i)vaTj  laropia;  Drpam-6,  ]FEE/AIE)  archive.  The 
lack  of  an  organised  archival  service  results  in  serious  restrictions  on  documents 
available  to  research.  The  problem  is  slightly  eased  in  the  case  of  the  military  archive 
due  to  the  availability  the  official  publications  of  the  Greek  General  Staff,  cited  as 
GES/DIS  to  underline  the  distinction  between  the  military  primary  documents  cited  as 
FEVAIE.  Access  to  the  archive  of  the  Greek  Communist  Party  (KKE)  is  still  forbidden 
to  researchers  rendering  the  assessment  of  the  policy  of  the  KKE  during  the  civil  war 
years  both  dangerous  and  difficult.  Although  there  are  published  official  collections  of 
15  R.  Frazier,  Anglo-American  Relations  with  Greece  (London,  1991),  p.  180. 9 
documents  of  the  Party  that  present  the  official  party  line,  as  well  as  memoirs  written  by 
Party  members,  these  should  be  treated  with  great  caution.  16 
The  literature  on  the  Cold  War  and  power  relations  between  the  actors  is  a 
matter  of  debate  for  years.  An  interpretation  that  dominated  for  the  last  twenty  years-  the 
height  of  the  Cold  War  animosities-broadly  accepted  the  positions  taken  by  western 
literature.  An  orthodox  or  traditional  point  of  view  developed  the  basic  argument  of  the 
influential  Soviet  expansionism.  The  orthodox  western  interpretation  puts  the  blame  for 
the  Cold  War  on  the  USSR  whereas  the  Cold  War  remained  only  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  revisionist  critique  of  this  interpretation  led  into  a 
reassessment  of  the  United  States  involvement  in  the  making  of  the  Cold  War. 
American  economic  imperialism  is  brought  the  ccntrc  stage.  A  post-rcvisionist 
interpretation  was  developed  in  the  1970s  to  avoid  polarities  of  the  above  debate.  Both 
previous  views  were  criticised  for  being  too  simplistic  in  their  adherence  to  one 
particular  side  of  the  argument.  "  Thus  a  typical  post-revisionist  conclusion  states  that 
The  Cold  War  grew  out  of  a  complicated  interaction  of  external  and 
internal  developments  inside  both  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  external  situation-circumstances  beyond  the  control  of 
either  power-  left  the  Americans  and  Russians  facing  one  another 
across  a  prostrate  Europe.  " 
However,  this  post-revisionist  conclusion  from  Gaddis  shares  bi-polar  assumptions 
along  with  both  the  orthodox  and  revisionist  writers.  Thus,  the  Cold  War  literature 
either  o  rthodox,  r  evisionist  orp  ost-revisionist  b  lames  ore  xonerates  e  ither  the  United 
States  or  the  USSR  for  any  contest.  Both  the  origins  and  the  first  Cold  War  years  seem 
to  be  a  matter  of  interaction  between  only  the  two  superpowers  where  there  is  no 
16  One  example  of  secondary  literature  based  on  research  in  the  KKE's  primary  sources  is  the  work 
written  by  Gr.  Farakos.  Farakos  had  been  archivist  of  the  KKE  for  more  than  thirty  years  and  an  active 
KKE  member  for  more  than  forty.  Gr.  Farakos,  December  1944-JcKtyflp?  7q  1944  (Athens,  1996);  Gr. 
Farakos,  ELAS  and  Power  -EAAE  Kai  Eýovuia  (Athens,  2000). 10 
mention  of  smaller  powers  involved  and  especially  Britain.  The  initial  stimulus  to  re- 
evaluate  Britain's  role  came  from  Deighton  who  argues  that  all  such  writing  is 
profoundly  'unhistorical'  and  that  'Britain  carried  out  the  responsibility  for  the  Cold 
War  as  much  as  Russia  and  America'.  `  Deighton's  argument  is  based  on  the  premise 
that  three  main  victors  emerged  from  the  Second  World  War  and  that  the  'Big  Three' 
constituted  of  three  superpowers:  The  United  States,  Soviet  Union  and  Britain.  Hence, 
in  this  period  Britain  was  as  active  and  war  victor  as  the  other  two  partners  in  tying  to 
reconstruct  world  order  and  geopolitical  balance  of  power. 
This  latest  deconstruction  requires  a  critical  re-evaluation  of  the  whole  bipolar 
nature  of  the  Cold  War.  If  follows  that  all  bi-polar  accounts  of  the  origins  of  the  Cold 
War  are  'fundamentally  deficient"'  and  from  this  perspective  this  is  indeed  true.  Such  a 
complex  reality  as  the  Cold  War  is  not  a  matter  of  interaction  between  only  two  powers 
but  a  multi-dimensional  issue  with  more  actors  involved.  In  an  even  more  'Anglocentric 
view  of  the  early  Cold  War"'  Frazier  suggests  that  Britain  played  an  important  role  in 
dragging  the  United  States  to  the  international  affairs.  "  Ryan  also  asserts  that  the 
preoccupation  of  the  Foreign  Office  was  to  'maintaining  Great  Britain  in  the  first  rank 
of  power'  and  this  made  the  Cold  War  its  'secondary  objective'.  "  Smith  has 
summarised  this  new  tendency  in  historiography  as  a  significant  response,  which  'has 
overtumed  the  bi-polarity  of  the  Cold  War'  and  sees  the  Cold  War  as  the  result  of  post- 
17  W.  Loth,  The  Division  of  the  World  (London,  1988),  p.  9. 
"  J.  L.  Gaddis,  The  United  States  and  the  Origins  of  the  Cold  War,  1941-1947  (New  York,  1972),  p.  361. 
19  A.  Deighton,  'The  "frozen  fronf':  The  Labour  government,  the  division  of  Germany  and  the  origins  of 
the  cold  war,  1945-17',  International  Affairs  63  (1987),  449-465.  On  the  role  of  smaller  powers  in  the 
formation  of  the  Cold  War  consider  also:  S.  Ball,  The  Cold  War.  An  International  History,  1947-1991 
(London,  1998). 
20  R.  H.  Hathaway,  Ambiguous  Partnership:  Britain  and  America,  1944-1947  (New  York,  1981),  p.  1;  T. 
H.  Anderson,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  the  Cold  War  1944-1947  (Columbia,  1981),  p.  viii.  21  D.  Reynolds,  'Rethinking  Anglo-American  relations',  International  Affairs  65  (1989),  89-111. 
22  Frazier,  Anglo-American  Policy  towards  Greece.  The  coming  of  the  Cold  War,  1942-1947(London, 
199  1);  R.  Frazier,  'Did  Britain  Start  the  Cold  War?  Bevin  and  the  Truman  Doctrine,  The  Historical 
Journal  27,3  (1984),  715-727. 
23  H.  B.  Ryan,  The  Vision  ofAnglo-America  (Cambridge,  1982),  p.  9. 11 
war  interaction  between  all  three  power-actors  of  the  wartime  Grand  Alliance.  " 
Although  Britain  did  not  remain  a  great  power  throughout  the  Cold  War  era  it  played  a 
significant  role  in  the  making  and  formation  of  the  early  period  and  this  makes  the 
British  argument  valid. 
This  new  assumption  of  British  significance  in  the  first  Cold  War  period 
enriches  British  Cold  War  policy.  The  argument  is  that  British  first  priority  was  to 
secure  British  sphere  of  influence  with  American  backing.  Both  Anderson  and 
Hathaway  focus  on  a  1944  Foreign  Office  Memorandum,  which  reads  that  'it  must  be 
our  purpose  not  to  balance  our  power  against  that  of  America,  but  to  make  use  of 
American  power  for  the  purpose  which  we  regard  as  good.  "'  As  the  argument  goes,  if 
Britain  wanted  to  maintain  its  role  as  a  world  power,  it  should  secure  political,  financial 
and  military  American  assistance.  For  British  historian  Ryan  British  power  crisis  could 
be  overcome  by  a  close  association  with  the  United  States.  "  Hence  Churchill's  Anglo- 
American  'special  relationship'  was  followed  by  a  co-ordinated  foreign  policy.  On  the 
same  principle  the  Labour  foreign  policy  continued  after  Churchill's  defeat  in  the  1945 
election.  Bevin's  role  in  the  origins  of  the  Cold  War  is  that  of  another  'Cold  Warrior'. 
Bevin  followed  the  policy  of  having  the  US  as  the  means  to  shore  up  the  British 
Empire.  "  Deighton  also  writes  that  the  overriding  aim  of  the  British  government  was  to 
ssecure  a  continuing  American  commitment  to  harmony  and  a  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  that  would  not  favour  Communism.  "' 
24  R.  Smith,  'A  climate  of  opinion:  British  officials  and  the  development  of  British  Soviet  policy,  1943- 
1947',  International  Affairs  65  (1989),  631-47. 
25  Anderson,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  the  Cold  War  1944-1947,  pp.  12-13;  Hathaway, 
Ambiguous  Partnership:  Britain  andAmerica,  1944-1947,  p.  52.  This  is  also  the  main  theme  in  A. 
Bullock,  Ernest  Bevin:  Foreign  Secretary  (London,  1983).  Although  the  argument  goes  back  to  the  First 
World  War  years,  it  acquires  special  importance  during  the  early  Cold  War  years  within  the  context  of 
British  decline. 
26  Ryan,  ne  Vision  ofAnglo-America,  p.  2. 
27  Bullock,  Ernest  Bevin:  Foreign  Secretary  (London,  1983);  Frazier,  Anglo-American  Relations  with 
Greece,  The  Coming  of  the  Cold  War,  1942-1947. 
28  Deighton,  'The  "frozen  fronf':  The  Labour  government,  the  division  of  Germany  and  the  origins  of  the 
Cold  War,  1945-17',  International  Affairs  63  (1987),  449-465. 12 
Regarding  British  role  in  the  Cold  War  origins,  Frazier  assumes  that  British 
policy  of  manoeuvring  the  Americans  eventually  produced  the  Cold  War  and  Ryan  that 
the  confrontation  of  the  Cold  War  was  the  result  of  hard  work  by  the  British  and 
especially  Churchill.  "  Rothwell  also  notes  the  importance  of  British  post-war  policy  and 
argues  that  the  Foreign  Office  did  not  point  towards  an  east-west  confrontation.  "  This 
work  does  not  consider  that  British  policy  of  manoeuvring  the  US  eventually  produced 
the  Cold  War,  but  that  Britain  was  powerful  enough  to  influence  policy-making  and 
subsequently  Cold  War  developments.  Hence,  British  role  as  'Cold  Warrior',  the  role  of 
smaller  powers  and  a  multi  polar  assumption  to  understand  the  Cold  War  is  a  more 
balanced  interpretation  to  the  traditional  Cold  War  perceptions. 
Although  both  the  Truman  Doctrine  and  NATO  creation  committed  the  US  to 
the  defence  of  Western  Europe  against  Soviet  aggression,  Britain  did  not  succeed  to 
remain  ag  reat  p  ower  f  or  long.  However,  in  the  process  of  the  power  struggle  of  the 
early  Cold  War  years  it  had  contributed  to  the  making  of  the  Cold  War  geopolitical 
order.  As  Reynolds  put  it,  the  British  argument  'offers  a  healthy  antidote  to  an 
excessively  American  dominated  account  of  western  policy  in  the  Cold  War'.  `  This 
thesis  is  built  on  the  promise  that  Britain  played  a  formative  role  in  the  early  Cold  War 
years. 
The  detailed  analyses  of  British  and  American  policy  written  since  the  I  980s 
form  the  starting  point  for  the  present  thesis.  By  using  new  Greek  sources  and  delving  in 
archives  of  British  agencies  other  than  the  Foreign  Office,  it  is  able  to  go  beyond  them 
and  suggest  that  relations  between  Britain  and  Greece  were  close  throughout  the  whole 
period  under  examination,  despite  the  promulgation  of  the  Truman  Doctrine  and  the 
29  Frazier,  Anglo-American  policy  towards  Greece.  The  coming  of  the  Cold  War,  1942-1947;  Ryan,  The 
Vision  ofAnglo-America,  p.  2. 
30  V.  Rothwell,  Britain  and  the  Cold  War  1941-1947  (London,  1982). 
31  Reynolds,  'Rethinking  Anglo-American  relations',  International  Affairs  65  (1989),  108. 13 
more  interventionist  stance  taken  by  the  United  States  government.  32  In  particular,  it 
argues  that  the  post-1947  situation  was  dynamic  and  fluid.  It  was  marked  by  constant 
military  and  political  manoeuvre  as  the  British,  the  Greek  government  and  the  KKE 
constantly  reassessed  their  interests  and  their  tactics.  British  military  influence  remained 
a  vital  element  in  Greek  politics  not  only  in  the  final  years  of  the  civil  war  but  also  until 
Greece's  entry  into  NATO  in  1952. 
The  structure  of  this  study  is  both  chronological  and  thematic.  The  work  is 
divided  into  six  chapters  presented  in  chronological  order.  Chapter  one  gives  a  general 
picture  of  the  driving  forces  that  influenced  the  course  of  events  and  the  key 
participants.  It  considers  the  reasons  for  the  dramatic  rise  in  communist  strength  during 
the  occupation  and  the  aims  of  EAM/ELAS;  the  communist  political  and  military 
resistance  organisation.  The  significance  of  British  involvement  in  Greece  and  its 
policies  to  secure  a  broadly  based  post-war  goverranent  are  also  assessed.  The  chapter 
refutes  the  traditionalist  argument  of  historians  of  Greece  that  the  civil  war  broke  out  as 
a  result  of  a  monolithic  c  ommunist  p  Ian  tos  eize  p  ower.  33  Similarly,  it  dismisses  the 
view  that  the  British  provoked  the  Left  into  hostilities  and  caused  the  civil  war.  34  It  also 
softens  the  leftist  argument  that  the  Warkiza  Agreement'  became,  in  the  hands  of  the 
35 
government,  an  instrument  of  revenge. 
32  In  the  present  work  there  is  no  discussion  about  economic  relations  between  Greece,  Britain  and  the 
United  States,  which  is  an  issue  explored  by  the  unpublished  thesis  of  J.  Stefanidis,  The  United  States, 
Great  Britain  and  Greece,  1949-1952  (University  of  London,  1992).  Stefanidis  focuses  on  American- 
backed  recovery  programmes  in  Greece  between  the  end  of  the  civil  war  and  the  inauguration  of  Papagos' 
premiership.  From  this  perspective  he  argues  that  after  1947  America  was  undoubtedly  the  dominant 
foreign  power  in  Greece.  Stefanidis,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Greece,  1949-1952,  p.  5  8.  This 
work  however  is  still  based  on  American  and  British  documents.  On  the  American  policy  consult:  L. 
Wittner,  'American  Policy  toward  Greece,  1946-1949',  in  J.  Iatrides  (ed),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  229- 
238. 
33  This  is  the  main  theme  in  A.  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe-OCOTid  Kai  TacKobpi  (Athens,  1974);  K. 
Tsoukalas,  The  Greek  Tragedy  (London,  1969). 
34  See:  Th.  Mosxatos,  The  Kapetanios  Meeting  in  Lamia-HE6myll  raw  Karcravalow  M  Aapla 
(Athens,  1985). 
35  H.  Richter,  'The  Varkiza  Agreement  and  the  Origins  of  the  Civil  War',  in  J.  0.  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in 
the  1940s,  pp.  167-18  1. 14 
Chapter  two  examines  British  policy  towards  Greece  in  1947  and  assesses  the 
British  role  in  the  American  policy  that  turned  into  the  Tnmian  Doctrine.  The 
significance  of  the  British  note  of  February  1947  on  Greece  is  analysed  and  its  effects 
within  the  Cold  War  context  are  evaluated.  The  chapter  traces  the  evolution  of  Greek 
expectations  of  Britain  during  the  period  of  the  escalation  of  the  civil  war  and  outlines 
the  importance  the  Greek  government  attributed  to  British  aid  and  assistance.  The 
chapter  examines  in  detail  Greek  counter-insurgency  operations  (COIN)  in  1947  and 
outlines  the  gradual  change  in  the  practises  of  the  National  Anny  (NA).  The  role  of  the 
British  Military  Mission  (BMM)  in  the  re-organisation  of  the  national  forces  is  analysed. 
American  missions  also  had  as  hare  int  he  r  e-organisation  oft  he  n  ational  f  orces  a  nd 
therefore  an  evaluation  of  British  and  American  co-operation  is  attempted.  Thirdly,  the 
policies  of  the  KKE  and  EAM  are  examined  and  the  responsibility  of  the  party  for  the 
civil  war  is  assessed.  Zahariadis  and  the  KKE  Politburo's  policy  in  the  spring  1947  is 
analysed.  The  aims  of  the  Democratic  Army  (DA)  and  the  subsequent  transformation  of 
the  civil  war  from  guerrilla  fighting  to  conventional  warfare  are  also  outlined.  The 
chapter  refutes  the  view  of  the  right-wing  traditionalist  historians  of  Greece  that  the 
British  supported  right-wing  governments  appointed  by  the  Palace.  36  It  is  demonstrated 
that  British  policy  supported  moderate  governments  of  the  Centre  in  an  attempt  to  soften 
the  political  extremes.  It  also  refutes  the  orthodox  left-wing  view  that  British 
imperialism  had  turned  Greek  politicians  into  puppets.  37  The  Greek  government,  it  is 
suggested,  was  mainly  responsible  for  its  own  weaknesses  and  disabilities.  Moreover, 
the  orthodox  view  that  the  Soviet  Union  and  its  communist  satellites  fomented  the  civil 
war  in  Greece  and  that  the  KKE  was  acting  as  their  agent  is  also  refuted.  38  The 
36  S.  Markezinis,  Contemporary  Political  History  of  Greece-E67  ov?  l  IZoAiT  JoTopla  Tqq  a, 
, 
Xp  xý  EUM  q 
vol.  2,  (Athens,  1994).  Hereafter  cited  as  Markezinis,  Political  History-  ffob=4  IoTopla 
37  This  is  the  argument  put  forward  in  the  official  history  of  the  KKE.  History  of  the  KKE-,  JOKfuiO 
Iaropfaq  Tot)  KKE  (Athens,  1996). 
38  G.  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat:  The  Story  of  the  Greek  Communist  Party  (Oxford,  1965). 15 
revisionist  view  that  the  communists  were  fighting  only  in  response  to  the  aggression  of 
the  Greek  government  is  also  dismissed 
. 
39  Like  the  government,  the  KKE  was  pursuing 
its  own  aims  with  considerable  success. 
The  chapter  dissents  from  the  view  that  British  involvement  in  Greek  affair  came 
40  to  a  deliberate  end  in  February  1947  as  a  result  of  British  financial  problems.  Instead, 
it  offers  an  account  of  how  Greece  remained  within  the  strategic  sphere  of  Britain  after 
February  1947.  The  American  presence  is  explained  in  terms  of  supporting  British 
policy.  Regardless  of  the  Truman  Doctrine,  the  Greek  government  continued  to  expect 
support  and  assistance  from  Britain,  especially  in  the  form  of  British  Military  Mission 
training  the  Greek  National  Army.  British  assistance  in  the  organisation  of  Greek 
counterinsurgency  operation  after  spring  1947  further  demonstrates  the  British  intention 
to  continue  support  for  the  governmental  fight  against  the  Democratic  Army. 
Chapter  three  examines  in  depth  the  development  of  Greek  counter-insurgency 
operations  and  the  evolution  of  the  Greek  national  forces  into  an  effective  and  self- 
sufficient  machine.  Although  the  Democratic  Army  evolved  into  a  sophisticated  and 
complex  force,  capable  of  challenging  the  National  Army  the  governmental  military 
machine  gradually  managed  to  defeat  the  Communist  forces.  The  chapter  refutes  the 
contention  of  the  orthodox  view  that  the  KKE  lost  the  war  because  of  lack  of  support 
from  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  closure  of  the  Yugoslav  borders.  41  The  left-wing  claim  of 
the  historians  of  Greece  that  the  western  allies  defeated  the  communist  army  is  also 
dismissed.  42  Instead,  the  chapter  demonstrates  that  a  combination  of  factors  brought 
bout  the  victory  of  the  National  Army  over  the  Democratic  Army.  The  fighting 
39  Alivizatos,  'The  "Emergency  Regime"  and  Civil  Liberties,  1946-1949',  in  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the 
1940s,  pp.  221-228. 
40  Vlavianos,  Greece,  1941-1949,  p.  236;  Eudes,  The  Kapetanios,  p.  279. 
41  See:  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe;  S.  Vukmanovic,  How  and  Why  the  People's  Liberation  Struggle  of 
Greece  Met  With  Defeat  (London,  1985). 16 
efficiency  of  the  National  Army,  the  western  allies'  assistance,  the  KKE's  inability  to 
cope  with  conventional  warfare  and  the  lack  of  communist  foreign  support  all  finally 
brought  the  defeat  of  the  Democratic  Army.  The  British  role  in  this  process  is  examined, 
with  the  aim  of  defining  the  true  extent  of  British  involvement  in  the  civil  war  and  the 
British  share  of  responsibility  for  the  defeat  of  the  KKE.  In  particular,  the  evolution  of 
air  power  is  analysed  in  detail,  because  it  was  a  decisive  factor  in  the  defeat  of  the 
communist  forces.  The  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force  (RHAF)  supported,  trained  and 
equipped  by  the  Royal  Air  Force  (RAF)  added  a  new  dimension  to  governmental 
supremacy.  The  co-operation  between  the  British  Military  Mission  and  the  Joint  United 
States  Military  Aid  Planning  Greece  (JUSMAPG)  is  analysed,  with  the  aim  of  offering  a 
realistic  account  of  the  allies'  relationship.  The  chapter  deconstructs  the  view  that 
British  and  American  policies  were  identical  and  their  co-operation  straightforward  and 
undisrupted.  43  The  revisionist  view  that  complete  American  domination  prevailed  on  the 
Greek  scene  of  operation,  following  the  British  withdrawal,  is  also  dismissed.  44  Instead, 
the  chapter  offers  a  more  complex  and  balanced  interpretation  of  the  situation  in  Greece. 
Chapter  four  revolves  around  the  issues  of  the  post-civil  war  search  for  domestic 
reconciliation  and  stability.  The  character  of  the  Greek  politicians  within  the  process  of 
cabinet  making  and  dissolution  is  e  xamined.  The  failure  of  the  Greek  government  to 
forrn  a  long-lasting  administration  is  analysed.  The  failure  of  the  Greek  political  world 
to  embrace  national  reconciliation  measures  due  to  the  pressure  of  the  Cold  War 
exaggeration  is  described.  The  chapter  suggests  that  instability  and  extremism  occurred 
not  because  of  but  despite  British  intervention.  Although  British  support  for  King  Paul 
and  moderate  cabinets  played  a  role  in  Greece's  political  development,  Britain  exercised 
42  See:  N.  Psyroukis,  History  of  Contemporary  Greece,  1940-1967-IoTopla  Tjq  rbyxpovq,;  E'u6zaq,  1940- 
1967  (Athens,  1975).  S.  Grigoriadis,  History  of  Contemporary  Greece,  1941-1974-  Io-ropla  inq  E6yxPovlq 
E,  U6&aq  1941-1974  (Athens,  1978). 
43  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe-Owud  Kai  TucKo6pi,  p.  267. 
44  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  173-175. 17 
a  light  touch  with  regard  to  Greek  domestic  affairs.  Partly  as  a  result  of  this  relation, 
Anglo-Greek  amity  in  the  foreign  policy  field  was  maintained.  The  relative  importance 
of  the  Cyprus  issue  in  the  early  1950s  bears  testament  to  these  good  relations. 
Chapter  five  analyses  the  failure  of  the  Centre  experiment  in  Greek  politics.  The 
role  of  the  Palace  and  the  royal  solution  to  the  parliamentary  deadlock  is  examined  as 
well  as  the  nature  of  royal  politics.  Foreign  intervention  in  Greek  affairs  is  also 
examined.  The  response  of  the  Greek  political  world  to  the  Papagos  solution  put  into 
question  the  kind  of  government  the  Greeks  wanted  for  themselves.  Both  the  palace  and 
the  government  looked  to  Britain  for  support  and  the  British  thus  became  an  integral 
part  of  Greek  political  machinations.  The  chapter  discusses  also  the  American  share  of 
responsibility  and  the  United  States'  objectives  in  the  new  system.  This  discussion 
reveals  the  essential  unity  of  aims  maintained  by  Britain  and  America.  Both  chapters 
four  and  five  examine  in  detail  the  domestic  aspect  of  Greek  politics.  These  chapters 
refute  the  traditional  claim  of  historians  of  Greece  that  the  Palace  enjoyed  the  Foreign 
Office's  full  support  and  that  Britain  was  obsessed  with  imposing  a  right-wing 
monarchical  government.  45  Instead,  British  aims  are  analysed  in  the  light  of  British 
pursuit  ofas  trong  a  nd  d  emocratically  e  lected  g  overnment  oft  he  Centre  to  moderate 
polarisation.  The  failure  of  the  Greek  government  to  fonn  a  strong  and  self-sufficient 
cabinet  is  explained,  therefore,  in  terms  of  Greek  internal  developments. 
Chapter  six  examines  the  evolution  of  Greece's  entry  into  NATO  as  a  full 
member.  The  chapter  attempts  to  moderate  over-exaggerated  claims  regarding  Greece's 
importance  to  NATO.  46  Instead,  the  chapter  suggests  that  there  were  variety  of  reasons 
that  convinced  NATO's  members  to  accept  Greece  into  the  North  Atlantic  Alliance. 
None  was  decisive  in  itself,  rather  it  was  the  accumulation  of  perceived  advantages  that 
45  Markezinis,  Political  History-ffobriký  Icropla,  pp.  295-300. 
46  A.  Siapkaras,  'The  Importance  of  Greece  to  NATO',  Military  Review  (August  1961),  90-97. 18 
led  to  the  decision.  The  chapter  also  challenges  the  view  that  Greece's  entry  into  NATO 
was  solely  an  American  objective.  Instead,  it  gives  a  more  rounded  interpretation  by 
analysing  t  he  B  ritish  r  ole  int  his  d  ecision-making.  C  ontrary  tot  he  c  ontention  of  left- 
wing  historians,  who  portray  Greece  as  capitulating  to  'imperial  interests',  Anglo-Greek 
relations  are  explained  in  the  light  of  mutual  interests. 19 
I  Setting  the  Stage:  1941-1946 
From  Resistance  to  Civil  War 
In  May  1941  the  Gennans  defeated  Greek  forces  and  their  British  allies.  King 
George  H  accompanied  by  Prime  Minister  Emmanuel  Tsouderos,  the  cabinet,  and  the 
great  bulk  of  the  British  and  Greek  forces  were  obliged  to  withdraw  to  Egypt.  '  The 
government-in-exile  established  itself  in  Cairo,  while  the  King  removed  himself  to 
London.  In  occupied  Greece  a  series  of  collaborationist  cabinets  -quisling-  functioned 
under  the  Axis  authorities,  however  the  de  jure  Greek  government  recognised  by  the 
Allies  was  King  George's  H  government-in-exile.  2 
Within  a  short  time  resistance  began  in  occupied  Greece.  The  Greek  Communist 
Party  -  the  KKE  -  was  the  first  group  to  organise  resistance.  The  Sixth  Plenum  of  the 
Central  Committee  of  the  KKE  in  July  1941  endorsed  a  national  front  policy  and  called 
upon  'the  Greeks,  the  parties  and  their  organisations'to  fonn  a  national  liberation  front 
to  fight  against  any  imperialistic  power'.  3  As  a  result  of  its  resistance  activities  the  KKE 
gained  considerable  political  influence  among  the  Greeks.  The  National  Liberation 
Front  (EAM)  was  founded  by  the  KKE  on  27  September  1941.  The  declared  aims  of 
EAM  included  the  I  iberation  of  the  nation  from  foreign  elements;  the  formation  of  a 
provisional  government  by  EAM  after  the  liberation;  and  the  safeguarding  of  'the 
fundamental  right'  of  the  Greek  people  to  decide  upon  the  forin  of  their  future 
government  themselves.  4  Resistance  to  the  Germans,  however,  was  the  priority  that 
1  For  an  account  of  Greek-British  relations  during  the  pre-war  period  see,  J.  Koliopoulos,  Greece  and  the 
British  Connection  1935-1941  (Oxford,  1977). 
2  The  Greek  government,  together  with  an  army  of  58,000  British,  who  had  assisted  the  Greek  Army 
against  the  Axis,  were  transferred  to  Cairo.  Prime  Minister  was  E.  Tsouderos,  a  former  Governor  of  the 
Bank  of  Greece  and  liberal  by  conviction,  who  also  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  conservative  party. 
3  KKE  Official  Documents  1940-1945-KKE  Eximlya  KElyeva,  vol.  5  (Athens,  198  1),  p.  39.  For  a  map  of 
Greece  see:  D.  1  p.  187. 
4  KKE  Official  Documents  1940-1945-KKE  Exim7ya  Kelyeva,  vol.  5  (Athens,  198  1),  p.  39. 20 
swelled  the  numbers  of  EAM,  appealing  to  members  from  diverse  political 
backgrounds.  5 
Other  resistance  movements  followed.  Yet  none  managed  to  mobilise  large 
segments  of  the  urban  and  rural  population  as  effectively  as  had  EAM.  General 
Napoleon  Zervas  created  the  National  Republican  Greek  League  (EDES)  on  9 
6  September  1941.  Although  the  republican  General  Nicolaos  Plastiras  nominally  headed 
EDES  the  right-winger  Zervas  was  its  true  leader.  EDES  was  second  only  to  EAM  in 
members,  although  far  less  popular.  Colonel  Psarros  founded  the  National  and  Social 
7  Liberation  (EKKA).  This  was  a  third  and  even  weaker  organisation.  To  some  extent  a 
resistance  movement  represented  each  major  political  party.  Yet  despite  the  number  of 
resistance  groups,  EAM  was  the  most  popular  and  powerful.  Although  exact  numbers 
are  lacking,  it  has  been  claimed  that  EAM  had  up  to  some  two  million  members  - 
8 
almost  thirty  per  cent  of  the  population. 
EAM's  mass  appeal  was  the  result  of  its  nation-wide  operations.  The  other 
groups  were  purely  regional  in  their  activities.  EDES  operated  in  Epirus  and  EKKA  in 
Rourneli.  EAM  developed  a  full  political  programme  and  established  numerous 
subsidiary  organisations,  designed  to  enlist  the  support  of  all  sections  of  the  population, 
5  L.  S.  Stavrianos,  'The  Greek  National  Liberation  Front  (EAM):  A  study  in  Resistance  Organisation  and 
Administration',  Journal  of  Modern  History  24  (1952),  42-54;  History  of  the  KKE-JOKI'pw  IaroplacrOv 
KKE,  pp.  387-89. 
6  General  Nicolaos  Plastiras  had  distinguished  himself  in  the  1909  and  1922  military  coups  for  his 
republicanisrn.  He  was  in  self-exile  in  Paris  following  a  failed  putsch  in  1933.  After  the  end  of  the  civil 
war  he  created  National  Progressive  Centre  Union  Party  (EPEK).  In  the  period  1950-52  he  headed 
coalition  governments  of  the  Centre  and  advocated  measures  of  leniency  towards  the  communists.  Zervas 
was  a  soldier  and  politician  as  well.  In  1941  he  founded  EDES  and  in  1945  he  resigned  from  the  army  to 
become  a  politician.  He  served  as  Minister  of  Public  Order  in  1947,  in  which  he  was  noted  for  his  harsh 
anti-Communist  measures.  In  1950  he  joined  the  Liberal  Party  and  served  as  Minister  of  Public  Works  in 
1950-51. 
7  K.  Pyromaglou,  National  Resistance.  EAM-EL4S-EDES-EKKA-E6vixý  AvTlo-rauq.  EAM-ELAS-EDES- 
EKKA  (Athens,  1975);  For  an  account  of  EKKA,  K.  Pyromaglou,  George  Kartalis  and  his  Period  1934- 
195  7-0  r  KapTaqq  Kai  H  ExqX4  TOV,  Vol.  I  (Athens,  1965). 
8  Stavrianos,  'The  Greek  National  Liberation  Front  (EAM):  A  Study  in  Resistance  Organisation  and 
Administration',  Journal  ofModern  History  24  (1952),  44. 21 
whilst  the  other  groups  were  primarily  military  in  character.  9  EAM's  appeal  was 
strengthened  by  the  fon-nation  of  the  National  Popular  Liberation  Army  (ELAS),  in 
March  1942.10  The  KKE,  therefore,  through  EAM/ELAS  established  itself  as  a 
dominant  resistance  power.  A  military  Commander,  or  Kapetanios,  was  in  charge. 
Thanassis  Klaras,  under  the  name  of  Aris  Velouhiotis,  became  the  political  and  military 
adviser  to  the  first  guerrilla  band  to  go  to  the  mountains  to  fight!  1  Thus  the  KKE  by 
1942  had  taken  the  lead  as  the  most  sophisticated  force  operating  in  Greece. 
Greece  remained  within  the  British  zone  of  interest  during  the  war  years.  British 
policy  inG  reece  focused  u  pon  m  aintaining  i  ts  i  nfluence  int  he  c  ountry  soastoh  elp 
secure  the  'traditionally  British  area'  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Middle  East  in  the 
long-term.  In  the  short-term  the  presence  of  King  George  in  London  and  the  Greek 
government  in  exile  under  British  protection  also  served  to  keep  interest  alive.  One  of 
the  principle  supply  lines  from  Germany  to  Field  Marshal  Rommel  in  North  Africa  ran 
through  Greece.  As  a  result  the  British  were  keen  to  become  involved  in  the  direction  of 
resistance  activities  in  Greece.  The  Special  Operation  Executive  (SOE)  war  organisation 
devoted  its  attention  to  the  possibilities  post-occupation  resistance  and  sabotage.  12 
British  contacts  with  the  resistance  organisations  became  more  intense  in 
October  1942,  when  SOE-Cairo  decided  to  launch  Operation  Harling.  Its  objective  was 
9  G.  M.  Alexander,  The  Prelude  to  the  Tmman  Doctrine  (Oxford,  1982),  p.  13.  For  a  scholar  account  Of 
Greek  occupation  years:  J.  Hondros,  Occupation  and  Resistance.  The  Greek,  4gony  1941-1944  (New 
York,  1983). 
10  EAM  claimed  that  its  members  up  until  October  1944  rose  to  1,500,000  members;  the  number  is  over 
exaggerated,  however,  there  is  no  doubt  that  EAM  was  the  most  widespread  Organisation  in  terms  of 
members  and  sympathisers.  N.  Svoronos,  'The  Main  Problems  of  the  Period  1940-1950  in  Greek 
History',  in  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  1-16.  The  dramatic  rise  of  communist  strength  is  dual 
to  its  double  political  and  military  nature. 
11  From  March  1943,  Stefanos  Sarafis  was  an  ELAS  commander,  together  with  Velouhiotis  and  an  EAM's 
political  conu-nissar.  S.  Sarafis,  ELAS  (London,  1980),  pp.  50,100,272.  EAM  representatives  were  taking 
part  in  ELAS's  command  dealing  exclusively  with  political  affairs.  The  position  of  the  EAM 
representative  was  abolished  in  March  1944  when  EAM  and  the  KKE  founded  PEEA-its  provincial 
government  in  the  mountains. 
12  For  an  account  of  SOE  activities  in  Greece  see:  R.  Clogg,  'The  Special  Operation  Executive  in  Greece', 
in  latrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  109-111;  B.  Sweet-Escott,  'SOE  in  the  Balkans',  in  Ph.  Auty 
and  R.  Clogg  (eds.  ),  British  Policy  towards  Wartime  Resistance  in  Yugoslavia  and  Greece  (London, 
1975)  p.  7.  Thereafter  cited  as  British  Policy;  R.  Clogg,  'Pearls  from  Swine',  in  British  Policy,  p.  192. 22 
to  blow  up  the  Athens-Salonika  railway  and  thus  prevent  the  dispatch  of  Axis  re- 
inforcements  to  North  Africa.  Three  British  commando  teams  -  nine  officers  and  three 
non-commissioned  officers  -  led  by  Colonel  Edward  C.  W.  'Eddie'  Myers,  with  Major 
Christopher  M.  Woodhouse,  as  second-in-command,  parachuted  into  central  Greece. 
The  operation  was  to  be  accomplished  by  Colonel  Myers,  ELAS  guerrillas  under 
Velouhiotis,  EDES  guerrillas  under  Zervas  and  other  minor  resistance  groups.  13  On  the 
night  of  25-26  November  1942,  they  blew  up  the  Gorgopotamos  viaduct.  This  operation 
was  SOE's  greatest  success  in  1942.  Initially,  the  intention  had  been  for  Myers'  team  to 
evacuate  Greece  thereafter.  However,  Myers  received  orders  to  remain  in  Greece  to  co- 
ordinate  the  activities  of  the  various  resistance  movements.  Keeping  a  general  eye  on 
political  forces  in  Greece  was  also  one  of  Myers'  assigned  tasks.  Subsequently  the 
British  resistance  and  intelligence  group  became  the  British  Military  Mission  in 
Greece.  14  The  mission  controlled  the  distribution  of  money,  arms,  and  other  supplies. 
Management  of  the  British  Military  Mission  was  entrusted  to  the  British  SOE-Cairo. 
Although  resistance  activities  continued,  however,  there  was  to  be  no  other  spectacular 
act  of  resistance  organised  by  British  and  Greek  forces.  The  amount  of  supplies  and 
assistance  that  was  provided  by  the  British  to  ELAS  to  fight  the  Gennans  was  actually 
very  limited.  The  reason  for  this  was  that  the  British  did  not  intend  to  boost  the 
communist  forces. 
15 
13  For  early  resistance  activities  between  the  British  and  EAM  see,  E.  W. Myers,  Greek  Entanglement 
(London,  1955);  C.  M.  Woodhouse,  'Early  British  Contacts  with  the  Greek  Resistance  in  1942',  Balkan 
Studies  12,  no.  2,  (1971),  347-354;  R.  Clogg,  'Pearls  from  Swine':  the  Foreign  Office  Papers,  SOE  and 
the  Greek  Resistance',  in  Ph.  Auty  and  R.  Clogg  (eds),  British  Policy,  pp.  167-208.  C.  Woodhouse,  'The 
National  Liberation  Front  and  the  British  Connection',  in  J.  Iatrides  (ed),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  81  -101. 
14  E.  W.  C.  Myers,  Greek  Entanglement  (London,  1955),  pp.  13-96;  C.  M.  Woodhouse,  'Early  British 
Contacts  with  the  Greek  Resistance  in  1942',  Balkan  Studies  12,  no.  2  (1971),  347-354. 
15  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  56-57.  E.  Barker  argues  that  British  policy  towards  the  various 
resistance  movements  in  Greece  'seemed  a  matter  of  conflict'  provoking  civil  war,  in  Barker,  British 
Policy,  p.  148;  Sfikas  also  emphasises  the  negative  effect  of  British  assistance  towards  ELAS,  for 
simultaneously  challenging  the  Greek  established  order.  Th.  Sfikas,  The  British  Labour  Government  and 
the  Greek  Civil  War  -01  A7yAoi  EpyaTIK01  Kai  0  EUt7viK6q  Eu(pbAioq,  (Athens,  1996),  p.  47.  On  this  line, 
Vlavianos  notes  that  the  British  assistance  to  ELAS  has  its  share  in  the  civil  war  that  followed  in  that  it 
cabled  'contradictory'  orders  after  1943.  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  30.  Sarafis  refutes  enormous 
British  assistance  to  the  KKE.  Sarafis,  ELAS,  p.  278.  KKE's  future  political  strategy  would  prove  that, 23 
Despite  British  efforts  to  limit  EAM's  powers  by  mid-1943  the  communists  had 
managed  to  fill  the  power  vacuum  left  by  the  absence  of  the  government-in-exile  and 
the  distrust  felt  by  most  Greeks  of  the  quisling  cabinets.  EAM  dominated  the  resistance 
scene  by  combining  both  political  and  military  power.  Myers  wanted  the  guerrillas  and 
the  government  in  Cairo  to  co-operate  with  each  other.  On  10  August  1943,  Myers,  now 
promoted  to  Brigadier,  and  his  political  adviser  Major  D.  Wallace  flew  to  Cairo  with  a 
guerrilla  delegation  to  meet  with  the  government-in-exile.  The  delegation  consisted  of 
six  Greeks,  representing  the  main  resistance  organisations.  EAM  secured  four  out  of  the 
six  places.  The  aim  of  the  delegation  was  to  obtain  recognition  of  their  status  as  part  of 
the  armed  forces  of  Greece  from  the  Greek  govemment-in-exile.  The  delegates  had  two 
main  demands.  Firstly,  that  King  George  H  should  declare  that  he  would  not  return  to 
Greece  before  the  conduct  of  a  plebiscite.  16  Secondly,  that  the  Greek  government  should 
be  broadened  to  include  EAM's  members,  who  should  hold  three  portfolios  within  the 
new  government:  Interior,  War,  and  Justice.  These  members  should  be  able  to  exercise 
their  powers  from  within  Greece. 
The  Foreign  Office  was  appalled.  17  Rex  Leeper,  the  British  Ambassador  to  the 
Greek  government  based  in  Cairo,  accused  Myers  of  encouraging  and  empowering  the 
communists.  As  a  result,  Myers  was  replaced  by  Chris  Woodhouse  as  Commander  of 
the  British  Military  Mission  in  Greece.  Republican  claims  also  alarmed  the  Greek  King. 
On  18  August  1943,  King  George  cabled  Roosevelt  and  Churchill,  appealing  for  their 
support  against  the  demand  of  the  delegation  to  postpone  his  return  to  Greece  until  after 
regardless  the  British,  the  Party  was  inclined  to  claim  for  power.  Of  the  same  opinion  are:  O'Ballance, 
The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  75-76,85-86;  C.  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine  (London,  1999),  p.  52;  C. 
Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece  (London,  1976),  pp.  27,3  6,64.  In  this  sense  both  Sarafis  and 
Woodhouse  proved  right 
16  The  position  of  the  King  was  always  in  debate  in  Greece.  Royalists  and  republicans  had  been  competing 
since  1920s.  E.  C.  Myers,  'The  Andarte  Delegation  to  Cairo:  August  1943',  in  Auty,  Clogg  (eds.  ),  British 
Policy,  p.  166;  C.  Woodhouse,  'Summer  1943:  The  Critical  Months',  in  Auty,  Clogg  (eds.  ),  British 
Policy,  p.  137. 
17  Churchill  supported  the  Greek  King  and  monarchy  in  Greece,  as  a  sign  of  political  stability  and 
proximity  to  the  West. 24 
a  plebiscite.  Four  days  later,  the  American  President  and  the  British  Prime  Minister 
replied  to  the  King's  telegram  after  their  meeting  in  Quebec.  Both  supported  'his 
contention  that  he  was  prepared  to  return  to  Greece  as  soon  as  possible'.  18  Churchill  and 
Eden  believed  that  Britain's  post-war  supremacy  in  G  reece,  c  ould  b  est  bes  ecured  by 
working  through  monarchy,  an  institution  to  which  they  also  felt  a  strong  attachment. 
Roosevelt  did  not  object  Churchill's  sympathy  for  the  old  order  of  Greece,  although  he 
remained  determined  to  avoid  involvement  in  Greek  affairs.  19  Greece  and  the  Balkans  in 
general,  were  considered  by  the  Americans  to  be  outside  their  area  of  interest  in  late 
1943. 
The  Cairo  meeting  was  a  failure.  Churchill,  Eden,  and  British  Ambassador 
Leeper,  together  with  the  Greek  cabinet,  refused  the  demands  of  the  KKE.  The 
delegation  departed  from  Cairo  within  days  of  its  arrival.  Richard  Clogg  has  written  that 
'the  total  failure  of  the  mission  [ 
... 
]  coupled  with  the  evidence  that  the  Greek 
government-in-exile  had  received  of  the  strong  commitment  of  the  British  government 
to  the  support  of  the  King,  was  certainly  a  factor  contributing  to  the  outbreak  of  civil 
war  between  the  rival  groups'.  20  The  agenda  of  the  Cairo  delegation,  therefore,  was 
crucial  in  establishing  the  course  of  future  events.  Churchill  in  particular  was 
detennined  to  re-establish  the  pre-war  order  in  Greece.  21 
In  October  1943,  anned  clashes  broke  out  between  ELAS  and  EDES.  What  is 
known  as  the  'first  round'  of  the  civil  war  had  begun.  Throughout  the  autumn  of  1943 
8  FRUS  (1943):  4,14243,932-34:  The  Conferences  at  Washington  and  Quebec. 
9  PU13LIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/37203  R6555,  A.  Eden  to  Leeper,  16  July  1943; 
FRUS  (1943):  4,131-32:  Aide  Memoir,  British  Embassy  to  the  State  Department,  24  April  1943;  R. 
Leeper,  "en  Greek  Meets  Greek  (London,  1950),  pp.  10,27-28;  Wittner  writes  that  Roosevelt  shared 
Churchill's  attachment  to  the  old  order  in  Greece  and  this  is  illustrated  in  that  the  American  President  did 
not  object  the  return  of  the  King  in  Greece.  Wittner,,  4merican  Intervention,  pp.  10-11.  The  clash  between 
royalism  and  republicanism  was  an  old  issue  in  Greek  affairs  including  coups  and  plebiscites  to  demolish 
and  restore  kingship  since  the  inter-war  period.  20  R.  Clogg,  "'Pearls  from  Swine":  the  Foreign  Office  Papers,  SOE  and  the  Greek  Resistance',  in  Auty, 
Clogg  (eds.  ),  British  Policy,  pp.  192-194. 
21  The  Times,  I  September  1943.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  PREM  3,211/4,  Churchill 
to  the  King  of  the  Hellenes  George  11,20  August  1943. 25 
and  the  winter  of  1944  the  two  main  resistance  organisations  began  a  series  of  attacks 
against  each  other.  Neither  managed  to  score  a  victory  -  although  EDES  managed  to 
repel  ELAS  units  that  had  penetrated  EDES  territory  in  Epirus.  22  In  an  attempt  to  reach 
a  political  compromise  Premier  Tsouderos  and  Ambassador  Leeper  proposed,  in  January 
1944,  that  Damaskinos,  Archbishop  of  Athens,  should  act  as  Regent  on  the  liberation  of 
Athens  from  the  Germans.  Damaskinos  would  try  to  bring  about  a  political 
understanding  among  all  parties  in  Athens,  before  elections  and  a  plebiscite  on  the 
return  of  the  King  were  held.  Tsouderos'  aim  was  to  pre-empt  EAM's  attempt  to  form 
its  own  government.  23  On  6  March  1944,  the  formal  agreement  of  the  political  parties, 
excluding  the  KKE,  over  Damaskinos'  Regency  was  achieved.  Sofoulis,  leader  of  the 
Liberal  Party,  was  nominated  as  prime  minister  in  the  first  post-war  government.  24 
By  that  time  the  military  hostilities  between  EAM  and  EDES  had  also  come  to 
an  end.  A  conference  started  on  15  February  1944,  at  the  Plaka  Bridge,  over  Arachthos 
River  inE  pirus.  E  AM/ELAS,  E  DES  a  nd  E  KKA  m  embers  all  took  part.  Woodhouse, 
who  as  senior  BMM  officer,  had  a  major  role  in  arranging  the  Plaka  conference.  He  had 
telegraphed  to  Cairo  and  emphasised  that  'a  solution  must  be  found  now,  or  Greece  will 
go  the  way  of  Yugoslavia'.  25  On  29  February  1944,  all  parties  concurred  in  the  'Plaka 
Agreement',  which  put  an  end  to  the  first  round  of  the  civil  war.  The  agreement  defined 
22  Frazier  notes  that  EAM  began  the  'first  round'  of  the  Greek  civil  war.  Frazier,  Anglo-American 
Relations  with  Greece,  p.  3  1.  On  the  contrary,  Vlavianos  states  that  EDES  turned  its  army  against  ELAS, 
after  arranging  a  cease-fire  with  the  Germans.  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  34. 
23  E.  Tsouderos,  Greek  Irregularities  in  Middle  East-Avc0paUeg  M  Mý0-j  AvaroA4  (Athens,  1945),  pp. 
78,85;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43676  R1440,  Leeper's  telegram,  27  January 
1944.  King  George  had  prornised  to  accept  the  Regent  to  soften  tension  until  the  plebiscite.  Archbishop 
Damaskinos  held  republican  views,  and  had  avoided  the  internecine  struggles  during  the  occupation  by 
focusing  his  interests  on  his  flock.  He  therefore  was  a  candidate  acceptable  to  all  sides. 
24  Thernistocles  Sofoulis  was  republican  politician  and  leader  of  the  Liberal  Party,  Premier  1945-46, 
1947-49.  George  Papandreou  also  consented.  He  was  a  republican,  anti-Communist  centrist  politician, 
prot6g6  of  the  liberal  E.  Venizelos  during  the  1920s.  PM  in  1944.  Leader  of  the  National  Political  Union 
in  1946.  In  1950  he  founded  the  small  Social  Democratic  Party,  an  offshoot  of  the  old  Venizelist  party;  he 
served  in  short  lived  Centre  coalition  cabinets  in  195  0-195  1. 
25  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43681  R3430,  Woodhouse  to  Cairo,  27  February 
1944. 26 
the  area  of  operations  of  EAM  and  EDES  organisations,  with  EDES  being  confined  to 
its  heutland  o  Epirus.  26 
Nonetheless,  on  10  March  1944,  EAM  announced  the  formation  of  the  Political 
Committee  of  National  Liberation  (PEEA).  The  formation  of  PEEA  came  as  a  shock  to 
most  politicians  in  Cairo.  27  The  Chairman  of  the  PEEA  was  Professor  Svolos,  an 
authority  on  constitutional  law.  On  9  April  1944,  PEEA  organised  free  elections  by 
secret  ballot  throughout  'free  Greece'  (areas  under  EAM-ELAS  control)  to  create  a 
'National  Council'  of  202  delegates.  The  KKE,  through  the  election  of  its  National 
Council,  took  another  step  in  undermining  the  legality  and  authority  of  the  non-elected 
govemment-in-exile.  28 
The  British  government  was  alarmed  by  the  creation  of  PEEA.  In  order  to  disann 
EAM  and  weaken  the  communist  plans  for  taking  over  power,  the  Foreign  Office  asked 
Tsouderos  to  invite  EAM  and  other  parties  to  Cairo  for  discussions  over  a  post-war 
government.  Leeper's  diplomacy,  aimed  at  rendering  EAM  impotent  by  enmeshing 
them  in  a  non-communist  government,  which  they  would  have  no  opportunity  to 
dominate,  was  too  subtle  for  some.  It  was  derailed  by  King  George's  sudden  refusal  to 
appoint  Damaskinos  as  Regent.  The  King  feared  that  the  regency  would  be  the  first  step 
towards  his  loss  of  the  throne.  29 
26  Woodhouse,  Apple  ofDiscord,  pp.  303-304;  Sarafis,  ELAS,  pp.  244-60.  Subsequently  it  was  an 
indefinite  and  short-term  agreement,  foreshadowing  future  escalation. 
27  EAM  during  the  Plaka  negotiations  demanded  the  formation  of  a  Provisional  Committee  to  form  a  post- 
war  representative  cabinet,  which  at  that  point  had  been  rejected  by  both  the  representatives  of  the 
government  and  the  representatives  of  the  BMM  on  the  grounds  that  the  government-in-exile  was  the  legal 
authority  they  all  recognised.  On  PEEA  see:  Archive  ofPolitical  Committee  offational  Liberation 
(PEEA)-  ApXcio  Tqq  Holirw4s  EmTpon4s  EOviK4q  A  7raXcv0hpcoaqc  (PEEA),  (Athens,  1990).  The  KKE 
seemed  to  follow  the  steps  of  Tito,  who  in  November  1943  turned  his  Antifascist  Council  of  National 
Liberation  into  a  'provisional  government'. 
28  Papastratis  notes  that  the  creation  of  PEEA  reinforced  Tsouderos'  plan  to  force  all  political  parties 
except  EAM  to  join  him  openly  in  Cairo,  and  then  blame  EAM  for  not  accepting  a  solution  to  which  all 
the  other  parties  had  agreed.  Papastratis,  British  Foreign  Policy,  p.  164. 
29  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43682  R3988,  Leeper  telegram,  14  March;  PREM 
3/211/11,  Churchill  to  Eden,  10  March  1944;  FO  371/43683  R4476,  Leeper  telegram,  13  March  1944. 27 
The  charged  political  situation  in  Cairo  was  worsened  when  a  crisis  broke  out 
amongst  the  20,000  Greek  armed  forces  stationed  in  the  Middle  East.  On  31  March 
1944,  thirteen  officers  of  the  Committee  of  National  Union  of  the  Greek  armed  forces 
demanded  that  Prime  Minister  Tsouderos  forms  a  government  based  on  PEEA.  30  On  7 
April  1944  the  Greek  army  mutinied.  A  soldiers  committee  assumed  control  of  the  First 
Brigade,  just  before  it  joined  the  allies  in  the  Italian  theatre  of  operations.  Greek  naval 
units,  stationed  in  the  port  of  Alexandria,  supported  the  mutinies.  The  Second  Brigade 
also  declared  its  loyalty  to  PEEA.  Many  other  units  of  the  Greek  army  and  navy 
declared  themselves  in  favour  of  PEEA.  The  only  notable  exception  was  the  Sacred 
Battalion,  which  remained  loyal  to  the  King  and  his  government  throughout  the 
upheaval.  The  air  force  backed  neither  side.  31  As  a  result  of  the  crisis,  Tsouderos 
tendered  his  resignation.  On  13  April  1944,  the  King  appointed  the  liberal  Thernistocles 
Venizelos  prime  minister.  " 
The  British  wanted  to  restore  order.  Churchill  declared  that  'rebellious 
manifestations  in  forces  will  not  be  tolerated'  and  that  the  British  government  would 
33 
support  'the  lawfully  constituted  Greek  Government  headed  by  the  King'.  Leeper, 
reinforced  by  Churchill's  solid  backing,  telegraphed  the  Commanders-in-Chief  that  the 
Greek  government  should  'win  a  complete  and  bloodless  victory  and  teach  the  Greek 
armed  forces  a  lesson'.  34  The  units  with  which  the  British  dealt  first  were  the  First 
Greek  Brigade,  stationed  in  Egypt,  and  the  Greek  ships  in  Alexandria.  On  16  April, 
30  j.  Iatrides,  Ambassador  MacVeagh  Reports  (Princeton,  1980),  p.  482;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE, 
KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43728  R5316,  Leeper  telegram-198,3  April  1944;  PREM  3/211/11,  Leeper 
telegrams-208,209,5  April  1944.  The  King  had  appointed  Emmanouel  Tsouderos  Premier  in  1941  and 
left  with  him  for  Cairo  after  the  German  occupation.  George  was  in  charge  of  the  Greek  armed  forces. 
Venizelos'  leftist  background  was  hoped  to  be  a  factor  in  reconciling  the  republicans. 
31  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  78-79.  Thernistocles  Venizelos  is  one  of  the  main  republican 
politicians  to  influence  the  developments  of  the  period. 
32  Themistocles  Venizelos  is  one  of  the  main  republican  politicians  to  influence  the  developments  of  the 
period.  Prominent  in  the  National  Political  Union  alliance  together  with  Papandreou  and  Kanellopoulos, 
leader  of  the  Liberal  Party,  Prime  Minister  for  a  while  in  1950  and  acting  premier  in  195  1. 
33  W.  Churchill,  The  Second  World  War,  vol.  5  (London,  1952),  p.  481. 
34  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43701  R6035,  Leeper's  telegram,  15  April  1944. 28 
Admiral  Sir  A  ndrew  C  unningharn  t  hreatened  t  hat  t  he  R  oyal  N  avy  w  ould  s  ink  a  11  t  he 
ships  of  the  Greek  fleet  'within  five  minutes',  unless  they  abandoned  the  mutiny.  Six 
days  later  Admiral  Voulgaris,  Venizelos'  new  Commander-in-Chief,  took  over  the 
ships.  On  25  April,  the  fleet  surrendered  and  following  the  British  intervention,  all  the 
mutinous  Greek  troops  laid  down  their  arms.  35  As  a  result  of  the  mutiny,  the  Greek  army 
was  thoroughly  reorganised.  Approximately  half  of  it  was  put  into  internment  camps.  It 
is  probable  that  had  the  British  not  intervened  or  supported  the  old  established  order,  the 
Greek  politicians,  under  the  pressure  of  the  mutineers,  would  have  formed  a  new  pro- 
Communist  cabinet.  36  The  mutiny  underlined  the  inefficiency  of  the  Greek  government 
and  the  weakness  of  its  mainstay:  the  army. 
While  the  army was  purged,  the  political  task  of  controlling  EAM  remained 
unsolved.  Papandreou,  a  prominent  ex-member  of  the  Liberal  Party,  provided  the 
solution.  The  KKE  regarded  him  as  a  sympathiser.  On  the  other  hand  Papandreou 
convinced  British  officials  that  he  could  wrest  the  political  initiative  from  EAM.  With 
their  support  he  was  appointed  the  new  prime  minister  of  the  government-in-exile.  37 
A  new  attempt  to  rebuff  EAM  was  organised.  Papandreou  summoned  a 
conference  in  Lebanon  on  17-20  May  1944,  to  which  twenty-five  representatives  of  all 
seventeen  political  p  arties  and  groups  were  invited  in  order  to  seek  a  way  out  of  the 
35  K.  Alexandris,  Our  Navy  During  the  War  Period  1941-1945-  To  NavTiK6  Maq  T?  jv  Ilcplobo  Tov 
17611yov  (Athens,  1952),  pp.  148-150.  Adn-dral  Alexandris  was  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  be  replaced 
by  Voulgaris. 
36  Col.  Thrasyvoulos  Tsakalotos  commanded  the  Third  Brigade.  Tsakalotos  fought  in  the  mutiny  as  well 
as  under  the  British  Eighth  Army  in  Italy,  earning  the  title  of  'Rimini  Brigade'.  Later  on  he  played  a 
prominent  role  in  the  civil  war  of  1945-49  as  a  senior  officer  of  the  Greek  national  army.  In  1952,  he 
became  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Greek  Army.  The  right-wing  stream  claims  that  the  mutiny  in  April  was 
'planned  by  the  Communists'  in  order  to  monopolise  power.  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat,  p.  187. 
However,  as  Woodhouse  noted  PEEA  was  the  occasion  not  the  cause.  Woodhouse,  Strugglefor  Greece, 
p-78.  Vlavianos  states  that  the  mutiny  was  only  the  result  of  rise  of  republicanism.  Vlavianos,  Greece 
1941-1949,  p.  38. 
37  Venizelos  was  forced  to  resign  on  the  grounds  that  he  was  a  KKE  sympathiser.  P.  Kanellopoulos,  Diary 
31  March  1942-  4  January1945-HpEpoMpo  31  MapTiou  1942-4  Iavovaplov  1945  (Athens,  1977),  pp. 
553-554;  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Ambassador  MacVeagh  Reports:  Greece  1933-1947,  pp.  505-508;  Papastratis, 
British  Foreign  Policy,  pp.  175-76. 29 
political  impasse  that  had  arisen.  38  Papandreou's  plan  was  to  disarm  ELAS  and 
incorporate  EAM  into  the  government.  As  one  result  of  this,  the  National  Anny  coupled 
with  ELAS's  forces  would  be  much  stronger  and  more  co-operative.  39  Papandreou 
announced  that,  in  the  case  of  civil  war  breaking  out,  the  Greek  government  would 
appeal  for  allied  support  and  call  on  the  Allies  to  intervene  openly.  Within  this  context 
he  proposed  the  formation  of  both  a  Government  of  National  Unity  and  a  National 
Amy. 
40 
All  representatives  finally  signed  the  resolution  of  what  is  called  the  'Lebanon 
Agreement'  or  'Lebanon  Charter'  on  20  May.  The  most  important  provision  of  the 
argument  called  for  all  guerrilla  fonnations  to  be  placed  under  the  command  of  a 
government  of  national  unity,  in  which  five  out  of  twenty  relatively  unimportant  posts 
were  reserved  for  EAM  representatives.  41  Papandreou  did  not  make  a  clear  statement  on 
the  Communist  demand  that  the  King's  return  should  be  prevented.  He  noted  that  'the 
Government  of  National  Unity  is  to  clarify  the  issue'.  42  Britain's  support  for  Papandreou 
proved  a  successful  gambit.  Meanwhile  the  KKE  disapproved  of  PEEA's  'cheap' 
capitulation  and  repudiated  the  agreement.  43  Churchill  announced  in  the  House  of 
Commons,  'a  hopeful  turn  in  Greek  affairs'.  44  The  course  of  events  served  British 
interests.  On  28  May,  the  Foreign  Office  instructed  Leeper  that  Papandreou  was  to  be 
38  G.  Papandreou,  The  Liberation  of  Greece-HA7rcAcvffp(oo-1  rqq  FU6&oq  (Athens,  1948),  pp.  54-56. 
39  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43731  R7608,  Spears  Telegram-278,13  May  1944. 
40  Papandreou,  The  Liberation  of  Greece-  HA7rcAcv0tpcoo-1  Tqq  E.  UMog,  pp.  67-70;  P.  Papastratis,  'The 
Papandreou  Government  and  the  Lebanon  Conference',  in  J.  Iatrides  (ed),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  119- 
130. 
41  L.  Woodward,  British  Foreign  Policy,  vol.  3  (London,  1971),  pp.  408409;  Sarafis,  ELAS,  pp.  308-33; 
Papandreou,  The  Liberation  of  Greece-  H  A7rcAcv0ýpr,  0",  r1q  EU6.  boq,  pp.  73-80. 
42  Papandreou,  The  Liberation  of  Greece-  H  A7rc2zv0tpc00-17  Ti7q  EAWoq,  p.  76. 
43  Sarafis,  ELAS,  p.  334.  KKE's  power  claim  demands  were  almost  equal  to  those  made  in  Cairo  in 
August  1943,  also  repeated  on  4  July  1944  and  rejected  by  Papandreou.  KKE  Official  Documents- 
Exiaqya  Kelyeva-  1940-1945,  pp.  406-407.  The  KKE  demanded  inter  alia  the  retention  of  four  ELAS 
divisions  under  the  command  of  ELAS.  This  divergence  between  the  KKE's  agenda,  PEEA  and  the  actual 
agreement  underlined  the  stability  of  the  Government  of  National  Unity.  This  is  one  of  the  incidents  that 
prove  the  complexities  of  the  KKE's  policy  and  smoothens  the  argument  of  right-wing  orthodox  historians 
of  Greece  that  the  Greek  Communist  Party  had  planned  its  attempt  to  take  over  power  right  after  EAM's 
creation.  For  this  argument  see:  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe. 30 
given  'the  fullest  support,  and  at  all  costs  prevented  from  yielding  to  the  insidious 
atmosphere  prevalent  in  Cairo'.  Leeper  was  also  directed  to  keep  in  touch  with  his 
American  and  Soviet  colleagues  and  ask  them  to  back  British  actions.  45 
The  Lebanon  Charter  and  EAM's  agreement  to  join  the  government  of  national 
unity  facilitated  the  principal  British  objective  regarding  Greece:  to  prevent  the  KKE 
from  seizing  power  after  the  German  withdrawal  and  then  to  create  a  Greek  government 
broadly  acceptable  to  the  Greeks  to  take  over  after  the  liberation.  British  policy 
regarding  Greece  in  1944  was  based  upon  the  principle  of  eliminating  the  communist 
threat  and  establishing  a  pro-British  governmental  scheme  so  as  to  secure  'our  strategic 
position  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean'.  Eden's  report  on  8  August  to  the  Foreign  Office 
reads: 
If  we  are  to  maintain  any  political  influence  in  SE  Europe  and, 
above  all,  our  strategic  position  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean 
after  the  war,  it  is  essential  that  Greece  should  be  ruled  by  a 
Government  friendly  to  us.  [ 
... 
]I  regard  it  as  essential  that 
British  influence  in  Greece  and  the  traditional  connection 
between  the  two  countries  should  be  preserved,  but  unless 
British  f  orces  c  an  bes  ent  in  there  isa  serious  danger  that  the 
Greek  people,  who  still  look  to  us  for  assistance,  will  lose  faith 
in  Great  Britain  and  that  a  Government  will  c  ome  i  nto  p  ower 
which  would  bring  the  country  under  Soviet  domination.  46 
The  next  day  the  War  Cabinet  decided  to  despatch  a  6,000  strong  British  force  to  Greece 
to  secure  peace  after  the  German  withdrawal  from  the  country.  Roosevelt  and  Stalin 
were  informed  of  the  British  decision  on  17  and  21  August  respectively  and  raised  no 
objection. 
47 
In  order  to  prevent  a  communist  attempt  to  seize  power,  the  new  Greek 
government  organised  a  Conference  at  Caserta,  near  Naples,  on  26  September  1944, 
44  House  of  Commons  Debates,  1943-1944,  vol.  400,  col.  772,  Churchill,  24  May  1944,  Thereafter  cited 
as  HCDeb. 
45  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43731  R8331,  Churchill  minute,  28  May  1944. 
46  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  371/437  1  5,  R1  2457,  Eden  memorandum,  8  August  1944. 
47  H.  Macmillan,  The  Blast  of  War:  1939-1945  (London,  1967),  p.  575. 31 
under  the  aegis  of  Papandreou  and  a  British  committee  . 
48  General  H.  Wilson,  C-in-C 
Middle  East,  called  both  ELAS  and  EDES  representatives  to  Italy  to  receive  instructions 
concerning  the  operations  for  the  final  phase  of  the  liberation  of  Greece.  Sarafis,  Zervas, 
Papandreou,  Harold  Macmillan,  Minister  Resident  at  Allied  HQ  in  North  West  Africa, 
Leeper  and  Lt.  Gen.  Scobie,  newly  appointed  as  General  Officer  Commanding  Greece, 
all  took  part  in  the  Caserta  Conference.  It  was  agreed  that  all  Greek  guerrilla  forces 
would  be  put  under  the  orders  of  General  Spiliotopoulos,  Military  Governor  of  Athens 
and  Attica,  acting  as  representative  of  the  Greek  govenunent.  Spiliotopoulos  would  then 
serve  under  the  command  of  Lt.  Gen.  Scobie.  The  agreement  decreed  that  no  military 
action  regarding  Athens  was  to  be  taken,  except  on  direct  orders  from  General  Scobie. 
In  this  way  EAM  was  put  under  British  command.  General  Othonaios,  a  figure 
respected  by  ELAS,  was  nominated  as  the  future  Commander  in  Chief  of  the  Greek 
aMY. 
49 
On  the  eve  of  the  German  withdrawal  from  the  Balkans,  Churchill  and  Eden 
a 
were  still  concerned  about  communist  activities  in  Greece  and  Soviet  intentions  in  the 
Balkans.  On  9  October  1944,  Churchill  flew  to  Moscow  to  conclude  the  'Percentages 
Agreement'  with  Stalin.  He  suggested  that  the  Russians  might  have  ninety  per  cent 
dominance  in  Romania  while  the  British  ninety  per  cent  in  Greece;  Yugoslavia  would  be 
shared  on  a  fifty-fifty  basis.  The  spirit,  if  not  the  details,  of  this  Anglo-Soviet  agreement 
had  an  important  impact,  for  it  served  to  define  post-war  territorial  areas  of  control.  50 
The  last  German  units  left  Athens  on  12  October  1944,  and  on  18  October  the 
Greek  govenunent,  backed  by  Lt.  -Col.  Sheppard,  the  British  liaison  officer  with  the 
48  The  Greek  Government  of  National  Unity  moved  from  Cairo  to  Italy  on  8  September  1944,  to  prepare 
itself  for  its  return  to  Greece. 
49  Sarafis,  ELAS,  pp.  382-389.  The  text  of  the  'Caserta  Agreement'  is  reproduced  in  Iatrides,  Revolt  in 
Athens,  pp.  311-313.  Othonaios  replaced  Ventiris,  the  latter  a  strong  anti-Communist. 
50  For  an  account  of  the  Anglo-Soviet  agreement  see,  Churchill,  The  Second  War  World,  vol.  6,  pp.  197- 
99;  S.  Xydis,  'The  Secret  Anglo-Soviet  Agreement  on  the  Balkans  of  October  9,1944',  Journal  of 
Central  European  Affairs  15,  (October  1955),  248-7  1. 32 
Greek  government,  was  established  in  Athens.  51  The  first  British  troops  under  Lt.  Gen. 
Scobie  arrived  on  14  October,  and  were  augmented  at  the  end  of  October  by  two 
brigades  of  the  4th  Indian  Division  from  Italy.  The  basic  objective  of  British  policy  had 
proved  successful:  the  communists  had  joined  a  government  friendly  to  Britain.  The 
most  serious  problem  facing  the  new  government  was  how  to  bring  about  the  peaceful 
disarmament  of  the  guerrilla  formations  and  their  replacement  by  a  national  army, 
without  whose  backing  the  government  could  not  long  hope  to  remain  in  place. 
The  December  Events 
In  mid-October  there  were  no  serious  clashes  between  ELAS  and  EDES.  Small 
British  units  guarded  principal  ports  such  as  Athens-Piraeus,  Salonika,  Patra,  Preveza, 
Volos,  and  Kavalla.  The  rest  of  the  mainland  was  under  the  control  of  the  guerrillas. 
Zervas  with  his  headquarters  at  Ioannina  held  most  of  Epirus.  ELAS  with  its 
headquarters  at  Lamia  held  Macedonia,  Thessaly,  Roumeli,  and  the  Peloponnese.  The 
islands  were  controlled  by  both  ELAS  and  the  Greek  authorities,  except  Crete,  which 
remained  under  German  control  until  after  their  final  surrender  in  May  1945.  Therefore, 
EAM/ELAS  had  three  quarters  of  the  liberated  territory  under  its  control.  52 
The  peace  did  not  last  long.  Disagreement  between  ELAS  and  Papandreou  arose 
over  military  issues.  The  Greek  forces  in  the  Middle  East,  ELAS  and  EDES 
organisations  would  have  to  be  disanned  in  order  to  form  the  new  National  Army.  But  it 
soon  became  clear  that  Papandreou  did  not  intend  to  disband  the  brigade  most  loYal  to 
the  King,  the  Third  Brigade.  53  ELAS  regarded  the  retention  of  the  Third  Brigade  as  a 
51  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/43694  R  16803,  The  Situation  in  Athens,  15 
October  1944. 
52  Leeper,  Nen  Greeks  Meet  Greeks,  p.  85. 
53  The  Third  Brigade  or  Rimini  Brigade  formed  the  bulk  of  the  re-organised  ME  forces  after  the  April 
1944  mutiny  and  consequently  was  formulated  to  be  anti-Communist.  It  arrived  in  Athens  on  9  November 
1944  from  the  Italian  front  to  Athens  to  support  Papandreou's  cabinet.  Its  strength  was  nearly  2,800  men 33 
breach  of  trust.  On  7  November,  Papandreou  declared  that  he  was  planning  to  dissolve 
EAM  before  the  Third  Brigade,  which  would  arrive  in  Athens  from  Italy  on  9 
November.  54  The  KKE  was  convinced  of  Papandreou's  anti-Communist  feelings  and 
therefore  called  for  mass  demonstrations  against  the  government. 
Leeper  wrote  in  his  diary  on  7  November  1944  that  he  did  not  expect  the  facade 
of  unity  to  last  and  that  'ever  growing  lawlessness  by  EAM  in  Athens'  was  about  to 
explode.  55  The  British  government  prepared  itself  to  face  a  communist  insurgency. 
Churchill  wrote  to  Eden,  that  'we  should  not  hesitate  to  use  British  troops  to  support  the 
Royal  Hellenic  Government  under  Papandreou'.  56  Indeed  General  Sarafis,  military 
commander  of  ELAS,  noted  that  he  had  been  warned  by  Lieutenant  General  Scobie,  'to 
bear  in  mind  that  a  guerrilla  army  is  not  able  to  face  a  modem  army  with  heavy  arms, 
57  tanks,  aircraft  and  a  fleet  at  its  disposal'.  British  reinforcements  were  despatched  from 
Italy  to  Greece.  There  were,  however,  few  heavy  weapons  and  no  tanks  in  Greece.  The 
Greek  air  force  was  weak.  On  17  November  two  RAF  squadrons  and  a  Greek  squadron 
flew  i  nto  t  he  m  ain  a  irfield  at  Athens,  to  be  greeted  by  the  Prime  Minister  in  person. 
Another  three  RAF  squadrons  arrived  by  the  end  of  the  month.  At  the  end  of  November 
Scobie  had  nearly  twenty-three  thousand  troops  under  his  command,  though  not  all  were 
combatants. 
58 
The  refusal  of  the  KKE  to  disarm  ELAS  led  to  the  military  confrontation 
between  ELAS  and  the  Anglo-Greek  government  forces  in  December  1944.  As  the  dates 
including  just  over  200  officers,  coupled  with  a  British  force  of  about  8,000  men.  General  Tsakalotos, 
Forty  Years  Soldier  of  Greece-Eýp&Ta  Xp6via  ETpa-rxý,  vol.  I  (Athens,  1960),  p.  5  87;  Woodhouse, 
The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  114;  H.  Macmillan,  War  Diaries,  vol.  1  (London,  1984),  p.  595.  ELAS  armed 
strength  at  the  time  of  the  liberation  in  mid-October  1944  was  5,240  officers  and  43,700  other  ranks. 
Sarafis,  ELAS,  p.  276.  Therefore,  the  non-communist  part  of  the  army  enjoyed  a  distinct  superiority  of 
force. 
54  G.  Papandreou,  The  Third  War-0  Tpi-roq  176)xpoq  (Athens,  1949),  pp.  202-03,  Leeper,  Hen  Greek 
Meets  Greek,  p.  92. 
55  Leeper,  Hen  Greek  Meets  Greek,  p.  92. 
56  Churchill,  The  Second  World  War,  vol.  6,  p.  250. 
57  Sarafis,  EL4S,  pp.  291-92.  Scobie  was  the  British  officer  designated  to  represent  the  Allied  Commander 
in  liberated  Greece. 34 
drew  near  for  the  dernobilisation  of  ELAS,  EDES  and  the  Third  Brigade,  tension 
increased.  Siantos  -  from  PEEA  -  and  Sarafis  -  from  ELAS  -  asserted  that  they  would 
not  disband  ELAS  unless  the  Third  Brigade  was  also  disbanded.  On  18  November,  the 
KKE  Political  Bureau  decided  that  'if  a  political  solution  was  not  found,  the  ELAS  must 
be  prepared  for  a  clash'.  59  In  a  show  of  force  the  six  EAM  ministers  in  the  Government 
of  National  Unity  resigned  on  2  December. 
The  direct  cause  of  the  fighting  was  EAM's  demonstration  on  3  December  in 
Syntagma  (Constitution)  Square,  Athens.  The  demonstration  turned  violent  when  police 
panicked  and  began  firing  at  the  demonstrators  as  they  advanced  across  the  square  in  the 
direction  of  the  police  headquarters.  The  'second  round'  of  the  civil  war,  or  the 
'December  Events',  h  ad  b  egun.  'Maintain  o  rder  in  Athens',  C  hurchill  c  abled  S  cobie, 
'defeat  EAM.  The  ending  of  the  fighting  is  subsidiary  to  this.  I  am  ordering  large 
reinforcements  to  come  to  Athens'.  60 
Britain  was  determined  to  put  down  the  insurgency.  General  Scobie  ordered  all 
ELAS  units  to  leave  Athens  within  seventy-two  hours  and  on  the  following  day  he 
declared  martial  law.  On  5  December  Scobie  committed  his  British  troops  to  the  fray. 
Scobie  commanded  the  4h  Indian  Division,  the  Greek  Third  Brigade,  a  parachute 
brigade  and  an  armoured  brigade,  a  total  of  nearly  20,000  combat  troops.  In  the  first 
three  weeks  of  the  fighting  in  the  Athens-Piraeus  area,  ELAS  held  the  upper  hand, 
however.  The  Tatoi  airfield  and  some  800  RAF  headquarters  and  ground  staff  personnel 
were  cut  off  in  the  northern  suburb  of  Kifissia.  The  Kalamaki  airfield  was  insecure  and 
the  ground  routes  from  and  into  the  city  centre  were  under  ELAS's  control. 
58  Ibid,  pp.  291-293. 
59  Y.  Ioannidis,  Memoirs-Avqqv4aeiq  (Athens,  1979),  pp.  329-33.  J.  Loulis,  The  Greek  Communist  Party 
(London,  19  82),  pp.  170-17  1;  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  48;  Shrader  claims  that  Scobie  should  be 
blamed  for  polarisation  over  the  demobilisation  of  ELAS,  which  brought  the  armed  conflict.  Shrader,  The 
Withered  Vine,  p.  39. 35 
Consequently,  the  port  facilities  were  limited  and  there  was,  in  Macmillan's  words,  no 
csecure  place'  of  operation  for  the  British  . 
61  Between  13  and  16  December,  however, 
two  British  divisions,  a  tank  regiment,  two  brigades  and  other  supporting  units  landed  in 
Piraeus.  Meanwhile,  the  ELAS  forces  of  General  Sarafis  continued  fighting  their  usual 
enemy:  the  EDES  forces  of  General  Zervas.  62 
Operational  control  of  the  Anglo-Greek  forces  were  entrusted  to  Maj.  Gen.  John 
L.  I.  Hawkesworth.  By  20  December  General  Hawkesworth  had  secured  his  base  at 
Faliron  and  began  attacking  ELAS  supported  by  artillery  and  aircraft.  On  27  December, 
Hawkesworth's  forces  took  control  of  the  southern  half  of  the  city,  except  the  Athens- 
Piraeus  road.  The  tide  had  turned  against  ELAS  although  fighting  continued.  The  role  of 
the  British  forces  during  the  December  events  was  decisive  even  if  they  did  not  do  the 
bulk  of  the  fighting.  British  troops  used  tanks  to  secure  main  communication  lines  such 
as  Sygrou  and  Kifissias  Avenue  and  to  defend  the  city  centre  and  governmental 
buildings.  In  terms  of  offensive  operations,  British  troops  were  limited  to  cutting  ELAS 
off  from  Athens-Piraeus  Avenue,  so  as  to  free  Piraeus  harbour  and  allow  supplies  to 
reach  Athens.  63  The  Greek  units  conducted  the  rest  of  the  fighting.  British  intervention 
64 
to  key  points,  however,  radically  changed  the  course  of  the  events  against  EAM  . 
On  Christmas  Eve,  Churchill  and  Eden  flew  to  Athens  for  a  first  hand  look  at  the 
emergency.  This  was  a  definite  proof  of  Churchill's  determination  to  oppose  the 
communists'  insurgency.  On  26-28  December,  Churchill,  Eden,  Macmillan,  the  leaders 
of  K  KE,  E  AM/ELAS,  the  American  and  French  Ambassadors,  Colonel  Popov  of  the 
60  Churchill,  The  Second  World  War,  vol.  6,  pp.  252,254.  According  to  Farakos:  17,000  men  of  ELAS 
took  action  in  the  December  Events;  11,000  of  Papandreou's  forces;  8,000  of  British  Army.  Farakos, 
ELAS  and  Power-O  EAAE  kai  H  Eýovala,  vol.  2,  p.  117. 
61  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  40;  Iatrides,  Revolt  in  Athens,  p.  227.  See  Map  D.  2,  p.  188. 
62  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War  1944-1949,  pp.  104-105. 
63  In  December  the  Greek  government  forces  constituted  of.  4,000  men  (Rimini  Brigade),  500  (The 
Sacred  Battalion),  3,000  (Athens  City  Police),  1,000  (X  Organisation);  9,000  men  (4h  Indian  Division-3 
infantry  brigades),  2,000  (Airborne  Brigade),  1,000  (Armoured  Brigade),  1,000  (Battalion,  Leicestershire 
Infantry  Regiment);  50,000  (ELAS),  10,000  (EDES).  Iatrides,  Revolt  in  Athens,  p.  176. 
64  G.  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War-O  EUIVIK6q  Ey(pbAiog,  vol.  1,  p.  72. 36 
Soviet  Military  Mission  and  Greek  national  governraent  officials  agree  to  appoint  as 
Regent  Archbishop  Damaskinos,  to  take  office,  on  31  December  1944.  On  3  January 
1945,  a  well-known  republican  General  Nicolaos  Plastiras,  recently  returned  to  Greece 
from  self-imposed  exile  in  PaTis,  was  appointed  as  prime  minister.  65 
The  'second  round'  of  the  civil  war  effectively  came  to  an  end  on  15  January. 
Although  ELAS  troops  had  defeated  EDES  and  occupied  most  of  the  country  they  had 
been  forced  to  abandon  Athens.  66  The  formal  end  of  the  December  Events  was  a 
political  settlement  between  the  new  govenunent  and  EAM,  signed  at  a  seaside  villa  in 
Varkiza,  a  small  resort  on  the  outskirts  of  Athens,  on  12  February  1945.  Under  the  terms 
of  the  Tarkiza  Agreement',  ELAS  agreed  to  disarm.  In  return  the  Plastiras  government 
promised  amnesty  for  political  crimes.  Martial  law  was  lifted,  civil  liberties  guaranteed 
and  the  K  KE  w  as  r  ecognised  asaI  egal  p  olitical  p  arty.  E  AM  w  as  tobep  ennitted  to 
continue  as  a  political  organisation.  A  plebiscite  on  constitutional  issues  and  elections 
67 
would  be  held  in  one  year,  followed  by  elections.  As  a  result  of  the  'Varkiza 
Agreement',  ELAS  surrendered  its  arms,  although  a  few  'hard  core'  party  members,  like 
Aris  Velouhiotis,  refused  to  comply  and  fled  to  the  mountains.  Other  EAM-ELAS 
members  left  for  Yugoslavia,  Albania  and  Bulgaria.  68  ELAS  officially  ceased  to  exist. 
The  Development  of  a  Full  Scale  Civil  War 
From  the  Warkiza  Agreement'  onwards  the  Greek  government  moved  steadily 
to  the  Right.  On  17  February  1945,  the  right-wing  Populist  Party  led  by  the  prominent 
conservative  politician  Konstantine  Tsaldaris,  which  had  been  totally  dismantled  under 
65  W.  McNeill,  The  Greek  Dilemma  (London,  1947),  pp.  103,192-93. 
66  Churchill,  The  Second  World  War,  vol.  6,  p.  252. 
67  The  terms  of  the  Tarkiza  Agreement'  are  included  in  Iatrides,  Revolt  in  Athens,  pp.  320-24. 
68  O'Ballance  puts  the  number  of  ELAS  fighters  who  crossed  over  into  Albania,  Yugoslavia  and  Bulgaria 
at  about  4,000.  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  113;  The  right-wing  historian  Kousoulas  estimates 37 
the  Metaxas  dictatorship,  was  re-established  in  Athens.  The  Populists  presented  the 
King  and  themselves  as  the  bulwark  against  communism.  The  moderate  republican 
Venizelist  Liberal  Party,  represented  by  Thernistocles  Sofoulis,  began  to  switch  its 
allegiance  to  the  right-wing  group.  'White  terror'  governmental.  measures  against  the 
communists  grew.  These  included  arrests  of  communist  suspects,  the  strengthening  of 
rightist  organisations  such  as  Grivas'  'X'  to  control  the  Army  and  Gendarmerie  and 
reduction  of  the  leftist  press.  69  The  right-wing  shift  of  the  government  was  also 
consolidated  by  the  appointment  of  Admiral  Petros  Voulgaris  as  a  new  caretaker 
premier  to  conduct  the  first  post-war  elections,  following  Plastiras'  resignation  on  7 
April  1945.  Voulgaris  had  proved  his  anti-Communist  bent  during  the  army  purge  of 
70  April  1944. 
On  26  July  1945,  the  victory  of  the  Labour  Party  over  Churchill's  Conservatives 
in  Britain  came  as  a  shock  to  the  Greek  political  world.  The  Labour  government  seemed 
to  represent  the  British  'socialism  in  one  country'.  71  Greek  conservatives  feared  that  the 
British  Labour  government  would  distance  itself  from  them.  72  These  fears,  however, 
were  not  realised.  Bevin  was  an  aggressive  and  anti-communist  Foreign  Seretary 
following  Churchill's  path.  Prime  Minister  Attlee  was  not  charismatic  but  strengthened 
Bevin's  anti-communist  strategies  and  backed  every  effort  to  weaken  the  Soviet  threat. 
Attlee  a  nd  B  evin  c  ontrolled  t  he  c  abinet,  w  hich  p  revailed  t  he  d  ecisions  of  the  Labour 
Party.  The  Left  had  only  four  representatives  in  the  government  of  minor  political 
importance  and  consequently  possible  debates  within  the  cabinet  were  easily  dissolved. 
The  foreign  policy  of  the  Labour  government  continued  Churchill's  pursuit  to  maintain 
23,000  communists  in  Albania,  20,000  Yugoslavia,  5,000  Bulgaria.  Kousoulas,  The  Price  offreedom,  p. 
149. 
69  General  Ventiris,  whom  Plastiras  appointed  Deputy  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  had  promoted  the 
penetration  of  extreme  right-wing  organisations  within  the  army.  Ventiris,  in  fact,  was  one  of  the  leaders 
of  IDEA  a  right-wing  organisation,  which  prevailed  over  the  Greek  Army  and  in  May  195  1,  was  to  play  a 
role  in  Papagos'  resignation  from  the  post  of  Cornmander  in  Chief. 
70  Leeper,  When  Greek  Meets  Greek,  pp.  161-62. 39 
73 
British  imperial  interests  in  the  Middle  East  against  the  Soviet  Union.  On  11  August 
1945,  Bevin  submitted  a  memorandum  on  British  policy  towards  Greece  to  the  Cabinet, 
stressing  the  continuity  with  Churchill's  line.  He  also  spoke  of  the  need  to  contain  . 
communism.  74  B  cvin  n  oted  int  he  H  ouse  ofC  ommons  t  hat  t  he  L  abour  government's 
foreign  policy  regarding  Greece  would  remain  almost  entirely  the  same  as  that  of  his 
predecessor.  75 
The  situation  in  Greece  was  exacerbated  by  the  continuing  conflict  between  the 
Right  and  the  Left.  Right-wing  groups,  such  as  Lt.  Col.  George  Grivas'  X  sought  to 
root  out  the  former  supporters  of  EAM/ELAS.  In  the  KKE  too  militants  were 
increasingly  in  the  ascendant.  In  May  1945  Zahariadis  returned  from  the  German 
concentration  camp  at  Dachau  and  resumed  the  leadership  of  the  KKE  from  Siandos.  76 
Zahariadis  at  the  Seventh  Party  Congress  on  4  October  1945  noted  that  'if  this  mess 
continues,  every  Greek  will  have  to  take  to  the  hills'.  77  In  order  to  avoid  a  new  crisis 
Leeper  suggested  Voulgaris  to  resign  in  October  1945.  After  a  month  of  uncertainty 
71  K.  Morgan,  The  British  Labour  Governments  1945-1951  (Oxford,  1985),  p.  93. 
72  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  120.  Alexander,  Yhe  Prelude  to  the  Thiman  Doctrine,  pp.  125-26. 
73  Morgan,  The  British  Labour  Governments  1945-1951,  pp.  56-81. 
74  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/48277  R13856,  Memorandum  by  Bevin,  II  August 
1945;  FRUS  (1945):  8,136-137:  British  Embassy  to  Department  of  State,  II  August  1945. 
75  HCDeb,  194546,  vol.  413,  cols.  289-91,16  August  1945. 
76  Following  the  decision  of  the  KKE  to  remain  officially  committed  to  the  establishment  of  a  more 
equitable  social  order  in  Greece  by  peaceful  means,  the  Central  Committee  of  the  KKE  proceeded  with 
the  organisation  of  Self  Defence  (Aftoamyna);  an  intelligence  and  propaganda  organisation  created  to  co- 
ordinate  defensive  actions  to  protect  the  KKE  from  'monarcho-fascist  terrorism.  Woodhouse,  The 
Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  163;  History  of  the  KKE-A0K1,  U10  Io-roplaq  Tov  KKE,  pp.  526-535.0.  Smith,  'Self- 
Defence  and  Communist  Policy  1945-1947',  in  L.  Baerentzen,  J.  0.  Iatrides  and  0.  Smith  (eds),  Studies 
in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War  1945-1949,  pp.  159-178.  EAM  threatened  to  abstain  from  the 
election  given  the  governmental  measure,  the  'white  terror',  against  the  KKE  sympathisers  and  the 
consequent  falsification  of  the  electoral  results  and  polls.  Sofoulis  and  his  Liberal  Party  also  consented 
with  EAM,  characterising  the  election  day  'pitiful  electoral  comedy'.  FRUS  (1945):  8,170:  MacVeagh  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  7  October  1945;  Sarafis,  After  Varkiza-Meric  Tj  B6PKi(a,  pp.  127-134.  McNeill, 
The  Greek  Dilemma,  p.  180. 
77  History  of  the  KKE-Aoq,,  uio  IoTopics  rou  KKE,  pp.  526-535.  The  KKE  established  in  cities  and  towns 
throughout  the  country  an  intelligence  network  based  on  Communist  'cells'  with  the  purpose  of  collecting 
information,  supplies,  money,  recruiting  and  terrifying  non-Communist  sympathisers.  These  cells  were 
known  as  yiajka.  O'Balance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  142.0.  Smith,  'Communist  Perceptions,  Strategy 
and  Tactics,  1945-1949',  in  J.  Iatrides  and  W.  Linda  (eds),  Greece  at  the  Crossroads.  The  Civil  War  and 
Its  Legacy  (Pensilvania,  1995),  pp.  87-120. 39 
over  the  new  prime  minister,  a  new  stopgap  government  was  formed  under  Liberal 
Sofoulis  in  November  1945  to  conduct  elections  on  31  March  1946. 
Greek  political  instability  had  become  an  international  issue.  On  27  November 
1945,  the  respective  American,  British  and  French  Chiefs  of  the  Allied  Mission  for  the 
Observation  of  the  Greek  Elections  (AMFOGE)  arrived  in  Athens,  headed  by  the  future 
American  Ambassador  to  Greece  Henry  Grady.  78  The  mission  signified  the  beginning  of 
American  involvement  in  Greek  affairs.  This  did  not,  however,  threaten  British  interests 
in  the  area;  on  the  contrary,  it  added  another  power  to  act  as  an  anti-communist 
watchdog. 
In  the  meantime,  the  Second  Plenum  of  the  KKE  Central  Committee,  which  met 
on  12  February  1946,  initiated  the  'third  round'  of  the  civil  war.  It  agreed  upon  a  dual 
strategy  of  continued  political  action  and  build-up  of  military  force.  This  was  signalised 
by  KKE's  decision  to  abstain  from  the  election  of  31  March  1946,  as  announced  on  22 
February,  and  the  birth  of  the  'Democratic  Army  of  Greece'  (DAG),  the  successor  of 
ELAS,  in  the  autumn  of  the  same  year.  79  According  to  Zahariadis'  speech  at  the  Seventh 
Plenum  of  the  Central  Committee  in  May  1950,  the  Second  Plenum  'in  effect  decided 
that  the  new  armed  struggle  should  begin'.  80 
The  elections  called  for  by  the  'Varkiza  Agreement'  were  finally  held  on  31 
March  1946,  under  the  proportional  system.  The  result  was  in  accordance  with  the 
intentions  and  manipulations  of  the  majority  of  the  Greek  political  world.  The  KKE 
boycotted  the  election.  It  had  already  decided  that  'the  new  anned  struggle  should 
78  FRUS  (1945):  8,185:  MacVeagh  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  4  December  1945.  AMFOGE  was  composed 
of  more  than  1,200  British,  French  and  American  observers,  under  the  American  chief  observer  Henry  F. 
Grady. 
79  KKE's  radical  decision  to  abstain  was  based  on  political  grounds  and  suppression  of  the  communist 
voters  and  sympathisers.  On  the  KKE's  decision  to  abstain  see,  G.  Mavrogordatos,  'The  1946  Election 
and  Plebiscite:  Prelude  to  Civil  War',  in  J.  0.  latrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  181-195;  Vlavianos, 
Greece  1941-1949,  pp.  189-224.  DAG  or  DA  is  used  in  the  text  as  DA  for  reasons  of  convenience.  8'N.  Zahariadis,  Ten  Years  qfFight-JtKa  Xp&ia  176AIq  (Athens,  1978),  p.  28. 40 
begin'.  81  The  right-wing  Populist  Party,  headed  by  Tsaldaris,  won  a  majority  of  206 
seats  out  of  354.82  The  election  of  March  1946  was  a  critical  development  marking  the 
evolution  from  occupation  and  civil  strife.  The  right-wing  party,  even  before  the 
election,  had  driven  former  ELAS  partisans  back  to  the  mountains.  This  process  gained 
momentum  int  he  e  lection  a  Ithough  t  he  g  overnment  e  xacerbated  an  already  polarised 
political  situation.  The  plebiscite  to  decide  the  future  of  the  monarchy  prescribed  by  the 
Warkiza  Agreement'  was  held  on  1  September  1946.  It  too  confirmed  the  re-emergence 
of  the  pre-1941  political  order.  Many  who  had  no  love  for  the  monarch  voted  in  favour 
of  his  return  merely  because  they  regarded  the  monarchy  as  the  best  guarantee  against  a 
communist  accession  to  power.  On  27  September  1946,  King  George  H  set  foot  on 
Greek  soil  for  the  first  time  since  he  had  fled  in  April  1941.  He  would  remain  on  the 
throne  until  his  death  in  April  1947. 
The  elections  signified  a  new  era  for  Anglo-Greek  relations.  On  one  hand, 
British  policy  was  based  on  a  determination  to  retain  British  military  presence  until  the 
Greek  governmentw  as  able  to  restore  law  and  order.  The  ForeignOfficehoped  that 
Greece's  political  leaders  would  join  together  in  the  face  of  the  Communist  threat  and 
establish  a  government  of  national  unity  or,  at  least,  a  two-party  government  in  which 
the  moderate  Right  would  join  forces  with  the  Centre  and  moderate  Left.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  the  Labour  government  declared  its  intention  to  be  released  from 
interfering  in  Greek  politics.  This  new  direction  was  to  be  implemented  by  Clifford 
Norton,  who  replaced  Rex  Leeper  as  Ambassador  on  7  March  1946.  Bevin  instructed 
Norton  to  support  the  Populist  government  of  Tsaldaris  but  to  coax  the  Greeks  towards 
81  Zahariadis,  Ten  Years  ofFight-&KaXp6vial761jq  (Athens,  1978),  p.  28. 
92  The  main  political  factions  were:  the  Populists  under  Tsaldaris,  the  Liberal  Party  of  Sofoulis,  National 
Union  under  Kanellopoulos,  Papandreou,  Venizelos,  the  National  Liberal  of  Gonatas-Zervas  and  the 
KKE-EAM.  AMFOGE  estimated  that  out  of  a  total  population  of  7,500,000  people  only  70  per  cent  of  the 
names  on  the  lists  belonged  to  valid  registrants,  13  per  cent  being  invalid  and  17  per  cent  of  doubtful 
validity.  Cmd.  6812  Report  of  the  AlliedMission  to  Observe  the  Greek  Elections  (London,  1946)  pp.  18- 
29;  R.  Clogg,  Parties  and  Elections  in  Greece  (London,  1987),  p.  18.  On  I  September  1946  the  plebiscite 41 
a  policy  of  peace,  constitutional  freedom,  parliamentary  institutions  and  financial 
stability. 
83 
British  ambitions  for  limiting  intervention  in  Greece  were,  however,  undermined 
by  a  renewed  escalation  of  violence  by  the  communists.  On  26  October  1946  Marcos 
Vafeiadis  (Marcos)  announced  the  creation  of  the  Democratic  Army  of  Greece  under  his 
command.  The  guerrillas  numbered  no  more  than  13,000  men,  yet  fighters  experienced 
in  resisting  the  Germans  more  than  balanced  the  advantages  that  government  forces  had 
in  numbers  and  material.  The  squatter  camps  of  neighbouring  Yugoslavia,  Albania  and 
Bulgaria  were  laced  with  mountain  trails  suitable  for  moving  men  and  supplies.  84 
Within  this  context  of  communist  aggression,  it  was  obvious  to  the  Greek 
govenunent  and  its  British  allies  that  the  Greek  National  Army  (NA)  needed  vast 
improvements  before  it  could  defeat  the  guerrillas.  In  December  1946,  the  NA 
manpower  ceiling  was  100,000  men,  along  with  almost  35,000  gendarmerie.  Units  of 
Rural  Defence  (MAY)  and  Units  of  Pursuit  Detachments  (MAD)  were  set  by  the  Greek 
85  General  Staff  to  act  as  local  home  guards  in  October  1945.  None  of  these  formations, 
however,  was  well  equipped.  Few  were  properly  trained  for  their  duties.  Many  lacked 
combat  motivation.  The  Greek  Navy  too  was  in  poor  shape.  The  outlook  of  the  Royal 
Hellenic  Air  Force  was  also  dismal.  It  consisted  of  fifty-four  British-made  obsolete 
aircraft  and  fewer  than  300  battle-trained  pilots.  Greek  finances  precluded  the  purchase 
of  more  aeroplanes,  and  the  Germans  had  confiscated  the  only  state  aircraft  factory. 
Greece  had  no  petroleum  refineries,  no  munitions  manufacturers,  and  no  facilities  for 
was  held,  68,4  per  cent  brought  King  George  back.  AMFOGE  did  not  supervise  the  plebiscite,  but  did 
control  the  electoral  registers. 
83  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/58679  R  3748,  Foreign  Office  to  Norton,  13  March 
1946. 
84  H.  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War'(Oxford,  1989),  pp.  19-2  1;  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp. 
179-80,187-88. 
85  Averoff,  By  Fire  andAxe,  p.  191;  Eudes,  The  Kapetanios,  pp.  274,278.  One  of  the  main  tasks  of  both 
orgamsations  was  to  counterbalance  the  conununist  Aftamyna 42 
overhauling  aircraft  or  for  making  spare  parts.  86  The  Greek  government,  for  all  its 
posturing,  was  in  poor  shape  to  fight  the  communists. 
86Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe,  pp.  190-19  1;  M.  A.  Campbell,  E.  W. Downs,  and  L.  V.  Schuetta,  The 
Employment  ofAirpower  in  the  Greek  Guerrilla  War,  1947-1949  (Maxwell  Air  Base,  1964),  p.  8. 43 
11  In  Search  of  Security:  1947 
The  Maximos  Government:  The  Test  of  the  Centre 
As  a  result  of  the  escalation  of  the  civil  war  a  new  round  of  political  negotiations 
started  in  Athens.  On  8  January  1947,  the  Foreign  Office  instructed  Norton  to  press 
Prime  Minister  Tsaldaris  to  form  a  centrist  coalition.  '  British  diplomats  wanted  power- 
sharing  between  the  parties  of  the  Right  and  the  Left.  Despite  the  assertion  ofs  ome 
historians  that  Britain  favoured  a  right-wing  govenunent  in  Greece,  the  consistent 
British  aim  was  the  establishment  of  a  moderate  government  of  the  Centre.  2  MacVeagh, 
the  United  States  Ambassador  to  Greece,  also  urged  Tsaldaris  to  form  a  right-wing 
coalition  of  the  Centre.  3  Tsaldaris,  however,  was  unwilling  to  surrender  the  position  of 
his  right-wing  party.  He  proposed  instead  that  elections  should  be  held.  Both 
ambassadors  rejected  the  Greek  premier's  proposition.  They  argued  that  there  was  no 
constitutional  reason  for  new  elections.  Moreover,  such  an  act  would  undermine 
stability  of  the  institutions  of  government  and  encourage  further  unrest.  4 
The  Anglo-American  determination  to  create  a  moderate  and  stable  government 
forced  Tsaldaris'  hand.  On  10  January,  he  consented  to  the  broadening  of  the 
government.  A  new  cabinet  would  be  formed  under  a  compromise  prime  minister  with 
the  Populists  and  Liberals  serving  as  joint  vice-premiers.  Negotiations  started  between 
the  Populists  and  the  Liberals  over  seats  in  the  cabinet.  Sofoulis,  however,  demanded 
the  premiership.  In  order  to  enhance  his  claims  to  leadership  he  championed  a 
1  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/66994  R1  13,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  8  January 
1947. 
2  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War-Iaropla  Tov  EUqVIK06  EpqvAlov  Hompov,  vol.  1,  pp.  174- 
176. 
3  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/66994  R78,  MacVeagh  to  State  Department,  8 
January  1947;  FRUS  (1947):  5,4:  MacVeagh  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  11  January  1947.  It  was  believed 
that  such  an  act  would  satisfy  the  claims  for  power  of  the  insurgents  and  bring  the  warfare  into  an  end. 44 
5 
programme  of  amnesty,  re-organisation  of  the  army  and  a  new  election.  Tsaldaris,  had 
no  intention  of  offering  Sofoulis  the  premiership.  He  was  unwilling  to  weaken  his  party 
by  co-operating  with  moderate  politicians  of  the  Centre  such  as  Papandreou, 
Kanellopoulos  and  Venizelos  from  the  National  Political  Union  (EPE).  Moreover  the 
hard-core  Populists  Gonatas  and  Zervas,  refused  to  serve  under  the  Liberals.  Three  days 
after  the  talks  had  begun  they  ended  in  failure  with  each  participant  accusing  the  other 
of  intransigence  over  the  distribution  of  power.  6  On  23  January,  disagreement  over  the 
balance  of  power  between  the  Liberals  and  the  right-wing  Populists  caused  the  collapse 
of  Tsaldaris'  premiership.  7 
Dimitrios  Maximos,  an  elderly  Populist  and  ex-govemor  of  the  National  Bank, 
was  drafted  in  a  stop-gap  prime  minister.  He  took  the  oath  as  Premier,  leading  a 
coalition  cabinet  of  the  Centre,  on  24  January  1947.  Maximos  enjoyed  the  approval  of 
the  Palace.  He  was  a  neutral  figure,  acceptable  to  the  parliamentary  parties,  and,  as 
Norton  put  it,  'no  one  imagined  that  at  the  age  of  seventy-three  and  after  [a)  long 
8 
absence  from  politics  he  wanted  the  job'.  The  coalition  cabinet  consisted  mainly  of 
Populists,  Liberals  and  the  National  Political  Union  (EPE).  Tsaldaris  remained  powerful 
because  he  became  Vice  Premier  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  EPE  were 
allotted  important  posts.  Zervas  became  a  Minister  but  without  portfolio  as  a  result  of 
Norton's  refusal  to  countenance  a  more  important  post  for  him.  The  British  Ambassador 
pointed  out  that  Zervas  was  known  to  advocate  extreme  measures  against  the  Left;  his 
4  See  footnote  1.  Tsaldaris,  a  purely  Populist  and  right-wing  politician,  would  have  preferred  new 
elections  with  the  aim  to  form  again  a  purely  right-wing  cabinet  and  avoid  negotiations  with  the  Liberals 
and  the  powers  of  the  Centre  and  Left. 
5  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/66995  R  460,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  10  January 
1947. 
6  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/66996  R  578,  Lascelles  to  Foreign  Office,  14 
January  1947. 
7  FRUS  (1947):  5,9-11:  Marshall  to  Athens,  21  January  1947. 
8  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/66998  R  15  15,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  3 
February  1947. 45 
appointment  c  ould  d  estroy  t  he  g  overnment's  c  hances  ofp  roj  ecting  am  oderate  i  mage 
both  at  home  and  abroad.  9 
In  the  short-term  British  and  American  objectives  were  realised  through  the 
formation  of  the  Maximos  government.  A  cabinet  of  the  Centre  had  been  created. 
Although  some  centre-right  politicians  had  joined  the  cabinet  (Kanellopoulos, 
Papandreou,  Venizelos)  there  was  no  change  in  policy:  the  military  campaign  against 
the  guerrillas  would  still  be  pursued.  Yet,  the  Maximos  coalition  was  extremely  fragile. 
The  Left,  which  would  have  preferred  a  more  friendly  government  under  Sofoulis  and 
the  Liberals  denounced  the  new  cabinet  as  a  'fraudulent  product  of  British  intrigue'  bent 
on  perpetuating  Tsaldaris'  'reign  of  terror'.  10  King  George  H  predicted  that  it  would  be 
very  difficult  for  the  new  cabinet  to  function.  Norton,  although  he  liked  the  'clever  and 
moderate'  Maximos,  agreed.  Paul  Porter,  Head  of  the  American  Economic  Mission, 
who  arrived  in  Greece  in  mid-January,  reported  that  Maximos  was  'the  most  non- 
partisan,  moderate  and  co-operative  personality  in  Government'  but  that  his  government 
was  little  more  than  a  'loose  hierarchy  of  individualistic  politicians'.  " 
The  Maximos  cabinet  had  to  cope  with  a  series  of  problems.  First,  and  most 
important,  of  these  were  the  continuous  communist  attacks  and  the  inadequacy  of  the 
National  Army.  By  early  1947  the  Democratic  Army  had  managed  to  build  an 
impressive  force,  operating  as  bands  or  'groups',  each  consisting  of  seventy  to  one 
hundred  men  and  called  'Military  Formations'.  In  February  1947,  Marcos  had  about 
13,000  fighting  men  organised  in  seven  commands  under  his  authority.  These 
commands  were  in  turn  headed  by  political  commissars  or  'kapetanios'.  The  DA  had 
9  Markezinis  believes  that  the  Maximos  government  was  a  Greek  test  to  find  the  most  acceptable 
combination  to  the  Americans.  He  notes  that  it  served  the  transitional  period  until  the  'real'  application  of 
the  Truman  Doctrine.  Markezinis,  Political  History-HoAmK4  Icropla,  vol.  2,  p.  307.  However,  the 
declaration  of  the  Truman  Doctrine  in  just  two  months  time,  weakens  this  theory. 
10  History  of  the  KKE-J0K1,  U10  Iaroplaq  Tov  KKE,  pp.  564-67. 
11  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/66998  R1524,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  3 
February  1947. 46 
established  pennanent  headquarters  in  the  north-west  comer  of  the  country,  close  to 
Lake  Prespa  on  the  Greek  side  of  the  Albanian  and  Yugoslav  borders.  The  Grammos 
and  Vitsi  mountain  ranges  provided  a  natural  fortress  that  protected  the  Democratic 
Army  against  the  National  Army.  This  location  was  also  near  to  the  Democratic  Army's 
supply  centres  outside  the  country.  12  An  important  factor  that  strengthened  the 
Democratic  Army  was  the  organisation  of  'hit  and  run'  attacks  by  bands  of  communist 
fighters  a  gainst  i  solated  p  olice  a  nd  a  rmy  s  tations.  The  advantage  of  the  'hit  and  run' 
strategy  was  that  it  weakened  the  strength  and  unity  of  the  National  Army  by  spreading 
its  units  into  different  micro-operations.  13  Thus,  the  Democratic  Army  challenged  the 
National  Army  with  guerrilla  warfare. 
On  paper  the  National  Army  should  have  had  little  difficulty  in  crushing  the 
opposition.  The  nominal  strength  of  the  National  Army  at  the  beginning  of  1947  was 
100,000  men,  organised  in  five  divisions  and  seven  independent  brigades;  an  increase  of 
almost  15,000  men  had  been  authorised  as  a  result  of  Spiliotopoulos'  (Chief  of  General 
Stafo  visit  in  London  in  November  1946.14  The  National  Army,  however,  trained  by  the 
British  Military  Miss.  ion  for  regular  warfare,  was  inexperienced  and  ill  equipped  for 
counter-guerrilla  mountain  operations.  15  During  1947,  the  Greek  National  Army 
attempted  to  apply  a  strategy  of  'encirclement'  supported  by  the  British  Military 
Mission  Commander  Rawlins  and  American  officers.  16  This  strategy  involved  attacks 
on  particular  communist  headquarters  or  isolated  communist  hubs.  The  drawback  of  this 
'2  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe,  pp.  203-4.  This  eventually  would  prove  a  decisive  fortress  to  support 
Communist  insurgency  operations. 
13  GES/DIS,  The  Greek  Army  during  the  Bandit  War:  The  First  Year  of  the  Bandit  War  1946-0  EUIVIK6; 
Xro=6;  K=6  'rov  AvTiavppopiaK6v  Aycbva,  (Athens,  197  1),  pp.  65-66;  Th.  Tsakalotos,  Forty  Years 
Soldier  of  Greece-  Eapdvra  Xp6via  ETparicbrqý  Tq(;  EUMoc,  vol.  2,  (Athens,  1960),  p.  5  1. 
14  The  British  government  had  agreed  to  finance  the  improvement  and  increase  of  the  National  Army.  On 
the  Greek-British  economic  agreement  in:  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War-Icropla  Tov 
E,  Ujv1K06  EyýpvAlov  HoAtluov,  vol.  1,  pp.  120-123,237-239. 
13  The  National  Army,  as  already  mentioned,  moved  to  Egypt  after  the  Germans  occupied  Greece  to 
continue  their  serni  normal  activities  in  training  camps  under  the  aegis  of  the  allies. 
16  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/893,  Rawlins,  Review  of  the  Anti-Bandit 
Campaign,  22  October  1947. 47 
strategy  was  that  it  left  many  areas  unprotected  against  the  depredations  of  the 
insurgents.  This  favoured  the  Democratic  Army,  in  that  it  could  counter-attack  after  the 
National  Army  had  withdrawn.  Another  implication  of  this  strategy  was  that  the 
National  Army  needed  high  manpower  levels  to  extend  control  over  the  cleared  targets. 
Thus  'hit  and  run'  warfare  offered  numerous  advantages  to  the  guerrillas.  17 
Several  other  factors  offset  the  DA's  numerical  disadvantages.  An  unknown  but 
significant  number  of  Greek  civilians  were  assisting  the  communist  fight.  "  The  'hit  and 
run')  missions  terrorised  settlements  throughout  Epirus,  Macedonia  and  Thrace  and 
yielded  conscripts  for  the  Democratic  Army. 
The  country's  inadequate  road  system  severely  limited  army  pursuit.  The 
National  Army  had  no  armoured  force,  except  for  a  few  British-made  Centaur  tanks.  But 
these  18-ton  tanks  armed  with  small  50-millimetre  cannons  were  virtually  useless 
because  they  were  unable  to  climb  mountainous  terrain  under  their  own  p  ower.  F  ew 
passageways  in  the  Greek  countryside  were  paved  and  once  motor  vehicles  left  the  main 
arteries,  they  had  to  reduce  s  peeds  toI  ess  t  han  f  ifteen  m  iles  p  er  h  our.  As  ingle  r  oad 
connected  Athens  in  the  south  to  Salonika  in  the  north-east.  Along  the  west  coast  the 
only  north-south  highway  was  the  Yannina-Arta-Agrinion  road.  Across  the  northern  part 
of  the  country,  a  single  west-east  link  ran  from  Yannina  to  Trikala  and  Larissa. 
Moreover,  the  Yannina  road  wound  through  a  low-lying  coastal  stretch  between  sea  and 
mountains  and  provided  an  excellent  opportunity  for  guerrilla  sabotage  and  ambush.  19 
On  18  February,  King  George  H  asked  Norton  and  MacVeagh  to  authorise  an 
increase  in  the  National  Anny's  strength  to  revive  morale  otherwise,  he  feared,  'serious 
and  widespread  breakdown  of  discipline'.  20  The  Maximos  government  would  be  tested 
on  its  ability  to  put  an  end  to  the  warfare  and  bring  peace  and  stability  to  the  country. 
17  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat,  pp.  241-242;  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  pp.  216-18. 
18  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  146. 
19  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  205. 49 
Changing  the  highest  echelon  of  command  would  show  its  determination  to  defeat  the 
enemy.  Consequently,  on  19  February  1947  George  Stratos,  Maximos'  Minister  of  War, 
convened  a  meeting  of  the  Supreme  National  Defence  Council  (ASEA)  with  the  aim  of 
boosting  military  organisation  and  morale.  Lt.  Gen.  Ventiris  replaced  Lt.  General 
Spiliotopoulos  as  Chief  of  General  Staff  although  Spiliotopoulos  was  retained  as  Deputy 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  . 
21  Plans  to  improve  the  equipment  of  the  army,  the  Units  of 
Pursuit  Detachments  (MAD),  the  Units  of  Rural  Defence  (MAY)  and  Commando  units 
were  announced.  22  In  February  1947  the  general  plan  of  the  governmental  forces  was 
war  on  all  fronts.  The  army,  gendarmerie,  MAD  and  MAY  would  all  be  used.  The  army 
thereafter  would  concentrate  in  spring  1947  and  start  continuous  military  attacks  of 
large  scale  and  duration  in  order  to  press  the  enemy  to  the  defeat.  23  The  rest  of  the  forces 
would  focus  on  the  civil  control  of  the  Communists. 
Yet  the  bellicose  rhetoric  emanating  from  the  Greek  government  did  little  to  hide 
its  parlous  state.  It  could  not  afford  to  pay  for  serious  military  operations.  On  17 
February  Paul  Porter  cabled  to  Washington  that  the  Greek  state  was  virtually  bankrupt, 
since  it  spent  more  than  fifty  per  cent  of  the  national  income  on  non-productive 
purposes.  The  budget  deficit  was  vast,  inflation  was  rampant  and  the  Greeks  were 
20  FRUS  (1947):  5,27-28:  MacVeagh  to  Marshall,  19  February  1947. 
21  GES/DIS,  Archives  of  the  Greek  Civil  War  1944-1949-ApXcia  TOv  EUqVIK06  EuýpvAlov  HoMpov  1944- 
1949-(thereafter  cited  as  GESIDIS  Archives-ApXcla)  Av(bTaTov  Euppof)),  tov  Uvwfj;  ARI)va;,  11paKTucd 
q;  I  I"  cmvc5ptdac(o;  Tou  AIEA,  19  Ocppouapiou  1947'(Minutes  of  the  I  la'Meeting  of  Highest  Board 
of  National  Defence-  ASEA,  19  February  194T),  vol.  3,  iceim.  (text)  58,  p.  333.  ASEA  was  composed 
after  the  'Varkiza  Agreement'  in  February  1945  to  co-ordinate  the  armed  forces;  headed  by  the  Prime 
Minister,  Greek  Ministers  of  War,  Navy,  Air  and  the  three  Chiefs  of  General,  Navy,  Air  Staff, 
representatives  of  the  British  and  American  military  missions  were  also  included.  After  the  end  of  the  civil 
war  it  became  General  Staff  of  National  Defence  (rEEGA). 
22  Lack  of  discipline  and  organisation  were  among  the  main  drawbacks  of  the  NA.  Tsakalotos,  Forty 
Years  Soldier  of  Greece  -  Eap6vTa  Xp6via  EipaTioýýq  rj,;,  EUd6oq,  pp.  52-55. 
23  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXcia,  Avagopd  ITpaTof)  4  Ocppovapiou  1947  (Army  Report,  4  February  1947), 
vol  3,  kcim.  42b,  p.  259.  The  war  preparations  had  already  started  since  the  days  of  Lt.  Gen. 
Spiliotopoulos  to  be  accomplished  and  further  enlarged  under  Lt.  Gen.  Ventiris.  The  new  plan  differed  to 
the  old  one  in  that  the  DA  would  be  fought  all  over  the  country,  as  opposed  to  the  local  nuclei  throughout 
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overcome  by  a  sense  of  national  helplessness  manifested  in  the  conviction  that  the 
country  should  be  taken  care  of  by  its  rich  allies.  24 
On  the  same  day  the  Foreign  Office  also  concluded  that  there  were  three  ways  in 
which  the  situation  in  Greece  could  evolve.  First,  if  Britain  and  the  United  States  agreed 
to  aid  the  country  jointly  after  31  March,  or,  if  the  Americans  undertook  to  shoulder  the 
entire  burden  the  Greek  government  would  fight  it  out  with  the  communists  to  the  bitter 
end.  Second,  if  Britain  and  the  United  States  decided  to  abandon  the  country,  the  Greek 
National  Army  might  still  manage  to  crush  the  guerrillas  during  the  campaign  planned 
for  the  spring.  This  seemed  a  doubtful  prospect,  however,  as,  according  to  Norton,  the 
Democratic  Army  was  now  operating  throughout  Thrace,  Macedonia,  Thessaly,  and  the 
Peloponnese  with  a  high  standard  of  organisation,  discipline,  and  morale.  Third,  if 
Western  aid  ceased  on  31  March,  and  the  guerrillas  survived  the  spring  campaign,  the 
morale  of  the  N  ational  Army  w  ould  p  robably  c  ollap  se  and  its  units  would  panic  and 
dissolve.  Maximos'  cabinet  would  then  be  compelled  to  negotiate  terms  with  the 
communists  from  a  disadvantageous  if  not  hopeless  position.  25  Norton  stressed  the  need 
to  continue  assisting  Greece  using  familiar  geopolitical  arguments.  The  threat  of  a 
political  breakdown  in  Athens,  in  the  light  of  the  communist  uprising,  would  render 
Greece  highly  vulnerable  to  Soviet  imperialism.  26  This  would  damage  the  security  of 
Europe  and  the  Western  world.  It  would  affect  areas  of  particular  importance  for 
Britain:  the  sea  routes  of  the  Mediterranean  and  the  Middle  East.  The  Soviet  threat  to 
Turkey  and  Iran,  coupled  with  the  civil  war  in  Greece  were  interpreted  as  threatening 
Europe  and  the  Northern  Tier.  The  threat  of  Soviet  imperialism  in  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean  gave  the  impetus,  therefore,  for  keeping  Greece  within  the  British  sphere 
24  FRUS  (1947):  5,20:  Paul  Porter  to  Clayton,  17  February  1947. 
25  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67000  R2359,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  14 
February  1947. 
26  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67032  R1900,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  5 
February  1947. 50 
of  influence.  The  Greeks  were  told  of  the  'permanent'  and  'unchangeable'  nature  of 
British  interests  in  the  area  and  in  the  political  developments  of  the  country.  27 
The  Truman  Doctrine 
Geopolitical  arguments  were  not,  however,  the  whole  story.  The  bleak  prospects 
of  the  Greek  goverriment  were  matched  by  the  bleak  prospects  of  the  British 
government.  British  financial  problems  preoccupied  Whitehall.  The  issue  of  whether  or 
not  to  extend  financial  assistance  to  Greece,  an  obligation  that  expired  in  March  1947, 
dominated  the  ministers'  agenda.  On  29  January,  Hugh  Dalton,  the  Chancellor  of  the 
Exchequer  sent  a  note  to  Prime  Minister  Attlee  arguing  that  in  light  of  the  weak  British 
economy  aid  to  Greece  should  be  reduced.  The  Chancellor  warned  the  Prime  Minister 
that  the  British  cabinet  should  judge  national  defence  'not  only  against  the  more  distant 
possibility  of  armed  aggression,  but  also  against  the  far  more  immediate  risk  of 
economic  and  financial  overstrain  and  collapse'.  28  Ranged  against  Dalton  were  the 
Minister  of  Defence,  Albert  Alexander  and,  more  importantly,  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
Ernest  Bevin.  Bevin  argued  that  Britain  should  finance  an  expansion  of  the  Greek 
National  Army.  To  balance  increased  aid  to  Greece,  British  forces  in  Greece  would  be 
reduced  to  one  brigade  of  four  battalions,  which  would  itself  withdraw  after  the  retreat 
of  the  Red  Army  from  Bulgaria.  Bevin's  plan  garnered  support  from  the  Chiefs  of  Staff 
The  British  govemment  had  a  clear  choice  set  before  it.  29 
On  II  February  Hugh  Dalton  asked  for  a  final  decision  on  ending  aid  to  Greece 
which,  in  his  view,  'from  the  end  of  the  war  onwards  had  received  thirty  nine  million 
11  YrIHPEEIA  IETOPIKOY  APXEIOY-SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVE,  ATHENS  (YIA), 
1947,86.1,16740,  Avayopdt  Tou  npcapmý  Ayvi8q  (yTqv  Ekkqvucý  rIpcapeta  A01jv6)v,  23  Iavouaptou 
1947  (Ambassador  Agnidis'  Report  to  the  Greek  Embassy  in  Athens,  23  January  1947).  This  note 
confutes  the  revisionist  argument  that  the  Greek  government  had  nothing  to  expect  from  London  after 
March  1947.  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  236. 
28  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  T  236/1037,11  January  1947;  H.  Dalton,  High  Tide  and 
After:  Memoirs  1945-1960  (London,  1962),  pp.  193,197. 
29  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  129/16  C.  P.  (47)  34,  Policy  towards  Greece  and 
Turkey,  25  January  1947. 51 
pounds,  almost  without  result'.  If  the  British  cabinet  desired  to  save  money,  he  argued, 
it  would  have  to  'start  immediately,  by  cutting  the  expenses  towards  Greece'.  Greek 
instability  and  the  inability  of  its  politicians  to  work  together  to  improve  their  country 
reinforced  Dalton's  scepticism  about  the  value  of  further  aid.  He  complained  to  Bevin 
that  'the  Greeks  were  not  helping  themselves.  30 
Bevin  himself  was  in  a  quandary.  On  one  hand,  he  believed  that  the  KKE  should 
be  contained.  On  the  other  hand,  he  recognised  that  the  Greeks  remained  incapable  of 
defending  themselves  and  the  burden  on  Britain  was  heavy.  The  British  Foreign 
Secretary  therefore  turned  to  the  United  States  to  seek  assistance.  31  The  two  British 
ministers  agreed  that  the  United  States  would  be  asked  to  subsidise  the  Greek  fight 
against  communism  and  western  interests  in  the  area.  Bevin  cabled  'a  strong  telegram  to 
the  United  States  for  the  sole  purpose  of  bringing  matters  to  a  head'.  Attlee  consented  to 
an  attempt  to  make  'the  Americans  face  up  to  the  facts  in  the  eastern  Mediterranean'.  32 
On  21  February,  Lord  Inverchapel,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Washington,  was 
instructed  to  deliver  a  note  to  George  Marshall,  the  American  Secretary  of  State, 
announcing  that,  given  British  financial  woes,  Britain  could  not  sustain  its  assistance  to 
Greece  after  the  end  of  March  1947.33 
Anglo-American  negotiations  followed  the  British  note.  The  Truman 
administration  was  in  little  doubt  that  if  the  British  could  not  contain  the  communists  in 
30  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67032  R2440,  Dalton  to  Bevin,  13  February  1947. 
31  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67032  R2443,  Dalton  to  Attlee,  II  February  1947. 
32  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  800/468/GRE/37/2,  Memorandum  Bcvin,  18  February 
1947. 
33  YrIHPEZIA  IETOPIKOY  APXEIOY-SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVE,  ATHENS 
(YIA),  1947,46.1,21503,  Avagop6rrou  Tac0,86pl  aro  I`cvuc6  Ent'rexcio  T.  Tp=6,21  Mapriol)  1947 
(Tsaldaris'  Report  to  GES,  21  March  1947);  FRUS  (1947):  5,32-37:  British  Embassy  to  State 
Department  21  February  1947;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67032  R  1900, 
Foreign  Office  to  Washington,  21  February  1947.  There  are  various  interpretations  of  the  British  decision 
to  withdraw  aid  from  Greece:  saving  manpower,  political  pressure  from  the  leftist  part  of  the  Labour 
government  and  public  opinion,  financial  necessity,  apply  pressure  on  America,  change  of  strategic 
priorities,  deliberate  plot  of  the  British  government  to  force  the  Americans  to  enter  the  international  arena. 
In  R.  Frazier,  Anglo-American  Relations  with  Greece,  pp.  132-156.  The  most  convincing  possible  reason 
focuses  on  creating  a  joint  Anglo-American  alliance  to  contain  communism  in  the  area.  Jones,  A  New 
Kind  of  War,  p.  3  3. 52 
the  Eastern  Mediterranean  alone,  the  Americans  would  have  to  join  in.  34  This  did  not 
mean,  however,  that  they  were  necessarily  willing  to  accept  a  British  timetable  or  a 
British  prescription  for  action.,  As  a  necessary  prelude  to  any  Anglo-American 
agreement  the  Americans  demanded  the  continuation  of  the  British  presence  in  Greece 
and  co-operation  in  coping  with  the  civil  war.  Greece  would  be  included  in  the 
American  sphere  of  interests  but  the  British  had  also  to  support  the  undertaking.  35 
London  welcomed  the  American  response.  If  the  Americans  agreed  to  share  the 
burden  then  London  would  agree  to  loan  the  Greeks  two  million  pounds  for  the 
maintenance  of  their  army  until  June  1947.  The  British  would  also  retain  five  thousand 
men  in  Greece,  as  well  as  non-combatant  forces,  and  would  assist  the  Greek  army  and 
the  Americans  in  organising  the  anti-Communist  campaign.  On  3  March,  Ernest  Bevin 
announced  that  British  troops  would  remain  in  Greece.  However,  their  number  would  be 
reduced  in  April  to  five  thousand  men.  36  Contrary  to  t  he  v  iew  oft  he  h  istorians  w  ho 
claim  that  the  British  note  signified  the  end  of  a  significant  British  role  in  Greece, 
Anglo-American  negotiations  yielded  a  condominium  of  the  United  States  and  Britain 
in  Greek  affairs.  37  On  12  March,  the  Truman  doctrine,  expounded  to  Congress  by  the 
President  af  ew  d  ays  a  fter  t  he  conclusion  of  Anglo-American  negotiations  on  Greece 
was  greeted  with  enthusiasm  by  the  British.  38 
34  H.  Truman,  Memoirs:  1946-1952,  vol.  2,  (London,  1956),  pp.  124-25;  M.  P.  Leffler,  A  Preponderance 
ofPower  (Stanford,  1992),  pp.  144-146. 
35  FRUS  (1947):  5,72,79-8  1:  State  Department  to  British  Embassy  in  London,  I  March  1947;  PUBLIC 
RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  131/5,  DO  (47)  6,  Cabinet  Defence  Committee,  3  March  1947; 
FO  371/67034  R  3190,  British  Embassy  to  the  State  Department,  4  March  1947. 
36  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  T  236/1038,  OF  48/39/1,3  March  1947;  FRUS  (1947):  5, 
87:  The  Secretary  of  State  (Marshall)  the  Embassy  in  Greece,  4  March  1947;  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  131/5,  DO  (47)  6,3  March  1947;  FO  371/67034  R3190,  British  Embassy  to 
the  State  Department,  4  March  1947;  CAB  128/9,  CM  30  (47)  2,  Cabinet  decision  to  confirm  maintenance 
of  BMM  in  Greece,  18  March  1947. 
37  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War-Io-ropla  Tov  EUjviKo6  Ey(pvAlov,  vol.  1,  p.  429.  Vlavianos, 
Greece  1941-1949,  p.  15  1;  Jones,  A  New  Kind  of  War,  pp.  17-3  5.  This  argument  is  approached  mainly  by 
revisionist  historians. 
38  Declaration  of  the  Truman  Doctrine,  www.  whistlestop.  org,  12  March  1947;  The  Truman  Doctrine  has 
been  considered  as  a  revolution,  which  made  the  United  States  abandon  isolation.  For  those  writers  who 
perceive  a  revolution,  see:  Harry  S.  Truman,  Memoirs  (New  York,  1956),  p.  106;  F.  F.  Lincoln,  United 
States'Aid  to  Greece,  1947-1962  (Germantown,  1975),  p.  166;  W. H.  McNeill,  Greece:  American  Aid  on 53 
The  Greek  government  too  was  pleased  with  this  double  alliance.  President 
Truman  received  grateful  reports  from  Prime  Minister  Maximos  and  Liberal  leader 
Sofoulis,  who  declared  that  the  American  help  would  serve  'the  aim  of  reconstructing 
and  rehabilitating  peace  and  freedom'  and  that  all  Greek  requests  for  help  from  the 
United  States  'have  become  true'.  39  On  18  March,  Vice-Premier  and  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  Tsaldaris  cabled  the  Chiefs  of  Staff,  War  and  Finance  Offices  that,  to  his  great 
relief,  the  British  government  would  offer  the  NA  two  million  pounds  for  military 
equipment  and  another  one  million  pounds  for  economic  assistance  until  the  Congress 
ratified  the  financial  assistance  to  Greece.  40  The  right-wing  world,  according  to  the 
newspaper  Kathimerini  declared  that  salvation  now  had  two  fronts:  America  and 
England  . 
41  Tsaldaris  declared  that  he  'continued  to  remain  faithful  primarily  to  Great 
Action,  1947-1956  (New  York,  1957),  p.  35.  More  balanced  interpretations  against  a  revolution  include: 
J.  L.  Gaddis,  The  United  States  and  the  Origins  of  Cold  War  (New  York,  1972),  p.  318;  B.  R.  Kuniholm, 
Origins  of  the  Cold  War  in  Near  East  (New  York,  1980),  p.  427.  MacVeagh  insisted  that  the  northern  tier 
was  the  'front  line'  between  the  'two  parts  of  the  world'  and  that  the  Greeks  were  in  the  'front-line 
trenches'.  Leffler  writes  that  the  Truman  Doctrine  was  the  US  policy  to  counterbalance  Soviet  influence  in 
the  Middle  East  and  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  scheduled  since  1946.  Leffler,  A  Preponderance  of 
Power,  p.  12  1.  Critics  of  the  Truman  Doctrine  include:  W.  A.  Williams,  The  Tragedy  of.  4  merican 
Diplomacy  (New  York,  1959);  Wittrier,  American  Intervention;  Sfikas  writes  that  'the  policy  of  support  to 
authoritarian  and  repressive  right-wing  regimes  in  the  name  of  freedom'  have  been  applied,  in  Sfikas,  The 
British  Labour  Government  and  the  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  143.  Among  defenders  of  the  Truman  Doctrine: 
H.  Feis,  From  Trust  to  Terror  (New  York,  1966);  J.  L.  Gaddis,  Strategies  of  Containment  (New  York, 
1982);  B.  R.  Kuniholm,  The  Origins  of  the  Cold  War  in  the  Near  East  (New  York,  1980);  D.  R.  McCoy, 
The  Presidency  ofHarry  S.  Truman  (U.  Press  of  Kansas,  1984).  The  Truman  Doctrine  was  significant  in 
that  it  was  the  first  step  in  containing  communism;  it  nonetheless  left  a  number  of  unresolved  questions 
regarding  the  duration  of  American  aid,  not  solved  before  NATO  creation.  A.  Bullock,  The  Life  and 
Times  ofErnest  Bevin  (London,  1983),  pp.  470-47  1.  Bullock,  as  opposed  to  the  historians  who  believe 
that  the  Truman  Doctrine  was  the  American  response  to  the  British  note  to  abandon  Greece,  deems  that  it 
was  a  diplomatic  success  on  Bevin's  part  to  divert  the  American  approaches  over  Greece  so  as  to  gain 
American  protection  of  the  Middle  East,  accordingly,  British  presence  in  Greece  was  the  price  the  British 
had  to  pay  to  keep  the  Americans  in  the  Mediterranean. 
39  YrIHPEZIA  IETOPIKOY  APXEIOY-SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVE,  ATHENS  (YIA), 
1947,129.1,1614,  Ava(popd  Tou  I'l.  Otxov6gou-rKoýpa  aito  qv  Mjvucý  r1peapcia  GqV  O1UdLGtyKT0V 
aTov  r1peAvicoupy6  M64týto,  II  Mapriou  1947  (Report  by  P.  Economou-Gouras  from  Greek  Embassy  in 
Washington  to  Prertiier  Maximos,  II  March  1947). 
"'  YnHPEEIA  IETOPIKOY  APXEIOY-SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVE,  ATHENS  (YIA), 
1947,46.1,21502,  Avagopdrou  TaaX86pij  7rpo;,  co  I-EE,  18  Mapriou  1947  (Tsaidaris'  Report  to  GES, 
18  March  1947). 
41  Kathimerini,  16  March  1947.  On  the  contrary  liberal  newspaper  To  Vima  stressed  that  America  would 
undermine  Greek  independence  whereas  Rizospastis  declared  that  the  Left  would  continue  fighting.  In  To 
Vima,  14  March  1947;  Rizospastis,  14  March  1947. 54 
Britain.  942  To  the  western  world  and  the  pro-westerners  the  Truman  Doctrine  signified 
the  strengthening  of  western  ties  and  security  under  an  Anglo-American  front.  It 
signified  neither  the  end  of  British  commitment  in  Greece  nor  the  end  of  Britain  as  a 
world  power. 
43 
The  War  in  Greece 
One  of  the  major  reasons  why  the  Greeks  continued  to  look  to  Britain  was  the 
reality  of  military  operations.  The  rhetoric  of  the  Truman  doctrine  was  vital  for  the  long- 
tenn  future  of  Greece.  Yet  the  Greek  state  could,  all  too  easily,  have  collapsed  in 
military  defeat  in  1947  before  American  aid  made  itself  felt. 
In  February  1947  the  KKE  Politburo  had  decided  to  give  priority  to  the  military 
struggle.  Nicos  Zahariadis,  the  General  Secretary  of  the  KKE,  informed  his  mentor, 
Stalin,  in  a  memorandum  dated  13  May  1947,  that  'the  Political  Bureau  of  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  KKE  [  ...  ]  consider  the  armed  struggle  as  the  most  important'.  44  By 
the  spring  of  1947  the  Communists  had  committed  themselves  to  an  all  out  armed 
confrontation  with  the  government.  Indeed,  contrary  to  the  claims  of  pro-leftist 
historians,  who  claim  that  it  was  the  'white  terror'  that  had  caused  the  KKE  to  act  in 
self-defence,  the  Party  had  a  clear  intention  of  seizing  power  through  military  victory.  45 
On  6  April  1947,  Nicos  Zahariadis  crossed  the  border  to  visit  Moscow  and 
Belgade  to  discuss  the  military  option  with  his  c  omrades.  0n  17  April,  hew  rote  to 
Marcos  that  'the  problem  of  re-provisioning  had  already  been  solved'.  The  Democratic 
Anny  would  have  as  its  main  objective  'the  capture  of  Salonika'  and  should  create  a 
42  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67003  R6476,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  8  May 
1947. 
43  Markezinis,  Political  History-HoAITIK4  IOTopfa,,  vol.  2,  p.  291;  Vlavianos,  History  of  Greece,  p.  236; 
Veremis,  The  Military  in  Greek  Politics,  p.  15  1;  Stavrianos,  Greece:  American  Opportunity,  pp.  184-185. 
"  Quoted  from  the  14  December  1947  edition  of  A  ygi  by  0.  L.  Smith,  'Self-Defence  and  Communist 
Policy',  in  Baerentzen,  Iatrides,  Smith  (eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War,  1945-1949,  p. 
175.  The  decision  was  subsequently  taken  with  the  understanding  that  both  the  Soviets  and  the  Yugoslavs 
would  provide  the  necessary  material  help. 55 
16 
'free  domain'  in  Macedonia,  Thrace  and  probably  Epirus.  in  May  Zahariadis  assured 
Stalin  that  the  Party  was  capable  of  beating  the  Maximos  government  and  coul  raise  an 
army  of  50,000  men  to  liberate  northern  Greece  with  the  'assistance  of  all  our  foreign 
friends'.  47  On  27  June,  Miltiadis  Porfyroyennis,  representing  the  KKE  Central 
Committee,  told  Eleventh  Congress  of  the  French  Communist  Party  in  Strasbourg  that 
henceforth  'all  of  the  political,  military  and  international  conditions  existed  for  the 
creation  of  a  Free  Government  in  Greece'.  He  demanded  the  support  of  all  Communist 
parties  in  the  struggle  for  final  victory.  48 
The  military  i  mPlications  oft  his  c  all  e  merged  o  ver  t  he  s  urnmer  of  1947.  T  he 
Communists  decided  to  abandon  their  guerrilla  strategy,  create  a  conventional  army  and 
fight  a  positional  war  against  the  National  Army.  49  On  11  September,  the  Third  Plenum 
proceeded  to  formulate  the  strategic  dimension  of  the  KKE's  plan  to  seize  power.  The 
new  strategy  was  based  upon  the  'Lakes  Plan'  -  the  creation  of  a  free  area  in  Macedonia 
and  Thrace  with  Salonika  as  its  centre.  This  area  would  be  held  by  a  Democratic  Army 
50 
triple  in  size  to  around  60,000  men  by  the  spring  of  1948. 
45  History  of  the  KKE-JOKIP10  Iaroplaq  TOv  KKE,  pp.  564-569;  0.  Smith,  'Self-Defence,  in  Baerentzen, 
Iatrides,  Smith  (eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War,  1945-1949,  p.  160. 
46  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  pp.  238-240. 
47  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  240.  It  has  been  suggested  that  after  Zahariadis'  discussion  with 
Zhdanov,  Stalin  promised  the  KKE  full  support.  Moreover,  that  Zahariadis,  after  being  re-assured  of 
Stalin's  support,  asked  Tito  and  Dimitrov  their  supplementary  military  assistance.  J.  Baev  (ed.  ),  The 
Greek  Civil  War  in  Greece-O  Eyýp6Aioq  176)xpoq  ainv  EW&a  (Athens,  1997),  pp.  143-146. 
48  Woodhouse,  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  212;  Eudes,  The  Kapetanios,  p.  296.  The  Central  Committee  of  the 
KKE  met  in  Belgrade  in  September  1947  with  only  six  out  of  the  twenty-five  regular  members  of  the  CC 
in  attendance.  The  resolutions  of  this  plenum,  one  of  the  most  controversial  in  the  history  of  the  KKE, 
presented  Marcos  and  the  other  advocates  of  guerrilla  warfare  with  afait  accompli.  The  ad  hoc  CC 
changed  the  military,  political  and  strategic  dimension  of  the  Party.  KKE  Official  Documents  1945-1949- 
KKE  Er!  677pa  Kelpeva  1945-1949,  vol.  6,  pp.  245-247. 
49  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  261.  The  author  believes  that  the  decision  for  transition  was  'ill-timed' 
and  'ill-advised'  and  led  the  KKE  to  defeat  because  its  recruitment  and  military  problems  had  not  been 
solved.  For  a  leftist  critic  of  the  decision  to  convert  to  conventional  warfare  see:  S.  Vukmanovic,  How  and 
Ry  The  Peoples'Liberation  Struggle  Met  with  Defeat  (London,  1950). 
so  0.  L.  Smith,  'Communist  Perceptions,  Strategy  and  Tactics,  1945-1949',  in  J.  latrides,  W.  Linda  (eds.  ), 
Greece  at  the  Crossroads.  The  Civil  War  and  its  Legacy  (Pennsylvania,  1995),  p.  107.  In  that  article, 
material  from  the  newspaper  Avgi  published  in  1979-1980  is  examined;  accordingly  the  official  version  of 
the  KKE  that  the  Third  Plenum  took  place  in  the  mountains  on  12-15  September  1947  is  refuted.  KKE, 
Qfficial  Documents  1945-1949-Em677ya  KciyEva  1945-1949,  vol.  6,  p.  245.  The  Umnes  Plan'  was  bound 
to  fail,  as  it  required  tripling  of  its  strength  in  a  short  time  and  the  necessary  assistance  from  abroad  had 56 
The  aggression  and  confidence  of  the  KKE  caused  uproar  in  Greece.  The  Right 
accused  the  KKE  of  threatening  to  undermine  the  territorial  integrity  of  Greece.  The 
leader  of  the  opposition  party,  Sofoulis,  accused  the  Maximos  government  and  the  Right 
of  not  having  put  down  the  Communist  claims  for  power.  The  Left  greeted 
Porfyroyennis'  announcements  with  concern.  Some  members  of  the  EAM  tried  to 
interpret  his  statement  a  merely  a  political  gambit.  51  Indeed  the  Central  Commission  of 
EAM  proposed  to  the  government  its  own  plan  to  lessen  tension.  They  suggested  that 
EAM  s  hould  t  ake  p  art  int  he  c  abinet,  t  hat  ag  eneral.  a  mnesty  should  be  declared  that 
Parliament  should  be  dissolved,  and  that  the  anti-Communist  intelligence  organisations 
should  be  disanned. 
The  Greek  government  was  far  from  sanguine,  however.  Maximos  interpreted 
Zahariadis'  visit  to  Moscow  as  constituting  a  formal  authorisation  from  Stalin  to  create 
a  communist  'Free'  government.  52  This  raised  the  danger  that  any  territory  lost  in 
northern  Greece  might  never  be  won  back.  Governmental  Greece  would  shrink  and 
'Free'  Greece  would  grow  until  the  latter  choked  the  fonner.  In  the  light  of  this  new 
danger,  the  leaders  of  the  opposition,  the  liberal  Sofoulis  and  the  conservative 
Tsouderos  made  an  attempt  to  reach  a  political  compromise  between  the  communists 
and  the  government.  Prime  Minister  Maximos  made  it  clear,  however,  that  the  only  way 
for  reconciliation  with  the  KKE  to  occur  was  if  the  Communists  laid  down  their  arms. 
In  p  ractice  nop  arty  f  elt  itw  as  sow  eak  that  it  had  to  capitulate  and  the  negotiations 
carne  to  a  fruitless  end.  Their  aftermath  was  ferocious  govenunent  campaign  against  the 
Left.  On  9  July,  three  thousand  KKE  sympathisers  were  arrested  on  the  pretext  that  a 
not  been  secured.  The  plan  of  the  KKE  to  take  over  before  the  Americans  could  penetrate  militarily  into 
Greece  was  not  viable,  as  the  KKE  had  no  military  means  to  support  its  plans.  51  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-Icropla  TOv  EUqviKob  EOvovq,  vol.  16  (Athens,  2000),  p.  143. 
52  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe-Oom6  Kai  TacKo6pi,  p.  224.  Unfortunately,  there  are  no  records  available  to 
verify  the  agenda  of  the  meeting. 57 
communist  revolt  was  imminent.  53  Even  the  American  Ambassador  MacVeagh  had 
doubts  at  to  the  wisdom  of  these  draconian  measures.  54 
By  the  spring  of  1947  the  Democratic  Army  had  occupied  wide  expanses  of 
territory  to  which  the  governmental  forces  had  no  access.  The  one  advantage  that 
accrued  to  the  Greek  National  Army  -  an  advantage  that  was  to  be  accentuated  by  the 
Communists'  evolving  strategy  -  was  that  for  the  first  time  they  had  a  tangible  target. 
The  National  Army  planned,  given  the  victories  of  the  Democratic  Army  in  the 
mountains  of  northern  Greece,  to  clear  the  rebels  from  the  south  to  the  north.  The  focal 
point  of  operations  would,  therefore,  be  central  Greece.  Here  government  forces  hoped 
to  achieve  two  objectives.  First,  to  cut  the  route  for  supplies  and  reserves  to  the  south 
and,  second,  to  cut  the  line  of  retreat  to  neighbouring  countries.  The  area  in  which  the 
counter-attack  would  start  included  the  regions  north  of  Karpenisi,  and  Mount  Agrafa, 
to  the  cities  of  Karditsa  and  Trikala.  The  whole  operation  was  given  the  code-name 
'Terminus',  symbolising  the  aim  of  the  National  Army  to  put  an  end  not  only  to  the 
55 
military  power  of  the  rebels  but  the  political  and  social  upheaval  in  Greece  as  well. 
Four.  operations  would  form  the  main  Operation  Terminus.  First,  was  Operation  Aetos 
(Mount  Agrafa,  Aheloos  river,  Nevropoli,  Koziakas,  Metsovo)  starting  on  5  April  with 
estimated  duration  of  fifteen  days.  56  Second,  was  Operation  Ierax  (Hasia,  Antihasia, 
53  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe-ft-rid  Kai  T=06pl,  p.  244.  Partsalidis,  Passalidis,  Loulis,  Gavriilidis  from 
the  Political  Bureau  of  the  KKE  included.  Arrests  were  followed  by  exile  without  trial  to  camps  of 
concentration  in  Makronisos  for  the  conscripts,  Trikeri  for  the  detainees,  Yaros  for  the  convicted. 
54  FRUS  (1947):  5,23  1:  MacVeagh  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  13  July  1947. 
55  FENIKO  EIIITEAEIO  ZTPATOY  /AIEYE)YNI;  H  ILTOPIAM  ETPATOY,  ATHENS  (FgZ/AlZ),  1947, 
1067/A/44,  Avagop6t  Atot",  roý)  ITpmrid;  AvTtcrrpdLTijyoi)  A.  FtavTt;  ý,  3  MapTioi)  1947  (Lt.  Gen. 
D.  Giantzis'  Report,  3  March  1947);  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXcla,  rEI  7[pog  A  icat  B  ld)g=  ITpaTob, 
'EittXcipqaq  N6Tta  kai  AI)TU(d  Tou  MadxRwva,  8  (Deppouapiou  1947'(GES  to  A  and  B  Army  Corps, 
'Operations  in  the  South  and  West  of  Alialanona'  8  February  1947),  vol.  3,  keimeno  45,  p.  285.  The  south 
to  north  modus  operandi  had  been  perceived  before  the  replacement  of  Spiliotopoulos;  to  be  perfected 
during  the  spring  under  Ventiris.  GES/DIS,  Archives-  ApXcla,  1,1  i:  TpaT,  d  -  rcvuc6  ZXt8jo  I:  TpaTtd;  Sta  TqV 
8tc4aymýv  T(ov  cmxetpýac(ov  TEPMINOYZ,  10  MapTioi)  1947'(1  st  Army  Group,  General  Plan  of  the 
Terminus  Operation,  10  March  1947),  vol.  3,  keim.  73,  p.  398.;  GES/DIS,  Archives-  Apvcla,  "  ZTPaTid, 
,  rcvtK6  IXt8to  Irp=t4  Sta  qv  &4aycoyýv  T(av  cnqctpýac(ov  TEPMINOYI,  10  MapTtoi)  1947'(1  Army 
Group,  General  Plan  of  the  Terminus  Operation,  10  March  1947),  vol.  3,  keirrL73,  p.  402. 
56  GES/DIS,  Archives-Apvela,  B  16ga  F.  Tporrob,  'AtaTayý  Eicqctpý=ov-  Yuv0qgcrrtK6  6voRa  'AcT6;  ',  23 
MapTiOl)  1947'  (B  Army  Corps,  'Operation  Command,  Code  name  'Eagle',  23  March  1947),  vol.  4,  keim. 58 
Kambounia)  planned  to  last  for  ten  days  starting  on  11  May.  Third,  was  Operations 
Korax  (north  of  Metsovo  to  the  Albanian  border,  Kastoria)  and  Kuknos  (Mount 
Olympos,  Pieria).  Finally  Operation  Pelargos  (Mount  Ossa,  Pylio)  was  due  for  launch  in 
July  depending  on  the  success  of  its  predecessors. 
The  British  lay  at  the  centre  of  'Terminus'.  The  command  of  the  National  Army 
was  a  joint  Anglo-Greek  effort.  The  decisions  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  National 
Defence  were  taken  by  the  Greek  Prime  Minister,  the  Ministers  of  Air  and  Navy,  the 
Chiefs  of  the  General  Staff,  Navy  and  Air  sitting  alongside  the  commanders  of  the 
British  Military  Mission,  the  British  Naval  Mission  and  British  Air  Mission.  "  Yet 
'Terminus'  did  not  meet  its  target.  Although  the  Democratic  Army  under  the  command 
of  Marcos  Vafeiadis  lacked  both  men  and  munitions,  they  were  able  to  mount  a  number 
of  successful  'hit  and  run'  missions  against  the  attackers  whilst  themselves  avoiding 
58  being  pinned  down  in  protracted  battles.  The  Communists  had  a  wholly  superior 
intelligence  operation  to  the  government.  The  command  of  the  Democratic  Army  was 
very  often  informed  about  the  plans  of  the  National  Army  before  the  attacks  themselves 
took  place.  Many  units  of  the  NA  became  demoralised  by  their  lack  of  effectiveness. 
Moreover  the  mountains  and  inaccessible  landscape  protected  the  Democratic  Army 
defenders.  59  Although  the  government  force  eventually  cleared  the  ground,  its 
cumbersome  operations  seemed  lack-lustre  when  compared  to  communist  daring. 
4,  p.  56;  D.  Zafeiropoulos,  Anti-Bandit  War,  1945-1949-OAvriavupopiaK6qAyo5v,  1945-1949  (Athens, 
1956),  p.  224;  GES/DIS,  Archives-  ApXE!  a,  8il  McpaXFia  rpaycto  rl),  T1poqopt6)v  A2,  'AO-Tio 
IIXýpoyoptd)v,  28  MapTiou  1947'(8d'  division,  Information  Office  A2,28  March  1947),  vol.  4,  keim.  8b, 
pp.  79-80.  According  to  the  estimations  of  the  Information  Office  of  the  8"'  division  the  number  of  the 
insurgents  in  the  Operation  Aetos  area  rose  to  approximately  2,000  men.  The  Greek  historian  D.  Botsikas 
writes  that  the  guerrilla  forces  in  the  Operation  Aetos  area  did  not  exceed  the  1,200-1,500  men. 
Zafeiropoulos  agrees  with  the  estimations  of  the  Information  Office  of  the  86'  division.  Zafeiropoulos, 
Anti-Bandit  War-0  Av-rtavpqqpiaK6q  Ayd5v,  1945-1949,  p.  224. 
57  GES/DIS,  Archives-  ApXcla,  AV6)TaTov  ZuRpobktov  EOvtKfl;  AR-6vil;  23  (Deppovaplou  1947  (Supreme 
Council  of  National  Defence,  23  February  1947),  vol.  3,  keirn.  58,  p.  333. 
5'T.  Psimenos,  Rebel  in  Agrafa  1946-1950-Avr4Mq  ar'Aypaýpa  1946-1950  (Athens,  1985),  pp.  78-79. 
59  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-  IcTopla  Tov  EUqV1K06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  145.  According  to  Woodhouse 
the  weaknesses  of  the  NA  consisted  of.  low  morale,  shortage  of  manpower,  Marcos's  tactical  astuteness  in 
launching  a  major  diversionary  attack.  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  205-207. 59 
An  additional  reason  for  the  failure  of  the  National  Anny  to  decisively  defeat  the 
communists  was  the  'Epirus  Manoeuvre'  executed  by  the  DA  by  the  beginning  of  July 
1947.  The  8h  division  of  the  National  Army,  having  turned  its  attention  towards  Mount 
Grammos,  had  lcft  unguarded  the  exits  to  Konitsa  and  Ioannina.  The  command  of  the 
Democratic  Army  grasped  the  opportunity  to  launch  attacks  in  the  Epirus  area  from  7 
July.  On  that  day  the  8th  and  15'h  divisions  of  the  National  Army  were  about  to  attack 
the  forces  of  the  Democratic  Army  in  the  area  of  Eptahorion.  Two  of  the  commands  of 
the  Democratic  Army  attacked  the  forces  of  the  National  An-ny  at  the  point  were  the 
latter  were  scheduled  to  meet  and  co-ordinate  their  forces.  That  was  the  weak  point  of 
the  National  Army.  The  Democratic  Army  attacked  with  approximately  one  thousand 
five  hundred  men  (three  battalions  and  one  party  of  two  companies  from  the  Hasia 
command  and  another  three  battalions  from  the  Epirus  command).  The  tactic  aimed  at 
breaking  the  pincer  movement  of  the  NA  at  first  and  then  beating  the  enemy  from  the 
rear.  The  first  success  of  the  Democratic  Army  came  on  the  night  of  6  to  7  July.  Parts  of 
the  8h  division  of  the  NA  in  Zouzouli  area  were  forced  to  retreat.  The  advance  of  the 
governmental  forces  was  stopped  . 
60  Simultaneously,  however,  successful  counter- 
attacks  occurred  against  the  15th  division.  61 
Epirus,  the  Democratic  Army's  hub,  became  the  focal  point  of  the  warfare.  On 
12  July,  the  National  Army  was  overcome  in  Derveni.  This  development  caused  panic  to 
the  national  forces,  which  started  evacuating  the  Grammos  area  to  cover  the  interior  of 
Epirus.  The  8  th  division  turned  to  Konitsa  and  a  great  part  of  the  9th  division,  scheduled 
to  attack  Grammos,  was  sent  to  Ioannina  by  track.  The  next  day,  the  Democratic  Army 
troops  occupied  the  Bourazani  bridge  threatening  the  road  to  Ioannina.  Eventually  the 
situation  was  stabilised  in  favour  of  the  NA.  New  government  air  and  land  forces 
60  Zafeiropoulos,  Anti-Bandit  War-0  AVTIUVUUOplaK6q  Ayd5v,  1945-1949,  vol.  2,  p.  243. 
61  GESIDIS,  Archives-ApXcia,  1"'I:  TpaTt6tq'Eic0cat;  rlenpayRtvo)vElliXetpýc;  F(t)v'K6pa4',  15 
Y.  CnTE[tPPt0U  1947'  (1"  Army,  'Report  on  Operation  Korax',  15  September  1947),  vol.  5,  keim.  20,  p.  178. 60 
managed  to  stop  the  communist  advance.  However,  the  fact  that  the  key  route  of  Pindos 
remained  under  the  Democratic  Army  was  a  sign  of  failure  for  the  National  Army.  The 
communists  still  controlled  the  areas  across  the  Albanian,  Yugoslavian  and  Bulgarian 
borders,  which  provided  them  with  supplies,  equipment  and  havens  in  which  to  hide  and 
organise  their  battles.  Hence  'Terminus'  was  only  a  relative  success  for  the  NA. 
That  some  successes  were  salvaged  from  'Terminus'  was  to  a  large  extent  due  to 
the  British  contribution.  This  contribution  was  felt,  most  decisively,  in  the  realm  of  air 
power.  62  One  of  the  National  Army's  trump  cards  was  the  co-operation  of  air  and  land 
forces,  for  the  Democratic  Army  completely  lacked  an  air  force.  Whereas  the  National 
Army  enjoyed  combat  air  support,  especially  when  defending  strongholds,  and  the 
advantages  of  aerial  reconnaissance,  the  Communist  benefited  from  neither.  Yet  the 
Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force  (RHAF)  was  a  weak  force.  Its  main  body  consisted  of  two 
British  Supermarine  Spitfire  IX  rocket-armed  ground  attack  squadrons  -  with  sixteen 
aeroplanes  each.  Some  C-47s  (Dakotas)  were  also  used  in  a  makeshift  bombing  role. 
The  rest  of  the  air  force  was  made  up  of  obsolete  communications  aircraft  such  as 
Airspeed  Oxfords  and  Avro  Ansons. 
During  the  summer  of  1947,  however,  the  British  worked  hard  to  strengthen  the 
RHAF.  The  British  dispatched  250  aeroplanes  to  Greece.  By  October  1947  the  RHAF 
was  equipped  with  included  113  Spitfires,  eight  C-47  (Dakota)  transports,  nine  Vickers 
Wellington  bombers  and  108  liaison  aircraft  (Ansons,  Harvards,  Austers,  Oxfords,  Tiger 
Moths,  L-5s).  The  single-engine  AT-6s  (Harvards)  were  useful  reconnaissance  aircraft, 
the  Spitfires  and  Wellingtons  carried  out  strafing  and  bombing  operations  and  the  twin- 
engined  C-47  transports  protected  ground  troops  and  dropped  supplies.  By  late  1947  the 
Greek  Air  Force  had  three  fighter-bomber  squadrons,  each  comprising  twenty  Spitfires, 
62  Among  the  historians  who  claim  that  British  involvement  came  to  an  end  by  beginning  of  1947  is 
Markezinis,  Political  History-HoAjrIK4  JoTopla,  p.  312. 61 
equipped  with  rockets,  cannons,  and  bombs,  and  three  reconnaissance  units,  each  made 
up  of  four  Harvards  armed  with  a  single  machine  gun  and  fragmentation  bornbs.  One 
squadron  and  one  reconnaissance  unit  were  located  at  each  of  the  three  bases:  Salonika 
for  the  north-castcm  operations,  Larissa  for  central  Greece,  Elevsina  for  the  south.  63 
These  units  were  hampered  by  poor  maintenance  and  inadequate  pilot  reserves.  Their 
obsolescent  aircraft  would  have  been  incapable  of  effective  air  superiority  operations.  In 
a  situation  where  the  government  enjoyed  total  air  superiority  they  were  of  inestimable 
advantage.  64  To  a  large  extent  it  was  air  power  that  proved  decisive  in  stabilising  the 
situation  at  the  height  of  the  Epirus  crisis.  Despite  the  Communist  victory,  the  massive 
intervention  of  the  RHAF,  the  arrival  of  the  new  govenunent  forces  and  the  vacillation 
of  the  Democratic  Army  helped  the  National  Army  in  its  final  though  relative  victory.  In 
the  second  week  of  July  the  Democratic  Army  was  forced  to  retreat  to  Mount  Pindos.  65 
The  fights  under  the  'Terminus'  continued  until  mid  October  1947  but  without  decisive 
results  for  the  civil  war  in  Epirus  area.  The  Democratic  Army  was  far  from  totally 
63  The  Wellington  was  the  principal  bomber  used  by  RAF  in  the  initial  stages  of  the  Second  World  War, 
this  twin-engine  aeroplane  was  effective  only  against  specific  targets  and  not  for  bombing  large  areas.  The 
RHAF  found  the  Wellington  useless  in  the  civil  war  and  ordered  it  grounded.  For  months  the  RHAF  was 
only  minimally  successful,  for  it  had  inadequate  equipment  and  facilities  and  an  insufficient  number  of 
trained  pilots  and  maintenance  men.  When  the  enemy  was  spotted,  the  pilots  failed  to  co-ordinate  with 
ground  units  or  establish  effective  communication.  The  Spitfires  were  vulnerable  to  ground  fire  and  could 
not  retaliate  effectively  because  of  their  limited  space  for  ammunition  and  their  short-range  flying 
capacity.  The  RHAF  later  used  the  Dakotas  (C-47)  for  bombing  expeditions,  but  with  no  particular 
accuracy.  On  one  hand  the  air  force  provided  valuable  reconnaissance  information,  protection  of  ground 
troops,  provision  of  supplies,  drop  of  propaganda  leaflets;  on  the  other  hand  though,  the  planes  could  not 
identify  guerrilla  strongholds  hidden  in  the  mountains  and  that  prevented  the  air  and  ground  forces  from 
defeating  the  DA.  Later  on  the  stricter  co-ordination  of  air  and  ground  forces,  the  use  of  tanks  and  napalm 
bombs  or  liquid  fire,  transformed  the  RHAF  into  a  more  effective  force  in  winning  the  war.  Campbell  (et. 
al.  ),  The  Employment  ofAirpower,  pp.  34-41,55-56,66-69. 
64  FRUS  (1947):  5,367-368:  Memorandum  by  the  Deputy  Co-ordinator  (Wilds)  for  Aid  to  Greece  and 
Turkey,  15  October  1947;  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2:  1946-1953,  Strategic  Issues:  Section  I  (thereafter 
cited  as  JCS),  US  Military  Assistance,  1798/1,  'US  Assistance  to  Greece',  15  October  1947,  Reel  I, 
Frame  0662. 
65  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXeia,  fil  1TaTt6t'EK0cat;  TIc7rpaygtvo)v  EmXctpýacwv  'K6pa4%  15  ZenTegPP101) 
1947'  (0  Army,  Reports  on  Operation  Korax,  15  September  1947),  vol.  5,  keim.  20,  pp.  179-180.  The 
decision  of  the  DA  not  to  attack  the  city  of  Ioannina  is  been  characterised  'lost  opportunity'  by  the  KKE 
and  is  a  controversy  among  the  left-wing  historiographers.  Zafeiropoulos,  Anti-Bandit  War-O 
Avrzuvp,  uopiaK6qAY05V,  1945-1949,  p.  247.  It  signified,  however,  the  guerrilla  character  of  the  communist 
warfare. 62 
defeated,  despite  Zafeiropoulos'  estimations  that  'the  operations  of  1947  assured  the 
salvation  of  Greece'.  66  Rather  'Tenninus'  brought  relative  success.  67 
The  operations  of  the  NA  against  the  DA  from  April  onwards  demonstrated  that 
the  Greek  government  was  determined  to  escalate  anti-communist  warfare  while 
Zahariadis  was  leading  the  KKE  towards  a  full  scale  civil  war.  The  escalation  of  the 
civil  war  had  turned  the  focus  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  KKE  on 
Soviet  military  assistance.  Zahariadis  while  preparing  for  full  scale  operations  was 
hoping  that  Stalin  would  assist  militarily,  strategically  and  financially  the  struggle  of  the 
KKE.  From  April  onwards  he  persistently  brought  pressure  upon  his  Soviet  comrades  to 
support  the  KKE's  struggle  to  win  the  war  in  Greece.  " 
Such  a  development  would  fit  Stalin's  strategic  interests  in  the  area  and 
strengthen  the  Soviet's  international  status.  Even  in  a  less  ambitious  plan,  a  powerful 
KKE  within  the  Greek  political  scene  seemed  attractive  to  the  Soviets  and  their  foreign 
policy.  However,  the  Soviet  leader  was  well  aware  of  the  British  involvement  in  Greece 
as  well  as  the  increasing  American  interest  to  prevent  the  Greek  communists  from 
taking  over  power.  By  1947  it  was  clear  to  him  that  there  were  no  possibilities  of 
preventing  western  involvement  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  Therefore  Stalin  would 
neither  support  an  open  or  total  confrontation  with  the  West,  which  would  jeopardise 
Soviet  foreign  interests  in  the  Eastern  Europe,  nor  back  the  war  in  Greece.  Had  Stalin 
decided  to  support  the  KKE  and  its  fight,  he  would  have  equipped  the  KKE  and 
supplied  its  anny  before  or  during  1947. 
66  Zafeiropoulos,  Anti-Bandit  War-O  AvriavuuqpiaK6q  Aycbv,  1945-1949,  p.  262. 
67  rENIKO  EriITEAEIO  ETPATOY  /AIEY(3YNEH  IETOPIAE  ZTPATOY,  ATHENS  (rEE/AIE), 
1067/B/6  0  P(boi)ktvq  oTov  Bmýpij,  27  OKTo)ppto'u  1947  (Rawlins  to  Ventiris,  27  October  1947).  On  the 
same  report  Rawlins  noted  to  the  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff  Lt.  Gen.  Ventiris  the  complains  made 
by  Col.  Davies,  Commander  of  the  British  Liaison  Units  on  C  Army  Corps,  on  the  bad  organisation  and 
lack  of  discipline  of  the  training  officers  of  the  non-commissioned  C  Army  Corps  training  school  in 
Salonika.  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  205-207.  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War- 
IoTopla  rov  Ey(pvAlov  HoAtluov,  vol.  1,  p.  327. 
6'  For  an  analysis  of  the  KKE  policy  and  the  USSR  see:  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949;  P.  J.  Stavrakis, 
Moscow  and  the  Greek  Communism  1944-1949  (London,  1989). 63 
Stalin  did  not  really  support  the  KKE's  struggle.  The  lack  of  reliable  Soviet 
assistance  is  also  consolidated  in  Zahariadis'  letters  dated  6  October  and  10  November 
1947.  These  letters  to  'comrade  Baranov'  in  Moscow  revealed  that  Soviet  aid  was 
exceptionally  slow  in  arriving  and  the  amounts  that  did  arrive  were  'still'  unsatisfactory. 
Zahariadis  also  confirmed  that  his  Balkan  comrades  'do  what  they  can'  with  their 
limited  resources.  "  This  was  the  picture  of  the  communist  assistance  from  abroad 
during  the  civil  war.  Stalin  provided  a  minimum  assistance  to  the  KKE  which  would  not 
turn  to  a  sufficient  back  up  to  counterbalance  t  hat  oft  he  o  ther  s  ide.  T  he  Y  ugoslavs, 
Bulgarians  and  Albanians  offered  their  land  for  shelter  and  training  and  minimum 
assistance  given  their  own  financial  restrictions.  The  communist  fight  thus  suffered  from 
limited  international  assistance,  government  measures  and  increasing  western 
assistance. 
The  Sofoulis  Government:  A  New  Centre  Experiment 
Mi  itary  ambiguity  translated  into  new  political  instability.  The  Maximos 
government  had  failed  to  provide  Greece  with  peace  and  indeed  the  civil  war  had 
become  a  war  on  all  fronts.  Maximos,  agreed  with  Dwight  Griswold,  Chief  of  American 
Aid  Mission  to  Greece,  that  structural  and  tactical  changes  at  governmental  level  were 
needed.  Griswold  suggested  that  Zervas  should  be  dismissed  as  his  anti-Communist 
campaign  united  the  Left  rather  than  weakening  it.  70  Konstantine  Tsaldaris,  leader  of  the 
powerful  Populist  Party,  Deputy  Premier  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  gasped  the 
opportunity  to  demand  the  formation  of  a  new,  purely  Populist  government.  On  18 
August,  Tsaldaris  flew  to  London  for  discussions  with  Sir  Onne  Sargent,  the  Pennanent 
Under-Secretary  at  the  Foreign  Office.  Tsaldaris  turned  to  the  Foreign  Office  to  which 
69  Avgi,  no.  32,12  January  1980.  Quoted  in  Stavrakis,  Moscow  and  the  Greek  Communism  1944-1949,  p. 
162.  Stavrakis  characterises  the  Soviet  policy  towards  the  KKE  as  'prudent  expansionism'  or  'policy  of 
dualism'.  Stavrakis,  Moscow  and  the  Greek  Communism  1944-1949,  pp.  6,14  1. 
70  FRUS  (1947):  5,299-301:  MacVeagh  to  Marshall,  19  July  1947. 64 
'he  remained  dedicated  first'  because  the  State  Department  had  told  him  to  form  a 
coalition  government.  Tsaldaris  failed,  however,  in  his  attempt  to  convince  Sargent  that 
he  was  the  most  suitable  man  to  take  over  power.  What  struck  Sargent  most  from  these 
talks  was  T  saldaris'  overweening  ambition,  which  Sargent  was  sure  would  be  placed 
before  the  national  interest  of  Greece.  71 
A  new  governmental  crisis  erupted  over  the  Liberals'  attempt  to  eliminate  right- 
wing  elements  of  the  cabinet.  On  21  August,  Papandreou,  Kanellopoulos  and  Venizelos 
asked  the  Populist  Ministers  of  Public  Order  and  of  War,  Napoleon  Zervas  and  George 
Stratos  respectively,  to  resign  on  the  grounds  that  they  were  unpopular  both  in  Greece 
and  with  the  British  and  the  Americans.  Their  aim  was  to  form  a  Liberal  government 
headed  by  Sofoulis.  Both  Tsaldaris  and  the  two  ministers  rejected  the  demands  and  on 
23  August  the  three  National  Political  Union  (EPE)  ministers  resigned.  The  coalition 
collapsed.  As  a  result,  on  the  same  day,  Prime  Minister  Maximos  resigned  as  well.  72 
A  new  element  in  politics  was  the  fact  that  Greece  had  a  new  king.  Paul  had 
succeeded  his  brother  at  a  good  moment,  in  the  spring  of  1947,  when  the  start  of  the 
government  offensive,  continued  British  support  and  the  promise  of  American  aid  had 
engendered  an  air  of  optimism.  He  was  fortunate  to  have  a  few  months  grace  to  ease 
into  the  succession  before  the  political  and  military  crises  broke  out.  Not  that  Paul  was  a 
passive  observer.  He  was  determined  to  be  more  of  an  interventionist  in  politics  than  his 
brother  had  been,  whose  influence  had  usually  been  exercised  as  blocker  and  a  wrecker. 
As  the  constitution  required,  Paul  asked  the  leader  of  the  second  biggest  party  to  fonn  a 
government.  Tsaldaris,  in  an  attempt  to  strengthen  the  government  he  was  planning  to 
fonn,  asked  Sofoulis  and  t  he  L  iberal  P  arty  toj  oin  t  he  c  abinet.  S  ofoulis  t  umed  d  own 
71  FRUS  (1947):  5,287-288:  Memorandum  of  Villard  to  Marshall,  8  August  1947;  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67145  R  11654,  Report  of  Discussions  between  Sargent  and  Tsaldaris,  18 
August  1947. 65 
Tsaldaris'  proposal,  as  he  demanded  more  power  for  the  Liberal  Party.  Dwight  Griswold 
warned  Tsaldaris  that  if  he  formed  a  purely  conservative  cabinet  American  aid  would 
slow  down.  73  Griswold's  intervention,  however,  had  no  impact  upon  Tsaldaris'  plans. 
As  Orme  Sargent  h  ad  p  redicted  t  he  I  eader  oft  he  P  opulists  a  nnounced  t  hat  hew  ould 
form  a  'pure'  right-wing  government.  Tsaldaris  formed  a  cabinet,  which  was  not 
acceptable  even  to  other  conservatives  such  as  Stefanopoulos,  Gonatas  or  Alexandris.  74 
In  response  to  Tsaldaris'  bid  for  power  the  American  government  used  its  most 
effective  weapon  to  put  the  Greek  politicians  on  their  best  behaviour.  On  30  August  Loy 
Henderson,  Director  of  Near  Eastern  and  African  Affairs  at  the  State  Department, 
arrived  in  Athens.  He  warned  Tsaldaris  and  Sofoulis  that  if  they  refused  to  co-operate 
with  a  coalition  government  then  American  aid  to  Greece  would  be  stopped  and  they 
would  be  blamed  for  it.  75  Henderson  proposed  the  formation  of  a  Sofoulis-Markezinis 
coalition  government.  Tsaldaris,  alarmed  at  the  prospect  of  losing  power  entirely,  was 
forced  to  compromise.  Once  more  Washington  and  London  had  stood  together  in 
refusing  to  support  Tsaldaris.  Instead,  they  preferred  a  coalition  of  the  Centre  under 
liberal  Sofoulis. 
The  rest  of  the  Greek  political  world  agreed.  EPE  now  agreed  to  the  new 
coalition,  after  the  exclusion  of  hard-core  right-wing  members.  Tsaldaris,  however, 
remained  as  Deputy  Premier  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  On  7  September,  the  new 
72  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371n2240  R2576,  Norton  to  Bevin,  IS  February 
1948:  Annual  Report  for  1947;  FRUS  (1947):  5,299-301:  MacVeagh  to  Marshall,  19  August  1947; 
Markezinis,  Political  History-HoAITM4  IO-ropla,  vol.  2,  pp.  307-309. 
73  FRUS  (1947):  5,311-313:  MacVeagh  to  Marshall,  25  August  1947;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE, 
KEW  (PRO),  F0371/67007  R1  1718,  Reilly  to  Foreign  Office,  26  August  1947;  History  of  the  Greek 
Nation-IoTopla  TOv  EU11VIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  146.  King  Paul  was  crowned  in  April  1947  following 
George's  death. 
74  All  three  important  allies  of  the  conservative  world  (Ministry  of  Co-ordination,  Public  Work,  Finance 
and  Justice)  under  Tsaldaris  cabinet  in  1946  and  Maximos  in  1947.  FRUS  (1947):  5,318-319:  MacVeagh 
to  Marshall  27  August  1947;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67007  R  11798,  Reilly 
to  Foreign  Office,  27  August  1947. 
75  On  that  event  is  based  the  view  that  American  pressure  turned  the  Greek  government  into  a  viable 
coalition  of  the  centre-right.  In  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  209-10.  A  view  shared  and  pursued 
by  the  British  as  well  as  already  noted. 66 
cabinet  of  ten  Liberals  and  fourteen  Populists  took  the  oath.  The  new  government 
committed  itself  to  an  amnesty  for  insurgents  who  agreed  to  surrender  and  to  the  release 
of  detainees.  76  On  the  other  hand,  it  pressed  the  British  and  American  to  further 
strengthen  national  armed  forces.  77  The  implications  of  'Terminus'  made  this  the  first 
priority.  On  14  October  1947,  the  Supreme  National  Defence  Council  (ASEA)  met  in 
Athens.  C  hairing  the  in  eeting  King  P  aul  c  alled  f  or  war  on  all  fronts:  'the  aim  of  the 
operations,  '  he  declared,  'is  to  defeat  the  bandits  not  to  repulse  them  from  one  place  to 
another'.  The  main  proposal  of  the  meeting  was  the  direct  increase  of  the  size  of  the 
army  and  the  creation  of  Territorial  Army  battalions,  which  would  assume  the  duties  of 
static  defence  and  thus  set  the  regular  army  free  of  this  responsibility  to  concentrate  on 
the  actual  fighting.  78 
Counter-insurgency  Operations  in  Greece 
The  outcome  of  Operation  'Ten-ninus'  had  made  clear  that  a  new  type  of 
warfare  was  needed  if  the  Greek  National  Army  was  to  defeat  the  Democratic  Army.  By 
the  end  of  1947  the  British  and  Americans  were  working  hard  on  the  problem  of 
counter-insurgency  in  an  effort  to  help  their  Greek  allies.  Counter-insurgency  warfare 
combined  intelligence  with  civil  and  military  efforts.  79  The  British  role  was  important  in 
76  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/72240  R2576,  Norton  to  Bevin,  18  February  1948: 
Annual  Report  for  1947;  FRUS  (1947):  5,299-301:  MacVeagh  to  Marshall,  19  September  1947; 
Markezinis,  Political  History-HoAITIKý  Io-ropla,  pp.  309-311. 
77  Winner,  American  Intervention,  pp.  227-228. 
7'  GES/DIS,  Archives-Apxcla,  Av(oraTov  ZuRpob%tov  EOvwý;  Agb";  (AMEA),  'llpaKTtKd  3  I'll 
luve8pidac(o;,  14  OKTcoppiou  1947'(Highest  Committee  of  National  Defence  (ASEA)  31"  Meeting,  14 
October  1947),  vol.  6,  keim.  33,  p.  219.  ASEA  co-ordinated  all  national  forces.  See  also  p.  48,  f.  21.  By 
the  end  of  October  1947,  the  National  Army  increased  from  100,000  to  nearly  132,000  men.  Jones,  'A 
New  Kind  of  War')  p.  106. 
79  The  Greek  undertaking  has  been  a  typical  case  of  foreign  COIN  objectives,  as  formulated  later  in  the 
1950s  and  1960s,  combining  military,  political  and  civil  control.  The  uniqueness  of  the  Greek  case, 
though,  is  that  the  KKE  itself  changed  its  warfare  from  guerrilla  to  conventional  combat  from  1947, 
complicating  the  nature  of  operations  and  that  the  insurgency  died  out  for  various  reasons,  some  of  them 
related  to  the  KKE  itself.  The  Anglo-American  co-operation  was  another  factor  that  made  the  Greek  case 
important.  For  the  rhetoric  of  the  British  Army  and  British  COIN  operations  see  H.  Strachan,  The  Politics 
of  the  British  Army,  (Oxford,  1997);  Th.  Mockaitis,  British  Counterinsurgency  in  the  Post-imperial  Era 
(New  York,  1995);  Th.  Mockaitis,  British  Counterinsurgency,  1919-1960  (London,  1990);  C.  McInnes, 
Hot  War,  Cold  War  (London,  1996),  pp.  122-123;  T.  L.  Jones,  The  Development  of  British  COIN  Policies 67 
its  development.  British  post-war  counterinsurgency  activities  world-wide  have  been 
well  documented;  however,  the  effort  in  Greece  has  been  neglected.  It  is  the  role  of  the 
United  States  in  shaping  Greek  counter-insurgency  operations  that  has  been  emphasised 
by  most  historians.  It  would  be  fruitless  to  deny  the  importance  of  the  American  effort. 
Yet  the  history  of  Greek  counter-insurgency  quite  clearly  demonstrates  the  continuing 
importance  of  Britain  in  the  final  years  of  the  civil  war.  80 
At  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  the  role  of  the  British  Military  Mission  had 
been  defined  as  the  training  of  the  National  Army.  81  It  also  provided  small  arms, 
artillery,  clothing  and  miscellaneous  supplies.  82  As  a  modem  guerrilla  conflict  gathered 
momentum  in  the  Greek  mountains  by  the  end  of  1946,  the  Chiefs  of  Staff 
recommended  that  the  British  Military  Mission  should  be  allowed  to  unfettered  advice 
on  counter-insurgency  operations.  The  British  set  about  organising  more  specialist 
teams  to  train  the  National  Army  in  ground  and  air  operations,  commando  tactics  and 
83  'Irregular  Warfare'  techniques.  The  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force,  the  national  forces,  the 
Greek  Royal  Navy  and  the  Police  were  all  encompassed  by  the  British  reconstruction 
programme. 
In  1946  General  Rawlins,  Commander  of  the  British  Military  Mission  between 
1945-1948,  General  Spiliotopoulos,  the  Chief  of  Greek  General  Staff,  and  Field  Marshal 
Montgomery,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  had  agreed  to  transform  the  National 
and  Doctrine,  1945-52  (PhD,  Univ.  of  London,  1992),  pp.  169-218;  T.  L.  Jones,  'The  British  Army  and 
Greece,  1945-49',  Small  Wars  and  Insurgencies  8,  no  1  (Spring  1997),  88-106. 
80  D.  S.  Blaufarb,  The  Counterinsurgency  Era:  US  Doctrine  and  Performance  (London,  1977);  Th.  K. 
Adams,  US  Special  Operation  Forces  in  Action  (London,  1998);  J.  J.  McCuen,  The  Art  of  Counter- 
Revolutionary  War  (London,  1966). 
81  BMM  and  Military  establishments  operated  in  Ethiopia  with  the  aim  of  training  the  Imperial  Army,  in 
Saudi  Arabia  with  a  small  BMM  at  Taif  to  give  infantry  training  in  Greece  and  a  small  number  of  British 
Navy,  Army,  Air  and  Police  personnel  and  Turkey  instructing  in  certain  specialised  fields.  FRUS  (1947): 
5,523:  State  Department  Memorandum  on  Military  Missions,  undated.  JUSMAPG  on  the  contrary  was 
applied  for  the  first  time  by  December  1947  in  Greece.  For  allies'  co-operation  see:  Map  D.  3,  p.  189. 
82  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/908,  BMM(G)  Official  History;  WO  32/15547, 
History  of  BMM  in  Greece  1945-1952;  King's  College  London  Archives,  Liddell  Hart  Centre  for  Military 
Archives,  Papers  of  General  Sir  Harold  E.  Pyrnan,  7/l/2,17  January  1947. 
83  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  79/54,  COS  (46),  11  December  1946;  WO  202/946, 
31  December  1946;  WO  202/908,  BMM(G)  Official  History. 68 
Army  so  that  it  could  'fight  an  irregular  enemy  in  mountainous  country'.  To  this  end  the 
British  proposed  innovations  such  as  the  greater  use  of  air  support,  light  infantry  and 
commandoS.  84  The  effect  of  these  innovations  would  emerge  gradually  over  the  next 
two  years.  Ine  arly  Ja  nuary  1947  t  he  C  hief  oft  he  I  mperial  G  eneral  S  taff  p  ressed  t  he 
Cabinet  Defence  Committee  for  a  greater  British  counter-insurgency  involvement  in 
Greece.  On  14  January  1947,  General  Rawlins  received  a  new  directive  which 
authorised  the  British  Military  Mission  to  'give  the  greatest  possible  assistance'  to  the 
enlarged  Greek  security  forces.  On  21  January,  following  another  Internal  Security 
conference  held  at  the  War  Office,  Rawlins  was  instructed  to  send  his  men  to  Greek 
'field  units'  and  to  ensure  that  the  Greek  General  Staff  acted  upon  British  advice.  85 
In  1947  the  escalation  of  the  communist  attacks  gave  the  British  an  opportunity 
to  test  their  counter-insurgency  techniques  on  the  battlefield.  At  the  start  of  1947 
organised  new  commando  training  courses  . 
86  A  three-stage  plan  was  approved  by  the 
Chiefs  of  Staff  on  27  January  1947.  The  first  phase  was  to  comprise  the  retraining  and 
reorganisation  of  the  security  forces,  assisted  by  British  Liaison  Units,  and  various 
special  teams  including  Mountain  Warfare  Instruction  Teams,  British  Instruction  Team 
Intelligence  officers,  and  an  'Arrny-Air  Co-operation  Training  Team'  under  Major 
Walker-Brush.  The  second  phase  would  feature  'counter-organisation'  actions  against 
the  KKE  underground  network  (viajka).  These  actions  would  consist  of  population 
relocation  combined  with  large-scale  'encirclement  clearance'  operations  incorporating 
the  armoured  and  artillery  assaults.  The  third  and  final  phase,  after  an  area  was  cleared, 
84  Agreements  to  organise  at  least  3,000  men  in  Commando  colurnns  were  also  taken  on  28  November 
1946  by  the  British  Chiefs  of  Staff.  Xydis,  Greece  and  the  Great  Powers,  pp.  361,432-33,53  1.  The  years 
to  come  in  the  following  chapter  would  prove  the  gradual  strengthening  of  the  national  forces. 
85  King's  College  London  Archives,  Liddell  Hart  Centre  for  Military  Archives,  Papers  of  General  Sir  H. 
Pyman  Papers,  6/l/2,  New  Directive  to  Rawlins,  14  January  1947;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW 
(PRO),  DEFE  4/2,  COS  (47)  30,21  February  1947;  WO  261/637  Increase  of  the  BMM,  30  January  1947. 
86  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  134/4,  DO  (47)  1,  COIN  Tasks,  I  January  1947;  WO 
261/637,  BMM  report,  30  January  1947. 69 
would  be  to  return  it  to  civil  goverranent  control.  87  In  pursuit  of  these  objectives  the 
British  Military  Mission  urged  the  National  Army  to  enhance  its  mobility  and 
intelligence-gathering  capacity.  88 
In  March  1947  the  posture  of  the  British  Military  Mission  was  modified  to 
encompass  Bevin's  plan  to  involve  the  United  States  in  an  allied  counter-insurgency 
effort  in  Greece.  Despite  the  assertions  of  many  historians  that  the  Truman  Doctrine 
signified  the  passage  from  a  Pax  Britannica  to  a  Pax  Americana  the  Americans  did  not 
89 
take  on  the  burden  of  counter-insurgency  operational  advising  alone  after  March  1947. 
Indeed  the  Americans  themselves  insisted  that  the  British  should  remain  fully  involved 
in  the  effort.  On  2  September  1947,  the  top  American  official  in  Greece,  Dwight 
Griswold,  invited  the  British  to  join  twenty-five  American  Army  officers  in  advising  the 
National  Army  on  future  operations.  On  19  September  1947,  the  War  Office  and  Chiefs 
of  Staff  approved  this  idea.  90  On  11  October  1947,  Bevin,  encouraged  by  the  American 
desire  to  co-operate  with  the  British,  proposed  that  the  British  Military  Mission's 
operational  advisory  role  in  Greece  should  be  strengthened.  He  wanted  to  send  Indian 
Army  and  other  'officers  with  guerrilla  experience  to  the  [British]  Mission  [in  Greece]' 
to  review  the  strategy  of  the  National  Army.  91  The  British  Military  Mission  further 
suggested  the  creation  of  'Commando  deep  patrolling'  as  well  as  the  retraining  the 
intelligence  network. 
92 
87  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  4/1,  COS  (47)  15,27  January  1947;  WO  261/637, 
BMM(G),  30  January  1947.  At  that  time,  Britain  had  not  developed  counterinsurgency  rhetoric.  As 
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supplies,  the  use  of  the  army  for  static  defence  duties  and  emergency  laws  to  apply  civilian  control  in 
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89  C.  Tsoukalas,  The  Greek  Tragedy  (Harmondsworth,  1969),  p.  109.  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  P. 
236;  Close  (ed.  ),  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  203-207.  On  the  contrary,  British  assistance  had  played  a 
significant  part  in  the  NA's  struggle  against  the  DA. 
90  Winner,  American  Intervention,  pp.  232-6;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War',  pp.  91-98;  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  4/7,  COS  (47)  121,19  September  1947. 
91  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  PREM  8/527,  note  from  Bevin,  II  October  1947. 
92  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/893,  AIR  46/62,  Rawlins,  'Review  of  the  Anti- 
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By  spring  1947,  however,  the  Americans  had  started  to  expand  their  political, 
financial  and  military  role  in  Greece.  The  first  American  Mission  to  Aid  Greece 
(AMAG)  was  established  in  Athens  in  May  1947.93  The  head  of  the  American  Mission 
to  Aid  Greece,  Dwight  Griswold,  would  supervise  all  expenditures  and  administer  both 
civilian  and  military  assistance  programmes.  The  mission  in  Greece  began  with  a  staff 
of  forty  members  (exclusive  of  military  and  naval  personnel)  but  that  figure  soon  grew 
to  about  175.  The  military  branch  of  the  mission  consisted  of  the  United  States  Army 
Group  Greece  (USAGG)  headed  by  General  William  Livesay,  who  arrived  in  Greece  on 
19  June,  and  a  small  naval  section.  United  States  Aid  Group  Greece  had  a  staff  of  fifty- 
four,  including  officers,  enlisted  men,  and  civilians.  The  naval  mission  had  no  more  than 
thirty  men,  whose  duty  was  to  train  the  Greeks  in  using  American  minesweepers,  tank 
landing  ships,  personnel  boats,  tugs,  and  other  craft  up  to  the  size  of  a  destroyer.  United 
States  Aid  Group  Greece's  mission  was  to  secure  supplies  and  equipment  for  the  Greek 
anny.  It  would  function  in  co-ordination  with  the  British  Military  Mission  in  advising 
the  National  Amy.  94 
Livesay's  first  challenge  was  the  Greek  government's  insistence  on  the 
expansion  of  the  gendarmerie.  The  gendarmerie  played  a  vital  role  in  maintaining  civil 
order  after  the  army  had  cleared  an  area  of  the  communist  forces.  However,  its  pay  and 
benefits  was  four  times  than  that  of  an  average  soldier,  so  there  was  no  advantage  in 
replacing  soldiers  with  gendannes.  George  Marshall  opposed  any  expansion  of  the 
Greek  gendarmerie.  Accordingly,  Livesay  approved  the  improvement  of  Army  Security 
Greece,  1945-29',  in  Close  (ed.  ),  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  203,207.  Instead  in  January  1948  A.  V. 
Alexander  suggested  sending  reinforcements  from  Palestine  to  bolster  the  allied  COIN  effort  in  Greece.  In 
R.  Frazier,  'The  Bevin-Marshall  Dispute  of  August-November  1947  Concerning  the  Withdrawal  of 
British  troops  form  Greece',  in  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War  1945-1949,  pp.  249-262; 
Sfikas,  Oi,  4yyAoi  EpyaTwol,  p.  207;  T.  L.  Jones,  'The  British  Army,  and  Counter-Guerrilla  Warfare  in 
Greece,  194549',  Small  War  and  Insurgencies  8,  no.  1  (1997),  88-106. 
93  The  Greek  historian  Veremis  writes  that  AMAG  in  1947  signified  'the  changing  of  guard  from  Britain 
to  the  US'. Th.  Veremis,  The  Military  in  Greek  Politics  (London,  1997),  p.  15  1.  Nevertheless,  in  1947 
the  United  States  was  taking  its  first  gradual  step  towards  intervention  in  Greece. 
94  Jones,  ',  4  New  Kind  of  War',  pp.  61,101-103. 71 
Units  rather  than  the  gendarmerie  to  conduct  'mopping-up  operations'  after  the  army 
had  cleared  an  area  previously  held  by  communists.  Of  course  the  Greeks  cared  more  for 
American  aid  rather  than  quibbles  over  its  actual  implementation.  Napoleon  Zervas,  the 
Minister  of  Public  Order,  accepted  the  American  preference  for  military  over  para- 
95 
military  forces.  The  switch  from  the  gendarmerie  to  Army  Security  Units  was  the  first 
substantive  American  impact  on  Greek  planning.  The  Americans  agreed  to  a  National 
Army  increased  in  size  from  100,000  to  132,000  men.  96 
By  early  November  1947  the  Truman  administration  was  moving  toward  the 
establishment  of  another  advisory  and  planning  group  in  Greece  (Joint  United  S  tates 
Military  Advisory  and  Planning  Group)  under  Livesay's  direction.  This  would  be  a 
group  of  ninety  officers  and  eighty  enlisted  men  divided  among  the  army,  navy,  and  air 
force,  as  part  of  the  military  section  of  the  aid  mission.  They  would  have  direct 
communications  with  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff.  The  group,  with  its  headquarters  in 
Athens,  would  aid  the  Greek  General  Staff  through  four  advisers  specialising  in  anned 
forces  personnel,  intelligence,  planning  and  logistics.  In  co-operation  with  the  British 
Military  Mission,  the  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and  Planning  Group  would 
provide  advice  to  the  Greek  commanders  and  staff.  The  British  would  continue  their 
current  training  duties  whilst  the  Americans  concentrated  on  raising  the  standard  of 
97  infantry  units.  On  31  December  1947,  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  (JCS)  appointed 
Livesay  to  command  JUSMAPG. 
A  new  Anglo-American  concordat  covering  the  presence  of  British  forces  had 
98 
also  to  be  worked  out  in  the  summer  of  1947.  In  January  1947  the  British  government 
had  decided  that  the  14,000  British  troops  stationed  in  Greece  would  have  to  be  reduced 
95  Ibid,  pp.  71-73. 
96  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War,  p.  106. 
97  FRUS  (1947):  5,399:  anonymous  note,  6  November  1947;  Kenneth  Matthews,  Memories  ofa 
Mountain  War  Greece  (London,  1972),  p.  177;  Wooodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  221-222; 
Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat,  p.  249. 72 
to  one  brigade  of  four  battalions.  By  July  1947  only  5,000  combatants  remained  in 
Greece.  The  British  regarded  their  presence  as  a  symbolic  gesture  of  British  interest  and 
military  power  in  the  country.  They  were  formally  committed  to  the  defence  of  the 
territorial  integrity  of  Greece  against  any  foreign  encroachment.  99  Yet  Bevin  proposed  to 
the  Chiefs  of  Staff  that  this  mission  should  be  reviewed.  He  suggested  that  all  the  troops 
might  be  withdrawn  in  September  1947.  The  Foreign  Office  argued  that  the  retention  of 
a  small  force  of  5,000  men  would  be  inadequate  to  meet  a  possible  Soviet  attack,  that 
the  British  presence  merely  provoked  the  Greek  left,  and  that  the  troops  were  thus  not 
good  value  for  money.  100  On  30  July  1947  Sir  Jock  Balfour,  the  British  Chargi  in 
Washington,  was  instructed  to  inform  the  State  Department  that  Whitehall  had  decided 
upon  the  'immediate'  withdrawal  of  its  army  from  Greece  for  'financial'  and 
cmanpower'  reasons.  Athens  was  not  informed  of  the  British  decision.  101 
In  reply  to  the  British  dimarche  Marshall  cabled  Bevin  one  of  the  strongest 
notes  recorded  in  Anglo-American  relations  concerning  Greece.  The  American 
Secretary  of  State  stated  that  the  British  note  rendered  co-operation  'unnecessarily 
difficult'  and  expressed  doubts  as  to  whether  there  would  be  any  significant  financial 
saving  to  Britain.  Marshall  threatened  that  if  London  persisted  with  its  course  the  United 
States  might  reconsider  all  economic  commitments  in  Europe  and  re-examine  the 
strategic  position  of  Greece,  'because  United  States  foreign  policy  had  been  [I 
predicated  upon  British  willingness  to  contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  stability  in 
Europe'. 
102 
98  FRUS  (1947):  5,268:  British  Chargt  John  Balfour  to  Secretary  of  State,  30  July  1947. 
99  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  128/9,  CM  14(47)  4,30  January  1947;  CAB  128/9, 
CM  30(47)  2,18  March  1947. 
100  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/67043  R  1064  1,  Report  by  the  COS,  28  July  1947. 
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102  FRUS  (1947):  5,273-274:  Marshall  to  Bevin,  1  August  1947. 73 
Bevin  replied  that  there  had  been  no  change  in  British  policy  and  inquired  as  to 
how  long  the  Americans  wished  the  British  troops  to  remain  in  Greece.  103  On  9 
September  1947,  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  noted  that  'it  is  strategically  important  that  we  must 
have  the  closest  military  collaboration  with  the  United  States  [  ...  ]  to  support  British 
policy  in  the  Middle  East  and  Eastern  Mediterranean'.  Any  decision  about  withdrawal 
of  British  troops  must  be  determined  on  political  grounds.  104  The  following  day  Bevin 
decided  'to  take  no  definite  decision'  until  further  discussions  had  taken  place  with  the 
Americans  about  the  Near  and  Middle  East.  105  The  British  troops  would  remain  in 
Greece  willingly  until  1950.  Bevin's  manoeuvre  had  never  been  indicative  of  a  desire  to 
abandon  Greece.  His  main  purpose  was  to  make  the  United  States  send  troops  to 
Greece.  This  would  increase  the  American  interest  in  Greece  and  in  Britain's  main  area 
of  interest:  the  Middle  East.  106  Yet  the  Truman  administration  was  unwilling  to  face  the 
difficulties  in  Congress  that  the  dispatch  of  combat  troops  would  have  entailed.  '  07 
Politically,  it  suited  the  Americans  that  the  British  should  remain  fully  engaged  in 
Greece. 
108 
Conditions  on  the  ground  remained  conducive  to  a  continuing  Anglo-American 
condominium.  There  was  neither  the  time  nor  the  opportunity  for  an  orderly  transfer  of 
power  even  if  either  party  had  wanted  it.  On  Christmas  Eve  1947  the  KKE  took  the  step 
most  feared  by  American  and  British  observers:  it  announced  the  establishment  of  the 
Provisional  Democratic  Government  in  the  mountains  of  north-westem  Greece  (at  Pyli, 
103  FRUS  (1947):  5,275-278:  Douglas  (Ambassador  in  the  UK)  to  Marshall,  3  August  1947. 
104  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  PREM  8/797,  Note  to  Prime  Minister,  9  September  1947. 
105  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  800/468/GRE/47/33,34,35,  Withdrawal  of  British 
Troops  from  Greece,  10,12,15  September  1947. 
106  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  PREM  8/841,  Policy  in  the  Middle  East  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean,  21  November  1947.  In  these  talks,  Bevin  had  made  it  clear  that  Greece's  independence 
was  vital  to  the  security  of  the  Eastern  Mediterranean,  which  together  with  the  Middle  East  forms  a 
strategic  whole.  The  United  States  aimed  at  securing  an  anti-Communist  'barrier'  in  Italy-Greece-Turkey- 
Iran. 
107  On  the  issue  of  the  withdrawal  of  the  British  Army  see,  Frazier,  'The  Bevin-Marshall  Dispute',  in 
Baerentzen,  Iatrides  (eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  249-262. 74 
in  the  vicinity  of  Lake  Prespa,  near  the  intersection  of  the  Greek,  Albanian  and 
Yugoslav  borders).  In  an  atmosphere  of  'celebration'  the  rebel  radio  station,  Free 
Greece,  announced  the  setting  up  of  this  shadow  government  headed  by  Prime  Minister 
and  Minister  of  War  'General  Marcos'.  Zahariadis,  following  Stalin's  model,  assumed 
no  cabinet  post  but  remained  the  KKE's  General  Secretary.  109 
The  announcement  of  the  formation  of  the  Provisional  Democratic  Government 
was  accompanied  by  a  deten-nined  major  attack  by  the  Democratic  Army  designed  to 
seize  the  north-west  town  of  Konitsa  as  its  capital.  Fourteen  Democratic  Army 
battalions  (over  2,500  men),  led  by  Marcos,  moved  south  from  Mount  Grammos  on  the 
night  of  24-25  December  and,  aided  by  diversionary  attacks  elsewhere  in  Thessaly  and 
Epirus,  seized  control  of  the  approaches  to  Konitsa,  which  was  defended  by  a  national 
forces  garrison  of  some  900  men.  Konitsa  was  the  last  of  the  unoccupied  fronts  of 
Epirus.  Amply  supplied  with  men,  rations  and  ammunition  from  a  provisions  supply 
base  in  the  village  of  Argyrokastro,  over  the  border  in  Albania,  Marcos  employed  all  of 
his  available  artillery  (two  batteries  of  75mm  mountain  guns,  three  or  four  105min 
howitzers,  and  a  variety  of  mortars)  to  support  a  number  of  attacks  on  the  town  from 
different  directions. 
Delayed  by  heavy  rains  the  NA  relief  forces  moving  from  Grevena  and  Ioannina 
did  not  appear  until  30  December.  Abandoning  the  usual  guerrilla  tactic  of  withdrawing 
before  the  arrival  of  superior  relief  forces  the  DA  chose  to  stand  and  fight.  However,  the 
108FRUS  (1947):  5,458-461:  Memorandum  by  Henderson,  22  December  1947;  Leffler,  A 
Preponderance,  p.  194. 
109  Marcos'  Provisional  Government  was,  despite  Zahariadis'  assurances,  not  recognised  by  anyone,  even 
by  the  Soviet  Union  or  Yugoslavia.  It  soon  became  clear  that  Stalin,  alarmed  by  the  growing  American 
involvement  in  an  area  so  close  to  his  satellites,  wanted  the  Greek  civil  war  to  be  brought  to  an  end. 
Marcos  later  criticised  Zahariadis  for  the  decision  to  proceed  to  the  formation  of  the  PDG  without  having 
fulfilled  the  necessary  precondition  for  international  recognition:  to  capture  a  major  city  in  which  a 
governmental  authority  could  be  established.  In  Vlavianos,  Greece  1941-1949,  p.  245.  The 
announcement  of  the  Provisional  Government  had  long-term  political  effects.  On  27  December  1947,  the 
Sofoulis  government  responded  to  the  communists'  initiatives  by  passing  the  Emergency  Law  509,  which 
outlawed  the  Greek  Communist  Party  and  penalised  all  communist  activities  with  incomparably  harsh 
penalties;  the  death  penalty  included. 75 
National  Army,  newly  equipped  with  American  weapons  and  supported  by  both  air 
power  and  artillery,  soon  drove  the  Communist  troops  from  the  high  ground  around  the 
town.  After  suffering  heavy  casualties  the  Democratic  Army  began  to  Withdraw  on  the 
night  of  31  December-1  January.  By  7  January  1948,  the  National  Army  had  cleared  the 
immediate  area  although  fighting  continued  until  15  January  in  the  surrounding  region. 
The  Greek  General  Staff  later  estimated  that  the  Democratic  Army  had  committed  about 
5,000  men  to  the  battle  and  suffered  1,169  casualties  (400  killed,  746  wounded,  23 
captured),  while  the  National  Army  had  suffered  363  casualties  (71  killed,  237  wounded 
and  55  missing).  '  lo 
The  battle  of  Konitsa  was  the  largest  and  most  sustained  Communist  offensive 
up  to  that  time.  It  was  the  first  conventional  battle  the  Democratic  Army  had  attempted. 
It  was  the  Communists'  first  serious  defeat.  The  attempt  to  seize  Konitsa  demonstrated 
that  a  guerrilla  force,  acting  prematurely  as  a  conventional  army,  lost  most  of  its  tactical 
advantages  when  it  exposed  itself  to  the  superior  firepower  of  its  opponents-"'  The 
dangers  of  Zahariadis'  concept,  of  confronting  the  National  Army  in  conventional 
operations,  were  made  manifest.  Marcos'  determination  not  to  abandon  guerrilla  tactics 
was  shown  to  have  a  basis  in  reality.  Zahariadis,  however,  refused  to  learn  the  lessons  of 
the  Communists'  first  major  military  blunder.  At  a  meeting  held  at  Vitsi  on  15  January 
1948  Zahariadis  announced  that  the  strategy  and  tactics  of  the  Democratic  Army  would 
continue  to  evolve  from  guerrilla  operations  towards  more  conventional  techniques.  The 
Democratic  Army  would  transform  itself  into  a  structured  military  organisation, 
employing  units  of  battalion  size  (500-600  men)  and  higher.  Marcos  opposed 
110  GESIDIS,  Archives-ApXcia,  ApXcio  ITparof)  (Army  Report),  vol.  7,  pp.  52-101;  Zafeiropoulos,  Anti- 
Bandit  War-O  Av-riavpqqpiaK6q  Ayd5v,  1945-1949,  p.  306;  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War.,  pp.  160- 
162;  Eudes,  The  Kapetanios,  pp.  308-309;  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War-Io-ropla  Tov 
E,  UqVIK06  EpýpWov,  vol.  1,  pp.  373-388.  The  KKE  officially  characterises  the  Konitsa  operation  a  power 
show  and  KKE's  attempt  to  provide  the  Democratic  Government  with  credentials.  History  of  the  KKE- 
, dOKf,  UIO  IoTopiaq  Tov  KKE,  vol.  1,  p.  58  1.  For  KKE  supplies  from  the  north  see:  Map  DA,  p.  190. 
111  History  of  the  KKE-,  dOKIUIO  Iaroplaq  Tov  KKE,  p.  58  1. 76 
Zahariadis'  plans  but  the  will  of  the  General  Secretary  of  the  Politburo  prevailed.  The 
Provisional  Democratic  Government  proceeded  to  the  creation  of  a  hierarchy  of  the 
Democratic  Army  officers'  ranks  similar  to  that  of  a  regular  army:  these  proposals  were 
signed  by  the  President  and  War  Minister  General  Marcos.  112 
The  process  of  the  'militarisation'  of  the  Democratic  Army  had  to  take  place  in 
secret  sustained  by  a  minority  of  the  population  and  quite  frequently  in  areas  and 
circumstances  where  its  prospects  were  uncertain  and  unstable.  The  areas  in  which  the 
Democratic  Army  was  operating  oflen  lacked  sufficient  communication  between  each 
other.  Even  if  communication  was  possible  enormous  precautions  had  to  be  taken  so  to 
hide  war  cabinets  from  government  forces. 
The  1947  operations  demonstrated  the  willpower  of  the  Democratic  Army  to 
pursuit  its  aims  and  challenge  the  status  and  strength  of  the  National  Army.  In  April  the 
National  Army  launched,  its  first  massive  campaign  against  the  DA  to  eliminate  its 
powers  and  free  the  occupied  by  the  Communists  areas.  Hence  'Terminus'  begun  in 
April  with  the  aim  to  cut  the  DA's  communication  line  from  the  north  and  clear  central 
and  northern  Greece  from  the  communist  influence.  The  undertaking  was  relatively 
successful  for  the  government  forces.  The  operation  demonstrated  the  weaknesses  of  the 
NA:  functional  inefficiency  and  lack  of  organisation  and  discipline.  The  fights  turned  in 
112  I.  General  (Marcos  Vafeiadis),  2.  Lieutenant-General  (Sarantis  Protopappas),  3.  Major-General 
(G.  Boditsios,  Th.  Genios,  V.  Ganatsios,  N.  Theoharopoulos,  N.  Kanakaridis,  G.  Blanas),  4.  Colonel: 
Infantry,  Artillery,  Cavalry,  Air  force,  and  Political  Delegates,  5.  Lieutenant-Colonel:  Infantry,  Artillery, 
Air  force,  Political  Delegates,  Medical  Committee,  6.  Major:  Infantry,  Artillery,  Cavalry,  Engineer, 
Political  Delegate,  Medical  Committee,  Military  Justice,  7.  Captain:  Infantry,  Engineer,  8.  Lieutenant: 
Artillery,  Engineer,  9.  Second  Lieutenant:  Artillery,  Engineer,  Medical  Committee,  Political  Delegates; 
History  of  the  Greek  Nation-1aropiarov  Wqv=6  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  150.  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine, 
pp.  48048  1.  On  the  DA's  transformation  see:  D.  Close,  Th.  Veremis  (eds.  ),  'The  Military  Struggle,  1945- 
1949',  in  Close  (ed.  ),  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  109-112.  YrIHPEZIA  IZTOPIKOY  APXEIOY- 
SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVE,  ATHENS  (YIA),  1948,126.2,16204,  Ynoupyciov 
Eýmrcptic(bv,  An6ppqrov,  -ralpoyopic;  Enuccigewov  Evcpyctd)v',  23  Iavouaptou  1948  (Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  Top  Secret,  Information  on  Future  Actions,  23  January  1948).  Unfortunately,  there  is  no 
way  to  double  check  the  validity  of  the  public  intelligence  information  office  in  terms  of  numbers  and 
specific  lists,  but  propaganda  of  the  KKE  itself  reinforce  the  idea  that  DA  fighters  were  expecting  Soviet 
assistance.  M.  Djilas,  Conversations  with  Stalin  (London,  1962),  pp.  181-82;  V.  Dedijer,  Battle  Stalin 
Lost  (New  York,  197  1),  pp.  68-68. 77 
favour  of  the  government  forces  in  the  battlefield  though  the  communist  forces  were  not 
totally  defeated  in  the  area.  The  key  factor  that  brought  the  supremacy  of  the  national 
forces  was  the  use  of  air  power  to  spot  and  bombard  the  DA.  The  'Epirus  Manoeuvre'  in 
July  proved  the  power  and  determination  of  the  Democratic  Army  to  pursue  its  goals.  It 
brought  a  serious  blow  to  the  prestige  and  morale  of  the  National  Army,  and  despite  the 
fact  that  the  communist  defenders  were  finally  beaten,  it  was  another  relative 
government  success.  The  line  of  communication  between  the  DA  and  the  Balkan 
communist  countries  was  not  cut.  Thus  from  a  strategic  point  of  view  'Terminus'  failed 
to  meet  its  two  main  objectives.  The  Democratic  Army  lost  the  battles  but  not  the  war. 
Konitsa  battle  was  the  first  communist  conventional  attempt  against  the  NA.  The  tide, 
however,  had  started  turning  towards  the  national  forces  due  to  allied  support  and 
equipment. 
Overall  the  1947  c  ampaigns  proved  the  determination  of  the  DA  to  take  over 
power  and  the  need  to  re-organise  and  supply  the  NA.  The  role  of  the  British  and 
Americans  in  this  process  obviously  was  of  great  importance.  These  operations, 
nonetheless,  were  of  different  and  changing  nature  for  both  sides.  The  year  1947  marks 
a  changing  type  of  warfare  for  the  communist  defenders.  Typical  guerrilla  warfare 
turned  to  an  almost  conventional  one  from  the  battle  of  Konitsa  in  December  onwards. 
The  successful  defence  of  Konitsa  encouraged  the  National  Army  and  British 
and  American  Missions  to  believe  that  an  offensive  in  1948  might  give  the  Democratic 
Army  a  decisive  victory.  The  prospect  of  victory  by  the  summer  of  1948  seemed  a 
realistic  one.  Underpinning  this  optimism  was  a  perception  that  all  units  had  been  more 
effective  whilst  co-operation  between  ground  and  air  forces  had  improved.  The 
continuous  assistance,  advice  and  equipment  provided  by  the  foreign  allies  had 
improved  the  quality  of  the  national  forces.  At  the  same  time  the  Communists  were 
beginning  to  conduct  operations  in  a  way  that  suited  the  British  and  the  Americans. 78 
III  The  Denouement:  1948-1949 
Military  Preparations 
At  beginning  of  1948  the  Greek  General  Staff  began  work  on  the  transformation 
of  the  national  forces.  This  transformation  was  made  possible  by  the  enhanced 
assistance  of  both  the  United  States  and  Britain!  In  January  1948  the  National  Defence 
Corps  (commonly  known  as  the  Ethnofroura)  was  strengthened  to  counter-balance  the 
communist  Aftoamyna.  Ethnofroura  would  accommodate  the  local  'home  guard' 
functions  of  the  Units  of  Pursuit  Detaclunents  (MAD),  Units  of  Rural  Defence  (MAY). 
Its  initial  establishment  of  20,000  would  soon  increase  to  more  than  50,000  men.  These 
units,  coupled  with  the  Gendarmerie,  would  perforrn  the  civil  part  of  clearance 
operations  by  arresting,  detaining,  and  persecuting  communist  suspects.  The  manpower 
ceiling  for  the  National  Army  itself  rose  in  stages  from  132,000  in  early  1948  to  147,000 
in  May  1948.2 
The  British  had  a  share  in  these  new  arrangements.  On  19  January  1948,  the 
British  Military  Attacht,  Colonel  Shortt,  complained  to  the  War  Office  that  there  were 
not  yet  enough  officers  with  the  counter-insurgency  experience  required  in  Greece. 
Nevertheless  in  March  1948  the  Training  Commando  Units  Centre  was  created.  The 
Greek  'Raiding  Forces'  were  reconstituted  as  commandos  at  the  Vouliagmeni  Training 
Centre  near  Athens.  3 
The  British  advisers  were,  however,  already  by  1948  shifting  their  main 
emphasis  to  conventional  rather  than  counter-guerrilla  war  as  they  sought  to  meet  the 
'  This  moderates  the  view  of  orthodox  and  revisionist  historians  that  the  defeat  of  the  insurgents  was  the 
result  of  the  two  foreign  powers'  intervention.  See  also  in  this  chapter  footnotes  88-92. 
2  By  the  end  of  the  civil  war  the  total  of  all  services  was  265,000  including  13,500  in  the  Royal  Navy  and 
7,500  in  the  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force.  Zafeiropoulos,  The  Anti-Bandit  War-O  AvriovupqpiaK6,;  Ay6v,  p. 
20.  Gendannerie  as  trained  and  advised  by  the  British  Police  Mission  would  pursuit  the  communists 
outside  the  battlefield. 79 
Communists'  shift  to  the  conventional  strategy.  4  Major  General  Ernest  Down  replaced 
Stuart  Rawlins  as  British  Military  Mission  Commander  on  27  March  1948.  As  a  result 
British  advice  on  operational  doctrine  was  modified.  The  strategy  of  'encirclement'  had 
been  found  wanting  in  1947.  Down  favoured  the  replacement  of  encirclement  in  villages 
5 
and  towns  with  the  'relentless  chasing  small  bands  in  the  hills'.  He  adhered  to  the 
strategy  of  'clear  and  hold'  but  insisted  that  it  had  to  be  based  on  the  continuous  conduct 
of  o  ffensive  o  perations  s  upported  bym  aximum  u  se  of  air  power.  6  To  match  Down's 
aggressive  military  strategy  Clifford  Norton  re-thought  his  political  strategy.  Norton  was 
so  deten-nined  that  the  National  Army  should  crack  the  'bandits'  in  1948  that  he  told  the 
Americans  that  no  political  compromise  was  possible  'until  their  final  defeat.  He 
adjudged  that  attempts  to  reach  a  compromise  with  some  elements  at  least  of  the  Left, 
which  heh  imself  h  ad  u  rged  ont  he  G  reek  govenunent  during  1947,  were  'absolutely 
wrong'. 
7 
On  14  February  1947,  the  Greek  government agreed  to  effective  Anglo- 
American  control  o  ver  t  he  N  ational  A  rmy.  8  T  he  a  rrival  ofav  igorous  a  nd  a  ggressive 
American  field  commander,  Lt.  Gen.  Van  Fleet  on  24  February  1948  to  assume 
command  of  the  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and  Planning  Group  signalled  the 
American  determination  to  bring  the  civil  war  to  an  end.  As  Van  Fleet  told  the  press,  the 
3  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/908,  History  of  BMM(G);  WO  33/2641,  War 
Office  Paramilitary  Establishments,  19  January  1948. 
4  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/950,  BMM(G),  31  March  1948;  WO  261/548, 
BLO  in  GHQMELF,  20  March  1948;  DEFE,  4/11,  COS  (48)  24,18  February  1948;  Jones,  'The  British 
Army,  and  Counter-Guerrilla  Warfare  in  Transition,  1944-1952',  Small  War  and  Insurgencies  7,  no-3 
(winter  1996),  278. 
5  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  5110,  COS  (48)  64(0),  24  March  1948;  King's 
College  London  Archives,  Liddell  Hart  Centre  for  Military  Archives,  Gen.  H.  Pyman  Papers,  6/1/14,3,4 
March  1948;  Woodhouse  states  that  training  effort  of  the  BMM  had  been  inefficient  for  long  and  that 
'criticism  of  British  training  methods  by  American  officers  was  justified'.  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor 
Greece,  p.  238. 
6  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/72248  R12202,  Gen.  Down's  'Appreciation  of  the 
Bandit  War  in  Greece',  October  1948.  Field  Marshal  Papagos,  'Guerrilla  Warfare',  in  F.  M.  Osanka  (ed.  ), 
Modern  Guerrilla  Warfare,  p.  236. 
7  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/72242  R  6174,  Norton  to  Sargent,  12  May  1948; 
FO  371n2242  R  7475,  Norton  to  Bevin,  21  June  1948. 
8  Wittner,  American  Intervention,  p.  242;  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  238. 80 
JUSMAPG,  'appears  to  be  in  charge  of  operations.  9  Van  Fleet's  aim  was  to  keep  the 
Democratic  Army  continuously  engaged.  JUSMAPG,  Down  and  the  Greek  commanders 
framed  the  plan  for  government  operations  in  1948.  The  national  forces,  it  was  agreed, 
would  undertake  a  'staggered  offence'  designed  to  extend  control  progressively  over 
selected  areas  on  the  country,  moving  from  the  south  to  the  north  in  four  phases.  First, 
the  Roumeli  region  would  be  cleared  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  national  forces  had  a 
line  of  communication  between  Athens  and  Salonika.  Second,  the  National  Army  would 
attack  Democratic  Army  bases  in  the  Grammos  area  in  June  1948.  Third,  it  would 
conduct  commando  operations  to  clear  the  Peloponnese.  Fourth  the  National  Army 
would  conduct  a  winter  campaign  in  the  Vitsi  area  to  eliminate  the  Democratic  Anny.  10 
During  this  planning  the  distribution  of  power  between  the  allied  military 
missions  became  a  delicate  issue.  Averoff  has  claimed  that  the  collaboration  between 
the  British  Military  Mission  and  the  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and  Planning 
Group  was  'excellent'.  O'Ballance  assumed  that  JUSMAPG  was  in  complete  control  by 
the  summer  of  1948.  In  fact  functions  remained  shared  between  the  British  and  the 
Americans  and  conflicting  interests  brought  clashes  between  the  two  missions.  "  In 
January  1948  Britain  had  assigned  an  additional  one  hundred  seventy-five  advisers  to 
the  Greek  army  units  in  the  field;  this  meant  that  there  were  three  times  as  many  British 
as  American  advisers  fulfilling  this  role.  The  January  1948  agreement  between  the 
American  and  the  British  missions  assigned  operational  and  logistical  duties  to  the 
former  mission  and  training  to  the  latter.  General  Down  suggested  that  co-operation 
could  be  further  improved  by  the  merger  of  the  American  and  B  ritish  groups.  12  V  an 
Fleet,  however,  rejected  this  proposal.  He  wanted  America's  officers  to  have  as  wide  an 
9  Wittner,  American  Intervention  p.  244. 
10  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  225.  The  main  drawback  of  the  1947  'encirclement'  strategy  was  that  it 
required  enormous  manpower  to  cover  the  various  targets  and  left  other  nearby  areas  unprotected  and 
vulnerable  to  the  'hit  and  run'  tactics  of  the  DA. 
11  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe,  p.  267;  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  175. 81 
authority  as  possible.  The  two  missions  continued  to  offer  separate  advice  to  the 
National  Army.  Members  of  both  missions  could  enter  the  combat  zones  but  they  could 
take  'no  executive  part'  in  the  campaigns.  13  The  Greek  Commander-in-Chief  had  to  give 
orders  for  any  field  operations,  deployment  of  units  or  release  of  battalions.  14 
The  Battles  of  1948 
From  the  spring  of  1948  the  Greeks  confronted  each  other  in  conventional 
warfare.  The  Greek  national  forces,  under  the  guidance  and  assistance  of  the  British 
Military  Mission  and  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and  Planning  Group,  started 
a  series  of  attacks  against  the  Democratic  Army.  The  National  Army  had  a  strength  of 
132,000  men,  with  artillery,  armour  and  aircraft,  and  were  supported  by  a  further  50,000 
National  Guards.  On  the  other  side  were  approximately  I  ess  t  han  2  4,000  D  emocratic 
Anny  troops,  who  had  little  artillery,  no  armour,  and  no  aircraft.  Despite  the 
overwhelming  superiority  of  the  government  forces,  however,  encounters  were  hard 
fought  and  the  outcomes  uncertain.  The  National  Army  continued  to  display  poor 
organisation  and  fighting  ability.  The  inferior  Democratic  Army  hampered  even  further 
by  its  faulty  strategy  fought  bravely  and  with  a  will  to  win  that  the  goverranent  forces 
found  hard  to  match. 
Operations  began  with  an  attempt  by  the  National  Army  to  occupy  the  DA  hub 
in  Roumeli.  The  Mounts  of  Parnassos,  Giona  and  Agrafa  remained  important 
Democratic  Anny  bases  and  jeopardised  the  rear  of  any  National  Anny  operations  in  the 
north.  The  aim  of  the  Operation  Dawn  was  to  clear  an  area  of  about  2,000  square  miles 
in  the  'waist'  of  Greece  and  eliminate  the  K  KE's  m  ilitary  c  entres  i  nside  G  reece  a  nd 
12  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/908,  BMM  (G),  History. 
13  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues,  Section:  1,  US  Military  Assistance,  1798/7,16  March 
1948,  Reel  1,  Frame  0815;  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues,  Section:  1,  US  Military 
Assistance,  1798/10,7  May  1948,  Reel  I,  Frame  0894. 
14  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/895,15  January  1948;  WO  202/950,  BMM(G)  31 
March  1948;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War,  pp.  158-159.  See  also  Map  D.  3,  p.  189. 82 
abroad.  On  13-14  April  1948  the  National  Army  established  the  tactical  initiative  by  a 
diversionary  raid  into  the  Mount  Agrafa  area  by  a  commando  battalion.  The  commandos 
successfully  neutralised  important  communist  headquarters  at  the  village  of 
Mastrogianni.  15  Spurred  on  by  General  Van  Fleet's  call  to  'get  out  and  fight!  '  the 
National  Army  initiated  its  first  major  campaign  under  the  new  strategy  of  'staggered 
offence'  on  15  April  1948.16  Army  units  blockaded  the  north,  east  and  west  of  the  area 
of  operation,  whereas  to  the  south  the  Gulf  of  Corinth,  patrolled  by  the  Royal  Hellenic 
Navy  (RHN),  prevented  the  Democratic  Army's  escape.  17  The  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force, 
strengthened  by  RAF's  aircraft,  flew  in  support  overhead.  There  was  hard  fighting  in  the 
Mornos  Valley  and  around  the  town  of  Artotina  but  the  hard-pressed  Democratic  Army 
units,  abandoning  mules  and  hostages,  took  guerrilla-like  avoiding  action  and  escaped 
towards  Agrafa.  By  17  May  the  insurgents  had  been  forced  out  of  Mount  Roumeli.  18  For 
the  time  being  Roumeli  was  cleared  of  organised  Democratic  Army  units  and 
government  communications  between  Athens  and  Salonika  were  re-established. 
Forty  days  were  required  for  the  completion  of  Operation  Dawn,  which  ended  on 
26  May  1948.  Many  of  the  Communist  troops  had  been  able  to  escape  to  the  north  or 
hide  in  Roumeli  itself  but  the  Democratic  Army's  underground  organisation  had  been 
broken  up.  Large  quantities  of  its  supplies  had  been  captured,  and  the  communist  army 
had  suffered  over  2,000  casualties  (6  10  killed,  3  10  wounded,  995  Aftoamyna  personnel 
15  Instead  of  a  sweep  from  south  to  north,  as  planned  in  1947,  which  had  the  effect  of  driving  the  rebels 
back  to  their  secure  bases,  Operation  Dawn  aimed  to  concentrate  and  crush  the  forces  of  the  DA  in  central 
Roumeli.  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  237-9.  The  numbers  of  the  National  Army  are 
estimated  totals  of  the  different  units  as  there  are  no  statistics  in  the  official  documents  of  GES/DIS.  As  a 
result  there  are  variations  in  the  strength  of  the  National  Army.  For  instance  Margaritis  gives  a  total  of 
90,000  men  in  a  combat  battalion  that  consisted  of  500-600  men.  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil 
War-IoTopla  Too  EUIIVIK06  Ep(pvAiov,  vol.  2,  p.  34. 
16  GES/DIS,  Archives-Apx6a,  13'  UqLct  Drpa-rob  "EmXFtpýmj  'Xapauyý',  25  MapTiou  1948"  (B'  Army 
Corps,  Operation  Dawn,  25  March  1948%  vol.  7,  keim.  59,  p.  311. 
17  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  240.  See  Map  D.  5,  p.  192. 
18  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXcia,  051yeta  I  Mcpap&;  II  Maýo'u  1948  (Directive  for  I  Division,  II  May 
1948),  vol.  8,  pp.  166-67.  Operation  Dawn  is  described  by  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat,  p.  255, 
257;  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe,  pp.  239-240,258-260. 83 
captured)  and  there  had  been  mass  arrests  of  communist  civilian  supporters.  19 
Dominique  Eudes  has  noted  that  Operation  Dawn  was  the  product  of  British 
gempiricism'.  20  British  intervention  was  apparent  in  the  course  of  this  operation.  British 
advisers  had  pushed  the  importance  of  intelligence-led  counter-organisation  mass 
arrests.  Yet  the  British  themselves  did  not  regard  Dawn  as  a  great  success.  They  pointed 
out  that  the  National  Army  had  not  managed  to  inflict  decisive  losses  on  the 
CommuniStS.  21 
The  next  major  National  Army  operation,  Operation  Crown,  was  launched  on  20 
June  1948  and  continued  until  22  August.  Theo  bjective  of  Operation  Crown  was  to 
clear  out  the  main  Democratic  Army  stronghold  in  the  Mount  Grammos  and  cut  the  line 
of  communication  to  the  north  and  south.  Grammos  was  a  complex  of  mountains  and 
extremely  rugged  terrain.  In  the  centre  of  the  range  lay  Aetomilitsa  the  seat  of  the 
Provisional  Democratic  Government  where  Vafeiadis  had  his  general  headquarters.  The 
Democratic  Army  defences  in  Grammos  consisted  of  two  lines  of  fortifications,  each 
several  kilometres  in  depth,  and  were  strong  and  well  manned.  The  outer  defence  ring 
blocked  the  passes  leading  through  deep  ravines  to  the  interior  of  the  region;  the  inner 
ring,  protecting  the  core  area,  included  numerous  wcll-camouflaged  machine  gun 
bunkers  constructed  of  logs.  Within  the  Grammos  stronghold  approximately  24,000 
Democratic  Army  troops  led  by  Vafeiadis  faced  some  70,000  govemment  troops 
organised  in  two  formations,  A  and  B  Corps.  22 
19  Averoff,  By  Fire  and,  4xe,  p.  260;  Tsakalotos,  Forty  Years  Soldier-  Eapdvra  Xp6via  Eipario5Tqq,  vol.  2, 
%120. 
Eudes,  The  Kapetanios,  p.  320. 
21  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  4/10,  Operational  War  Office  plan  BMM(G),  COS 
(48)22,13  February  1948;  AIR  46/30,  RAF  to  BLU,  19  March  1948;  DEFE  5110,  COS(48)38  (0),  17 
February  1948,  COS(48)64(0),  24  March  1948;  WO  202/893,  BMM(G)  Operations,  20  August  1948. 
22  D.  Katsis,  Diary  ofA  DA  G  Rebel  1947-1948-To  HucpoA6yio  Ev6q  Avr6pTj  rov  JEE  1947-1948,  vol.  2 
(Athens,  1998),  p.  150.  According  to  intelligence  report  the  General  Staff  estimated  the  Democratic  Army 
combatant  forces  at  about  six-and-a-half  thousand  men.  Although  the  government  intelligence  information 
was  wrong,  the  National  Army  held  a  clear  numerical  supremacy.  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXcia,  GES/Al, 
EXtStov  Enqctpýacwv  Kop(ový;,  10  Maýou  1948,  nap6tpqgct  npwTo,  l7paycio  A2,  &%Ttov 84 
The  initial  National  Army  deployment  comprised  five  divisions  (40,000  men) 
supported  by  air  and  artillery,  together  with  an  additional  7,500  National  Corps  and 
4,500  Ethnofroura  troops  to  protect  the  government  lines  of  communications.  The 
National  Army  plan  called  for  a  three-phase  operation.  First,  it  aimed  to  clear  areas  near 
the  main  Democratic  Army  base.  Second,  government  troops  would  attack  and  occupy 
positions  along  the  Democratic  Army  outer  defence  belt.  Third,  communications 
between  the  Grammos  and  Democratic  Army  support  in  Albania  would  be  cut  and  a 
general  assault  from  all  directions  would  be  launched  against  the  Democratic  Army 
inner  defences.  Tsakalotos'  A  Corps  was  assigned  the  mission  of  protecting  the  lines  of 
communication  and  dealing  with  the  Democratic  Army  units  in  Epirus  while 
Kalogeropoulos'  B  Corps  was  assigned  the  main  attack  itself.  23 
The  National  Army  would  enjoy  much  better  air  support  from  the  RHAF  during 
the  operation.  One  of  the  most  important  contributions  was  to  be  made  by  two 
24 
squadrons  of  British-made  Spitfire  fighter-bombers  based  at  Ioannina  and  Kozani.  The 
Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force  aircraft,  employing  strafing  attacks,  rockets,  fragmentation 
bombs,  and,  for  the  first  time  on  20  June,  napalm  supplied  by  the  Americans,  wreaked 
serious  damage  on  Democratic  Army  installations  and  troops.  The  Royal  Hellenic  Air 
Force  flew  3,474  sorties  during  Operation  Crown  reaching  a  peak  during  August,  when 
1,570  sorties  were  flown. 
25 
nX1po(popt6)v  (GES/Al,  Operation  Plan  Crown,  10  May  1948,  annex  1,  Bureau  A  Information  form), 
vol.  8,  pp.  263-68;  Zafeiropoulos,  The  Anti-Bandit  War-  0  AvrtcvyqopiaK6qAycbv,  pp-363-64. 
23  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  170-173.  The  official  archives  do  not  provide  the  exact  number 
of  the  forces  that  took  part  in  the  Grarnmos  fights  and  thus  the  approximate  number  varies  based  on  the 
additions  of  the  paramilitary  troops.  A  combat  battalion  consists  of  500-600  men,  whereas  the  LOK  units 
are  considered  to  be  weaker  than  regular  units.  Margaritis  estimates  that  the  number  of  the  National  Army 
to  take  part  rose  to  90,000  men.  In  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War-IoTopla  TOD  WIVIK06 
Eyýpvllov  HoAtyov,  vol.  2,  p.  34. 
24  Air  support  had  become  an  established  COIN  concept  in  the  RAF,  RHAF  and  British  and  Greek  army 
groups.  The  Air  Ministry  thus  mirrored  the  practice  of  other  British  institutions  in  dispatching  specially 
selected  personnel  to  advise  the  Greeks  on  COIN  matters.  In  that  sense  T.  L  Jones  is  justified  in  noting 
that  the  RHAF  approved  RAF  'anti-bandit  doctrine.  Jones,  The  Development  ofBritish 
Counterinsurgency  Policies  and  Doctrine,  1945-1952,  p.  208. 
25  Campbell,  Down,  Schuetta 
,  The  Employment  ofA  irpower,  pp.  42-45,52.  Implications  of  the  Operation 
Crown  were  that  the  British-made  Centaurs,  armed  with  small  50  millimetre  cannons,  were  obsolete, 85 
Operation  Crown  officially  ended  on  21  August  1948.  By  22  then  some  1,500 
Democratic  Army  defenders  had  slipped  over  the  border  into  Albania  fully  equipped. 
Another  8,000  Democratic  Army  combatants  moved  off  to  the  Vitsi  region.  26  Averoff 
characterised  Operation  Crown  as  'the  largest,  the  most  difficult,  the  longest,  and  the 
most  deadly  battle  of  the  entire  war'.  27  Nonetheless,  it  achieved  only  moderate  success, 
for  it  did  not  bring  about  any  fundamental  change  in  the  situation.  The  ability  of  the 
Democratic  Army  to  take  refuge  in  nearly  Albania,  Yugoslavia  and  Bulgaria  was 
particularly  galling.  Several  National  Army  commanders  were  accused  of  a  lack  of 
aggressive  leadership.  After  the  end  of  the  o  peration  V  an  F  leet  c  haracterised  itas  'a 
bitter  disappointment'  and  the  'guerrilla's'  leadership,  training  and  morale  as 
'excellent'.  He  stated  that  'everything  that  has  been  accomplished  up  there  has  been 
done  by  air  and  artillery'.  29 
Technically  Operation  Crown  was  an  American  operation.  Yet  British  continued 
to  have  a  say  in  Greek  warfare.  The  American  mission  gave  advice  in  the  allied  joint 
planning  group  where  it  retained  four  permanent  members  compared  to  the  BMM's  two. 
The  situation  was,  however,  different  at  the  technical  level.  Joint  United  States  Military 
Advisory  and  Planning  Group  had  fewer  than  300  men.  It  maintained  20  officers  at  the 
National  Army  unit  level  whereas  the  British  Military  Mission  had  over  four  times  as 
many  men  overall  and  seven  times  the  American  number  in  Liaison  Units.  Lieutenant 
General  Tsakalotos  pressed  his  generals  to  adopt  British  thinking  and  therefore  to  place 
underpowered  and  unable  to  climb.  As  a  result,  the  army  was  unable  to  defeat  the  Democratic  Army  and 
close  the  guerrillas'  main  avenue  of  escape.  Wittner,  American  Intervention,  p.  243;  O'Ballance,  The 
Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  170-173.  An  additional  drawback  was  that  the  Spitfires  could  carry  only  a  limited 
number  of  napalm  bombs  for  they  were  too  heavy.  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War,  p.  293. 
26  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  476/2  R9148/11/19,  Consul-General  Knight  to  Reilly 
(Athens)  6  August  1948;  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXcla,  rEYJ  rpayciov  A  I,  '130c(K  eniXelpý0CWq  BtTafou- 
Ano  23  Auyo-GaTou  [tcWt  3  Aciccgppiou  1948'(GES/Bureau  A  1,  'Operation  Vitsi  Report,  23  August  to  3 
December  1948),  vol.  1  1,  p.  35;  O'Ballance  gives  the  Democratic  Army  casualties  as  3,128  killed,  589 
captured,  and  603  surrendered,  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  173. 
27  Averoff,  By  Fire  andAxe,  p.  280. 
28  FRUS  (1948):  4,196,206:  Van  Fleet,  24  November  and  30  November  1948;  Woodhouse,  The  Struggle 
for  Greece,  pp.  242-245. 86 
a  greater  emphasis  on  small  unit  patrolling.  29  The  Greek  headquarters  noted  that  during 
the  summer  operations,  General  Down  'acted  as  Advisor-in-Chief  on  tactical  matters' 
and  British  liaison  units  advised  on  the  execution  of  operations  down  to  brigade  level. 
Furthermore,  Royal  Air  Force  officers  on  the  ground  cast  a  'critical  eye'  on  the  Royal 
Hellenic  Air  Force.  30 
Mount  Vitsi  was  the  next  important  hub  of  the  Democratic  Army.  The 
Provisional  Democratic  Government  and  the  Democratic  Army  General  Command  had 
been  re-established  at  Vitsi  after  having  been  forced  to  leave  their  headquarters  in 
Grammos.  The  Vitsi  operation  lasted  from  29  August  to  20  September  1948.  The  plan 
of  the  Vitsi  campaign  was  much  the  same  as  that  undertaken  at  Grammos  albeit  on  a 
smaller  scale.  The  National  Army  used  three  (1",  2  nd 
,  15"')  divisions  from  B  Army 
Corps.  After  reconnaissance  aeroplanes  located  the  enemy,  Spitfires  began  strafing 
operations.  The  initial  results  were  successful.  Nonetheless,  as  in  the  Grammos 
operation  the  National  Army's  weakness  became  apparent  as  the  drive  broke  down 
because  of  confusion  in  command,  complicated  by  bad  weather.  On  29  August,  the 
National  Army  launched  a  strong  attack  against  the  Vitsi  position  but  the  government 
troops  w  ere  t  ired  a  nd  t  he  D  emocratic  A  nny  t  roops  defended  their  base  tenaciously.  31 
29  General  Down,  Commander  1948-1950,  distinguished  himself  in  supporting  'clear  and  hold'  operation 
by  air  support  and  small  army  units. 
30  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/983,  BMM(G)  Operations,  20  August  1948; 
DEFE,  4/14,  COS  (48)92,5  July  1948;  AIR  23/6395,  RAF  to  BLU,  I  June  1948;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of 
War',  pp.  158-59;  Abbott,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  13.  After  the  Czech  crisis  the  United  States  increased 
defence  budget  for  Universal  Military  Training  (UMT)  in  Western  union  within  the  context  of  European 
Recovery  Program.  Greece,  Italy,  Germany,  Palestine,  France,  Philippines  were  a  few  countries  military 
assistance  was  recommended  to  support  governments  friendly  to  the  United  States  to  preserve  internal 
order.  M.  Leffler,  A  Preponderance  ofPower  (Stanford,  1992),  pp.  148,194-197,239.  British  advisers, 
however,  continued  to  be  involved  in  National  Army  training  during  1949.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE, 
KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/899,  Commander  in  Chief  Middle  East  Land  Forces  (CINCMELF)  notes  to  War 
Office,  16  October  1948.  See  Map  D.  6,  p.  193. 
31  FENIKO  EriITEAEIO  ETPATOY/  AIEYGYN1H  IETOPIAZ  ETPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE  OF  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARMY,  ATHENS  (FEE/All),  1948,1012/  A/57, 
Avayopdt  AvTtaTp&Tqyou  A.  rtavTl;  ý  7Ecpt  cjcKa0apAaco);,  rou  BtTato%  3  OK=Ppiou  1948  (Lieutenant- 
General  D.  Yiantzis'  Report  on  Vitsi  clearance,  3  October  194  8). 87 
The  results  were  moderately  successful.  Both  sides  needed  a  rest  and  were  thus  forced  to 
pause.  32 
The  stalemate  of  Grammos  and  Vitsi  led  the  Greek  government  to  renew  its 
pleas  for  an  expansion  of  the  armed  forces  funded  by  the  Americans.  Tsaldaris  argued 
that  the  army  should  be  enlarged  from  132,000  to  250,000  soldiers  by  the  spring  of 
1949.  The  army,  Tsaldaris  and  Sofoulis  insisted,  must  wage  offensive  war  at  the  same 
time  as  it  conducted  defensive  operations  to  protect  people  and  property  in  the  wake  of 
the  advance.  33  On  29  September  1948,  the  stalemate  in  Grammos  and  Vitsi  forced  Van 
Fleet's hand.  He  advised  the  Department  of  the  Army  that  the  Greek  armed  forces 
should  not  be  reduced  to  a  level  which  the  Greek  economy  could  support.  He  informed 
Colonel  Walker  from  the  United  States  Army,  who  arrived  in  Athens  to  discuss  the 
issue  of  reduction,  that  such  an  act  was  out  of  the  question.  Given  the  'guerrilla'  move 
from  one  area  to  another,  Van  Fleet  insisted  that  'overall  the  picture  had  worsened  rather 
than  improved  since  the  Grammos  victory'.  34  General  Down,  for  his  part,  emphasised 
the  importance  of  air  cover  while  performing  counter-insurgency  operations.  35  General 
William  A.  M  atheny,  C  hief  oft  he  Air  Section  of  the  JUSMAPG,  too  argued  that  an 
expanded  air  support  system  was  needed  to  give  the  army  the  mobility  it  required.  The 
soldiers  could  not  by  themselves  pursue  small  guerrilla  groups  in  such  rough  terrain.  36 
Both  the  British  Military  Mission  and  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and 
Planning  Group  in  Athens  moved  towards  the  Greek  position  of  further  enlarging  the 
32  Margaritis  characterised  the  September  results  as  'failures'.  In  Margaritis,  History  of  the  Greek  Civil 
War-loTopia  Tov  EU?  jviKo6  Ep(pt)Afov  HoAtyov,  vol.  2,  pp.  195-13  1;  Rentis,  Minister  of  Interior, 
overreacted  by  asking  Sofoulis  whether  this  'would  be  another  Asia  Minor  disaster'.  In  Th.  Tsakalotos, 
Grammos-rpdppoq  (Athens,  1970),  p.  32. 
33  FRUS  (1948):  4,154-155:  Memorandum  by  G.  Marshall,  30  September  1948;  FRUS  (1948):  4,156- 
157:  The  Chargt  in  Greece  (Minor)  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  I  October  1948. 
34  FRUS  (1948):  4152-153:  Grady  to  Secretary  of  State,  29  September  1948. 
35  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  5111,  COS's  views,  COS  (48)  127(0),  10  June  1948; 
AIR  8/1258,  COS  (48)  155,19  July  1948;  FO  371/722498  R12202,  Gen.  Down,  Appreciation  of  the  Anti- 
Bandit  War  in  Greece,  22  October  1948. 
36  FRUS  (1948):  4,160:  Grady  to  Marshall,  16  October  1948;  Wittner,  American  Intervention,  p.  245; 
Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War,  pp.  184-85. 88 
armed  forces  in  response  to  the  Grammos-Vitsi  stalemate  in  autumn  1948.  The  key  to 
success,  according  to  the  JUSMAPG,  was  'more  men,  more  money,  more  equipment'. 
Van  Fleet  submitted  a  military  b  udget  f  or  t  he  c  orning  f  iscal  y  ear.  Aso  pposed  tot  he 
$150  million  allocated  by  the  government  for  fiscal  year  1949  Van  Fleet  requested  a 
new  budget  ceiling  of  $200  million  and  a  new  Greek  army  ceiling  of  147,000  men.  37 
Van  Fleet's  belligerent  attitude  had  consequences  for  the  British.  The  more  the 
JUSMAPG  became  involved  in  the  National  Army  affairs,  the  more  the  BMM  was 
demoted  into  a  secondary  role  in  Greece.  On  2  July  1948,  the  War  Office  had  even 
recommended  that  in  order  to  retain  American  co-operation,  the  BMM  should  be 
subordinated  to  the  JUSMAPG.  By  1  October  1948,  the  British  had  agreed  that  the 
JUSMAPG  should  assume  full  responsibility  for  'all  operational  matters  [ 
... 
]  [Ofl  policy 
or  higher  direction  [and]  tactical  training',  and  henceforth  the  Americans  should 
predominate  in  this  regard  . 
38  Nevertheless,  the  British  Military  Mission  would  still  be 
responsible  for  organisation  and  training  of  the  Greek,  air,  army,  navy  and  police  and  in 
this  way  the  British  share  in  Greek  affairs  is  consolidated.  39 
Stalemate  in  Late  1948 
The  Grammos-Vitsi  stalemate  reawakened  the  issue  of  Army  restructuring. 
Prime  Minister  Sofoulis  tried  to  solve  the  army's  leadership  problem  by  putting  forward 
a  well-known  military  figure,  General  Alexander  Papagos,  for  the  position  of 
37  FRUS  (194  8):  4,193  -94:  McGhee  to  the  Under-Secretary  of  State  (Lovett),  24  November  194  8;  FRUS 
(194  8):  4,18  3:  Grady  to  Marchall,  13  November  194  8. 
38  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  4/14,  War  Office  view  in  COS  (48)  91,2  July  1948; 
WO  261/549,  GHQMELF  Report,  20  September  1948;  WO  202/895,  Agreement  Regarding  British 
Advice,  1  October  1948;  Jones,  The  Development  ofBritish  counterinsurgency  policies  and  doctrine,  pp. 
225-26. 
39  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  5/8,  COS/WO  views,  COS  (48)  129,22  October 
1948;  IFENIKO  ErIITEAEI0  ZTPATOY/  AIEYGYNEH  ILTOPIAL  YTPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE  OF  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARMY,  ATHENS  (17EVAIZ),  1948,1012/A/6, 
Avayopdt  ano  Tov  AvTtaTPdT1j7o  r.  rianayecapy[o-u,  27  OKTcoppiou  1948  (Report  by  Lieutenant-General 
G.  Papageorgiou,  27  October  1948).  In  July  1948,  Mac  Veagh  was  replaced  by  Henry  Grady  as 
Ambassador  and  Chief  of  the  USAGG  to  smooth  tension  between  Mac  Veagh  and  Griswold  over 89 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Greek  armed  forces.  40  King  Paul  also  supported  Papagos' 
accession  as  Commander-in-Chief.  41  Papagos  himself  laid  down  his  conditions  of 
acceptance  in  a  letter  to  Sofoulis  on  11  November.  He  demanded  complete  control  of 
planning,  order  of  battle,  appointments  and  operations.  Martial  law  was  to  be  imposed 
throughout  the  country,  with  strict  censorship.  Papagos  would  command  the  Navy,  Air 
Force  and  Gendarmerie  as  well  as  the  Army.  Papagos  was  unwilling  to  brook 
interference  by  the  allied  missions.  42  These  demands  w  ere  soe  xtensive  that  S  ofoulis 
hesitated  to  meet  them.  Nevertheless  martial  law  was  extended  to  the  entire  country  on 
29  October  1948. 
Despite  his  touchiness  on  the  issue  of  foreign  interference  both  Van  Fleet  and 
Down  supported  Papagos  as  Commander-in-Chief.  Van  Fleet's  bullish  demands  for 
more  money  and  equipment  ran  parallel  to  Papagos'  similar  demands.  To  many  in 
Greece,  therefore,  it  seemed  that  the  Americans  were  willing  to  endorse  not  only 
. 
43  uture  Papagos  but  also  his  methods  Any  hopes  that  Papagos'  appointment  in  the  near  f 
would  g  ive  t  he  G  reek  g  overmnent  ab  oost  s  oon  e  vaporated,  however,  because  a  new 
command  issues.  Grady,  head  of  the  Allies'  March  1946  observation  of  Greek  elections,  would  be 
responsible  for  supplies,  logistics  and  operations  in  Greece. 
40  Alexandros  Papagos  had  been  victorious  in  Albanian  war  against  the  Italians  in  1940  and  was 
imprisoned  in  a  Nazi  concentration  camp  from  June  1943  to  May  1945.  After  the  War  he  held  no  military 
command  but  in  July  1947  he  was  offered  the  title  of  General  ex  officio.  Papagos  was  Lord  Chamberlain 
of  King  Paul's  Household  until  January  1949.  He  witnessed  Operation  Dawn  as  an  observer  with  Van 
Fleet  and  Down.  In  January  1949  he  became  Commander-in  Chief  of  the  armed  forces  as  well  as  Field 
Marshal.  Papagos  was  the  first  non-blue  blooded  Greek  to  become  Field  Marshal,  a  title  hitherto 
exclusively  preserved  for  the  members  of  the  royal  family.  Lt.  Gen.  Giantzis  became  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff. 
41  The  Palace  played  a  vital  role  in  Greek  decision  making,  standing  at  the  top  of  political  hierarchy.  It 
represented  a  combination  of  both  political  and  military  powers  and  within  this  context  the  Court  could 
play  a  decisive  role  in  politicising  the  Army  or  militarising  the  cabinet.  Norton,  Van  Fleet,  Down  and 
Grady,  however,  had  proposed  Papagos'  appointment  as  Commander-in-Chief  by  23  October  1948 
because  the  national  forces  needed  a  'strong  personality'  and  a  'strong  leader'.  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371n2248  R  12095,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  23  October  1948.  Papagos' 
strong  personality  would  create  in  early  1950s  a  clash  between  the  two  important  institutions  of  Greek 
politics:  the  Army  and  the  Court. 
42  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/72249  RI  3203,  Papagos  to  Prime  Minister,  II 
November  1948;  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  247. 
43  FRUS  (1948):  4,176-77:  Grady  Confidential  Telegram,  26  October  1948;  Wittner,  American 
Intervention,  pp.  247-248;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War,  p.  186. 90 
political  crisis  broke  out.  44  On  6  November,  Venizelos,  who  had  withdrawn  from  EPE 
to  rejoin  the  Liberal  Party  as  its  Vice-Chairman,  informed  King  Paul  that  the  majority  of 
his  Members  of  Parliament  had  withdrawn  their  support  from  the  coalition  government 
in  order  to  form  a  new  Liberal  cabinet.  As  a  result,  Sofoulis  resigned  on  12  November.  45 
Tsaldaris  and  his  Populist  Party  tried  to  styrnie  the  Liberals  by  forming  a  new 
cabinet  with  the  right-wingers  Napoleon  Zervas  and  General  Stylianos  Gonatas  as 
Ministers  of  Public  Order  and  War  respectively.  Norton  and  Grady,  however,  intervened 
to  prevent  this  'provocative'  move.  46  They  reasoned  that  a  purely  right-wing  formation 
would  antagonise  the  Liberals  and  the  other  parties  of  the  Centre,  who  would  constantly 
try  to  overthrow  it.  Four  days  after  Sofoulis'  resignation  Norton  proposed  to  Grady  that 
he  should  intervene  in  favour  of  the  formation  of  a  neutral  cabinet  excluding  the 
provocative  extremists  General  Zervas  and  General  Gonatas.  As  a  result  of  this  Anglo- 
American  pressure  the  coalition  re-assembled  on  18  November  under  Sofoulis' 
premiership.  47  Norton  and  Grady  had  been  forced  to  intervene  more  overtly  that  they 
would  have  wished.  The  crisis  further  discredited  democratic  Greek  politicians  in  their 
eyes.  Greek  politicians  would  indulge  in  their  own  petty  squabbles  at  the  moments  of 
gravest  danger. 
As  the  politicians  squabbled  in  Athens  the  Greek  government  had  to  face  a  wave 
of  Democratic  Army  counter-attacks.  Despite  the  losses  sustained  in  holding  off  the 
44  The  military  inefficiency  was  attributed  to  the  political  weakness.  The  main  characteristic  of  this  was 
the  'conventional'  policy  and  a  lack  of  determination  to  beat  the  enemy.  General  Down  has  reported  that 
the  Greek  national  forces  lacked  combat  spirit  and  the  Greek  politicians  and  government  were  exclusively 
responsible  for  this.  Close,  'The  Reconstruction  of  a  Right-Wing  State',  in  Close  (ed.  ),  The  Greek  Civil 
War,  1943-1950,  pp.  172-73. 
45  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  37ln2201  R  13356,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  23 
November  1948.  YrIHPEEIA  IETOPIKOY  APXEIOY-  SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVE, 
ATHENS  (YIA),  1948,57.1,56786,  YPEX-Av6)vuRq  Ava(popd  Ilept  Eaonpmý;  rlo%MKý;,  16  NOCPP 
plou  1947-  Report  On  Greek  Internal  Politics,  16  November  1947. 
46  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/72248  R12357,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  I 
November  1948;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371n2248  R12579,  Norton  to  Foreign 
Office,  6  November  1948. 
47  PUBLIC  p 
'ECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/72202  R13356,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  23 
November  1948. 91 
governmentils  attacks  on  Grammos  and  Vitsi,  Zahariadis  convinced  the  KKE  that  the 
fault  did  not  lie  with  the  strategy  of  using  the  Democratic  Army  in  a  conventional  army 
role.  Zahariadis  blamed  instead  Marcos'  emphasis  on  guerrilla  tactics  for  dividing  the 
Party  and  obstructing  victory.  The  Democratic  Army,  according  to  the  General  Secretary 
of  the  Politburo,  should  be  more  thoroughly  reorganised  along  regular  army  lines  to 
enable  it  to  take  the  offensive.  Zahariadis'  will  prevailed.  The  General  Secretary  ordered 
as  eries  ofa  ssaults  ont  he  t  owns  ofK  arditsa,  E  dessa  and  Naoussa,  and  established  a 
concentration  of  troops  in  Grammos  and  Vitsi  that  was  intended  to  beat  the  National 
Army  into  submission.  48 
By  the  end  of  1948  the  Democratic  Army  had  accomplished  its  reorganisation 
into  divisions,  brigades,  battalions  similar  those  of  the  national  forces.  After  the 
Grammos  battle  the  total  Democratic  Army  forces,  according  to  the  intelligence  sources 
of  the  GES,  rose  to  21,400  combatants.  Of  these  2,700  were  acting  in  the  Peloponnese, 
1,700  in  mainland  Greece,  2,500  in  Epirus,  almost  6,500  in  Vitsi  and  Agrafa  and 
another  almost  7,700  in  Thrace  . 
49Having  re-occupied  the  Grammos  during  the  last 
months  of  1948  the  Democratic  Army  increased  its  attacks  on  major  towns  throughout 
Greece. 
The  most  serious  of  these  attacks  was  carried  out  bys  ome  6,000  D  emocratic 
Anny  troops  against  the  town  of  Karditsa,  on  the  plain  of  Thessaly.  Karditsa  was  a  town 
of  50,000  citizens,  plus  refugees  from  other  areas,  defended  by  a  reinforced  National 
Army  battalion  of  approximately  860  men.  On  the  night  of  11-12  December  1948  the 
48  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  253-57;  Iatrides,  'Civil  War  1945-1949',  in  Greece  in  the 
1940s,  pp.  210-11;  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe,  pp.  276-77;  Matthews,  Memories  of  a  Mountain  War,  pp. 
252,267;  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  181-183;  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat,  pp.  252- 
53;  Eudes,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  335-338;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War',  p.  190. 
49  rENIKO  EriITEAEIO  ETPATOY/  AIEYE)YNIH  11TOPIAZ  ETPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE  OF  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARMY,  ATHENS  (17EVA11),  1948,1015/A/57, 
Amý)Ovvlq  rIXqpoyopt(bv,  15  FenTegPpiou  1948  (Information  Office,  15  September  1948);  GES/DM 
Archives-ApXcla.  Atc0uv"  nXijpoyopt6)v  -FEE,  'Ac),  Tio  I'I%ijpoqopt6)v  10  1CnTERPptou 
1948'(Information  Office,  GES,  10  September  1948),  vol.  1  1,  p.  318.  According  to  Shrader  the  DA 92 
communist  forces  eliminated  the  National  Army  outposts  and  struck  at  the  town.  50  The 
Democratic  Army  combatants  put  out  road-blocks,  set  ambushes  on  approach  roads  and 
destroyed  a  bridge  on  the  Trikkala  to  Larissa  road,  all  of  which  delayed  the  arrival  of 
reinforcements.  The  telephone  network  connecting  the  government's  defence  was 
damaged.  By  the  dawn  of  12  December  the  city  was  entirely  under  the  control  of  the 
Democratic  Army  force.  The  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force  was  unable  to  damage 
Democratic  Army  posts  because  they  had  been  established  in  the  city  centre.  51  At  this 
stage  the  Karditsa  battle  appeared  to  be  a  great  victory  for  the  Democratic  Army,  which 
proved  quicker  and  more  efficient  than  the  National  Army. 
However,  by  the  night  of  12  December  Greek  national  forces  reinforcements 
started  arriving  in  the  area  from  around  Thessaly.  These  forces  included  armoured  units 
equipped  with  British-made  Centaur  tanks.  Once  the  National  Army  had  been 
strengthened  the  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force  attacked  the  Democratic  Army  forces.  The  I" 
and  2  nd  divisions  of  the  B  Arrny  Corps  pushed  the  Democratic  Army  forces  outside  the 
52 
city  centre  into  the  open  country.  In  the  battle  the  National  Army  lost  23  men  killed, 
76  wounded  and  35  missing  a  total  of  134  men  or  18  per  cent  of  its  initial  force.  The 
gendarmerie  lost  four  men  and  had  six  wounded.  The  Units  of  National  Guard  Defence 
(MEA)  lost  15  dead,  15  wounded  and  13  missing  men.  The  losses  of  the  garrison  were 
about  200  killed,  wounded  and  missing.  Most  serious  of  all  were  the  civilian  casualties: 
150  were  killed  and  wounded  and  over  1,000  were  abducted,  of  whom  about  35  per  cent 
strength  was  about  23,000  combats  during  the  height  of  the  civil  war  in  1948-1949.  Shrader,  The  Withered 
Vine,  p.  I  10. 
50  GES/DIS,  Archives-  ApXcla,  'EXtStov  Ka'r6lilyIq  704o);  Kap8tral;  '(Capture  plan  of  Karditsa  city), 
vol.  11,  pp.  378-79. 
51  rENIKO  EIIITEAEIO  ETPATOY/,  &IEYE)YNEH  IETOPIAF.  ZTPATOY-GENERAL 
STAFF/DIRECTORATE  OF  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARMY,  ATHENS  (I-EVAIZ),  1948,1513/  B/  23, 
Y-XtStov  Alau6mog  17164(o;  KapSfra%  Ava(popd  AvTtaTPdqy0U  rtavTýý,  12  AcKeppplov  1948  (  Report 
on  Safeguard  Karditsa  city,  Lieutenatn  General  Yiantzis,  12  December  1948);  GES/DIS,  Archives- 
Apxcla,  Eicftact;  nenpay[ttwov  Opoupd;  KapSiTua;  (Report  by  Karditsa  Guard),  vol.  11,  p.  387;  T. 
Psimmenos,  Rebel  in  Agrafa-  Avr6prqq  oT'Aypaýpa,  1946-1950  (Athens,  1983),  p.  209. 93 
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were  women.  The  Democratic  Army  troops  suffered  some  800  casualties.  The  battle  of 
Karditsa  ended  up  as  something  of  a  success  for  the  National  Army.  Eventually  the 
battle  would  turn  in  favour  of  the  government  forces. 
On  21-22  December,  some  2,500  Democratic  Army  combatants  attacked  the  key 
towns  of  Edessa  and  Naousa  on  the  road  from  Salonika  to  Florina,  using  both  machine- 
guns  and  mortars.  The  assault  on  Edessa  failed.  The  Democratic  Army  attacks  failed  to 
catch  the  National  Army  by  surprise.  The  communist  forces  were  weakened  by  their 
losses  in  material  and  troops,  the  physical  exhaustion  of  its  combatants  and  bad  winter 
weather.  Under  the  constant  threat  of  the  air  strikes  it  was  becoming  harder  and  harder 
for  the  Democratic  Army  to  hide  and  move  from  one  area  to  another.  54 
Despite  the  unsuccessful  attacks,  the  Democratic  Army  did  not  waste  any  time 
before  starting  the  next  operation.  The  troops  of  the  Democratic  Army  departed  on  26 
December  1948  from  Vitsi  with  sixty  new  recruits,  food  and  a  large  quantity  of  medical 
supplies  looted  from  a  hospital.  On  II  and  12  January  1949,  the  same  Democratic  Army 
troops,  which  had  attacked  Edessa  on  21  December,  took  Naousa  from  its  900  strong 
National  Army  garrison.  On  12  January,  however,  further  National  Army  reinforcements 
of  some  2,5000  men  arrived  from  Salonika  and  Veroia  to  assist  the  National  Army.  On 
15  January,  the  National  Army  managed  to  re-capture  the  city  of  Naousa.  Nevertheless, 
the  D  emocratic  A  rmy  a  ttackers  e  scaped  o  nce  a  gain  ing  ood  o  rder  ont  he  night  of  15 
January  1949  with  large  quantities  of  supplies  and  over  600  recruits.  The  National  Anny 
52  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXcla,  EKOccrt;  r1c7cpayýLtva)v  Opoupd;  KapSiToa;  kaTa  qv  Tptýgcpov  I&Xýv  11, 
12,13,  Acice[tPpiou  1948'(Report  by  Karditsa  Guard  over  the  battle  on  11,12,13  December  1948),  vol. 
11,  p.  3  89;  Psimenos,  Rebel  in  Agrqfa-Avr6ipTjq  ar'Aypa(pa,  1946-1950  pp.  290-2  10.  53  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  257;  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  230.  54  GES/DIS,  Archives-  ApXcAx  Atofictaý  EOvoypoi)pd;  E)EaaaXia;,  'EKOeall  Ent  -r(Ov  yCYov6TCOV  TCOV 
EO(PdS(OV  OTt;  19,20,23  Aciccgppfou  1948'  (Report  on  events  in  Sofades  on  19,20,23  December  1948), 
vol.  11,  pp.  398404. 94 
lost  only  8  men,  whereas  the  Democratic  Army  lost  58  killed  and  70  captured  or 
surrendered  during  the  battle  for  the  town.  55 
Despite  the  growing  size  of  the  National  Anny,  its  material  advantages,  its  better 
allied  equipment  and  the  steady  improvements  in  leadership  and  training  introduced  by 
the  British  and  the  Americans,  it  continued  to  find  that  superior  numbers  and  firepower 
did  not  bring  the  hoped-for  final  success  against  the  Democratic  Army.  The  ability  of 
the  Democratic  Army  to  escape,  endure  long-lasting  operations  and  counter-attack  were 
all  threatening  signs  for  the  National  Army.  The  Democratic  Army  had  conducted 
unsuccessful  p  ositional  d  efence,  I  ike  t  he  b  attles  ofK  arditsa  a  nd  Naousa  and  suffered 
serious  defeats,  like  Operation  Crown.  It  was,  in  truth,  losing  the  war.  Yet  the 
atmosphere  in  governmental  Greece  at  the  turn  of  the  year  was  hardly  triumphant.  The 
continued  uneven  performance  of  national  forces  further  strengthened  the  voices  of 
those  calling  for  change. 
The  End  of  tit  e  Civil  War 
On  19  January  1949  Papagos  was  appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Greek 
armed  forces.  He  was  equipped  with  new  powers  enabling  him  to  replace  corps 
commanders,  implement  martial  law  and  bypass  the  nation's  civilian  leadership.  Three 
days  after  his  appointment,  P  apagos  enlarged  the  Supreme  National  Defence  Council 
into  the  War  Council,  which  consisted  of  the  premier,  the  deputy  premier,  the  leaders  of 
the  four  parties  participating  in  the  government,  Grady,  Van  Fleet  and  Down.  56  Papagos 
informed  the  War  Council  that  'the  size  of  [the]  Greek  Armed  Forces  was  inadequate' 
and  that  he  had  accepted  the  position  of  Commander-in-Chief  only  upon  allied  and 
55  GESIDIS,  Archives-ApXcia,  GES/Al,  'EKOcat;  cntq;  cntOtac(o;  kaT6tNaoýýg,  11  -16  lavowplou 
1949'  (Report  on  Naousa  battle,  11-16  January  1949),  vol.  12,  keim.  8,  p.  94;  GESIDIS,  Archives-ApXcia, 
'EkOeat;  -tta  q  V&Xj  q;  Ndouaa;  kat  yta  Tov  E%tyg6,28  lavouapiau  1949'(Report  on  Naousa  battle  and 
manoeuvre,  28  January  1949),  vol.  12,  keirn.  8,  p.  91. 
56  ASEA  was  the  body  to  co-ordinate  the  Greek  armed  forces.  For  ASEA  see  also  pp.  48,66. 95 
governmental  assurances  that  the  armed  forces  would  be  increased  to  250,000  men.  57 
Indeed  the  national  forces  including  the  Units  of  Pursuit  Detachments  (MAD),  the  Units 
of  Rural  Defence  (MAY)  and  Units  of  National  Guard  Defence  (MEA)  increased 
throughout  1949  and  reached  an  eventual  total  of  265,000  men.  The  tide  of  battle  in  the 
Greek  civil  war  shifted  dramatically  in  1949  as  a  result  of  the  enlargement  of  the 
National  Army,  modem  and  abundant  equipment,  new  tactics  and  most  notably  the  use 
of  the  air  power.  Papagosp  roved  to  bean  efficient  Commander-in-Chief  but  he  was 
fortunate  in  having  such  supportive  allies.  The  communists  still  committed  to  an 
aggressive  strategy.  Yet  that  strategy  was  one  which  the  British  and  the  Americans  were 
well-equipped  to  meet. 
At  the  Fifth  Plenum  of  the  KKE  on  30  and  31  January  1949,  Z  ahariadis  h  ad 
engineered  the  ousting  of  Marcos  from  his  positions  as  Premier,  Minister  of  War,  and 
Commander  of  the  Democratic  Anny.  58  Vice  Premier  Ioannidis  took  over  as  Premier  of 
the  Provisional  Government.  Zahariadis  himself  took  over  the  direct  command  of 
military  operations,  in  order  to  complete  the  conversion  of  the  Democratic  Army  from  a 
guerrilla  army  to  a  conventional  force.  By  the  spring  of  1949  the  Democratic  Army  had 
reached  a  strength  of  100,000  men  and  women  fighters,  reserves  and  auxiliaries  from 
,  11, .  broad.  Between  30  March  and  5  April  1949,  Zahariadis  radically  re-organised  the 
Provisional  Government  to  constitute  a  cabinet  under  his  full  control.  59  Zahariadis' 
strategic  policy  of  sustained  attacks  against  well-defended  urban  areas,  along  with  a 
'static  defence'  of  the  Grammos  and  Vitsi,  concentrated  the  lightly  armed  Democratic 
57  FRUS  (1949):  6,24649:  Satterthwaite  to  Secretary  of  State,  8  February  1949;  Wittner,  American 
Intervention,  p.  248;  Jones,  'A New  Kind  of  War,  p.  196. 
58  Marcos,  after  being  expelled  from  the  party  took  refuge  in  the  Soviet  Union  and  did  not  return  to 
Greece  before  1982. 
5'  Now  that  Marcos  was  put  aside  Zahariadis  had  no  opposition  in  decision  making  in  the  Politburo.  In 
January  1949,  the  KKE  officially  announced  that  it  had  sided  with  Moscow  regarding  Tito's  quarrel  with 
Stalin  since  June  1948,  when  Yugoslavia  was  expelled  from  Cominform.  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe,  pp. 
334-35;  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  263. 96 
Army  and  exposed  it  to  the  devastating  effects  of  the  National  Army's  superior 
numbers,  artillery,  and  most  of  all  aerial  firepower. 
In  March  1949  the  8h  Democratic  Army  division  in  Grammos  managed  to  join 
up  with  the  Democratic  Army  forces,  which  had  escaped  into  the  mountains  after  the 
Grammos  battle  (on  20  August  1948).  During  the  winter  of  1949  this  force  had  created  a 
new  area  of  Communist  control  in  the  highest  areas  of  the  Mount  Grammos.  Its  aim  was 
to  "re-capture  Grammos  area'.  This  area  was  Democratic  Army's  political  and  military 
base  with  natural  barriers  to  protect  the  Democratic  Army  from  the  National  Army.  The 
bases  in  Mounts  Grarnmos  and  Vitsi  were  also  adjacent  to  the  Albanian  and 
Yugoslavian  borders  and  housed  reception  and  distribution  points  for  supplies  and 
equipment  from  the  neighbouring  Communist  countries.  The  Yugoslav-Soviet  split  had 
decreased  the  amount  of  aid  the  Democratic  Army  received  from  Yugoslavia.  On  the 
other  hand  the  DA  had  received  a  large  quantity  of  Czechoslovakian  and  German  spoils 
of  the  Second  World  War.  Albania  and  Bulgaria  continued  to  provide  the  Democratic 
Army  with  a  wide  range  of  support,  including  free  transit  across  their  borders, 
pennission  to  manoeuvre  on  their  territory,  training  bases,  hospitals,  recruiting  areas, 
food,  money,  clothing,  arms,  ammunition  and  refuge  for  the  families  of  the  Democratic 
Army  combatants.  60  It  was  from  Albania  that  a  Democratic  Army  division,  newly 
equipped  with  modem  Soviet-type  automatic  weapons,  entered  the  Mount  Grammos  in 
the  first  days  of  April  1949  seizing  and  occupying  peaks  and  passes.  61 
In  late  March  1949  General  Van  Fleet  developed  a  campaign  plan  for  1949.  Van 
Fleet's  plan  was  to  use  some  50,000  National  Defence  Corps  (Ethnofroura)  men  to  free 
the  National  Army  from  its  static  defence  obligations,  to  contain  the  Democratic  Army 
in  northern  Greece,  to  conduct  mobile  operations  with  the  bulk  of  the  147,000  men  of 
60  Margaritis,  History  ofthe  Greek  Civil  War  Impla  Tov  EUjvIK06  EppAfov  17oAtpov,  vol.  2,  p.  48  1. 97 
the  National  Army  to  attack  the  Democratic  Army  strongholds  in  Mounts  Grammos  and 
Vitsi  and  then  to  mop  up  the  remaining  communist  troops  throughout  Greece.  62  The 
British  Military  Mission  opposed  Van  Fleet's  south  to  north  plan,  citing  the  urgent 
necessity  to  first  cut  off  the  Democratic  Army's  supply  lines  with  the  neighbouring 
Communist  states.  Van  Fleet,  however,  persuaded  General  Papagos  and  the  Greek 
General  Staff  to  follow  his  own  plan.  63 
In  March  1949  the  BMM  re-assessed  its  role  in  Greece.  General  Down  ordered 
that  henceforth  the  British  should  not  take  on  any  operational  role  because  the  'United 
States  view  tends  to  predominate'.  Indeed  Van  Fleet  preferred  that  the  British  should 
take  'take  no  active  part  in  operations'.  Nevertheless  the  BMM  continued  to  offer  advice 
to  the  Commandos  at  the  Vouliagmeni  Training  Centre.  There  it  stressed  the  need  'to 
patrol  constantly  in  order  to  obtain  information  and  security'.  The  British  retained  some 
influence  in  tactical  training  and  planning.  The  advisers  attached  to  the  Greek  Raiding 
Forces,  which  were  incorporated  into  the  Commandos,  operated  throughout  1949.64 
General  Down  noted  that  the  Raiding  Forces  were  'the  best  troops  for  eliminating  small 
groups  of  bandits  [  ...  ]  [by]  continuous  and  relentless'  pursuit  operations.  65 
Most  of  the  aid  that  would  enable  the  Greek  armed  forces  to  be  expanded  came 
from  the  United  States.  Yet  Britain  remained  active  in  specific  areas.  Field  Marshal  Sir 
William  Slim,  who  had  succeeded  Montgomery  as  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff, 
pointed  out  after  a  visit  to  Greece  that  the  'bandit'  problem  was  still  a  serious  one  and 
demanded  a  major  commitment  of  air  power.  He  proposed  a  further  increase  of  the 
61  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXelu.  81j  jt&papXe[a,  'IcrToptjc6V  T(oV  TEXnralow  RaX6)V  Tou  rpdpgo%'  (8th 
division,  'the  last  battles  of  Grammos')  vol.  13,  keirn.  16,  p.  127;  Zafeiropoulos,  The  Anti-Bandit  War-O 
AvriovppqpzaK6qAy(Lv,  pp.  575-76. 
62  Campbell,  (et.  all),  The  Employment  ofAirpower,  p.  30. 
63  Abbott,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  34;  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  235. 
64  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/895,  British  and  American  views,  10  February 
1949;  FO  371/78481  R2657,  Down  in  Peak  Foreign  Office  note,  3  March  1949.  65  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  216nO2,  Field-Marshal  Slim  report,  18  March  1949; 
Jones,  The  Development  ofBritish  Counter-Insurgency  Policies  and  Doctrine,  pp.  205-248;  Jones,  'The 98 
Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force  by  two  bomber  and  one  reconnaissance  squadron.  On  24 
March  1949  Slim  told  Bevin  that  if  Greek  air  power  was  enhanced  the  Democratic 
Army  would  be  defeated  within  the  next  12  months.  66  Subsequently  Norton  was 
'pleased  to  a  nnounce'  tot  he  G  reek  g  overnment  t  hat  B  ritain  w  ould  furnish  t  he  R  oyal 
Hellenic  Air  Force  with  22  Spitfires  which  would  arrive  in  Greece  in  June-July  1949  to 
67  cover  the  summer  operations.  Yet  even  in  this  specialist  field  American  influence  was 
growing.  United  States  Navy  Helldiver  bombers  and  large  stores  of  napalm  bombs  were 
68 
made  available  for  the  operations  carried  out  in  the  summer  of  1949  . 
One  of  the  first  successes  enjoyed  by  the  Papagos  regime  was  the  final  operation 
to  mop  up  Democratic  Army  forces  in  the  Peloponnese.  These  were  wiped  out  by 
Operation  Pigeon.  The  National  Army  under  Lieutenant  General  Tsakalotos  had  great 
superiority  in  numbers:  a  division,  a  brigade  and  thirteen  battalions  of  light  infantry: 
nearly  20,000  men,  against  the  approximately  4,000  Democratic  Army  troops  which 
remained  in  the  region  after  the  Aftoamyna  (KKE  self  defence  organisation)  had  been 
purged.  Operation  Pigeon  began  on  19  December  1948,  before  Papagos  took  over.  It 
consisted  of  11,000  men  and  several  LOK  units  under  Tsalakotos.  The  operation  was 
divided  into  two  phases.  The  first  phase  was  to  clear  the  northern  part  of  the  peninsula 
supported  by  a  secondary  effort  to  neutralise  the  Democratic  Army  troops  from  the 
south.  The  second  phase  was  thorough  sweep  from  north  to  south.  69 
The  Greek  Navy  secured  the  coasts  of  the  Peloponnese,  particularly  along  the 
Gulf  of  Corinth  in  the  north,  to  prevent  re-supply  and  escape  by  sea  of  the  Democratic 
British  Army  and  Counter-Gueffilla  Warfare  in  Transition,  1944-52,  Small  Wars  and  Insurgencies  7, 
no.  3  (Winter  1996),  265-307. 
66  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371n8348  R3285,  Slim-Report  on  the  Situation  in 
Greece,  18  March  1949.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  800/468/GRE/49/5,  Greece, 
Bevin's  report  on  meeting  with  Slirn-CIGS  on  24  March  1949. 
67  PUBLIC  RECOp 
'D  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  800/468/GRE/49/7,  Bevin  to  Attlee,  13  May  1949;  FO 
371n8339  R5579,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  2  June  1949. 
68  GESIDIS,,  4rchives-ApXcia,  A  Z(bga  ZTpamb/Al,  'EkOcar,  c7nXctpýac(0;  'rlUpa6;  ',  2-30  AuY6aT0'U 
1949,  (A'Army  Corps,  Report  on  Operation  Torch,  2-30  August  1949),  vol.  14,  keim.  35,  pp.  414-15. 99 
Army  forces.  70  At  the  end  of  January  1949  the  2Vd  brigade  of  the  Democratic  Army  and 
other  units  in  the  Ahaia  and  Hleia  areas  tried  to  counterattack  the  National  Army. 
Gradually,  however,  the  National  Army  proved  stronger  and  more  effective,  causing  the 
collapse  of  the  enemy's  activities.  The  Democratic  Army  was  denied  supplies,  nursing 
care  for  the  wounded  and  an  intelligence  network.  At  the  same  time  the  battles  created  a 
wave  of  unarmed  communist  migrants  who  tended  to  stick  to  the  Democratic  Army 
combat  units  for  protection.  The  Democratic  Army's  flexibility  and  military 
performance  was  consequently  undermined.  71 
In  the  seven  weeks  of  Operation  Pigeon,  the  Democratic  Army  combatants  had 
679  killed,  1,601  taken  prisoner  and  628  voluntarily  surrendered,  in  addition  to  the 
complete  destruction  of  Aftoamyna  apparatus.  The  National  Army  reported  26  killed  and 
72  wounded  from  A  Army  Corps.  Having  attained  his  objectives  Lieutenant  General 
Tsakalotos  left  the  mopping-up  to  mobile  Gendarmerie,  Detachment  Units  and  groups 
of  armed  peasants  under  regular  army  officers.  72  The  communists  were  defeated  both 
politically  and  militarily  in  the  Peloponnese. 
Having  cleared  the  Peloponnese  Lieutenant  General  Tsakalotos  went  to 
Roumeli  to  implement  the  'south  to  north'  plan.  The  campaign  was  to  begin  with 
mopping  up  operations  in  central  Greece.  Operation  Rocket  was  launched  on  25  April 
69  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXcla,  A'  2:  6)ga  1TPaTWAl,  '1Xt8tov  EntXctpýac(ov,  nFptartpa,,  14  AciccýPptou 
1948'(A'  Army  Corps,  Operation  Pigeon,  14  December  194  8),  vol.  11,  p.  29  1. 
70  The  role  of  the  Royal  Hellenic  Navy  (RHN)  was  not  a  dramatic  one,  for  there  was  no  actual  battle  at 
sea.  On  an  average  of  four  times  a  week,  ships  were  called  upon  to  deliver  gunfire  ashore  to  assist  in  the 
defence  of  a  beleaguered  coastal  village  or  support  with  their  presence  an  army  unit  operating  near  the 
coast.  Its  task  was  limited  to  patrolling  the  sea  and  the  providing  of  sea  transport  for  the  movement  of 
troops  and  supplies.  Thus  the  navy  denied  the  waters  to  DA  defenders.  The  aim  of  sea  patrolling  was  to 
prevent  the  communists  from  sea  escape,  reinforcement  or  re-occupation  of  seaside  cleared  areas  and  to 
secure  the  islands  from  potential  attack.  J.  C.  Murray,  'The  Anti-Bandit  War',  in  T.  N.  Greene  (ed.  ),  The 
Guerrilla  And  How  To  Fight  Him  (London,  1962),  pp.  65-111. 
71  The  Greek  Navy  consisted  of  about  115  ships,  three-quarters  of  which  were  on  loan  from  Britain.  There 
were  I  cruiser,  10  destroyers  and  2  submarines.  The  Greek  Navy  lifted  a  complete  infantry  division, 
together  with  four  LOK  (Commando)  units,  from  the  mainland  to  the  Peloponnese. 
72  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXE!  a,  A  16ga  1TpaT6,  '  EicOcai;  MtXqpýacw;  AXF-),  6)ol),  21-30  MapTiOU 
1949'(A  Army  Corps  Report  on  Aheloos  operations,  21-30  March  1949),  vol.  13,  p.  465;  Tsakalotos, 
Forty  Years  Soldier  of  Greece-  Eo;  p6vra  Xp6via  ETpaTi&rtjq  rjq  EUd&oq,  vol.  2,  p.  2  10;  Woodhouse,  The 
Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  261. 100 
1949.50,000  troops  of  the  National  Army  descended  upon  Rourneli  and  Thessaly 
determined  to  drive  the  12,000-strong  Democratic  Army  northwards.  Their  tactics  were 
to  round  up  all  suspected  Aftoamyna  personnel  and  other  communist  sympathisers  in  the 
area  of  operations.  The  government  forces  were  formed  into  small  groups  in  order  to 
carry o  ut  a  relentless  p  ursuit  of  the  communist  army.  Three  months  after  the  start  of 
Operation  Rocket  Tsakalotos'  forces  had  driven  the  Democratic  Army  troops  north  of 
the  Aliakmon  River.  Central  Greece,  Thessaly  and  the  southern  area  of  Mount  Pindus 
were  all  clear. 
73 
In  mid-1949  Epirus  became  the  main  focus  of  the  government  forces.  The  major 
task  of  the  National  Army  was  to  drive  the  Democratic  Army  from  its  bases  in  the 
Mounts  Grammos  and  Vitsi.  On  12  May  1949,  Papagos  initiated  a  new  temporary 
command:  the  Headquarters  of  Epirus  and  Western  Macedonia  (SHDM)  under  direction 
of  t  he  G  eneral  A  rrny  I  nspector,  L  ieutenant  G  eneral  V  entiris.  74  T  he  s  cheme  u  nited  a  11 
government  forces  in  an  area  dominated  by  the  communists.  SHDM,  once  reinforced 
from  southern  Greece,  would  have  nearly  200,000  men  under  its  control.  The  creation  of 
the  Headquarters  of  Epirus  and  Western  Macedonia  demonstrated  the  army's 
determination  to  improve  its  reputation  after  the  lacklustre  perfon-nance  of  previous 
years.  The  Headquarters  of  Epirus  and  Western  Macedonia  included  B  Army  Corps, 
which  w  as  inc  harge  oft  he  M  ount  V  itsi  a  rea.  Inp  articular  t  he  heavily  reinforced  8'ý 
division  was  responsible  for  Epirus.  Political,  military  and  intelligence  units  were 
incorporated  to  raise  the  strength  of  the  division  to  some  30,000  men.  75 
73  Averoff,  By  Fire  and  Axe,  p.  338;  E.  Wainhouse,  'Guerrilla  War  in  Greeece,  1946-1949.  A  Case 
Study',  in  F.  M.  Osanka,  (ed),  Modern  Guerrilla  Warfare:  fighting  communist  guerrilla  movements 
(London,  1962),  pp.  217-227. 
74  Lieutenant  General  Ventiris  from  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff  since  February  1947,  became 
General  Army  Inspector  in  February  1948  and  Commander  of  SHDM  in  May  1949.  During  1948 
Lieutenant  General  Giantzis  became  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff. 
75  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApX6aAPX1aTPdTqY0q  rIandyoq,  Atarayý,  I-Ipoa(opwý  YUyKp6TIaq  Atowý=);,  12 
Maýou  1949  (Field  Marshal  Papagos,  Command,  Provisional  Command  Composition,  12  May  1949), 
vol-13,  keim.  5  1,  p.  358.  The  force  of  the  National  Army  was  so  enlarged  that  a  regular  National  Army 
infantry  division  had  nine  battalions  and  the  8h  of  the  B  Army  Corps  had  twenty-one.  On  24  June  1949, 101 
In  August  1949  the  National  Army  launched  Operation  Torch.  The  plan  of  this 
operation  was  to  drive  the  Democratic  Army  from  its  strongholds  in  Grammos  and  Vitsi 
on  the  Albanian-Yugoslav  border.  Torch  A  would  attack  the  Democratic  Army  on 
Mount  Grammos.  Torch  B  would  clear  Mount  Vitsi  and  finally  Torch  C  would  clear  out 
the  Grammos  region.  76  By  the  beginning  of  August  1949  the  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force 
had  concentrated  almost  all  of  its  effective  units  around  the  Grammos  and  Vitsi  areas. 
The  plan  was  first  to  bombard  the  Democratic  Army's  areas  of  control.  The  National 
Army  would  then  follow  up  to  pursuit  the  communist  troops.  The  power  of  the  Royal 
Hellenic  Air  Force  consisted  of  three  squadrons  of  54  English-made  Spitfires  XVI,  three 
reconnaissance  flights  of  twelve  American  Harvards,  one  transport  squadron  which 
comprised  of  eleven  Dakotas,  one  flight  assigned  to  artillery  observation  composed  of 
ten  old-fashioned  aircraft  and  a  bombardment  flight  which  constituted  three  Dakotas.  77 
The  real  advantage  was  the  proximity  of  the  airports  to  the  battlefields.  Most  of  the 
Prime  Minister  Sofoulis  died  at  the  age  of  eighty-eight.  Alexander  Diomidis,  ex-Governor  of  the  Bank  of 
Greece,  formed  another  coalition  government  until  new  elections  be  held  in  early  spring  after  the  four  year 
term  of  the  current  parliament  was  due  to  expire.  This  transition,  however,  did  not  affect  the  Army's 
operations. 
76  On  II  July  1949  Tito  announced  the  closure  of  Yugoslav  frontiers  with  Greece  owing  to  the  numerous 
violations  and  the  many  Yugoslavs  who  were  being  killed.  However  this  was  the  result  of  Tito-Stalin 
break  and  Yugoslavia's  expulsion  from  the  Cominform  by  June  1948.  On  the  role  of  Yugoslavia's  cut  of 
assisting  the  DAG,  it  has  been  supported  that  Tito  had  decided  to  reduce  aid  to  the  guerrillas  as  a  result  of 
Western  diplomatic  pressure  and  the  possibility  of  Western  economic  aid.  In  N.  Pappas,  'The  Soviet- 
Yugoslav  Conflict  and  the  Greek  Civil  War',  in  W. S.  Vucinich  (ed.  ),  At  the  Brink  of  War  and  Peace:  The 
Tito-Stalin  Split  in  a  Historic  Perspective  (New  York,  1982),  pp.  224-225.  E.  Barker  explains  it  as  a  result 
of  the  pro-Stalinist  stance  of  the  structure  of  the  KKE.  In  Barker,  'The  Yugoslavs  and  the  Greek  Civil  War 
of  194649',  in  Baerentzen,  latrides,  Smith  (eds),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  300- 
05.  Another  view  suggests  that  Tito  was  unable  to  stop  his  country's  aid  to  the  Greek  communists  as  soon 
as  he  wanted  to  because  of  protests  from  his  Slavo-Macedonian  communist  supporters.  In  J.  Pidevec, 
'The  Tito-Stalin  Split  and  the  End  of  the  Civil  War  in  Greece',  in  Baerentzen  (et  all.  ),  Studies  in  the 
History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  316.  The  Communists  named  Tito  'traitor'  for  having  withdrawn  his 
support  to  the  communist  struggle.  Zahariadis,  Ten  Years  ofStruggle-,  dtKa  Xp6via  17611q,  p.  4  1.  From 
the  view  point  of  the  Right  Zafeiropoulos  agrees  with  the  communist  argument  that  the  DA  was  totally 
'dependent'  on  Yugoslavia.  Zafeiropoulos,  Anti-Bandit  War  -0  AVTiCVppopiaK6q  AyO5v,  p.  657. 
O'Ballance  notes  that  the  closing  of  the  Yugoslav-Grcck  frontier  was  a  'deadly'  blow  to  the  DA.  In 
O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  p.  195.  M.  Mazower  notes  that  it  was  the  'last  straw'.  In  Mazower 
(ed.  ),  After  the  War  Was  Over,  p.  7.  Indeed  the  Yugoslavian  help  had  affected  the  final  outcome,  but  not 
to  a  significant  extent.  By  June  1949  the  DAG  had  already  been  decisively  defeated  in  the  Peloponnese, 
an  area  with  no  direct  connection  and  effect  to  Yugoslavia.  On  top  of  that  the  DA  forces  were  better 
equipped  than  ever  during  the  Grammos  and  Vitsi  battles  in  August  1949.  See  Map  D.  6,  p.  187.  77  Spitfires  XVI  gradually  replaced  the  IX  model.  This  type  of  aircraft  was  totally  upgraded  since  their 
1940  ancestors  and  the  Battle  of  England.  They  were  equipped  with  strong  engines  of  1,700  horsepower, 102 
aircraft  were  operated  from  Kozani,  which  was  equi-distant  to  Vitsi  and  Grammos.  The 
arrival  of  the  American  Helldivers  improved  bombing  performance  even  further.  During 
the  first  week  of  August  the  air  force  made  widespread  use  of  napalm.  78  The  centrality 
of  air  support  in  counter-insurgency  operations  had  become  an  established  concept.  The 
full  realisation  of  this  concept  was  made  possible  by  American  material  support.  The 
concept  itself,  however,  was  the  fulfilment  of  the  advice  the  British  had  given  the 
Greeks  about  the  use  of  air  power  since  1947.79 
Several  key  positions  were  taken  and  the  Democratic  Army's  lines  of 
communications  into  Albania  were  threatened  as  a  result  of  the  Torch  A  attack.  The 
Torch  B  offensive  started  on  10  August  1949.  The  National  Army  managed  to  force  the 
Provisional  Government  to  abandon  its  capital  at  Pyxos  (Epirus)  and  take  refuge  in 
Albania.  Some  4,000  Democratic  Army  troops  also  crossed  the  border  into  Albania. 
Another  thousand  fled  to  Yugoslavia  where  they  were  disarmed  and  interned.  For  the 
National  Army  the  battle  w  as  m  ost  s  uccessful:  M  ount  V  itsi  w  as  c  leared.  D  emocratic 
Army  casualties  during  Operation  Torch  B  included  997  killed,  509  captured,  and  133 
surrendered,  as  well  as  twenty  Albanian  soldiers  killed  and  seven  captured.  B  Army 
Corps  of  the  National  Army  lost  265  killed,  1377  wounded  and  9  missing.  80  Even  more 
availability  to  transfer  war-cargo,  rockets,  bombs,  and  after  special  alterations,  under  the  aegis  of 
JUSMAPG,  to  carry  Napalm  bombs.  Zafeiropoulos,  Anti-Bandit  War-O  AvriavppopiaK6q  Aycbv,  p.  595. 
78  The  first  two  of  a  large  instalment  of  American  Helldivers  had  arrived  that  month  at  Larissa,  the  newly 
established  HQ  Central  Greece.  The  remainder  of  the  aircraft-39  Helldivers  and  10  additional  surplus- 
were  scheduled  to  arrive  by  carrier  on  15  August  1949.  T.  Papathanasiadcs,  'The  Bandits'  Last  Stand  in 
Greece',  Milita?  y  Review  30,11  (February  1951),  22-3  1. 
79  Campbell  (et  all.  ),  The  Employment  ofAirpower,  pp.  31,51-52;  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp. 
196-99;  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  278-93;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War',  p.  218;  Jones, 
The  development  ofBritish  counterinsurgency  policies  and  doctrine,  p.  242;  GESMIS,  Archives-ApXcfa, 
IHAM,  'EKOeat;  ent  q;  acponopwýq  8pdaccoq  KaT&  qv  cmXcipilail  '11upa6;  ',  18  AuyObmu  1949' 
(SHDM,  Report  on  air  force  activities  during  Operation  'Torch',  18  August  1949)  vol.  14,  keirn.  27,  pp. 
312-13. 
80  GES/DIS,  Archives-ApXsla,  B  Mga  Y.  TpaTob  Ai  rpa(peto,  'EKOCat;  cnqctpýacw;  Irlupcr6;  '.  Apo  10- 
15  MyobaTou  1949'(B  Army  Corps  Al  Bureau  ,  Report  on  Operation  'Torch,  10-15  August  1949),  vol. 
14,  keim.  33,  pp.  389-390;  GESIDIS,  Archives-ApXcia,  Avo)Ttpa  AtOlKtail;  Aeponopelaq,  'EKOCCIV, 
Mupa6;  ',  10  lenTclipplou  1949'  (Highest  Air  Command,  Report  on  Operation  Torch,  10  September 
1949),  vol.  15,  keim.  5,  p.  147;  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  280;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War', 
p.  218;  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  239. 103 
damaging  than  the  casualties  and  the  loss  of  territory  for  the  Democratic  Army  was  the 
loss  of  its  equipment. 
Torch  C  was  the  final  offensive  on  Mount  Grammos  and  started  on  19  August. 
By  the  start  of  operations  the  Royal  Hellenic  Air  Force  had  been  reinforced  by  fifty-one 
Helldivers.  The  Democratic  Army  defenders  numbered  7,000-8,000  combatants  plus  the 
remnants  of  those  who  had  escaped  from  Vitsi.  The  National  Army  outnumbered  the 
Democratic  Army  forces,  however,  by  ten  to  one  . 
81  On  the  night  of  24-25  August  the 
final  assault  on  the  Grammos  area  began  with  an  artillery  bombardment  and  attacks 
from  rocket-firing  Spitfires.  The  government  army  moved  forward  shielded  by  the 
Helldivers,  which  in  the  first  twenty-four  hours,  dropped  forty-eight  tons  of  incendiary 
bombs  on  the  Democratic  Army's  defences.  Between  24  and  29  August  the  Royal 
Hellenic  Air  Force  flew  826  sorties  and  delivered  250  tons  of  bombs,  rockets  and 
napalm.  The  accuracy  of  the  bombing  was  more  impressive  than  in  any  previous 
operation  by  the  National  Amy.  82 
The  Democratic  Army  position  on  Mount  Grammos  itself  fell  on  27  August.  On 
the  following  day  the  National  Army  sealed  off  the  two  main  passes  into  Albania,  Stairs 
and  Brooks.  The  Democratic  Army  defenders  finally  abandoned  Grarnmos  entirely  on 
31  August.  Their  remnants  retreated  into  Albania,  Bulgaria,  Rumania  and  Yugoslavia 
where  they  were  subsequently  disarmed  and  detained.  The  civil  war  was  over.  Contrary 
81  Woodhouse  claims  forty-nine  Helldivers.  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  pp.  281-83;  Margaritis, 
History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War-Icropla  TOD  EWIVIK06  Epqvllov  HoAtpov  vol.  2,  pp.  535-36. 
82  The  air  force  mobilised  at  Operation  Torch  C  included:  a.  Kosani  airport-ahnost  50  Spitfire  XVI  model 
combatant  air  craft  (two  squadrons),  one  flight  pursuit  of  Spitfires  IX  model,  one  flight  Dakota  bombards 
(4  air  craft),  one  flight  Harvard,  b.  Larissa  airport-  one  squadron  bombard  Helldivers  (24  air  craft),  flight 
Dakota  transport  (4  air  craft),  c.  Ioannina  airport-  one  flight  combatant  Spitfire  (6  air  craft),  d.  Argos, 
Elefsina,  Sedes,  Orestiko,  Airports  various  air  support.  GES/DIS,  Archives-Apxcia,  Av(oTtpct  Atot"an 
Atponoplq,  'EicOcat;  cntXctpýcrcw;  1TIupa6;  ',  10  E=TCPPPt0U  1949'(High  Air  Command,  Report  on 
Operation  Torch,  10  Sept.  1949),  vol.  15,  keim.  5,  p.  152.  On  Tsamo  attack:  GES/DIS,  Archives-Apxcla, 
Iý  Mepap&,  'EKO&atq  ncnpayýttvwv  ent  Tn;  c7itxcipýace);  -ni)pa6;  r'  MI  TcT(bacca;,  rov  rpdRýo%  iý 
MepapXeia'  (I  Division  'Report  on  Operation  Torch  C',  Grammos  collapse,  I  Division'),  vol.  15,  p.  48. 
GESMIS,  Archives-  Apx,  -Ia,  EKOcat;  Tq;  aeponopik-fl;  8pdcrco)q  kcrrd  Tqv  Cn1Xc[p1jG1jv  IrII)pa6q  F',  2 
EVETE[tPP[01)  1949',  (Report  of  air  force  during  Operation  Torch  C,  2  September  1949),  vol.  15,  keim. 
(text)  36,  pp.  473-74. 104 
to  the  boast  made  by  the  KKE  Politburo  that  'Grammos  will  be  the  tomb  of  monarcho- 
fascism'  the  Torch  C  operation  proved  to  be  the  epitaph  of  the  Democratic  Amy.  83 
On  16  October  1949  Radio  Free  Greece  announced: 
The  Greek  Provisional  Government  is  ceasing  hostilities  to 
prevent  the  total  destruction  of  Greece.  The  Democratic  Army 
has  not  laid  its  weapons  aside,  but  has  suspended  its  operations 
for  the  time  being.  This  should  not  bet  aken  to  rn  ean  that  the 
Greeks  a  re  g  iving  upt  he  s  truggle  for  t  he  r  ights  of  the  people. 
The  Anglo-American  Imperialists  and  their  monarcho-fascist 
agents  would  be  mistaken  if  they  assumed  that  the  struggle  was 
over  and  that  the  Democratic  Army  had  ceased  to  exist.  84 
Notwithstanding  this  empty  Communist  bluster,  on  27  October  1949,  the  Labour 
government  announced  that  the  British  army  would  withdraw  from  Greece  because  the 
85 
civil  war  had  come  to  an  end.  On  7  November,  the  Intelligence  Division  of  the 
American  Army  General  Staff  issued  an  estimate  of  the  situation  in  Greece  declaring 
that  the  Greek  government  was  'able  to  control'  any  'guerrilla'  threat.  86  In  the  same 
month  President  Truman  announced  to  Congress  victory  in  Greece.  All  sides  agreed  that 
the  Greek  civil  war  was  over. 
The  National  Army  had  suffered  about  13,000  casualties,  either  dead  or  missing, 
and  over  26,000  wounded.  Approximately  38,000  communists  were  dead  and  over  twice 
that  many  wounded.  In  addition  a  mixture  of  mines  and  massacres,  by  both  sides,  had 
killed  some  80,000  civilians.  Almost  40,000  leftists  were  in  detention.  Over  5,000  had 
received  death  or  life  sentences.  On  top  of  that,  large  numbers  of  Greeks  had  been 
displaced  and  were  homeless.  Almost  10  per  cent  of  the  population  had  taken  refuge  in 
Yugoslavia,  Bulgaria,  Albania  and  the  Soviet  Union.  If  one  considers  that  the  National 
Army  had  lost  37,000  men  in  the  Asia  Minor  Expedition,  8,000  in  the  Balkan  Wars  and 
83  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  283.  Cold  War  exaggeration  did  not  cease  to  exist  for  the 
American  Ambassador  in  Moscow,  Alan  G.  Kirk  insisted  that  the  cease-fire  was  'a  Soviet  tactical  lull'  and 
thus  the  Americans  should  push  the  rehabilitation  of  Greece.  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War',  p.  220. 
84  Eudes,  The  Kapetanios,  p.  354. 
85  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  128/16/CM  62(49),  27  October  1949.  16  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  241. 105 
15,000  during  the  Second  World  War  then  the  civil  war  was  the  most  costly  struggle  of 
twentieth  century  Greece.  There  is  little  wonder  that  it  cast  a  long  shadow  over  Greece's 
post-war  political  development.  87 
The  manner  and  nature  of  this  victory  was  pregnant  with  future  importance.  The 
explanation  for  the  success  of  the  National  Army  forces  has  long  been  the  subject  of 
debate.  Some  observers  tied  the  victory  to  the  Stalin-Tito  split.  According  to  this 
argument  the  crucial  ingredient  was  the  shift  in  Balkan  alignments  that  ultimately  forced 
Yugoslavia  to  withdraw  support  from  the  Democratic  Army  combatants  . 
88  There  can  be 
little  doubt  that  this  created  problems  to  the  KKE  troops.  Yet  the  remainder  of  the 
Communists'  Balkan  allies  remained  steadfast.  The  Democratic  Army  was  able  to  fight 
a  very  tough  war  after  the  closing  of  the  Yugoslav  border.  The  KKE's  change  in  tactics 
from  guerrilla  to  conventional  warfare  has  been  emphasised  by  numerous  writers.  89  The 
conventional  tactics  used  in  Konitsa  a  nd  N  aousa  c  ost  t  he  K  KE  p  opular  s  upport.  T  he 
most  important  single  factor  in  the  defeat  of  the  Democratic  Army,  however,  was  the 
improvement  in  the  morale,  discipline,  combat-worthiness  and  equipment  of  the 
National  Army.  In  the  final  Grammos  and  Vitsi  operations  the  government  forces  fully 
exploited  their  material  and  manpower  advantages.  America's  Cold  War  strategy  and 
massive  American  economic  and  military  aid  to  Greece  all  played  an  outstanding  role  in 
this  transformation.  Victory  without  American  support  is  almost  impossible  to 
imagine.  90  However,  the  presence  of  British  troops,  training  personnel  and  advisers 
97  Clogg,  A  Short  History  ofModern  Greece,  p.  164;  A.  Laiou,  'Population  Transition  during  the  Civil 
War',  in  Baerentzen  et  all  (eds.  ),  Studies  in  the  History  of  the  Greek  Civil  War  1945-1949,  pp.  55-105. 
Logistics  and  numbers  are  usually  an  unreliable  source.  The  history  of  the  KKE  notes  that  the  NA  had 
15,969  killed,  37,557  wounded,  2,001  missing;  in  total  55,527  men.  The  Democratic  Army  lost 
approximately  30,000  lives.  The  civilians  were:  154,000  killed,  800,000  homeless,  24,626  totally 
destroyed  houses.  History  of  the  YXE-JOKIP10  Iaroplaqrot)  KKE,  p.  619. 
8'  O'Ballance,  The  Greek  Civil  War,  pp.  195;  McNeill,  Greece,  p.  42. 
89  Kousoulas  defines  Zahariadis'  decision  for  conventional  warfare  the  'most  basic  error'  made  in  the  war, 
in  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat,  p.  27  1;  Wittner,  American  Intervention,  p.  253. 
90  Indeed,  by  the  end  of  1949,  the  American  military  programme  had  channelled  $353,6  million  worth  of 
military  aid,  including  hundreds  of  war  equipment,  warplanes  and  ships,  4,130  mortar  and  artillery  pieces, 106 
played  a  vital  role  as  well.  Some  commentators  have,  rightly,  drawn  attention  to  the 
contribution  made  by  the  RHAF,  an  organisation  tied  particularly  closely  to  its  British 
patrons.  91  Without  the  British  and  the  Americans  the  Greek  forces  would  have  been 
quite  unable  to  encompass  the  'continuous,  relentless'  pursuit  of  the  Communists  so  as 
to  'exhaust  them  and  to  force  them  to  disintegrate'  that  Papagos  identified  at  lying  at  the 
head  of  victory.  92 
Although  the  Communists  had  been  defeated  the  Greek  state  had  been  hollowed 
out.  The  British  and  the  Americans  had  repeatedly  committed  themselves  and  attempted 
to  aid  moderate  governments  of  the  Centre.  Yet  this  commitment  had  been  just  as  often 
undermined  by  the  egregious  behaviour  of  centrist  politicians.  They  had  squabbled  and 
intrigued  in  Athens  whilst  the  war  was  won  by  their  American-supplied  and  Anglo- 
American  trained  army  in  the  rest  of  the  country.  The  British  and  the  Americans  did  all 
they  could  to  retain  civil  control  and  democratic  norms.  It  was  inevitable,  however,  that 
the  prestige  of  the  army should  rise,  both  in  its  own  eyes  and  those  of  others,  as  the 
reputation  of  politicians  waned.  The  British  government  hoped  to  disengage  gently  from 
Greece  offering  encouragement  from  the  sidelines  as  the  Greek  body  politic 
89,438  bombs  and  rockets,  159,922  small  weapons,  7,7  million  artillery and  mortar  rounds,  and  344 
million  small  arms  rounds.  Wittner,  American  Intervention,  p.  253;  Jones,  'A  New  Kind  of  War%  p.  197. 
91  See:  Campbell  (et.  all),  The  Employment  ofAirpower. 
92  The  importance  of  Papagos  as  the  central  constant  in  the  defeat  of  the  KKE  is  emphasised  at  Papagos, 
'Guerrilla  Warfare',  in  Osanka,  (ed),  Modern  Guerrilla  Warfare,  pp.  228-242.  Matthews  also  stresses 
Papagos'  Command  in  Matthews,  Memories  ofa  Mountain  War,  pp.  261-63;  Woodhouse  is  not 
enthusiastic  about  Papagos'  contribution.  He  notes  that  the  Greeks  'had  won  the  war'  before  he  took 
command  and  before  the  deployment  of  Napalm  bombs,  which  arrived  in  Greece  too  late.  Woodhouse, 
The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  276. 107 
reconstructed  itself  Yet  the  morbidity  of  Greek  politics  drew  the  British  in  once  more 
as,  having  won  the  war  for  the  Greeks,  they  attempted  to  win  the  peace  as  well. 108 
IV  Post-Civil  War  Politics,  the  Korean  War  and  NATO  Security 
Considerations:  1950 
The  Period  of  Unstable  Coalitions 
The  end  of  the  Greek  civil  war  did  not  bring  stability  to  Greece.  As  Sir  Clifford 
Norton,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Athens,  put  it  at  the  end  of  1950:  'if  1949  was  the 
year  of  victory  over  the  communist  rebels,  1950  may  well  be  labelled  the  year  of  hope 
deferred,  so  far  as  political  stability  and  economic  progress  are  concemed.  'I  Te 
struggle  between  the  communists  and  the  non-communists  was  replaced  by  competition 
between  liberals  and  conservatives  and  rivalry  amongst  politicians  of  the  Centre.  The 
result  was  the  collapse  of  successive  govemments.  The  failure  of  the  political  parties  to 
create  stable  alliances  meant  that  six  different  coalition  governments  were  formed 
during  1950  alone.  Historians  have  placed  the  blame  for  this  instability  in  various 
places.  Some  highlight  the  role  of  the  Palace  in  political  intrigues.  Others  see  Greece  as 
a  penetrated  political  society.  Constant  meddling  by  foreign  powers  lie,  for  them,  at  the 
root  of  the  problem.  The  aftermath  of  the  civil  war  is  also  seen  as  important:  for  the  Left 
the  harsh  treatment  of  the  defeated  Communists  -  who  still  commanded  considerable 
popular  support  -  poisoned  the  body  politic  by  encouraging  the  growth  of  an  anti- 
democratic  police  state.  Historians  of  the  Right  regard  the  leniency  shown  to  the 
Communists  as  a  destabilising  influence  on  politics.  A  close  study  of  Greek  politics  in 
the  immediate  post-civil  war  period  confirms  that  all  these  factors  had  a  part  to  play. 
More  immediately,  however,  such  a  study  reveals  that  the  Greek  situation  can  be  'over 
ideologised'.  One  is  struck  by  the  fact  that  the  most  obvious  and  recurrent  problem  was 
the  overweening  ambition  of  the  leading  Greek  politicians.  It  was  not  ideology  but  a  lust 
for  place  and  power  that  constantly  destabilised  the  political  situation.  There  were  no 
1  PU13LIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  95106,  Annual  Review  for  1950,  Norton  to  Bcvin, 109 
Greek  political  leaders  who  might  be  described  as  statesmen.  None  had  a  vision  that 
stretched  beyond  the  next  deal  or  cabinet  reshuffle.  The  Greek  electoral  system  had  been 
designed  to  allow  these  pygmies  to  ply  their  trade.  2 
On  6  January  1950,  John  Theotokis,  a  former  leading  Populist,  ex-Speaker  of 
the  House  and  King  Paul's  confidant,  was  appointed  Prime  Minister  of  a  caretaker 
government.  3A  debate  arose  over  the  electoral  system  under  which  the  elections  would 
be  held.  King  Paul  proposed  a  'photographic  system'  based  on  the  majority  principle. 
There  would  be  a  separate  ballot  for  each  candidate  with  his  photograph  printed  on  it. 
This  system  would  strengthen  personalities,  weaken  parties  and  enable  the  King  to 
dominate  the  cabinet.  For  that  reason,  of  course,  the  parties  rejected  this  system.  They 
threatened  to  boycott  the  election  unless  it  was  held  according  to  the  existing  system  of 
proportional  representation.  4 
Norton  would  not  support  King  Paul's  plans.  He  reported  to  the  Foreign  Office 
his  belief  that  King  Paul  was  trying  to  impose  a  political  system  based  around 
personalities  that  the  King  could  dominate.  Norton  foresaw  further  political  upheavals  if 
the  King  continued  to  demand  the  creation  of  a  new  electoral  system.  Norton  did  not 
merely  report  his  views  to  London;  he  told  Paul  quite  bluntly  that  the  foreign  a  ies 
13  January  195  1. 
2  Respectively  in  Markezinis,  Political  Hlsto?  Y-17021TIKý  IoTopla;  E.  Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and 
Parliamentary  Elections-K6,  uyara  Kai  Bov)xvriKtq;  P.  Paraskevopoulos,  Liberal  openings-01WE60cpa 
Avoiypara  (Athens,  1987);  S.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War  to  Hounta  -A;  rorov  EpýpUio  arl  Xo6vra 
(Athens,  1977).  Thereafter  cited  as  From  Civil  War-  A;  ro  Tov  Ep(p6Aio.  See  also  Appendix  C,  p.  185. 
3  Following  Sofoulis'  death  on  24  June  1949,  Alexandros  Diomidis,  Vice-President  of  Sofoulis 
government,  ex-Governor  of  Bank  of  Greece,  formed  a  coalition  government  with  conservative 
Konstantine  Tsaldaris  and  liberal  Sofocles  Venizelos  as  Deputy  Premiers.  The  coalition  increasingly 
suffered  from  the  rivalries  between  these  dominant  partners  from  opposing  parties.  The  four  years  after 
the  last  elections  of  March  1946  were  about  to  come  to  an  end  and  elections  would  be  held  in  spring  1950. 
On  5  January  1950,  Venizelos  and  his  liberal  ministers  resigned  from  the  coalition  to  push  for  early 
elections  before  republican  General  Plastiras  returned  from  Paris  and  organised  his  own  political  party  of 
the  Centre,  which  would  threaten  the  Liberals'  unity  and  strength.  Consequently,  the  coalition  dissolved 
and  Diomidis  on  5  January  1950  also  submitted  the  King  his  own  resignation.  On  14  January  1950, 
Plastiras  and  Tsouderos  founded  EPEK  (National  Progressive  Union  of  the  Centre).  Papandreou  renamed 
his  'Democratic  Socialist'  into  'Party  G.  Papandreou'. 
4  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87660,  R  10110/12,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  9 
January  1950;  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-Io-ropla  Tov  EUIVIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  173. 110 
would  not  support  his  political  gambit.  5  Without  t  he  s  upport  ofB  ritain  a  nd  A  merica 
King  Paul  had  little  chance  of  imposing  a  new  electoral  system  in  the  face  of  the  furious 
opposition  of  the  political  parties.  He  had  little  choice  but  to  withdraw  his  constitutional 
reforms.  The  existing  system  of  proportional  representation  would,  therefore,  be  applied 
in  any  future  election.  6 
The  organisation  of  the  state  was  still  dominated  by  the  system  that  had  been 
created  during  the  civil  war.  The  anti-Communist  Resolution  'C'  of  1946  -  under  which 
any  political  activity  endangering  the  'security  of  the  state'  was  penalised  was  still 
active.  The  Emergency  Law  509  of  1947  banned  any  Communist  activity.  Special  court- 
martials  existed  with  the  jurisdiction  to  deal  with  crimes  against  the  state.  Directives 
introduced  since  1947  restricted  basic  civil  rights  such  as  freedom  of  the  press.  The 
creation  of  a  truly  democratic  state  faced,  therefore,  major  obstacles.  The  Gendarmerie 
and  the  various  units  of  anned  civilians  created  during  the  civil  war  for  counter- 
insurgency  operations  still  dominated  the  countryside.  There  were  also  several  thousand 
political  prisoners  held  without  trial  in  concentration  camps.  7  Most  of  the  country  was 
still  governed  under  the  martial  law,  which  had  been  introduced  in  November  1948.8 
British  and  American  officials  stationed  in  Greece  regarded  political  repression 
in  Greece  to  be  excessive.  Given  that  the  civil  war  was  over,  they  believed  that  the 
continuation  of  these  punitive  anti-Communist  policies  undermined  democracy  and 
prevented  nonnalisation.  The  allies'  representatives  continuously  expressed  the  view 
that  the  Theotokis  government  and  the  Greek  military  leadership  constituted  an  obstacle 
5  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87660  RIO  110/4,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  6 
January  1950.  This  is  one  of  the  cases  that  illustrated  that  the  Foreign  Office  did  not  follow  a  particular 
policy  to  back  the  Palace  unconditionally,  as  often  supported.  On  that  see:  Markezinis,  Political  History- 
HoAmKý  IoTopla,  p.  298.  The  broader  spectrum  of  the  cases  of  Iraq  and  Egypt  as  well  as  the  microworld 
of  Greek  politics  demonstrated  that  there  was  not  consolidated  British  policy  to  support  kingship.  W.  R. 
Louis,  The  British  Empire  in  the  Middle  East  1945-1951  (London,  1988),  pp.  263,694-699.  Occasionally, 
the  Foreign  Office  put  aside  the  power  of  the  King  if  this  did  not  promote  British  policy.  6  On  Greek  internal  situation  and  elections  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-AX0  Tov  EPý0611o,  pp.  72,87.  7  Alivizatos,  'The  Emergency  Regime  and  Civil  Liberties'  in  Iatrides  (ed.  ),  Greece  in  the  1940s,  pp.  223- 
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to  Greece's  return  to  a  nonnal,  stable  and  unified  political  life.  9  As  a  result  of  Anglo- 
American  pressure  martial  law  was  lifted  on  II  February  1950.  Restrictions  on  travel 
were  removed  in  most  parts  of  the  country.  Resolution  'C'  was  also  abolished. 
However,  Emergency  Law  509  remained  intact.  The  military  tribunals  also  remained  in 
operation.  10 
New  political  forces  emerged  for  the  forthcoming  election.  On  the  Right  the 
Populist  Party  faced  a  challenge  from  a  new  right-wing  formation,  the  Independent 
Political  Camp  (PAP),  which  was  led  by  former  collaborators  of  the  dictator  Metaxas. 
The  National  Unity  Party  of  Kanellopoulos  also  challenged  moderate  conservatives.  The 
Liberal  Party  of  Venizelos  in  the  Centre  was  reinforced  by  the  adherence  of  the  National 
Liberals  of  General  Stylianos  Gonatas,  who,  in  the  1946  electoral  campaign  had  co- 
operated  with  the  Populists.  Tsouderos'  Democratic  Progressive  Party  and  George 
Papandreou's  Party  also  competed  for  the  traditional  Liberal  vote.  Another  new  political 
force  was  EPEK  -  the  National  Progressive  Union  of  the  Centre  led  by  General 
Plastiras.  Plastiras'  republicanism  had  endeared  him  to  the  greater  part  of  the  republican 
and  left-wing  supporters  of  Eleftherios  Venizelos,  particularly  the  refugees  from  Asia 
Minor.  "  EPEK  would  form  a  join  coalition  of  the  Centre  together  with  the  parties  of 
Tsouderos  and  Papandreou.  The  Left  was  represented  in  the  election  by  an  alliance  of 
the  various  leftist  groups:  the  Union  of  Democratic  Leftists,  the  Socialist  Party,  the 
Leftist  Liberals  and  the  Politically  Independent  Camp.  All  favoured  amnesty  for 
8  To  Vima,  28  January  1950. 
9  FRUS  (1949):  6,465:  Minor  (Chargi  at  the  Embassy  in  Greece)  to  Acheson,  16  December  1949. 
10  Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K6pp=  Kai  Bov)xurmtq  Woyts,  pp.  157-8. 
Resolution  'C'  of  June  1946  introduced  a  series  of  new  crimes  and  reinforced  the  powers  of  the  executive 
for  the  persecution  of  the  Left.  Emergency  Law  509  of  December  1947,  outlawed  the  KKE  and  the 
organisations  that  were  under  its  influence  and  penalised  any  type  of  communist  activity.  11  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87668  R  10  113/15,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  12  May 
1950.  EPEK's  drawback  was  that  it  suffered  the  enmity  of  the  Palace,  because  Plastiras  had  been 
instrumental  in  the  ousting  of  two  kings,  Paul's  father,  Konstantine  I  in  1922  and  Konstantine's  I  son 
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communists  and  abolition  of  restrictive  measures.  12 
Although  this  plenitude  of  parties  created  an  apparently  divergent  political 
spectrum,  in  reality  there  were  no  substantial  differences  on  either  domestic  or  foreign 
policy  issues.  All  the  parties  supported  Greece's  detennination  to  side  with  the  West  and 
contain  Communism  with  British  and  American  backing.  In  terms  of  political 
programmes,  t  hey  a  11  s  upported  af  airer  d  istribution  ofw  ealth  a  nd  c  laimed  to  have  a 
special  interest  in  the  welfare  of  the  rural  class.  13  As  Norton  noted  wearily  these 
political  forces  afforded  little  hope  for  change.  14 
The  elections  were  held  on  5  March  1950.  No  less  than  twenty-nine  parties  and 
alliances  contested  250  seats  under  a  system  of  proportional  representation.  '  5  The 
election  left  the  Populists  with  62  seats,  the  Liberals  with  56  seats,  EPEK  with  45  seats 
and  Papandreou  with  35  seats,  as  the  strongest  parties.  16  No  party  was  powerful  to  fonn 
even  a  minority  government  strong  enough  to  resist  probable  post-election  alliances. 
Thus  a  one-party  government  could  not  be  formed.  The  formation  of  a  coalition  was, 
therefore,  inevitable.  The  combined  vote  of  the  three  Centre  parties  of  Venizelos, 
Plastiras  and  Papandreou  taken  together  gave  them  the  majority  of  the  seats  -  136  out  of 
250.  As  a  result  the  three  men  agreed  to  set  aside  their  differences  and  form  a  centrist 
coalition.  Plastiras  would  take  over  premiership  as  the  'newest'  and  most  appealing 
liberal  politician  in  the  Parliament.  The  aim  of  Plastiras  coalition  would  be  to  displace 
the  Populists.  As  a  result  Norton  concluded  that  General  Plastiras  was  'the  moral  victor 
in  the  election'.  17 
King  Paul,  however,  was  reluctant  to  offer  Plastiras  the  Prime  Minister's  chair 
"  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-Aw  Tov  EuqRio,  pp.  83-84;  Charises,  Elections-EkAoyts,  p.  230. 
13  The  Times,  4  March  1950. 
14  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87661  R  10110125,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  16 
February  1950. 
15  Clogg,  Parties  and  Elections  in  Greece,  pp.  22-24. 
16  For  an  account  of  the  election  results  see:  Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections- 
K6,  q,  qaTaKaiBovAcvTiKtq  EKAoyts,  pp.  394-5;  Clogg,  Parties  and  Elections,  pp.  22-26. 113 
due  to  his  anti-royalist  past.  18  It  was  not  just  Plastiras'  past  that  worried  the  King.  As 
premier  Plastiras  would  threaten  the  rule  of  the  Army.  Not  only  the  Palace  but  its  main 
ally,  the  national  forces  and  Field  Marshal  Papagos,  would  be  put  under  the  command  of 
the  goverment,  turning  the  royal  order  upside  down.  Inevitably  King  Paul  disliked  the 
idea  of  risking  his  own  status  and  power  by  swearing  in  Plastiras  as  Prime  Minister.  As 
a  result  of  the  King's  disapproval,  there  was  a  delay  in  forming  a  cabinet. 
Clifford  Norton  'did  not  entirely  trust  Plastiras'  entourage'  because  it  was 
dominated  by  leftists.  Nevertheless,  he  believed  that  a  Plastiras-Venizelos  coalition 
government  would  correspond  to  the  'will  of  the  people'.  A  government  aligned  with 
popular  sentiment  as  expressed  through  the  ballot  box  offered  the  best  chance  of 
cnduring  pcace  and  s  tability.  T  hc  F  orcign  0  ffice  i  nstructed  N  orton  tot  ry  toi  mprove 
King  Paul's  poor  relations  with  General  Plastiras.  The  British  Ambassador  in  his  turn 
advised  King  Paul  that  Plastiras'  coalition  govenunent  would  constitute  the  'best 
solution'.  19  The  British  embassy  calculated  that  EPEK's  leniency  programme  directed  at 
the  Communists  might  help  to  bring  the  stability  necessary  to  normalise  the  situation  in 
Greece.  Britain  was  still  interested  in  securing  a  democratic  government  politically 
acceptable  to  the  Greek  people  as  well  as  in  keeping  Greece  under  the  western 
umbrella. 
20 
Attempts  to  coax  King  Paul  to  accept  the  'moral'  outcome  of  the  election  were, 
however,  derailed  almost  as  soon  as  they  had  begun.  Venizelos  betrayed  his  allies 
Plastiras  and  Papandreou  by  conniving  with  the  Palace.  He  accepted  the  King's  mandate 
to  form  a  government  himself.  He  was  hastily  sworn  in  as  prime  minister  before  he  had 
17  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87661  R  10110/33,  Norton  to  Bevin,  10  March 
1950. 
18  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-krowv  EpV6bo,  pp.  97-8.  See  footnote  11. 
19  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87661  RIOI  10/  33,  Norton  to  Bevin,  10  March 
1950;  FO  371/  87661  RIO  110/40,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  9  March  1950. 
20  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87662  R  10110/46,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  16 
March  1950.  Grady  replaced  Mac  Veagh  in  July  1948. 114 
even  had  the  chance  to  produce  a  full  list  of  ministers.  The  public  justification  of  this 
manoeuvre  of  creating  a  'cabinet  of  the  King's  mandate'  was  that  the  Liberal  Party  was 
the  strongest  party  at  the  election.  The  turn  to  Venizýlos  was,  however,  ar  isky  o  ne. 
Without  EPEKs  and  Papandreou's  support  the  cabinet  would  have  little  chance  of 
survival.  21 
Not  only  did  the  British  and  Americans  deprecate  the  formation  of  the  Venizelos 
ad  hoc  minority  government  but  it  was  assailed  from  all  comers  of  the  Greek  political 
world.  T  he  p  apers  oft  he  C  entre  a  nd  C  entre-left  inG  reece  -  To  Vima  and  Ta  Nea  - 
denounced  it  for  frustrating  the  freely  expressed  will  of  the  people.  They  found  it 
troubling  that  the  Premier  would  have  to  rely  upon  the  support  of  conservatives.  The 
Populist  leader,  Tsaldaris,  announced  the  'unconditional'  support  of  his  party  for  any 
cabinet  that  would  prevent  Plastiras  and  Papandreou  from  taking  over.  EPEK  had 
emerged  as  Tsaldaris'  main  political  rival  during  the  elections.  22  Papandreou 
condemned  Venizelos.  Prominent  members  of  the  Liberal  Party  declined  to  accept  posts 
in  the  new  cabinet  on  the  grounds  that  this  government  was  an  attempt  by  the  Palace  and 
the  Right  to  weaken  and  divide  the  Liberal  world.  23 
The  British  and  American  Ambassadors  were  as  one  in  their  aim  of  establishing 
a  stable  cabinet.  The  British  Ambassador  stressed  the  danger  that  the  new  government 
would  provoke  the  'bitter  enmity  of  the  Right'  as  well  as  dividing  the  Centre. 
Nevertheless,  he  made  clear  to  King  Paul  and  Queen  Frederica  that,  despite  his 
objections,  he  did  not  intend  to  interfere  in  the  Greek  internal  political  affairs,  let  alone 
21  FRUS  (1950):  5,351-52:  Minor  to  Acheson,  23  March  1950.  In  this  light,  the  theory  that  the  Palace 
acted  arbitrarily  was  justified.  For  such  views  see  Linadratos,  From  Civil  War-AZO  Tov  EpýpQo,  pp.  84- 
87,146-147.  American  Ambassador  Grady  was  absent  to  the  United  States. 
22  FRUS  (1950):  5,346:  Grady  to  Acheson,  15  March  1950.  This  is  one  of  the  few  cases  that  the  whole 
political  world  agreed  upon  an  issue,  as  a  result  of  personal,  political  ambitions. 
.3  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87662  R101  10/62,  Commonwealth  Relations 
Office,  29  March  1950. 115 
prevent  the  government  from  taking  over.  24  The  British  thought  that  the  Venizelos 
experiment  was  misconceived  but  did  not  think  it  in  their  interest  to  constantly  interfere 
in  Greek  politics.  The  Americans  were,  however,  much  less  diplomatic.  They  started  to 
mutter  darkly  that  instability  and  autocracy  would  put  at  risk  the  chances  of  future 
American  aid. 
25 
Indeed  both  the  British  and  the  Americans  had  every  intention  of  drawing  down 
their  aid,  whatever  the  twists  and  turns  of  Greek  politics.  The  end  of  the  civil  war  and 
the  consequent  surrender  of  the  Democratic  Army  forces  confirmed  the  supremacy  of 
the  National  Army  and  its  allies.  The  national  forces  had  not  only  proved  themselves 
competent  in  defeating  the  insurgents  but  had  also  emerged  as  an  effective  and 
technologically  advanced  army.  Both  the  British  and  the  Americans  believed  that  a 
smaller  National  Army  was  desirable  once  the  emergency  was  over.  As  early  as  23 
October  1949,  when  the  tide  of  the  combat  shifted  in  favour  of  the  National  Army,  the 
Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and  Planning  Group  proposed  a  reduction  of  the 
Greek  military  and  security  forces  from  250,000  to  123,000  by  the  end  of  195  0.26 
At  the  same  time  JUSMAPG  also  proposed  that  its  own  size  should  also  be 
reduced.  27  On  6  March  1950,  the  Under-Secretary  of  State,  James  Webb,  proposed  to 
the  Executive  Secretary  of  National  Security  Council,  James  Lay,  the  reduction  of 
American  aid  to  Greece.  JUSMAPG  would  be  reduced  from  274  advisers  in  August 
1949  to  128  by  the  end  of  1950.  Indicative  of  American  perceptions  was  that  in  June 
1950  the  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  and  Planning  Group  in  Greece  became 
Joint  United  States  Military  Aid  Group  in  Greece,  eliminating  the  advisory  and  planning 
24  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87662  R  10110/46,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  23 
March  1950.  This  is  one  of  the  cases  that  illustrated  that  the  Foreign  Office  did  not  support  the  Greek 
Palace  unconditionally.  Similarly  there  was  no  particular  policy  to  assist  the  policies  of  the  Crown.  25  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87663  RIO  110/72,  Chancery  to  the  Southern 
Department-Foreign  Office,  3  April  1950. 
26  FRUS  (1950):  6,440442:  Grady  to  Diomidis,  23  October  1949. 
27  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues,  Section  1,  US  Military  Assistance,  Reel  II,  Frame  032  1, 116 
nature  of  the  mission.  The  lower  ranking  Major  General  Reuben  Jenkins  replaced 
Lieutenant  General  James  Van  Fleet  on  30  June  1950.28 
This  policy  was  mirrored  by  Britain.  In  November  1949  the  Chiefs  of  Staff 
approved  the  withdrawal  of  the  last  British  brigade  from  Greece.  The  last  battalion  was 
departed  from  Salonika  in  February  1950.29  The  four  British  Military  Missions  remained 
in  Greece,  however.  On  20  January  1950,  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  noted  that  the  British 
Naval,  Military,  Air  Force  and  Police  Missions  in  Greece  were  still  engaged  in  training 
and  organising  the  Greek  armed  and  Police  forces.  30  On  24  January  1950,  a  common 
proposal  d  rawn  upbyt  he  Chiefs  of  Staff  in  London  and  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  in 
Washington  suggested  that  the  British  Military  Mission  should  be  reduced  in  parallel.  31 
As  a  result,  on  3  March  1950,  the  strength  of  the  British  Military  Mission  was  reduced 
from  200  to  60  relatively  high-ranking  officers.  32 
The  newly-formed  Venizelos  government's  most  immediate  problem  was  not, 
however,  the  chilly  attitude  of  Greece's  allies.  Rather  it  was  the  split  of  the  Centre  that  it 
itself  had  created.  Prime  Minister  Venizelos  asked  the  prominent  leaders  of  the  Centre 
parties  of  Papandreou  and  of  Plastiras  to  join  his  cabinet.  Papandreou  refused  and  told 
Venizelos  tor  esign.  P  lastiras  w  as  u  nwilling  too  ffer  s  uccour  to  his  treacherous  rival, 
Venizelos.  On  the  other  hand  Kanellopoulos,  the  Deputy  Premier  and  Minister  of 
Defence,  himself  resigned  because  he  was  offended  that  a  deal  of  any  kind  had  been 
1801/27,  Memo  by  the  COS,  US  Army  for  JCS,  3  February  1950. 
28  FRUS  (1950):  5,410-411:  NSC  42/1  Paper,  19  September  1950;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW 
(PRO),  FO  371/101818  RI  192/23,  History  of  the  British  Military  Mission  to  Greece. 
29  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues:  Section  1,  Reel  II,  Frame  0267,1801/27,  Memo  by  the 
COS,  US  Army  for  JCS,  16  November  1949;  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues:  Section  1,  Reel 
II,  Frame  0321,3  February  1950.  Vlavianos,  Greece,  1941-1949,  p.  236.  Stefanidis,  Britain,  the  United 
States  and  Greece,  p.  58. 
30  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO/37187755  R  1202,  from  the  Ministry  of  Defence  to  the 
Chiefs  of  Staff,  20  January  1950. 
31  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  21/1966,  Telegram  from  Washington  to  Ministry  of 
Defence  in  London,  24  January  1950;  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues:  Section  1,  Reel  11, 
Frame  0321,1801/27,  Memorandum  by  the  COS  to  the  JCS,  3  February  1950. 
32  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/908,  Report  by  Major  General  Packard  C.  D., 
BMM  Athens,  3  March  1950. 117 
offered  to  the  republican  Plastiras.  On  14  April  1950,  having  failed  to  garner  any 
worthwhile  support,  the  Venizelos  government  resigned.  33  Contrary  to  the  view 
expressed  by  some  historians  it  was  not  the  Americans  who  were  to  blame  for  the 
collapse  of  the  Venizelos  cabinet.  It  was  other  domestic  political  leaders  who  crushed 
Venizelos.  As  Ambassador  Grady  noted  the  resignation  of  Venizelos'  government  was 
due  to  'its  innate  weakness  primarily  and  to  likelihood  that  it  would  not  get  from 
parliament  a  vote  of  confidence'.  34  King  Paul  was  left  with  no  alternative  but  to  offer 
the  loathed  republican  Plastiras  the  mandate.  A  new  coalition  of  the  Centre  was  sworn 
in  on  15  April  1950. 
The  Plastiras  administration  was  based  on  another  broad  coalition.  Despite  his 
treachery  Venizelos  was  offered  the  posts  of  Deputy  Prime  Minister  and  M  inister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  an  attempt  to  appease  the  Palace.  He  declined  Plastiras'  offer, 
however,  and  the  posts  remained  vacant  for  the  rest  of  Plastiras'  short  premiership.  The 
Populists  too  were  excluded  from  this  formation.  Field  Marshal  Papagos  told  both 
Norton  and  Grady  that  he  would  accept  the  Plastiras  govenunent  as  a  'necessary  stage' 
in  Greece's  political  evolution.  However,  he  would  immediately  resign  from  the 
position  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  if  the  Plastiras  administration  attempted  to  curtail 
his  powers  and  put  the  army  under  the  authority  of  the  government.  Papagos  was  still  in 
aubsolute  control  of  the  armed  forces,  which  had  been  entrusted  to  him  at  the  climax  of 
the  civil  war. 
35 
33  Stefanidis  noted  that  Venizelos'  resignation  came  as  a  result  of  American  intervention,  discontent  over 
his  economic  policy  and  determination  to  impose  a  government  of  the  Centre.  Stefanidis,  The  United 
States,  Great  Britain  and  Greece,  p.  139.  Linardatos  as  well,  believes  that  the  government  was  brought 
down  because  of  Grady's  intervention  against  the  Venizelos'  political  measures.  Linardatos,  From  Civil 
War-Azo  -rov  Ey(p6Aio,  pp.  104-107.  The  foreign  factor  was  decisive.  However,  the  Greek  politicians 
themselves  proved  unable  to  sustain  their  government.  It  was  not  foreign  pressure  that  brought  down  the 
Venizelos  government,  because  Venizelos  would  form  another  three  different  cabinets  in  the  months  to 
come. 
34  FRUS  (1950):  5,364-365:  Grady  to  Acheson,  17  April  1950.  Grady  had  anyway  not  exceeded  the  State 
Department's  policy  of  technical  'non-interference'  in  Greek  internal  political  affairs,  though  did  not  go  to 
the  limit  of  this  direction  either. 
35  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87663  R101  10/93,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  28  April 118 
Plastiras  himself  had  no  intention  of  deviating  from  a  pro-Western  line.  Contrary 
to  popular  belief  Plastiras  was  not  a  left-wing  politician:  he  devoted  to  maintaining  the 
alliance  with  the  western  powers.  In  the  case  of  Britain  this  was  best  illustrated  by  his 
attitude  to  the  Cyprus  question.  By  spring  1950  agitation  among  the  Greek  public  over 
the  question  of  Enosis  with  Cyprus  was  strong  enough  to  seriously  concern  British 
observers.  36  Yet  Plastiras  declined  to  endorse  the  Greek-Cypriot  demands  for  support  of 
their  struggle  on  the  grounds  that  the  time  was  inopportune  for  raising  the  question.  His 
government  was  anxious  not  to  strain  Anglo-Greek  relations  and  the  British  would  not 
depart  from  the  view  that  the  question  of  sovereignty  over  Cyprus  was  closed  for  the 
foreseeable  future.  37 
Despite  its  pragmatic  approach  to  international  relations  the  Plastiras  coalition 
enjoyed  neither  unity  nor  stability.  Very  soon  disputes  arose  over  programmes  in  favour 
of  the  communists.  Plastiras  w  as  n  ot  ah  ard-core  I  eft-wing  p  olitician.  Hew  as  t  rying, 
38  however,  to  bring  society  into  a  balance.  In  June  1950  Plastiras'  government  passed 
five  'leniency'  bills  and  was  about  to  close  the  concentration  camps.  39  With  the  outbreak 
1950. 
36  On  15  January  1950,  an  unofficial  plebiscite  among  the  Greek-Cypriot  population  of  the  island  was  held 
in  Cyprus  and  resulted  in  a  96  per  cent  vote  in  favour  of  Enosis.  This  further  alarmed  the  British  about 
Greek  foreign  policy. 
37  pLTBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87722  R1081/169,  Report  in'Activitics  of  the 
Cypriot  Delegation  to  Greece',  8  August  1950.  Plastiras'  pro-westem  foreign  policy  contradicts  historians 
who  support  that  the  General  was  a  left-wing  politician  as  considered  in:  Markezinis,  Political  History- 
NoAirwý  Iaropla.  In  practise  there  was  no  difference  between  conservatives  and  liberals  in  Greece 
towards  foreign  policy  issues.  Field  Marshal  Papagos  who  supported  agitation  strengthened  Enosis 
sentiments.  According  to  General  Grivas,  leader  of  EOKA  pro-Enosis  and  anti-British  organisation, 
General  George  Kosmas,  the  Chief  of  General  Staff  in  Cyprus  was  in  the  confidence  of  Marshal  Papagos 
and  hoped  to  win  official  backing  for  the  Enosis  plans.  However  for  the  time  being  Papagos  noted  that  the 
Cypriot  liberation  campaign  was  'premature'  and  at  this  moment  he  would  do  nothing  to  risk  exposure  as 
a  revolutionary  plotting  against  Great  Britain.  Ch.  Foley  (ed.  ),  The  Memoirs  of  General  Grivas  (London, 
1964),  p.  13. 
38  Around  13,000  detainees  were  in  exile  (Makronisos  island),  around  17,000  sentenced  and  2,289 
sentenced  to  death  for  political  reasons,  and  5,500  pending  trial.  Histor 
.y 
of  the  Greek  Nation-loTopla  Tot) 
E,  UqVIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  173. 
31  In  July  1950  the  initiatives  of  the  Premier  Plastiras  to  release  ailing  detainees  caused  great  opposition  to 
the  government.  Vice-Prcsident  Papandreou  and  some  liberals  accused  Plastiras  of  being  too  tolerant  with 
the  communists.  The  Premier  announced  that  he  was  obsessed  with  reconciliation.  Failing  to  succeed  he 
would  resign.  Venizelos  as  well  turned  against  Plastiras  with  the  aim  to  overthrow  the  government. 
Linardatos  suggested  that  Plastiras  government  was  brought  down  because  the  Palace  and  the  Americans 
disliked  'communist'  Plastiras.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-A7ro  Tov  Eyqblio,  pp.  140-141. 119 
of  the  hostilities  in  Korea  at  the  end  of  June,  however,  anti-Communist  hysteria  grew 
and  it  became  more  difficult  to  make  a  case  for  national  reconciliation  measures. 
Pressure  on  the  Greek  cabinet  by  the  Greek  moderate  parties  to  abandon  measures  of 
leniency  increased.  40  In  August  the  Liberal  Party  ministers  resigned  from  the  Plastiras 
coalition  supposedly  over  the  issue  of  leniency  measures.  This,  however,  was  only  the 
official  excuse.  The  real  reason  was  that  Venizelos'  party  was  offered  more  posts  in  a 
new  Liberal  government  by  the  King.  Anti-Communist  rhetoric  was  merely  a  cover  for 
the  personal  ambition  of  Venizelos  and  the  Liberals.  General  Plastiras  submitted  his 
resignation  on  18  August  1950  after  125  days  as  prime  minister.  The  withdrawal  of  the 
Liberal  Party's  support  from  the  coalition  brought  the  third  governmental  collapse  in  the 
first  eight  months  of  1950.41  The  Foreign  Office  was  under  no  illusions  as  to  the  real 
driving  force  -  personal  ambition  -  that  dominated  Greek  politics.  The  new  royal  plans 
did  not  enjoy  the  approval,  let  alone  the  consent,  of  the  British  government.  Norton  once 
again  tried  to  discourage  King  Paul  and  the  royal  establishment  from  undermining 
stability  in  Greece. 
42 
The  Venizelos  Governments:  A  Marginal  Stability 
King  Paul  entrusted  the  mandate  for  the  formation  of  a  new  government  of 
cnational  unity'  to  Sofocles  Venizelos  who  was  sworn  in  on  21  August  1950.  A  new 
coalition  based  on  the  Liberals,  the  second  strongest  party,  was  fonned.  The  King 
wanted  this  coalition  to  include  the  Populists.  Venizelos,  however,  proposed  an  alliance 
with  the  moderate  politicians  Papandreou  and  Tsouderos,  hoping  that  they  would  both 
support  him  and  form  a  purely  Centre  coalition.  Tsouderos,  however,  refused  to  betray 
40  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87664  RIOIIO/101,  Norton  to  Younger,  7  July 
1950. 
41  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87664  RIO  110/125,  Norton  to  Atllee,  22  August 
1950;  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-kro  Tov  Ep(pbAto,  pp.  143-147. 
42  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87701  R1054/3,  Conversations  between  Ernest 
Davies  and  King  and  Queen  of  Greece  and  Field  Marshal  Papagos,  14,17  July  1950.  Dafnis,  The  Greek 120 
his  electoral  ally  Plastiras.  The  Democratic  Progressive  Party  and  EPEK  deputies 
decided  not  to  give  a  vote  of  confidence  to  the  Venizelos  govenunent.  The  Populists 
refused  to  tolerate  an  administration  in  which  they  themselves  were  not  strongly 
represented.  On  its  own  Papandreou's  support  was  not  enough  to  give  the  government 
the  necessary  majority  in  Parliament.  Consequently,  Venizelos  failed  to  receive  his  vote 
of  confidence.  He  was  forced  to  submit  his  resignation.  His  suggested  solution  to  the 
impasse  was  the  holding  of  fresh  elections  under  the  majority  system.  43  The  failure  of 
the  Venizelos  government  to  receive  a  vote  of  confidence  signified  a  new  period  of 
political  unrest  and  re-ignited  calls  to  set  up  a  single  strong  party  that  could  command  a 
stable  majority  in  Parliament. 
King  Paul,  in  particular,  had  a  preferred  solution  to  the  power  vacuum  created  by 
party  infighting.  He  wanted  his  confidant  Papagos  to  assume  power.  The  combination  of 
royal  and  military  power  would,  in  the  King's  opinion,  not  only  guarantee  political 
stability  but  also  the  safety  of  the  monarchy.  Yet  Papagos,  royalist  though  he  was,  was 
far  from  being  a  royal  poodle.  In  August  1950  Papagos  and  King  Paul  seriously 
discussed  the  creation  of  a  royal-military  government.  Their  negotiations,  however,  did 
not,  at  this  stage,  reach  fruition.  Indeed  they  ended  in  deadlock.  Papagos  demanded  an 
unconditional  Premiership  -  untrammelled  control  wielded  in  the  royal  interest  but  not 
by  the  Palace.  Naturally  enough  King  Paul  shield  away  from  the  possibility  that  he 
would  become  a  powerless  figurehead  in  a  regime  in  which  the  real  leader  was  a 
military  dictator.  His  thoughts  started  to  turn  instead  to  the  creation  of  a  government  that 
was  devoted  to  the  Court.  The  Anny  was  to  be  the  bulwark  of  royal  power  rather  than  a 
Political  Parties-Ta  E.  UlviKit  HoAnKd  K6pyaTa,  p.  470. 
43  Vcnizclos'  Liberal  Party  received  106  votes  for  and  124  against.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW 
(PRO),  FO  371/87664  R  10110115,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  6  August  1950;  History  of  the  Greek  Nation- 
Iaropia  Tov  EU11VIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  175;  Markczinis,  Political  History-IMAITIKý  Iaropla,  p.  360. 
The  majority  system  would  restrict  participation  in  parliament  to  the  parties  with  the  largest  share  of  votes 
and  offer  the  first  party  massive  parliamentary  majority. 121 
threat  to  it. 
44 
Neither  the  Papagos  solution  nor  a  royal  puppet  government  attracted  much 
support  from  Britain.  As  usual  the  British  wanted  an  efficient  and  sustainable 
government  to  take  over.  The  Head  of  the  Southern  Department,  Sir  Anthony  Rumbold, 
described  Papagos'  entry  into  politics  as  the  last  card  to  be  played.  Papagos  acted  as  a 
guarantor  against  the  recrudescence  of  Communist  power.  His  intervention  in  politics  at 
a  time  of  anything  other  than  acute  crisis  was,  however  more  likely  to  further  increase 
rather  than  suppress  long-term  instability.  British  interest  in  the  developments  in  Greece 
was  expressed  in  discussions  between  the  Foreign  Office  and  State  Department  officials 
in  September  1950.  Ernest  Davies  and  the  American  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  the 
Near  East,  South  Asia  and  Africa,  George  McGhee,  discussed  a  closer  co-ordination  of 
British  and  American  efforts  to  support  political  stability  in  Greece.  Both  decided  that  a 
joint  Anglo-American  front  was  needed  to  prevent  King  Paul  from  arbitrary  attempts  to 
impose  his  own  ideas  and  solutions  to  the  political  instability.  45 
With  spectre  of  the  'Papagos  solution'  hanging  over  him  Venizelos  renewed  his 
46 
efforts  to  form  a  new  coalition.  The  Populists  would  be  included 
. 
On  13  September 
1950,  the  fifth  cabinet  of  1950,  a  tripartite  coalition  administration,  was  sworn  in, 
headed  again  by  Venizelos.  Papandreou  and  Tsaldaris  were  appointed  Deputy 
Premiers.  47  This  tripartite  coalition  proved  a  difficult  test  of  the  cohesion  of  not  only  the 
44  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87663  RIO  110/93,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  28  April 
1950;  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-A7ro  rov  EpýpQo,  pp.  147-150.  Papagos'  detern-dnation  to  form  the 
cabinet  he  would  have  liked  is  also  justified  in  Dafnis,  The  Greek  Political  Parties-Ta  WIvwd  I70AITIK4 
K6ypaTa,  pp.  474475. 
45  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87664  RIO1  10/118,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  8 
September  1950;  FO  371/87665,  R  10110/  125,  Rumbold  to  Norton,  9  October  1950.  Giannoulopoulos 
supports  that  the  Americans  supports  Papagos'  solution  on  the  grounds  that  he  would  form  a  strong 
government;  in  Giannoulopoulos,  Post-  War  World-O  McrazoAzyw&  K6apoq,  p.  289.  Dafnis,  The  Greek 
Political  Parties-Ta  EUqviK6tl7oAiTiK6  K6ppara,  pp.  474-475. 
46  Linardatos  suggests  that  Papagos  solution  was  a  King's  trick  to  avoid  new  elections  and  probable 
victory  of  Plastiras.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-Axo  Tov  EpýpQo,  pp.  147-155.  However,  this  conspiracy 
theory  should  be  treated  with  caution  for  it  was  the  Centre's  power  clashes  and  desire  to  exclude  the 
Populists  that  had  mainly  caused  goverrunental  making  and  dissolving. 
47  The  Liberals  were  given  ten  ministries,  the  Populists  and  Papandreou's  party  nine.  History  of  the  Greek 
Nation-IoToplarov  EUqviKob  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  175.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-Airo  Tov  EpqQo,  pp. 122 
cabinet  but  also  the  Liberal  Party  itself.  The  co-operation  with  Tsaldaris  and  the  Populist 
Party  was  bitterly  opposed  from  within  the  Liberal  Party.  Twenty  out  of  fifty-seven 
Liberal  deputies  voted  in  favour  of  immediate  elections.  Two  prominent  leaders  of  the 
Liberal  Party,  the  former  ministers,  Konstantine  Rendis  and  Ioannis  Zigdis,  left  its  ranks 
to  join  Plastiras.  In  mid-October  the  liberal  newspaper  To  Vima  began  a  strong 
campaign  against  Tsaldaris'  son  over  charges  of  misuse  of  public  money.  In  reality  this 
was  an  attack  against  the  leader  of  the  Populist  Party  himself  and  an  attempt  to  exclude 
the  Populists  from  the  government.  Papandreou  declared  that  the  dealings  in  which  the 
name  of  the  Populist  leader  was  involved  were  'too  strong  to  be  ignored'.  With  the 
consent  of  Venizelos  he  tried  to  convince  Tsaldaris  to  withdraw  from  the  government 
until  the  scandal  had  passed  off  48  Tsaldaris,  however,  refused  to  resign.  Therefore,  on  2 
November  1950,  the  Prime  Minister  submitted  his  own  resignation  to  the  King.  He 
claimed  that  his  resignation  was  a  sign  of  'political  responsibility  and  sensitiveness'.  In 
reality  d  issent  inh  is  o  wn  p  arty  had  forced  him  to  try  and  exclude  the  Populist  Party 
from  the  cabinet.  49The  tripartite  government  was  dissolved  after  just  fifty-one  days.  50 
Venizelos  and  Papandreou  intended  to  continue  the  government  with  a  reshuffled 
bipartite  cabinet. 
On  3  November  1950,  Venizelos  took  over  Premiership  for  fourth  time  in  the 
same  year.  Papandreou  became  Deputy  Premier  and  Minister  of  Co-ordination. 
Portfolios  were  distributed  amongst  the  Liberals  and  Papandreou's  Party  members.  51 
156-157. 
48  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87665  R  10110/139,  Norton  to  Bevin,  29 
November  1950. 
49  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87665  RI01  10/138,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  15 
November  1950.  Clogg  supported  the  view  that  the  Populists  withdrew  their  backing  to  provoke  new 
elections.  In  Clogg,  A  Short  History  ofModern  Greece,  pp.  166-7;  Markezinis  noted  that  the  Liberals 
withdrew  as  a  result  of  the  scandals.  Markezinis,  Political  History-HoAITIKý  IcTopla,  p.  360. 
50  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87665  1110110/139,  Norton  to  Bevin,  29 
November  1950. 
51  On  16  November,  the  Populist  Ministers,  who  had  been  left  out  of  Venizelos  cabinet,  twenty-seven  of 
sixty-two  of  the  Populist  deputies  (Stefanopoulos,  Karamanlis  and  Rallis  included)  joined  forces  with 
Kanellopoulos'  National  Unity  Party  and  formed  the  Populist  Unity  Party  (LEK)  headed  by  both 123 
The  bipartite  cabinet  could,  in  fact,  command  a  workable  parliamentary  majority.  Thus, 
on  16  November  1950,  Sofocles  Venizelos  and  George  Papandreou  managed  to  secure  a 
vote  of  confidence  in  Parliament  of  164  for  to  54  against.  Simultaneously,  strong  anti- 
Communist  measures  were  revived.  Resolution  'C'  was  re-imposed  and  left-wing 
newspapers  were  suppressed.  52 
As  these  events  unfolded  Clifford  Norton  and  the  new  American  Ambassador  in 
Athens,  Jo  hn  P  eurifoy  a  greed  t  hat  itw  as  d  angerous  for  the  government  of  Greece  to 
continue  with  its  hand-to-mouth  parliamentary  existence.  This  existence  depended  on 
the  whims  of  a  group  of  political  power  brokers.  These  political  leaders  disliked  and 
distrusted  each  other.  They  were  happy  to  betray  one  another  in  order  to  gain  a  marginal 
political  or  personal  advantage.  The  British  and  Americans  thought  that  this  circus  had 
to  end.  One  group  of  politicians  had  to  triumph  whilst  other  faded  from  the  scene.  It  was 
not  particularly  important  in  the  grand  scheme  of  things,  which  group  turned  out  to  be 
winner  or  loser.  Each  was  anti-communist  enough  for  Anglo-American  purposes.  The 
tendency  of  some  centrists  to  flirt  with  the  left-wing  was  offset  by  the  tendency  of  some 
politicians  of  the  right  to  engage  in  capricious  and  destabilising  persecutions.  Thus,  the 
Foreign  Office  could  support  Plastiras'  government  whilst  rejecting  Papagos'  entry  into 
politics  or  Tsaldaris'  premiership  despite  the  fact  that  Plastiras  was  considered  a 
communist  sympathiser  whereas  Papagos  and  Tsaldaris  were  out-and-out  anti- 
Communists.  Norton  and  Peurifoy  had  little  confidence  that  the  Venizelos-Papandreou 
coalition  would  last  much  longer  than  its  predecessors.  They  believed  the  best  thing  that 
could  happen  o  nce  itc  ollapsed  w  as  for  e  arly  e  lections  tobeh  eld  u  nder  t  he  m  ajoritY 
system.  The  result  should  empower  the  big  parties  and  make  possible  a  stable 
Kanellopoulos  and  Stefanopoulos,  on  6  January  195  1.  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-IoTopla  Tov  EUIVIK06 
EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  176. 
52  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  87665  R101  10/139,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  29 
November  1950;  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-IoTopiarov  EUIVIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  179;  Linardatos, 
From  Civil  War-  A  7ro  Tov  Epýp6Aio,  pp.  179,181-3. 124 
government.  53  The  probable  alternative  to  a  new  electoral  system  was  the  emergence  of 
an  authoritarian  regime  under  Field  Marshal  Papagos.  Such  a  regime,  they  believed, 
would  be  at  odds  with  the  needs  of  post-civil  war  Greek  society.  On  27  November  1950, 
the  Greeks  were  warned  that  only  the  formation  of  a  strong  government  would  make 
Greece's  association  with  NATO  possible.  54  The  very  fact  that  this  warning  was  issued, 
however,  suggested  that  the  Western  allies  were  moving  back  towards  a  more 
interventionist  approach  in  Greek  affairs. 
Greece  Joins  NA  TO 
In  October  1949  the  Greek  Foreign  Minister,  Panayis  Tsaldaris,  had  prepared  an 
aide-memoire  to  Acheson  requesting  him  to  consider  some  kind  of  security  arrangement 
55 
for  the  countries  immediately  to  the  east  of  the  NATO  area.  In  April  1950  Greece  and 
Turkey  made  fon-nal  applications  to  join  NATO.  Many  existing  members  did  not, 
however,  welcome  the  application.  Denrnark,  Norway,  and  the  Benelux  states  expressed 
apprehension  about  assuming  responsibility  for  the  defence  of  a  region  distant  both 
geographically  and  culturally  from  Western  Europe.  Britain  preferred  the  establishment 
53  FRUS  (1950):  5,433435:  Acheson  to  Peurifoy,  9  November  1950;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW 
(PRO),  FO  371/87665  R101  10/138,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  15  November  1950.  The  Foreign  Office 
disagreement  with  royal  tactics  further  weakens  historians  who  believe  that  the  Court  was  fully  backed  by 
the  Foreign  Office.  In  Markezinis,  Political  Hlstory-HoAirwý  laropla,  pp.  295-300. 
54  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87665  R101  10/138,  Minute  to  Norton,  27 
November  1950.  The  Foreign  Office  had  an  additional  reason  to  discourage  Papagos  from  entering 
politics  and  taking  over  power,  as  Field  Marshal  was  in  favour  of  Enosis  of  Cyprus  with  Greece.  From  the 
Foreign  Office's  point  of  view  D6tente  in  Greek-Turkish  relations  would  reinforce  stability  in  the  area  and 
keep  Cyprus'  issue  dormant;  that  excluded  the  take  over  of  a  military  government,  in  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95106,  Annual  Report  for  1950,  Norton  to  Rumbold,  13  January  195  1. 
53  FRUS  (1949):  6,447449:  Tsaldaris  to  Acheson,  28  October  1949.  Greece's  entry  into  NATO  was  a 
dividing  issue  among  Greek  historians.  For  an  account  of  both  the  right  and  left-wing  arguments  see:  Th. 
Couloumbis,  Greek  Political  Reaction  to  American  and  NA  TO  Influences  (London,  1966),  pp.  40-41.  An 
official  source  is  that  by  Major  General  A.  Siapkaras,  'The  Importance  of  Greece  to  NATO'  Military 
Review,  August  (1961),  90-97.  The  author  states  that  Greece's  inclusion  into  NATO  was  the  result  of  its 
affluent  material  resources  (minerals,  agriculture,  trade,  industry),  land-sea  and  air  space,  'moral  strength' 
of  the  Greeks  and  'outstanding  place  among  Europe's  modem  armies'  and  finally  the  convincing 
argument  of  its  strategic  importance.  He  totally  neglects  the  impact  of  the  Korean  War  in  pointing 
Greece's  importance  to  the  western  security.  Despite  both  right  and  left-wing  views  that  the  West  was  by 
definition  interested  in  Greece's  entry  into  NATO,  the  process  of  its  incorporation  was  longwinded  and 
precipitated  by  the  Korean  War. 125 
of  a  separate  Middle  East  Command.  56 
In  the  spring  of  1950,  however,  more  auspicious  signs  for  the  Greek  petition  to 
join  NATO  emerged.  57  In  May  1950  at  the  tripartite  discussions  held  in  London 
between  the  United  States,  Britain  and  France  the  situation  in  Greece  and  its  strategic 
importance  was  discussed.  Acheson  and  Bevin  reaffirmed  the  determination  of  the 
United  States  and  Britain  to  safeguard  the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
Greece.  58  The  volatile  situations  in  Egypt  and  Iran  suggested  the  need  for  action  to  firm 
up  the  western  position  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  the  Middle  East.  The  British 
and  American  approach  was,  however  one  of  caution.  59  Both  allies  were  still  undecided 
regarding  the  necessity  of  including  Greece  in  NATO.  The  limited  American  defence 
budget  and  limited  British  resources  were  devoted  to  making  good  NATO  commitments 
to  secure  Western  Europe.  Moreover,  opposing  Anglo-American  interests  in  the  Middle 
East  complicated  matters.  The  British  plan  for  a  Middle  East  Command  faced  American 
scepticism.  Endless  conversations  seemed  likely  to  produce  stalemate  rather  than  action 
in  this  area. 
60 
This  rather  sluggish  approach  to  Mediterranean  security  was,  however, 
galvanised  by  the  outbreak  of  the  Korean  War.  Within  this  context  the  need  to  broaden 
NATO's  geographical  borders  was  re-assessed.  61  Greece  and  Turkey  were  included  in 
56  S.  Papacosma,  'Greece  and  NATO',  in  L.  S.  Kaplan,  R.  W.  Clawson,  R.  Luraghi  (eds),  NATO  and  the 
Mediterranean  (SR,  1985),  p.  19  1.  The  containment  of  Soviet  power  in  the  Middle  East  was  agreed  as  a 
shared  Anglo-American  objective  in  as  series  of  talks  held  in  1950.  See:  Leffler,  A  Preponderance  of 
Power,  pp.  192-197.  In  these  talks  British  goal  focused  on  securing  American  support  in  the  Middle  East. 
PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  131/9,  DO  (50)  40,19  May  1950;  CAB  131/8,  DO  (50) 
5  Meeting,  23  March  1950;  CAB  131/9,  DO  45,  Report  by  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  on  Defence  and  Global 
Strategy,  7  June  1950;  Documents  on  British  Policy  Overseas  (DBPO)  Series  II,  vol.  4,  (London,  1991), 
pp.  411-434.  On  the  British  attempt  to  establish  a  MEC  consult:  D.  Devereux,  The  Formulation  ofBritish 
Defence  Policy  Towards  the  Middle  East,  1948-56  (London,  1990),  pp.  43-75. 
57  Gaddis,  Strategies  of  Containment,  pp.  91-9,109-110 
58  FRUS  (1950):  5,414:  Memorandum  by  the  Acting  Secretary  of  State  (J.  E.  Webb)  to  the  Executive 
Secretary  of  the  NSC  (Lay),  extract  19  September  1950;  FRUS  (1950):  3,1076:  Report  of  the  Tripartite 
Preliminary  Meeting,  6  May  1950. 
59  Leffler,  A  Prependerance  ofPower,  p.  348. 
60  McGhee,  The  US-Turkish-NATO,  p.  65. 
61  L.  Kaplan,  The  UnitedStates  and  NATO  (Kentucky,  1984),  pp.  9-10.  The  Berlincrisis,  Prague's  coup, 
the  conununist  invasion  of  South  Korea,  the  explosion  of  the  first  Soviet  atom  bomb  and  the  victory  of  the 126 
this  re-assessment.  On  6  July  1950,  Premier  Attlee  intimated  to  President  Truman  his 
fears  of  a  possible  Soviet  initiative  to  're-light  the  fire'  in  Greece.  62  On  26  July,  Reuben 
Jenkins,  the  new  Chief  of  the  Joint  United  States  Military  Aid  Group  to  Greece, 
reported  to  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  that  he  and  Ambassador  John  Peurifoy  had  revised 
their  estimate  of  the  amount  of  aid  required  by  Greece.  They  proposed  that  Joint  United 
States  Military  Aid  Group  should  be  authorised  to  programme  for  a  200,000  men  force 
with  the  possibility  of  expanding  the  national  forces  to  400,000  men.  63  Even  at  the  peak 
of  the  civil  war  the  government  had  not  had  such  a  strong  national  defence  force.  In  the 
summer  of  1950  the  policy  of  demilitarising  Greece  was  thrown  into  reverse  by  the 
Americans. 
Although  the  American  and  British  diplomats  were  reluctant  to  encourage  a 
military  autocracy  this  change  in  military  policy  inevitably  increased  the  importance  and 
power  of  Field  Marshal  Papagos.  Papagos  had  been  politically  weakened  by  the  decision 
to  reduce  the  size  of  the  armed  forces  and  the  military  missions.  He  could  no  longer 
pose  as  the  sole  conduit  or  arbiter  of  Anglo-American  aid  to  Greece.  In  July  1950, 
however,  he  was  able  to  suspend  dernobilisation.  The  whole  Greek  political  world 
agreed  that  because  of  the  deteriorating  international  situation  the  National  Anny  should 
be  increased.  In  September  1950  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  agreed  with  Papagos  that  the 
Greek  National  Army  should  be  increased  to  a  strength  of  147,000  men  by  the  end  of 
the  year  -  as  compared  to  the  122,000  serving  in  July  195  0.64  On  1  September  1950, 
Venizelos  had  announced  to  the  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations  that  the  Greek 
communist  forces  in  China  had  all  increased  the  Soviet  threat. 
62  FRUS  (1950):  5,314:  Attlee  to  Tnunan,  6  July  1950.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO 
371/  87710  R1078/2,  Foreign  Office  to  Crossely,  UK  Delegation  to  UNSCOB,  19  July  1950;  FRUS 
(1950):  5,408-409:  Memo  of  informal  discussions  prepared  in  the  embassy  in  London,  19  September 
1950.  Woodhouse,  The  Strugglefor  Greece,  p.  286. 
63  FRUS  (1950):  5,387:  Reuben  Jenkins  to  Joint  Chief  of  Staff,  26  July  1950. 
64  FRUS  (1950):  3,240-241:  Minor  to  Acheson,  24  August  1950.  According  to  Jenkins  the  national  forces 
would  consist  of  a  force  of:  147,000  NA,  10,000  for  RHN  and  60  ships,  7,400  for  RHAF.  AMAG  would 
remain  in  Greece.  JUSMAG  would  have  266  personnel  by  30  June  1950.  FRUS  (1950):  5,406:  JCS  to 
Jenkins,  15  September  1950;  FRUS  (1950):  5,410-411:  NSC  42/1  policy  on'US  Objectives  with  Respect 127 
government  had  unanimously  decided  to  send  a  unit  of  brigade  strength  to  join  the 
United  Nations  Forces  in  Korea.  65 
A  further  boost  to  the  power  of  the  military  and  its  allies  was  provided  by  the 
association  of  Greece  with  NATO.  On  4  September  1950,  during  a  tripartite  meeting  of 
Foreign  Ministers  in  New  York  between  the  United  States,  Britain  and  France,  it  was 
decided  that  the  security  of  Europe  a  nd  t  he  M  iddle  E  ast  w  ould  bee  ndangered  ift  he 
Soviet  Union  obtained  control  of  either  Greece  or  Turkey.  Bevin  and  Acheson  agreed  to 
66 
announce  the  admission  of  Greece  and  Turkey  to  associate  status  with  NATO 
. 
On  4 
October  1950,  Greece  was  invited  to  co-operate  with  the  Atlantic  Treaty  countries  in 
military  planning  for  the  Mediterranean  area. 
In  the  winter  of  1950-51  there  was  a  tension  in  British  policy  towards  Greece. 
British  analyses  of  Greek  politics  acknowledged  its  very  personal  nature.  They 
concluded  that  the  frangibility  of  politics  caused  by  its  personalisation  could  probably  be 
fixed  by  changes  in  the  structure  of  the  political  system.  Political  turmoil  in  Greece  had 
little  to  do  with  the  Cold  War.  Yet  once  instability  in  Greece  was  set  in  the  context  of 
international  'instability'  it  took  on  a  much  more  ideological  Cold  War  aspect.  Co- 
operation  with  the  Americans  was  desirable  for  Cold  War  reasons  but  inhibited  British 
to  Greece  and  Turkey',  19  September  1950. 
65  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87710  R1078/9,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  4 
September  1950.  Turkey  a  Iso  followed  the  s  ame  p  ath.  The  Menderes  government  gathered  over  5,000 
troops  to  embark  for  Korea  on  18  October  1950.  This  battalion  eventually  departed  for  Korea  on 
Christmas  day  1950.  F.  Ahmad,  The  Turkish  Experiment  in  Democracy  1950-1975  (London,  1977),  pp. 
390-392.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95106,  Annual  Report  for  1950,  Norton  to 
Bevin,  13  January  1951. 
66  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/87466  R1074/8,  Tripartite  Meeting  of  Foreign 
Ministers  in  New  York,  4  September  1950.  There  are  various  explanations  to  explain  the  entry  of  Greece 
and  Turkey  into  NATO  in  the  beginning  with  associate  status  and  finally  as  a  full  member.  It  has  been 
noted  that  the  Korean  War  was  the  turning  point,  creating  the  need  for  massive  increase  in  military 
assistance,  expanded  geographical  territories  under  NATO,  defence  of  Europe  and  the  creation  of  a 
Mediterranean  command.  In  Kaplan,  Clawson,  Luraghi,  NA  TO  and  the  Mediterranean,  pp.  9-19; 
Rearmament  efforts,  political  and  economic  interests  in  the  Middle  East.  In  Leffler,  A  Preponderance  of 
Power,  pp.  419-425;  For  an  account  on  the  Middle  East  Command  negotiations  see  Devereux,  The 
Formulation  ofBritish  Defence  Policy.  Leffler,  A  Preponderance  ofPower,  p.  420.  American  isolationists 
feared  that  the  opening  wedge  for  a  vast  program  of  assistance  would  destroy  the  American  economy 
before  it  damaged  the  Russians.  In  Kaplan,  Clawson,  Luraghi  (eds.  ),  NATO  and  the  Mediterranean,  p.  35. 
The  creation  of  Supreme  Headquarters  Allied  Powers  of  Europe  and  of  American  military  air  bases  in 
Turkey  overcame  objections  to  their  membership  because  Europe's  southern  flank  defence  had  been 128 
freedom  of  manoeuvre  in  regional  affairs.  Whilst  the  British  wished  to  discourage  Field 
Marshal  Papagos  from  emerging  into  politics  the  strengthening  of  the  army,  to  which 
they  acquiesced,  was  likely  to  make  this  a  possibility.  The  Greek  problem  could  not  be 
placed  on  the  back  burner  because  internal  crises  were  likely  to  continually  reoccur  until 
some  kind  of  solution  had  been  found. 
These  dilemmas  were  soon  brought  to  a  head.  The  Venizelos  administration 
faced  a  decisive  crisis  in  late  February  1951.  The  leaders  of  the  Populist  Unity  Party 
(LEK),  Panayiotis  Kanellopoulos  and  Stefanos  Stefanopoulos,  announced  that  their 
party  was  withdrawing  its  support  from  the  government.  67  This  meant  that  the 
Venizelos-Papandreou  coalition  could  no  longer  muster  a  parliamentary  majority.  The 
motives  of  Kanellopoulos  and  Stefanopoulos  were  difficult  to  comprehend.  There  were 
allegations  that  Field  Marshal  Papagos  was  behind  the  defection.  The  prospect  of  the 
LEK  and  Papagos  forming  a  new  right-wing  cabinet  was  rumoured.  A  political  power 
play  by  both  leaders  was  another  possibility.  They  may  have  wished  to  force  the  LEK's 
way  into  the  government  from  a  position  of  strength  after  it  had  demonstrated  the 
government's  dependency  on  its  support.  68  Whatever  LEK's  motives  their  manoeuvre 
simply  confirmed  British  scepticism  that  under  the  political  system  as  it  existed  in  1950 
any  coalition,  even  one  with  a  large  majority,  could  hold  on  to  power  for  any  length  of 
time. 
The  National  Progressive  Union  of  the  Centre  (EPEK)  skilfully  exploited  the 
crisis.  As  the  government  was  dragged  into  a  test  of  confidence  in  the  Chamber,  General 
Plastiras,  offered  the  support  of  his  party  on  two  conditions:  that  an  all-party  committee 
strengthened.  Kaplan,  Clawson,  Luraghi  (eds.  ),  NA  TO  and  the  Mediterranean,  p.  9. 
67  LEK  had  won  deputies  from  the  Populist  Party  and  turned  powerful  conservative  party.  PUBLIC 
RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  95116  R101  14/5,  Chancery  to  Southern  Department,  21 
February  195  1.  Linardatos  suggests  that  the  aim  of  LEK  seemed  to  be  the  formation  of  a  new  cabinet  with 
the  new  force  sharing  power.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-AX0  Tov  EqV6A1o,  pp.  196,199.  61  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95116  R101  14/3,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  8 
February  195  1. 129 
be  set  up  in  order  to  draft  a  new  electoral  law  and  that  the  goverranent  should  propose  to 
the  King  that  general  elections  be  held.  Prime  Minister  Venizelos  accepted  these  terms 
and  his  goverranent  received  a  133-to-91  vote  of  confidence  on  22  February  195  1.69  The 
issue  of  the  conduct  of  general  election  came  to  the  foreground  once  again.  Efforts 
would  concentrate  on  the  reconstruction  of  the  traditional  'big  parties'. 
69  PU13LIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95116  R101  14/5,  Chancery  to  Southern 
Department,  21  February  195  1;  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-A  7ro  Tov  EpVbAio,  p.  199. 130 
V  Stabilisation  Era:  1951-1952 
Papagos  Enters  Politics 
As  a  result  of  the  announcement  of  the  elections  the  political  temperature  rose 
once  again.  Papagos'  steps  to  enter  politics  stoked  up  the  heat  even  further.  On  10 
January  1951,  Papagos  made  his  first  attempt  to  present  himself  as  the  best  solution  to 
the  p  olitical  c  risis.  Inani  nterview  w  ith  C  harles  Y  ost  -t  he  USC  harge  dAffaires  in 
Athens  -  the  Field  Marshal  denounced  the  Venizelos  government.  He  stated  that  a 
'strong  administration'  was  needed  to  secure  a  parliamentary  majority.  The  statement  in 
itself  was  of  no  p  articular  i  mportance.  W  hat  w  as  s  ignificant,  h  owever,  w  as  P  apagos' 
portrayal  of  himself  as  potential  saviour.  The  Field  Marshal  told  Yost  of  his  intention  to 
become  prime  minister.  He  intended  to  enter  the  election  at  the  head  of  a  slate  composed 
of  candidates  of  his  own  choosing.  His  ticket  would  be  drawn  from  'all  groups  and 
classes'.  ' 
Some  conservative  and  liberal  politicians  favoured  the  Papagos  solution.  Indeed 
Markezinis,  head  of  the  conservative  New  Party,  Papagos'  friend  and  main  counsellor 
proposed  his  own  version  of  the  Papagos  solution.  Markezinis  favoured  Papagos' 
participation  in  the  next  elections  as  the  head  of  a  wider  right-wing  coalition  of 
individual  politicians.  Markezinis  wanted  to  renovate  the  traditional  Right  and  secure  a 
2  conservative  cabinet  to  replace  the  failing  coalitions  of  the  Centre.  At  the  other  end  of 
the  political  spectrum  the  liberal  newspaper  To  Vima  spoke  of  'the  need'  for  Papagos' 
entry  into  politics.  For  the  liberals  Papagos'  appeal  to  all  groups  and  classes  appeared  to 
guarantee  liberal  participation  in  the  government.  If  Papagos  appeared  to  be  able  to 
attract  substantial  support  from  within  the  traditional  parties  he  had  also  gained  a  new 
1  FRUS  (1951):  5,445:  Yost  to  the  State  Department,  4  January  1951;  In  Papagiannopoulos,  Field  Marshal 
A-Papagos-.  rrpa*Xqq  A.  U&vJpoq  1767r6yoq,  p.  372. 131 
and  important  opponent.  By  the  beginning  of  1951  the  Palace  had  swung  from  its  initial 
enthusiasm  for  the  Field  Marshal  to  outright  opposition.  3  The  falling  out  had  its  origins 
in  the  rift  between  Papagos  and  the  Palace  over  the  issue  of  the  distribution  of  power, 
which  had  arisen  in  1950.  The  clash  became  more  intense  in  the  months  that  followed. 
If  the  King's  enthusiasm  for  Papagos  had  waned  then  that  of  Greece's  allies 
remained  low.  The  British  and  American  embassies  believed  that  the  international  and 
domestic  situation  in  Greece  called  for  a  'strong  government'.  However,  they 
considered  that  there  were  still  'overriding'  arguments  against  the  Field  Marshal.  They 
feared  that  his  entry  into  politics  would  foreshadow  the  creation  of  a  dictatorship. 
Peurifoy  announced  that  Papagos'  entry  into  politics  should  not  be  encouraged. 
According  to  Norton  Papagos  might  be  'acceptable'  only  if  he  headed  a  broad  and 
moderate  coalition  and  formed  a  'right  of  centre'  party.  4 
On  28  May  195  1,  Papagos  submitted  h  is  r  esignation  from  t  he  p  osition  oft  he 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  National  Army.  Two  d  ays;  I  ater,  a  fter  a  fruitless  m  eeting 
with  King  Paul,  the  Field  Marshal  submitted  his  formal  resignation  letter  to  Prime 
Minister  Venizelos  citing  'ill  health'  as  his  reason  for  dernitting  office.  King  Paul  was 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief  in  Papagos'  place  according  to  the  protocol  set  out  in 
the  constitution  for  such  emergencies.  The  Field  Marshal  himself  told  Peurifoy  that  is 
resignation  was  the  result  of  the  rift  with  the  Palace.  '  Papagos'  resignation  from  the  post 
of  Commander-in-Chief,  however,  was  dictated  by  his  personal  ambitions.  By  resigning 
2  FRUS  (1951):  5,445:  Yost  to  the  State  Department,  4  January  195  1. 
3  To  Vima,  22  February  195  1. 
4  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95116  RIO  114/2,  Norton  to  Noble,  31  January 
195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,470:  Peurifoy  to  the  State  Department,  9  March  195  1. 
5  FRUS  (1951):  5,477:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State,  5  June  195  1.  This  reason  is  also  supported  by 
some  historians.  According  to  this  argument  Papagos  accused  Paul  of  trying  to  limit  his  army  powers  by 
re-organising  the  General  Staff  officers.  Verernis,  'The  Military'  in  Featherston,  Katsoudas  (eds.  ), 
Political  Change  in  Greece,  p.  218;  Stefanidis,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Greece,  p.  172.  This 
was  not  the  case  though,  because,  despite  the  change  of  officers,  no  policy  was  scheduled  to  limit  the 
Field  Marshal's  authorities.  Papagos  had  under  his  control  all  three  armed  forces  and  the  police  up  until 
he  resigned.  On  Papagos  resignation  see  next  footnote. 132 
from  the  Army,  the  road  to  enter  politics  was  opened.  He  eliminated  accusations  that  he 
was  trying  to  create  a  military  dictatorship.  6 
The  Greek  government  was  alarmed  by  this  new  development.  The  resignation 
of  the  Field  Marshal  caused  a  variety  of  reactions  across  the  Greek  political  world.  No 
one  doubted  its  importance,  however.  All  political  parts  stressed  the  appointment  of  the 
King  as  C-in-C  and  the  effect  of  the  subordination  of  the  army  to  the  government.  7 
Venizelos  asked  Papagos  to  reconsider  his  decision.  He  was  particularly  fearful  of  the 
response  of  IDEA  to  the  resignation.  The  Holy  Bond  of  Greek  Officers,  Iep0q  Awyk 
E,  Uývcov  AýtcqpaTIK05V  (IDEA),  was  a  powerful  group  of  right-wing  officers  in  the 
armed  forces.  The  organisation  had  been  created  in  October  1944  as  a  result  of  the  anny 
mutiny  in  the  Middle  East.  8 
In  the  early  hours  of  31  May  1951  high-rankingofficers  and  members  oft  he 
Higher  Military  Committee  met  unofficially  to  discuss  the  issue  of  the  resignation. 
Many  were  prominent  members  of  IDEA.  As  a  result  of  the  meeting  most  major  military 
garrisons  in  the  country  were  put  on  alert.  A  number  of  military  units  moved  into  the 
city  of  Athens.  The  main  routes  into  Athens  were  put  under  military  control.  Brigadier 
Christeas  'occupied'  the  General  Staff  building  situated  at  the  Old  Palace  in  the  centre 
of  Athens.  9  According  to  Lieutenant  General  Karayannis,  an  IDEA  member,  Papagos' 
resignation  was  seen  as  a  reaction  against  the  Venizelos  goverru-nent's  attempts  to 
6  Linardatos,  in  a  rather  exaggerated  form,  suggests  that  Field  Marshal's  resignation  was  sudden  in  the 
hope  of  catching  by  surprise  the  Greek  politicians  and  consolidating  his  strength.  Linardatos,  From  Civil 
War-  A7rorov  Ey(pQo,  p.  227.  On  the  contrary,  Papagiannopoulos  writes  that  Papagos  had  made  clear  to 
the  public  his  entry  to  politics  in  order  to  'bring  the  real  change  the  Nation's  needs'  and  so  the  government 
was  prepared  for  Papagos'  resignation.  In  Papagiannopoulos,  Field  Marshal  A.  Pqpagos-ETpaT6PxjC 
AWavbpo,;  17a7rdyo,;,  pp.  443-444.  Stefanidis  writes  that  the  reason  was  over  the  control  of  the  armed 
forces.  Stefanidis,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Greece,  p.  177.  Veremis  notes  that  Papagos 
resigned  'following  a  disagreement  with  the  royal  court'  due  to  King's  interference  in  army  affairs.  Th. 
Veremis,  'The  Military',  in  K.  Featherstone,  D.  Katsoudas  (eds.  ),  Political  Change  in  Greece  (London, 
1987),  p.  218.  Haralampes  writes  that  the  disagreement  of  the  Palace  and  Papagos  over  army  command 
brought  Papagos'  resignation.  Haralampes,  Army  and  Power-E=T6,;  Kai  17011TIK4  Eýovala,  pp.  3941. 
This  argument,  however,  does  not  explain  Papagos'  entry  into  politics  later  on  in  August. 
7  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95143  RI  195  1/1,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  31  May 
195  1.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95143  RI  195/5,  News  Review,  I  June  195  1. 
'  Grigoropoulos,  From  the  Top  of  the  Hill-Aro  Tjv  KopWP4  TOv  A6Vov,  pp.  446-448. 133 
reduce  the  anny's  powers.  This  triggered  a  coup  to  secure  the  independence  of  the 
army.  10  The  plotters  established  themselves  in  the  Ministry  of  Defence  (located  in  the 
Parliament  building).  In  the  confusion  that  followed  Papagos'  resignation  it  was  the 
IDEA  organisation  that  was  able  to  act  most  quickly  in  speaking  for  the  army.  "  Within 
hours,  however,  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Lt.  Gen.  Grigoropoulos,  asked  from  the 
putschists  to  return  to  order.  The  rebels  made  clear  that  they  would  only  obey  the  Field 
Marshal's  orders.  Grigoropoulos  asked  for  Papagos'  intervention.  The  Field  Marshal 
visited  the  Ministry  of  Defence  and  asked  the  officers  there  to  return  to  their  normal 
duties.  By  noon  of  31  May  1951  order  had  been  restored  in  Athens,  after  the  putschists 
had  been  reassured  by  Papagos  that  there  would  be  no  sanctions  against  them.  The 
Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of  Defence  Venizelos  attributed  the  settlement  of  the  coup 
to  Papagos'  decisive  intervention.  12 
The  existing  literature  on  the  coup  of  31  May  has  gaps  despite  the  credible  but 
biased  accounts  of  the  officials  involved  in  the  incident.  There  is  no  clear  evidence  as  to 
who  organised  the  coup,  why  and  when.  According  to  the  official  findings  of  Zozonakis, 
the  Counsellor  of  the  Military  Defence,  who  carried  out  an  investigation  in  January 
1952,  the  plotters  were  mobilised  by  IDEA.  It  is  not  clear  at  what  stage  Papagos  himself 
became  aware  of  the  initiative  of  the  plotters.  However,  no  matter  what  the  extent  of  his 
support  might  have  been,  the  truth  is  that  the  coup  ended  only  after  the  Field  Marshal's 
intervention.  His  willingness  to  stand  down  his  admirers  suggests  that  he  was  not 
aiming  at  military  dictatorship.  Rather  he  was  confident  that  he  could  obtain  power  by 
9  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  Aro  Tov  EyVUio,  p.  229. 
10  On  the  military  coup  there  is  a  detailed  account  in  Karayiannis,  The  Greek  Drama-  To.  Jp6'Ua'rqc 
E,  Ud&oc  (Athens,  1964),  p.  265. 
11  It  has  been  estimated  that  in  winter  1945-1946  seventy-five  per  cent  of  the  army  officers  were  IDEA 
members.  Karayannis,  The  Greek  Drama-ToJp6pa  Tqc  ERMoc,  pp.  210-211. 
12  After  the  end  of  the  rebellion  Lt.  Gen.  Grigoropoulos  was  appointed  C-in-C  of  the  General  Staff 
National  Defence  (rEEE)A),  Tsakalotos  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff,  Kitrilakis  General  Inspector  of 
the  Army.  Grigoropoulos,  From  the  Top  of  the  Hill-Ax6  T?  jv  Kqpv(p4  rov  A6(pov,  pp.  451-3;  Lieutenant- 
General  and  member  of  IDEA-  Karayannis,  The  Greek  Drama-Todp6ya  rqc  EU6c&o,;,  pp.  266-267. 134 
political  means.  13  He  was  even  willing  to  acquiesce  to  moves  that  the  govermnent  took 
against  the  plotters.  The  Field  Marshal  had  asked  Venizelos  not  to  impose  sanctions 
against  the  insurgents  as  he  himself  had  promised  them.  He  even  proposed  that  the 
events  should  be  described  as  an  alarm  drill.  Venizelos,  however,  expressed  his 
government's  intention  to  gradually  remove  the  most  important  of  the  IDEA  officers 
from  key  positions.  Lieutenant  General  Grigoropoulos  put  the  participants  of  the  putsch 
under  detention  and  ordered  a  preliminary  examination,  while  the  ringleaders  of  the 
coup  were  placed  under  house  arrest.  14 
Papagos'  resignation  and  the  ensuing  events  of  31  May  came  as  a  blow  to  the 
British  and  Americans.  Norton  and  the  British  embassy  believed  that  the  deterioration  in 
the  relations  between  King  Paul  and  Papagos  was  a  serious  cause  for  alarm.  Instead  of 
acting  as  guarantors  of  Greece  against  Communism,  their  personal  ambition  was 
pressing  them  forward  into  the  front-line  of  politics  thus  removing  the  safety  net  that 
had  underlain  the  unpredictable  political  situation.  Norton  believed  that  the  most 
important  act  was  to  try  to  reconcile  the  Palace,  the  Field  Marshal  and  the  Venizelos 
government.  15  The  American  Ambassador  agreed  with  his  British  colleague.  Peurifoy 
reported  that  the  resignation  of  the  Field  Marshal  was  a  great  blow  to  Greece  at  time 
when  some  formal  security  arrangements  for  the  country  with  NATO  were  being 
13  Based  on  the  available  sources  it  is  not  clear  whether  Papagos  directed  the  coup  or  if  so  the  extent  of  his 
influence.  He  might  have  caused  it  as  a  direct  attempt  to  demonstrate  his  power  to  the  public,  militia  and 
government  or  as  an  indirect  way  to  underline  his  power  without  being  accused  of  having  planned  it.  Lt. 
Gen.  Grigoropoulos,  Chief  of  General  Staff,  writes  in  his  memoirs  that  the  Field  Marshal  knew  in  advance 
the  intentions  of  the  plotters.  For  an  account  of  the  coup,  see  Grigoropoulos,  From  the  Top  of  the  Hill- 
Aro  Tqv  Kopvýp4  Tov  A6ýpov,  pp.  445-64,468-72.  Veremis  supports  that  IDEA  members  did  not  only  want 
to  support  Papagos  but  attempted  to  overthrow  the  government  after  the  Field  Marshal  resigned  as 
Commander  in  Chief.  Veremis,  'The  Military',  in  Featherstone,  Katsoudas  (eds.  ),  Political  Change  in 
Greece,  p.  218.  A  hard-core  right-wing  version  claims  that  Papagos  had  no  relation  in  any  way  with  IDEA, 
which  had  anyway  dissolved  itself  after  the  end  of  the  civil  war.  In  Papagiannopoulos,  Field  Marshal  A 
Pqpagos-ETpaT6pXj;  AMýav6poq  17a7r6yo;,  p.  44  8. 
14  FRUS  (1951):  5,475-6:  Yost  to  the  Department  of  State,  I  June  195  1;  Brigadiers  Kontopoulos, 
Christeas,  Tavoularis,  Colonel  Papadopoulos,  Anagnostopoulos  were  among  those  who  had  been 
demobilised.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  Tov  EyVQo,  p.  238;  Grigoropoulos,  From  the  Top  of  the 
Hill-  A;  ro  T?  jv  Kopv94  rov  A6Vov,  pp.  460-1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,48  1:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State, 
II  June  195  1. 135 
discussed.  General  Jenkins  and  Peurifoy  believed  that  Papagos'  resignation  involved  the 
morale  and  efficiency  of  armed  forces  and  hence  the  security  of  Greece  and  the  West.  16 
The  British  agreed.  17  Upon  his  return  to  Greece  on  2  June  1951  Peurifoy  undertook  a 
sustained  effort  to  mend  fences.  In  a  discussion  between  himself,  the  Prime  Minister,  the 
King,  and  Papagos,  the  American  Ambassador  proposed  to  them  to  bury  past  grievances 
and  try  to  bring  the  Field  Marshal  back  to  his  post.  From  the  allies'  point  of  view,  the 
Field  Marshal  as  Commander-in-Chief  would  guarantee  the  military  stability  required 
for  Greece's  entry  into  NATO.  18  Regardless  of  Ambassadors'  negative  responses, 
however,  P  apagos  was  determined  to  stay  away  from  his  military  duties.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  the  British  and  the  Americans  had  any  direct  influence  on  the  events  of 
May  1951.19  The  Field  Marshal  was  content  to  have  demonstrated  his  power  whilst 
Venizelos  believed  that  he  had  skilfully  outmanoeuvred  IDEA. 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  coup  the  next  bone  of  political  contention  was  the  system 
that  would  govern  the  elections.  The  fon-nal  discussions  about  the  electoral  law  lasted 
from  10  to  26  July  1951.  Venizelos  and  Plastiras  were  in  favour  of  a  kind  of  modified 
proportional  representation,  which  would  favour  the  two  or  three  parties  heading  the  list. 
Both  Plastiras  and  Venizelos  e  xpected  t  hat  s  uch  as  ystem  w  ould  b  enefit  t  heir  p  arties 
whilst  opening  up  reasonable  prospects  for  creating  working  majorities  in  Parliament. 
Tsaldaris  advocated  the  introduction  of  the  majority  system  as  a  means  of  achieving  a 
strong  government.  Papandreou,  on  the  other  hand,  wished  to  see  the  existing  system  of 
15  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95143  RI  195  1/1,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  31 
May  1951. 
16  FRUS  (1951):  5,4  82:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State,  II  June  195  1. 
17  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95143  RI  195n,  Norton  to  Morrison,  7  June  195  1.  18  FRUS  (1951):  5,482-483:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State,  II  June  195  1.  19  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95143  RI  195/8,  Norton  to  Morrison,  20  June 
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simple  proportional  representation  maintained.  The  system  favoured  his  own  small  party 
and  increased  the  probability  that  he  would  be  included  in  any  coalition  cabinet.  20 
Knowing  that  the  electoral  system  proposed  by  Venizelos  and  Plastiras  would 
weaken  his  party  Papandreou  tried  to  scupper  its  chances.  He  decided  to  resign  from  the 
cabinet  with  immediate  effect.  Papandreou  calculated  that  his  resignation  would  trigger 
an  immediate  election  under  the  old  system.  21  In  order  to  cover  his  tracks  he 
manufactured  a  dispute  with  the  Americans  o  ver  t  he  p  rice  ofw  heat  a  nd  t  he  s  cale  of 
government  subsidies  to  wheat  producers.  On  I  July  195  1,  Papandreou  and  the  ministers 
politically  close  to  him  such  as  Lagakos,  Minister  of  Justice,  Makkas,  Minister  of 
Industry,  Yiannopoulos,  Minister  of  Transportation,  Labropoulos,  Minister  of 
Agriculture  as  well  as  their  junior  ministers  handed  in  their  resignations.  The 
government  was  left  with  insufficient  parliamentary  support  and  collapsed.  On  28  July, 
Venizelos  was  forced  to  offer  his  resignation  as  well.  22 
The  King,  however,  objected  to  the  prospect  of  early  elections.  He  was  still 
averse  tot  he  i  dea  ofa  ccepting  P  lastiras  b  ack  i  nto  p  ower.  Hea  Iso  w  anted  top  revent 
Papagos  from  entering  politics.  He  grasped  the  opportunity  of  Papandreou's  resignation, 
therefore,  to  form  another  stop-gap  cabinet.  He  asked  Venizelos  to  form  a  broader 
coalition  and  thus  forestall  rushed  elections.  Venizelos  agreed  to  take  over  until  the 
planned  elections.  Venizelos  promised  that  he  would  safeguard  the  rights  and  powers  of 
the  Crown  in  the  coming  revision  of  the  constitution.  He  was  able  to  form  such  a 
government  because  Tsouderos  was  willing  to  betray  his  ally  Plastiras.  The  Populist 
20  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95117  RIO  114/14,  Norton  to  Morrison,  9  May 
1951;  FRUS(1951):  5,473:  Yost  to  Department  of  State,  12  May  1951.  Modified  proportional 
representation  would  grant  to  three  parties  receiving  largest  popular  vote  all  parliamentary  seats  not 
allotted  in  first  distribution. 
21  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95117  RIO  114/16,  Norton  to  the  Foreign  Office,  4 
July  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,473:  Yost  to  the  Department  of  State,  17  May  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,48  1- 
483:  Peurifoy  to  Department  of  State,  II  June  195  1;  A.  Raikou,  Lectures  on  Constitutional  Law- 
1TqpaJd5aciq  EvvraypaTIK06  A  walov,  vol.  5  (Athens,  1978),  pp.  148-15  8. 
22  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  Tov  Ep(p6Aio,  p.  253. 137 
Unity  Party  (LEK)  left  EPEK  and  went  over  to  the  Liberals.  23  Tsouderos  became  Deputy 
Premier  and  Minister  of  Co-ordination  of  the  Venizelos'  caretaker  government  on  3 
AuguSt.  24 
On  27  Ju  ly  195  1,  t  he  G  reek  P  arliament  i  ntroduced  t  he  n  ew  e,  lectoral  I  aw  t  hat 
would  create  a  system  of  modified  proportional  representation.  Its  main  stipulation  was 
a  threshold  of  votes  that  would  allow  a  party  to  take  part  in  Parliament.  Under  the  new 
law  a  party  would  need  seventeen  per  cent  and  a  coalition  of  parties  twenty  in  order  to 
participate  in  Parliament.  Smaller  parties  would  have  to  be  wound  up  to  combine 
together  in  bigger  organisations  in  order  to  survive.  25 
On  3  August,  the  King  signed  the  decree  dissolving  the  Parliament  and 
proclaiming  the  elections.  Three  days  later  Papagos  officially  announced  the  creation  of 
his  party:  The  Greek  Rally.  Its  aim,  he  claimed,  was  to  provide  the  country  with  'the  real 
change  the  Nation  needs'.  He  advocated  both  'change'  and  'stability',  catchwords  that 
would  prove  effective  in  the  party's  electoral  campaign.  26  Papagos  decreed  that  the 
Greek  Rally  would  accept  politicians  of  all  persuasions.  It  would  only  do  so,  however,  if 
they  agreed  to  serve  under  his  banner.  He  wanted  to  attract  and  accommodate  both 
conservative  and  liberal  adherents  in  a  right-wing  party.  The  Rally  was  avowedly  hostile 
to  co-operation  with  other  parties. 
23  In  July  EPEK  split.  On  13  July  Enimanouel  Tsouderos  and  his  friends  and  MPs  St.  Merkouris,  K. 
Maris,  G.  Tsouderos,  among  others,  left  the  party.  The  official  excuse  given  by  Tsouderos  for  the 
resignation  from  the  party  was  the  disagreement  with  N.  Plastiras  over  the  organisation  of  the  party  and 
particularly  the  combinations  in  the  electoral  districts.  Plastiras  attributed  Tsouderos'  resignation  to  his 
own  'hidden  ambitions'.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7rorov  Epýpblio,  p.  258.  In  fact,  Tsouderos  shifted 
to  the  conservative  party  eventually  to  take  part  to  the  government. 
24  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95117  RIO  114/16,  Norton  to  the  Foreign  Office,  4 
July  195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95117  RIO1  14/2  1,  Norton  to  Foreign 
Office,  3  August  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,489-490:  Peurifoy  to  Department  of  State,  28  July  195  1.  Dafnis, 
The  Greek  Political  Parties-Ta  EUjviK6c  HoArrmi  K6,  qpara,  pp.  486488. 
25History  ofthe  Greek  Nation4aropla  Tov  EUlviKob  EOvovc,  vol.  16,  pp.  176-177;  Nikolakopoulos, 
Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K6pyaTa  Kai  B0V)XVT1Ktq,  pp.  149-19  1. 
26  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95117  RIO  114/2  1,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  3 
August  1951;  FRUS  (1951):  5,490491:  Peurifoy  to  Department  of  State,  31  July  195  1. 138 
Papagos'  candidature  caused,  as  might  be  expected,  a  furore.  27  The  King  was 
outraged  and  threatened  to  'take  steps'  against  the  Field  Marshal.  According  to  an 
account  given  by  the  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff,  Tsakalotos,  King  Paul  asked  him 
to  arrest  Papagos.  The  Palace  maintained  that  according  to  military  law  any  officer  who 
resigned  remained  an  army  official  for  six  months  thereafter.  Papagos  was  thus 
committing  a  breach  of  military  discipline  by  defying  his  commander-in-chief.  Papagos 
was  debarred  from  politics  unless  he  had  the  explicit  consent  of  the  King.  King  Paul 
believed  he  had  the  right  to  arrest  the  Field  Marshal  if  Papagos  defied  him.  Tsakalotos, 
however,  had  no  intention  of  moving  against  Papagos.  Tsakalotos  refused  to  obey  the 
King's  order  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  an  extreme  and  unwarranted  act.  Paul's 
impotence  merely  served  to  reinforce  Papagos'  power  in  theArmy.  28 
The  Populist  leader,  Tsaldaris,  perceived  Papagos  as  a  formidable  threat  to  the 
political  existence  of  his  conservative  party.  He  described  Papagos'  entry  into  politics  as 
an  'intrigue'.  Papagos'  purpose,  Tsaldaris  charged,  was  the  disorientation  of  the  Greeks. 
He  w  as  p  aving  t  he  p  ath  toam  ilitary  d  ictatorship.  T  saldaris  w  as  r  ight  to  be  worried, 
although  Papagos  was  far  from  preparing  a  dictatorship.  29  The  Populists  had  failed  to 
win  a  workable  majority  at  the  last  two  elections.  The  emergence  of  Papagos  into 
politics  offered  the  hope  of  new  impetus  for  the  Right.  Many  Populists  were  attracted  by 
the  prospect  of  a  strong  charismatic  leader  whose  appeal  stretched  beyond  their  existing 
constituency.  The  same  calculations  were  made  further  to  the  left.  LEK  dissolved  itself 
27  The  Greek  historian  S.  Linardatos  writes  that  Papagos'  entry  into  politics  had  fallen  'as  a  bomb',  that 
many  had  been  caught  by  surprise  and  also  that  it  had  been  a  'shock'  to  the  King.  Linardatos,  From  Civil 
War-  A=  rov  EpV6Aio,  pp.  262-263;  Stefanidis,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Greece,  p.  187. 
However,  Papagos  searns  to  have  been  preparing  the  ground  for  his  entry  into  politics  gradually  since 
1950.  Firstly  with  his  careful  plan  to  present  himself  as  an  independent  and  self-sufficient  politician  and 
eventually  with  his  resignation  in  May  1951  from  the  Army.  J.  P.  Carey,  A.  G.  Carey  give  an  over- 
idealised  version  of  Papagos  supporting  that  his  entry  into  politics  came  as  a  result  of  'his  national  pride, 
with  the  main  aim  to  give  an  end  to  instability.  In  J.  P.  Carey,  A.  G  Carey,  The  Web  ofModern  Greek 
Politics  (New  York,  1968),  p.  149. 
2'  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-IcTopia  Tov  EAA?  IviKo6  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  177;  Linardatos,  From  Civil 
War-  A7rorov  EpýpbAto,  pp.  263-265. 139 
as  party  and  joined  Papagos  banner.  Papandreou  too  rapidly  found  himself  in  difficulties 
as  some  of  his  followers  seemed  to  be  preparing  to  join  Papagos'  bandwagon.  The  left 
of  Centre  press  joined  with  their  enemy  Tsaldaris  and  embarked  upon  a  campaign  to 
prove  that  Papagos'  ultimate  aim  was  to  impose  a  dictatorship.  Papagos  frightened  and 
galvanised  the  hard  Left  as  well. 
Simultaneously,  the  Left  was  given  a  new  boost.  A  new  left-wing  formation 
appeared  on  3  August  1951:  the  United  Democratic  Left  (EDA).  It  was  originated  by 
former  EAM  members,  members  of  the  outlawed  KKE  and  minor  left-wing  parties.  Led 
by  loannis  Pasalidis  EDA  was  intended  to  be  the  Rally  of  the  Left.  30  This  polarised 
scheme  of  the  Greek  Rally  and  EDA  reflected  the  impact  of  the  Cold  War  in  Greece.  It 
also  proved  the  polarised  character  of  the  forthcoming  election.  The  only  leader  who 
was  confident  enough  to  believe  that  he  would  not  be  entirely  occluded  by  Papagos  was 
31  Plastiras.  He  publicly  welcomed  the  Field  Marshal's  candidature. 
As  ever  British  diplomats  feared  for  the  stability  of  the  Greek  political  system. 
Accordingly  Norton's  first  priority  w  as  to  prevent  open  conflict  braking  out  b  etween 
Papagos  and  King  Paul.  Along  with  his  American  colleague,  Peurifoy,  Norton 
persuaded  King  Paul  to  relinquish  the  office  of  Commander-in-Chief.  Lieutenant 
General  Grigoropoulos  was  raised  to  the  office  in  his  stead.  The  King,  however,  would 
not  leave  the  matter  alone.  He  believed  that  Papagos  was  potentially  a  threat  to  the 
29  Conservative  newspapers  on  31  July  195  1,  in  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  Ano  Tov  Ep(pQo,  p.  266; 
Papagiannopoulos,  Field  Marshal  A.  Pqpagos-ETpaT6PXr7q  AM&v6poq  17a7r6cyoq,  p.  4  84. 
30  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  rov  EpVblio,  pp.  270-27  1;  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-loTopid  Tov 
E,  U)7VIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  178;  Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K6pp=  Kai 
BoV1CVT1K9S,  P.  179.  EDA  was  a  coalition  of  the  Left  and  the  only  communist  voice  in  the  political  scene 
until  1956.  It  represented  a  coherent  effort  of  the  Left  to  give  itself  a  new  blow,  similar  to  the  right-wing 
parties.  After  failing  to  co-operate  with  General  Plastiras,  EDA  took  a  hard-core  stance  and  incorporated 
in  its  list  a  number  of  deportees  and  imprisoned  KKE  members. 
31  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95117  RIO  114/21,  Norton  to  the  Foreign  Office,  3 
August  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,490-491:  Peurifoy  to  the  State  Department,  31  July  195  1. 140 
32 
monarchy  itself  because  of  his  relationship  with  the  Army.  On  4  August  1951,  King 
Paul  responded  to  this  threat.  He  ordered  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Tsakalotos,  to 
sound  out  army  commanders  about  the  desirability  of  the  armed  forces  being  permitted 
to  vote  in  the  forthcoming  elections.  The  issue  was  of  great  importance  since  in  the  1950 
elections  the  military  had  represented  more  than  ten  per  cent  of  the  electorate.  King  Paul 
was  afraid  that  the  great  majority  of  the  army  officers  led  by  IDEA  would  vote  for 
Papagos.  Tsakalotos  conceded  that  Papagos'  entry  into  politics  was  'a  grave  test'  for  the 
armed  forces.  He  was  particularly  concerned  about  'the  deleterious  influence  of  IDEA' 
and  warned  that  the  organisation  'should  not  be  underrated'.  Tsakalotos  admitted  that 
officers  would  not  hesitate  to  guide  their  men  towards  voting  in  Papagos'  favour.  Once 
again,  however,  Tsakalotos  defied  the  King's  wishes.  He  refused  to  exclude  the  Army 
from  voting  in  the  forthcoming  elections.  He  feared  that  such  a  move  would  merely 
precipitate  another  IDEA  'reaction'.  33 
Once  again  the  allies  backed  Tsakolotos  in  his  attempts  to  prevent  the  King 
stirring  up  the  Anny.  Norton  told  King  Paul  to  practice  restraint.  Peurifoy  was  even 
more  active  on  this  issue.  The  American  Ambassador  obtained  an  assurance  from 
Venizelos  that  the  soldiers  would  be  allowed  to  vote.  Peurifoy  asked  General  Frederick 
(Head  of  JUSMAG)  to  ensure  that  all  legal  steps  were  taken  to  permit  the  soldiers  to 
exercise  t  eir  ght  to  vote.  He  went  on  to  tell  the  King  to  stop  interfering  with  the 
electoral  campaign.  34  On  the  other  hand  Peurifoy  visited  Papagos  and  urged  him  to 
avoid  any  action  that  might  make  the  King's  position  'difficult'  in  case  he  was  elected.  35 
32  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95118  R101  14/39,  Norton  to  Morrison,  5 
September  195  1;  Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K6,  uyara  Kai  Bovlcmwtc,  p.  178; 
Karayiannis,  The  Greek  Drama-Tojp6pa  TIC  E.  Wboc,  pp.  262-264. 
33  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  Tov  EyqQo,  pp.  280-281. 
34  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95118/10114/36,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  29 
August  195  1. 
35  FRUS  (1951):  5,501-506:  Peurifoy  to  the  Chief  of  the  JUSMAG  G  (Frederick),  22  August  195  1.  The 
leftist  historians  suggest  that  Papagos  formed  a  semi-dictatorship  supported  by  the  United  States.  In  N. 
Psyroukis,  History  of  Contemporary  Greece-  Iaropla  TqC  Nc6Tcpqq  E.  U66aq  1940-1967,  vol.  2,  (Athens, 
1975),  pp.  50-55.  Giannoulopoulos  suggests  a  more  balanced  account:  that  the  Americans  supported 141 
These  Anglo-American  manoeuvres  avoided  the  prospect  of  the  King  and  the  Field 
Marshal  fighting  for  the  soul  of  the  Ariny  in  the  event  of  Papagos'  election.  36 
Although  the  attempts  to  head  off  a  Paul-Papagos  clash  by  restraining  the  King 
suggest  that  the  Western  powers  favoured  Papagos  this  was  not  entirely  the  case.  The 
British  were  reluctant  to  support  Papagos.  Sir  Clifford  Norton  felt  uneasy  about  the 
connections  ofP  apagos'  entourage  with  IDEA.  He  felt  even  uneasier  about  Papagos' 
support  for  Enosis.  The  combination  of  Papagos'  influence  over  the  military  and  his 
revanchist  goals  concerning  Cyprus  threatened  to  shift  the  axis  of  Greek  foreign  policy. 
The  pro-Western  aspect  of  the  military  might  be  replaced  by  its  anti-British  aspect. 
Anglo-Greek  conflict  would  'neutralise'  t  he  v  alue  ofG  reece  asap  rospective  N  ATO 
ally.  Peurifoy  shared  Norton's  reservations  about  Papagos.  Not  only  did  he  warn  of  the 
consequences  of  a  Palace-Amy  split  he  also  feared  the  polarisation  of  Greek  politics 
into  two  camps:  one  led  by  Papagos  the  other  by  Plastiras.  Although  the  American 
Ambassador  conceded  that  Papagos'  initiative  might  form  a  possible  answer  to  the 
problem  of  political  instability,  he  expressed  concern  about  the  'artificial  and  probably 
temporary  crystallisation  of  political  forces'  which  might  create  a  'meaningless' 
reconstruction  of  the  traditional  conservative  party.  37  Papagos'  connection  to  IDEA  was 
a  further  complication  in  his  mind.  Both  the  British  and  American  embassies  feared  that 
the  Field  Marshal's  entry  into  politics  might  lead  to  the  establishment  of  a  military 
regime.  Neither,  however,  planned  any  serious  intervention  in  Greek  politics  except  for 
emollient  and  ameliorative  measures  such  as  the  change  in  Commander  in  Chief.  This 
was,  in  part,  an  admission  of  impotence.  Diplomats  recognised  that  Papagos  was  a 
popular  figure.  Any  attempt  to  strangle  his  movement  at  birth  was  likely  to  provoke  a 
Papagos  because  he  could  provide  strong  political  government  backed  by  the  army.  Giannoulopoulos, 
Post  War  World-O  MeTa;  ro2,  cuiK6q  K6apoq,  p.  289. 
36  Thus  King  Paul  failed  to  strengthen  his  power  in  17EEGA,  which  was  headed  by  the  Gin-C.  37  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95117  RIO  114/24,  Norton  to  Mason,  I  August 
195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,492493:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State,  I  August  195  1. 142 
dangerous  backlash.  Furthermore  British  and  American  officials  in  Greece  admired 
Papagos  as  an  energetic  and  competent  figure.  He  was  neither  weak  enough  nor 
dangerous  enough  to  move  against.  38 
Indeed  the  new  electoral  law  transformed  the  Greek  political  scene  in  the 
elections  held  on  9  September  1951.  As  a  result  of  the  modified  proportional 
representation  only  nine  parties  contested  the  election.  The  main  contestants  were  The 
Greek  Rally  headed  by  Papagos,  the  Populists  headed  by  Tsaldaris,  the  Liberals  headed 
by  Venizelos,  National  Progressive  Centre  Union  (EPEK)  headed  by  Plastiras  and  the 
United  Democratic  Left  (EDA)  headed  by  Pasalidis.  The  poll  was  declared  seventeen 
days  later.  It  returned  the  Greek  Rally  as  the  strongest  party.  The  Rally  did  not,  however, 
gain  an  absolute  parliamentary  majority.  The  Rally  received  36.53  per  cent  of  the  vote 
and  114  seats  out  of  258.  EPEK  came  second  with  23.49  per  cent  and  74  seats. 
Venizelos  polled  19.04  per  cent  and  secured  57  seats,  EDA  received  10.57  per  cent  and 
elected  ten  deputies.  Tsaldaris  managed  only  6.66  per  cent  and  two  deputies. 
Papandreou's  party  failed  to  cross  the  threshold  and  neither  he  nor  any  of  his  supporters 
were  re-elected.  The  borderland  polling  districts  and  the  military  polling  stations  in 
particular  favoured  the  Field  Marshal.  Papagos  received  53.43  per  cent  of  the  army 
votes.  39  The  modified  proportional  representation  system  as  well  as  the  creation  of  the 
new  bipolar  system  of  the  Right  and  the  Left  had  obviously  favoured  the  big  parties.  The 
elections  of  9  September  1951  were  a  landmark  for  the  future  political  development  of 
Greece.  The  political  alliances  that  had  been  formed  dominated  Greek  politics  for  the 
38FRUS  (1951):  5,491:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State,  31  July  1951. 
39  FRUS  (1951):  5,508:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State,  15  September  195  1;  Meynauld,  The 
Political  Powers  in  Greece-Oi  17oAmKtqdvv6#ciq  oTqv  EUd&a,  p.  92;  Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K6,  upara  Kai  BoOzmwts,  pp.  422-423.  Clogg,  Parties  and  Elections,  p.  27.  The 
Populist  Party,  which  was  all-powerful  during  the  civil  war,  although  it  had  lost  its  strength,  reduced  the 
strength  of  the  Greek  Rally.  In  this  light,  one  can  justify  those  who  believed  that  Papagos'  entry  into 
politics  was  'premature'.  To  Vima,  the  Centre  newspaper  noted  that  the  elections  after  would  be  Papagos' 
success,  whereas  these  ones  were  'untimely'.  To  Vima,  I  August  195  1.  Nevertheless,  Papagos  needed  time 
to  establish  himself  on  the  political  scene  and  in  this  light  his  entry  into  politics  in  1951  offered  him  the 
time  to  win  the  absolute  majority  in  the  elections  of  November  1952. 143 
following  two  decades.  Moreover,  the  elections  showed  that,  contrary  to  the  usual  belief 
that  the  King  headed  the  Right,  the  majority  of  the  conservatives  voted  against  the  will 
of  the  Crown. 
Yet  despite  this  momentous  re-alignment  there  was  a  limit  to  change.  As  before 
it  was  impossible  to  forin  a  single-party  government.  Papagos'  key  goal  had  not  been 
achieved.  Indeed  although  the  emergence  of  his  Rally  as  the  single  largest  party  in  this 
its  first  election  was  a  major  achievement  the  results  demonstrated  that  there  were  limits 
to  the  Field  Marshal's  appeal.  In  fact  the  parties  of  the  Centre  had  won  an  overall 
majority.  Their  problem  was  that  these  seats  were  still  divided  between  two  separate 
fonnations:  EPEK  and  the  Liberals.  As  a  result  there  was  a  serious  possibility  that 
politics  would  return  to  'business  as  usual'.  Indeed  King  Paul  proposed  a  tripartite 
coalition  composed  of  the  three  major  parties.  Norton  and  Peurifoy,  perhaps  relieved 
that  Papagos  had  not  achieved  an  unalloyed  triumph,  also  favoured  the  three  party 
solution  in  order  to  create  a  'strong  and  broadly  acceptable  government'.  40 
Papagos,  however,  in  a  typically  uncompromising  stand,  excluded  any 
possibility  of  taking  part  in  a  coalition  cabinet.  Instead  he  called  for  the  formation  of  a 
caretaker  government  and  the  proclamation  of  new  elections  under  the  majority  system. 
Naturally,  King  Paul  and  the  Palace  strongly  opposed  this  prospect.  41  Instead,  on  29 
September  195  1,  Plastiras  and  Venizelos  formed  a  government  enjoying  a  parliamentary 
majority.  Plastiras  was  Premier  whilst  Venizelos  took  on  the  posts  of  Deputy  Prime 
40  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95118  RIO  114/43,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  19 
September  1951;  FRUS  (1951):  5,508-509:  Peurifoy  to  the  Department  of  State,  15  September  1951. 
41  On  the  rift  between  Papagos  and  the  Palace  there  are  different  views.  Papagiannopoulos  writes  that, 
despite  the  well  known  and  well  proven  pro-royalist  Papagos'  beliefs,  the  clash  between  Papagos  and  the 
Palace  originated  from  the  end  of  1950  when  the  former  refused  to  be  appointed  the  King's  Premier. 
Papagiannopoulos,  Field  Marshal  A.  Papagos-Zrpar6pX?  1c  AAt&v&poq  I7a7rdyoq,  pp.  469470.  There  is 
also  the  view  that  the  relationship  of  Papagos  and  the  Palace  deteriorated  because  of  disagreements  with 
King  Paul  over  the  powers  of  the  Army,  which  according  to  the  King  could  'awake'  Ethnikos  Dichasmos 
(National  Schism)  and  this  in  turn  would  challenge  again  the  position  of  kingship  as  in  the  case  of 
Eleftherios  Venizelos  and  King  Konstantine  I,  father  of  King  Paul,  in  1920.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War- 
A2rorov  EpýpbAio,  pp.  296,299.  Indeed,  both  cases  are  justified.  However,  the  uncompromising  character 
of  Papagos  and  mainly  his  political  ambitions  had  brought  the  clash  between  the  two  men. 144 
Minister  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  cabinet  consisted  of  EPEK  and  Liberal 
ministers  in  proportion  to  the  parliamentary  strength  of  the  two  parties.  42 
The  Plastiras  Government 
The  Plastiras  government  managed  to  remain  in  power  for  almost  a  year. 
Although  Plastiras  had  always  been  considered  to  be  a  left-wing  sympathiser  politician 
he  turned  out  to  be  a  typical  Cold  War  pro-westemer  prime  minister.  He  followed  an 
anglophile  foreign  policy  on  the  Cyprus  issue.  He  confirmed  the  rights  of  the  King  by 
the  introduction  of  a  new  constitution.  The  eventual  fall  of  his  cabinet  was  the  result  of 
the  usual  falling  out  between  coalition  partners  over  issues  of  personality  and  power 
rather  than  'the  contradictory  policies  towards  the  communists'  as  suggested  by  some 
historians. 
43 
An  important  issue  for  Plastiras  premiership  was  the  constitution,  which  had  not 
been  reformed  since  1911.  On  27  July  195  1,  at  an  ad  hoc  meeting  at  the  Tatoi  Palace 
between  all  party  leaders,  except  for  Papagos  and  the  Lefl,  it  had  been  agreed  that  the 
new  chamber  would  vote  for  a  new  constitution.  The  prime  mover  in  maintaining  the 
momentum  for  constitutional  reform  was  the  King  himself.  Paul  was  still  smarting  from 
his  repeated  humiliations  during  the  rift  between  Papagos  and  the  Palace.  He  was 
desperate  to  consolidate  his  status.  44  The  role  of  the  King  and  his  authority  to  appoint 
ministers  and  dissolve  governments  were  ratified  in  article  31  of  the  constitution.  At  one 
42  pLMLIC  RECOp  'D  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95118  RIO  114/54,  Norton  to  Foreign  Office,  I 
October  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,511:  Peurifoy  to  Department  of  State,  16  October  195  1. 
Papagiannopoulos  argues  that  the  King  proposed  the  formation  of  the  tripartite  coalition  to  undermine 
Papagos'  strength.  Papagiannopoulos,  Field  Marshal  Ale-xandros  Papagos-  ZTpo:  r6pXjqAAt&v6poC 
17=6yoq,  p.  445.  From  another  perspective,  Linardatos  notes  that  King  Paul  aimed  at  sustaining  the 
Liberals  in  power  as  much  as  possible  to  please  the  Liberals  and  put  down  any  liberal  claims  for 
republicanism.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro,  Tov  Ep(pbAio,  p.  301.  Both  historians  are  partly  right. 
Papagos  had  strengthened  his  powers  during  Plastiras  premiership  through  the  new  electoral  law. 
Similarly,  the  new  constitution  under  Plastiras  cabinet  would  favour  the  King's  rights.  Claims  for 
republicanism,  however,  were  not  a  threat  at  that  point  for  the  King. 
43  History  of  the  Greek  Nation4aropla  Tov  EU?  IvIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  180. 145 
stage  Papagos  had  threatened  to  break  the  power  of  the  Palace.  Instead  the  result  of  the 
election  led  to  the  confinnation  ofr  oyal  p  ower  inG  reek  p  olitics.  T  his  w  as  t  he  m  ost 
important  achievement  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Palace.  The  new  constitution  was 
also  framed  to  appeal  to  the  Army.  It  prescribed  inter  alia:  restrictions  on  the  press  and 
freedom  of  speech  and  that  civilians  should  be  court-martialled  if  they  acted  'against  the 
security  of  the  armed  forces'.  The  application  of  emergency  laws  in  the  case  of  a  threat 
to  national  security  even  without  parliamentary  approval  was  ratified.  The  constitution 
banned  the  right  of  strike  to  civil  servants.  The  constitution  was  a  thoroughgoing  Cold 
War  document.  It  reflected  the  balance  of  power  thrown  up  by  the  September  1951 
elections.  There  could  be  considerable  dispute  as  to  which  political  grouping  had 
emerged  best  from  this  election.  One  thing  was  certain,  however:  the  left  was  weak.  All 
other  parties  could  agree  to  measures  that  infringed  civil  liberties  but  helped  guarantee 
their  own  political  futures.  45 
The  strengthening  of  the  centre-right  in  Greek  politics  was  entirely  satisfactory 
to  Britain.  The  Cold  War  politics  of  Greece  could  be  seen  as  a  triumph  for  British 
diplomacy.  They  had  managed  to  achieve  their  objectives  and  stay  friendly  with  both  the 
Greeks  and  the  Americans.  Sir  Charles  Peake,  Norton's  successor  as  British 
Ambassador,  considered  that  the  allies  were  still  'on  close  and  cordial  terms'.  46  It  was 
not  just  the  embassy  that  provided  a  conduit  for  this  cordiality.  The  British  Military 
Mission  was  still  in  operation  training  Greek  forces.  British  diplomats  and  soldiers 
attended  political  and  military  meetings  and  took  part  in  decision-making. 
44  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101799  R1017/5,  Peake  to  Eden,  5  February  1952; 
History  ofthe  Greek  Nation4aropia  Too  EUqviKo6  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  179. 
45  History  of  the  Greek  Nation-IoTopla  Too  F-UlviKob  EOvovc-,  vol.  16,  p.  179.  For  an  account  of  the  new 
constitution  see,  A.  Svolos,  Vie  Greek  Constitution-To  EaUqVIK6  Ebvrayua,  vol.  I  (Athens,  1954),  pp.  3-8. 
Svolos  and  Vlahos  write  that  this  new  constitution  'was  not  new  but  just  a  deterioration  of  the  old  ones'. 
Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A  7rO  Tov  EyýpQo,  p.  362.  That  constitution  was  applied  until  1967,  to  be 
renewed  in  1975. 
46  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  101899  R1017/3,  Peake  to  Harrison,  6  February 
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Even  the  most  difficult  issue  in  Anglo-Greek  relations  -  Cyprus  -  had  been  kept 
off  the  boil.  Archbishop  Makarios'  demand  that  the  question  of  self-determination  for 
Cyprus  should  be  institutionalised  by  the  Greek  government  taking  the  issue  to  the 
United  Nations  alarmed  the  Foreign  Office.  William  Strang,  the  Permanent  Under- 
Secretary,  had  made  clear  to'Venizelos  and  Leon  Melas,  the  Greek  Ambassador  in 
London,  that  'there  were  no  disposition  on  the  p  art  ofH  is  M  aj  esty's  G  overnment  to 
discuss  the  Greek  proposals'.  47  On  14  May  1951,  Venizelos  had  met  with  Norton  and 
the  British  Ambassador  and  had  stressed  to  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  that  'there  is  no 
Cyprus  issue'.  Five  days  later  the  Greek  Prime  Minister  stated  that  the  official  Greek 
position  towards  the  Cyprus  issue  was  that  'the  issue  of  Cyprus  is  always  open'  but  'the 
contemporary  situation  does  not  allow  us  to  proceed  to  a  solution'  . 
48  Plastiras,  in  his 
turn,  continued  the  same  Anglophile  foreign  policy.  In  his  pre-election  programme  there 
was  no  agenda  for  Cyprus.  49  On  22  November  1951,  Averoff,  the  Under-Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  cabled  the  Greek  delegation  to  the  United  Nations  led  by  George 
Mavros  instructing  them  'not  to  raise  the  Cyprus  question'.  50  The  Foreign  Office  in 
return  recognised  the  efforts  of  the  Greek  government  'to  minimise  Enosis 
propaganda'.  51 
47  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  101793,  Annual  Report  of  1951,24  January  1952. 
48  To  Vima,  20  May  195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101793,  Annual  Report  for 
1951,24  January  1952. 
49  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/  101793,  Annual  Report  for  195  1;  On  the  contrary, 
Valinakis  supports  that  the  Cyprus  issue  was  one  of  the  main  pillars  of  Greek  foreign  policy,  together  with 
NATO  and  containment  of  communism.  G.  G.  Valinakis,  Introduction  to  the  Greek  Foreign  Policy- 
Eioraya)y4  oTqv  EýU?  jvzK4  E&rcpwý  1`7olmK4  (Thessaloniki,  1989),  p.  45. 
50  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  Tov  Ey(p6lio,  p.  350.  On  12  November  195  1,  Politis,  the  former 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Archbishop  of  Athens,  Spyridon,  as  well  as  the  Greek  delegation 
indirectly  brought  the  question  of  Cyprus  to  the  attention  of  the  UN  General  Assembly  in  a  speech  about 
the  interpretation  of  Article  73  of  the  Charter  and  self-determination  rights.  Simultaneously  pro-Enosis 
student  demonstrations  were  organised  in  Athens  University  on  22  November.  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101793,  Annual  Report  for  195  1.  All  developments  remained  small-scale 
reactions  easily  controlled  by  the  government  itself. 
51  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101807  R.  1051/2,  D.  F.  Murray  Minute,  14  May 
1952.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95118  1110114/65,  Peake  to  Mason,  10 
November  195  1;  Linardatos  suggests  that  the  Americans  were  in  favour  of  the  British  deterioration  as  a 
power  and  prefer  to  'forward  their  status  on  the  ruins  of  the  British  Empire'.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War- 
Aro  Tov  Ep(p6Aio,  p.  35  1.  However,  it  seems  that  the  Americans  relied  on  British  support  still  at  that  time. 147 
The  Plastiras  government,  however,  faced  serious  practical  drawbacks.  On  10 
March  1952,  Plastiras  suffered  a  stroke,  which  incapacitated  him  for  many  months.  Four 
days  later  Theodoros  Havinis,  the  Minister  of  Public  Works,  resigned  in  protest  against 
American  pressure  on  the  issue  of  the  renewal  of  the  contract  between  the  Greek  state 
and  the  American  owned  Athens  Water  Authority.  At  the  same  time,  Kartalis,  the 
Minister  of  Co-operation  and  Sakellariou,  Minister  of  Defence,  also  resigned  in  protest 
of  the  reactions  at  the  continuing  executions  of  communists.  A  number  of  deputies 
resigned  from  both  EPEK  and  the  Liberals:  as  a  result  the  Plastiras  government  lost  its 
majority  of  the  seats  in  Parliament.  Plastiras  announced  that  elections  would  take  place 
in  September  1952.52  Once  again  the  Greek  political  system  revealed  its  fissile  nature.  A 
potentially  strong  government  of  the  Centre  had  been  created.  The  hard  Left  had  been 
reduced  to  a  negligible  political  force.  The  militaristic  Right  had  been  contained. 
Political  reform  had  reduced  the  number  of  parties  to  manageable  numbers.  Yet  the 
leading  politicians  were  simply  unwilling  to  make  the  system  operate.  Instead  of 
recognising  its  virtues  their  disagreements  on  a  myriad  of  issues  destabilised  it  once 
more. 
As  a  result  the  electoral  system  came  to  the  fore  once  again.  The  majority  system 
seemed  to  be  as  the  only  solution.  Since  Greek  politicians  were  unable  to  get  along  with 
each  other  only  the  enforced  dominance  of  one  figure  of  party  would  provide  the  ballast 
the  system  needed.  The  electoral  law,  however,  divided  the  Greek  leaders.  General 
Alternatively,  Stefanidis  believes  that  the  Americans  pressed  the  British  to  'support'  Greek  leaders.  In 
Stefanidis,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Greece,  p.  207. 
52  FRUS  (1952-54):  5,271-272:  Peurifoy  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  25  February  1952;  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101794  R1013/6,  Peake  to  Foreign  Office,  12  March  1952;  History  of  the 
Greek  Nation-Idropla  Tov  EUIVIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  180.  At  the  same  time,  anti-Communist  measures 
and  executions  of  communists  had  caused  strong  reactions  in  Greece  and  abroad.  Telegrams  from 
politicians,  clergy  and  common  people  from  across  the  world  had  been  sent  to  King  Paul  to  cancel  the 
executions  of  eight  communists.  The  case  had  become  internationally  known.  Picasso  had  drawn  the 
sketch  of  Belogiannis,  one  of  the  most  famous  convicts.  However,  Cold  War  rhetoric  prevailed. 
Linardatos  suggests  that  Minister  of  Defence  Sakellariou  has  been  forced  to  resign  in  order  to  smooth  the 
upheaval  of  the  executions.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  Tov  EpýpQo,  p.  395.  This,  up  to  a  certain 148 
Plastiras,  re-affirmed  his  preference  for  the  majority  system.  Papagos  too  favoured  the 
majority  system.  King  Paul  and  Venizelos,  however,  favoured  the  re-introduction  of  the 
simple  proportional  representation  system,  which  would  allow  small  parties  the  strength 
to  gain  seats  in  the  Parliament. 
The  risk  of  another  prolonged  and  destabilising  argument  alarmed  the  allies.  On 
14  March  1952,  Peurifoy  warned  that  a  return  to  simple  proportional  representation 
would  have  'disastrous  effects'  on  the  supply  of  American  aid.  He  described  the 
initiative  for  the  re-introduction  of  simple  proportional  representation  as  'palace 
intrigue'  aiming  at  pen-nitting  King  Paul  to  rule  through  unstable  coalitions.  Peake 
agreed  with  his  colleague's  exasperation  with  the  Greek  political  situation.  According  to 
his  own  reports  to  the  Foreign  Office  he  had  sided  with  the  American  as  'for  good  or  ill 
the  United  States  Government  have  now  committed  themselves  to  a  definite  and  overt 
53  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  country'.  The  Americans  supported  the 
majority  system  because  the  Centre  experiments  had  failed  to  provide  parliamentary 
strong  c  abinets.  54  In  an  undisguised  intervention  in  domestic  politics  Peurifoy  openly 
55 
advocated  a  change  in  the  electoral  system  to  a  simple  majority  one. 
extent,  brought  the  downfall  of  the  government,  but  this  downfall  coupled  with  the  instability  of  all 
coalitions  demonstrates  that  the  electoral  system  allowed  the  dissolution  of  the  cabinets. 
53  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101799  R1017/12,  Peake  to  Eden,  19  March  1952. 
Linardatos  believes  that  the  Palace  together  with  the  'English'  did  not  favour  the  majority  system  because 
they  preferred  coalition  cabinets,  which  offered  them  more  space  for  intervention.  Both  the  Palace  and  the 
British  were  afraid  of  Papagos'  Premiership  and  the  total  American  'guardianship'  in  Greece.  Linardatos, 
From  Civil  War-  A7ro  rov  EpqbAzo,  p.  37  1.  W.  H.  McNeill  gives  a  more  realistic  account  and  writes  that 
the  American  embassy  and  Missions  continued  to  pay  for  Greece  provided  the  establishment  of  'stable 
government',  which  the  majority  system  would  provide.  In  W.  H.  McNeill,  The  Metamorphosis  of  Greece 
since  WWII  (Oxford,  1978),  p.  48.  Orthodox  historians  of  Greek  history  tend  to  believe  that  the  Foreign 
Office  supported  a  priori  the  Palace  and  the  Americans  preferred  any  right-wing  formations.  Markezinis, 
Political  History-HoAmK4  Iaropia,  pp.  295-300.  This  incident,  however,  is  one  of  the  cases  that 
discredited  these  beliefs. 
54  Clogg,  A  Short  History  qfModern  Greece,  p.  167. 
55  J.  Carey  and  A.  Carey,  The  Web  qfModern  Greek  Politics,  p.  153. 149 
The  Rally  Wins  the  Election 
Plastiras  tabled  a  proposal  for  a  new  electoral  system.  On  12  September  1952,  it 
gained  the  approval  of  Parliament  by  a  narrow  majority.  The  American  intervention 
played  a  decisive  role  in  creating  this  new  system.  Without  this  stick  it  would  have  been 
unlikely  that  the  necessary  votes  in  favour  of  change  could  have  been  found.  It  was 
obvious  to  all  that  the  majority  system  would  favour  Papagos  who  had  been  the  victor  of 
the  previous  elections.  56  Those  not  aligned  with  Papagos  would  lose  out.  57  The  biggest 
loser,  of  course,  was  the  King.  In  September  1951  he  had  been  threatened  by  political 
impotence.  Instead  the  Papagos  threat  had  been  averted  and  a  new  constitution  had 
reiterated  his  position  at  the  heart  of  political  life.  Now  the  Americans  had  forced  the 
Greek  political  elite  to  reverse  that  decision.  Paul  wildly  declared  that  he  split  the  Rally 
by  appealing  to  royalists  and  rule  through  a  new  series  of  royal  minority  governments. 
Peake  quite  understood  why  Peurifoy  had  finally  lost  patience  and  effectively  committed 
the  United  States  to  a  Papagos  government.  Yet  because  Britain  had  not  had  the  power 
to  engineer  this  crisis  themselves  they  were  at  least  able  to  wield  a  calming  influence  at 
a  time  that  anti-Americah  sentiment  ran  high.  It  was  left  to  the  British  to  remind  the 
King  how  unrealistic  he  was  being.  58 
56  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101800/1017/3  1,  J.  Galsworthy  to  Foreign  Off"ice, 
27  August  1952;  History  of  the  Greek  Nation4aropla  rov  E.  UtIVIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  18  1. 
57  The  American  support  of  Papagos  and  the  majority  electoral  system  in  the  elections  of  November  1952 
is  a  matter  of  controversy  in  Greek  historiography.  Linardatos,  ftorn  a  rather  'conspiracy'  point  of  view, 
notes  that  Plastiras  voted  for  the  new  system  solely  as  a  result  of  American  'blackmail'  over  reducing 
American  financial  support.  In  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A;  ro  Tov  Ep(pQo,  pp.  495-496.  Valinakes 
gives  a  more  rounded  account  and  justifies  the  American  'intervention'  in  order  to  support  Papagos  and 
stability  between  government  and  army.  In  Valinakes,  Introduction  to  the  Greek  Foreign  Policy-Ewaycoy4 
oTqv  EUqvixý  E&rcpxý  HoAnipý,  p.  44.  Giannoulopoulos,  emphasising  the  domestic  factor,  notes  that 
the  change  of  the  electoral  system  came  as  a  result  of  a  Greek  need  to  form  a  strong  parliamentary 
majority.  In  Giannoulopoulos,  Post-  War  World-0  M6Ta7r0ACU1K6q  K6apog,  p.  294.  Papagiannopoulos,  in  a 
totally  pro-Papagos  interpretation,  notes  no  relation  between  the  new  electoral  law  and  Papagos' 
Premiership,  which  would  have  occurred  regardless  the  system.  Papagiannopoulos,  Field  Marshal  A. 
Papagos-Erpar6px?  1,;  AMýavbpoq  l7a7rdyoq,  pp.  480-484.  This  system  would  subsequently  back  a  strong 
single-party  cabinet. 
58  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101800  RIO  17/37,  Peake  to  Harrison,  2  September 
1952;  FO  371/101800  RIO  17/40,  Peake  to  Strang,  17  September  1952. 150 
On  the  basis  of  a  deal  between  the  government  and  the  Rally,  the  majority 
system  was  finally  enacted  into  a  new  electoral  law  on  4  October  1952.  The  deal  also 
promised  further  advantages  for  the  Right.  Voters  would  need  to  return  to  their  home 
town  and  villages  in  order  to  vote.  The  place  where  a  man  could  vote  was  determined  by 
the  1940  census  rather  than  by  the  incomplete  1951  census.  Voting  based  on  this 
traditional  basis  was  easier  for  the  anti-communist  local  police  forces  to  monitor  and 
control.  In  theory  women  were  to  be  allowed  to  vote  and  to  stand  as  candidates.  In 
practice,  however,  few  were  registered  to  vote.  59  The  Army  was,  of  course,  encouraged 
to  vote. 
On  10  0  ctober  1952,  t  he  P  lastiras  g  ovenunent  r  esigned  tobes  ucceeded  bya 
caretaker  government  headed  by  the  Public  Prosecutor  in  the  Supreme  Court  of  Justice 
Dimitrios  Kiousopoulos.  Kiousopoulos  proceeded  to  dissolve  the  Parliament  and 
60 
proclaim  elections  for  the  16  November  1952  . 
Even  more  so  than  in  September  1951  the  appeal  of  Papagos  -  now  being  made 
under  an  electoral  system  favourable  to  him  -  forced  the  other  parties  to  reorganise 
themselves.  A  number  of  prominent  Centre  politicians,  including  George  Papandreou 
and  Emmanouel  Tsouderos,  had  already  aligned  themselves  with  Papagos.  In  an  attempt 
to  withstand  the  impact  of  the  Papagos'  bandwagon  the  National  Progressive  Centre 
Union  (EPEK)  headed  by  Plastiras,  the  Liberals  headed  by  Venizelos  and  the  small 
Socialist  Party  headed  by  Svolos  decided  to  enter  the  elections  on  a  joint  slate.  This  so- 
called  Union  of  the  Parties  also  included  a  small  number  of  left-wing  personalities.  The 
59  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101803  RIOI  14/4,  Galsworthy  to  Barnes,  8 
October  1952;  Nikolopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K6ppara  Kai  BovIEDTIKk  pp.  194- 
195. 
60  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101800  R1017/42,  Lambert  to  Southern 
Department,  'The  Record  of  the  Plastiras  Government',  22  October  1952;  History  of  the  Greek  Nation- 
IoTopla  rov  EUIVIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  182.  The  Greek  left-wing  historian  Linardatos  attributed  the  fall 
of  Plastiras  government  to  the  American  intervention.  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A;  rO  Tov  EUV6110,  P. 
414.  The  execution  of  the  communists,  Plastiras'  bad  health  and  the  re-organisation  of  the  political  world 
coupled  with  the  western  preference  to  Papagos,  also  contributed  to  Plastiras'  fall.  The  main  drawback, 151 
campaign  strategy  of  the  centre-leftist  world  was  two-fold.  They  wished  to  point  to  the 
government's  achievements  during  its  year  in  office.  Even  more,  however,  they  tried  to 
whip  up  fears  of  a  'white  terror'  by  arguing  that  Papagos'  movement  was  merely  a  front 
for  right-wing  authoritarians  backed  by  the  Army.  Yet,  in  truth,  Plastiras  had  very  little 
with  which  to  appeal  to  the  electorate.  His  attempts  to  extend  leniency  to  former 
communists  had,  of  necessity,  been  half-hearted.  They  had  called  into  question  his 
reliability  without  addressing  in  any  real  way  the  bitterness  left  over  from  the  civil  war. 
Neither  had  his  much  vaunted  social  reform  programmes  amounted  to  much.  Legislation 
allowing  the  expropriation  of  land  and  its  redistribution  to  landless  peasants  had  been 
enacted  but  no  land  transfers  had  yet  taken  place.  61 
The  elections  of  16  November  1952  returned  the  Rally  with  a  majority  of 
unprecedented  proportions  in  Greek  electoral  history.  The  Union  of  the  Parties  failed  in 
its  last  ditch  attempt  to  deny  Papagos  a  majority.  Reaping  the  benefits  of  the  ma  ority  j 
system  Papagos'  party  won  a  crushing  parliamentary  majority.  Out  of  the  300  seats 
being  contested  the  Rally  won  247.  This  landslide  was  based  on  winning  49.22  per  cent 
of  the  vote.  Support  for  Papagos  had  increased  by  one-third  over  a  year. 
Notwithstanding  this,  however,  the  effects  of  the  new  system  are  clear.  Papagos  had 
received  less  than  half  of  the  total  vote  but  over  four-fifth  of  the  seats.  The  obverse  of 
this  was  that  the  Union  of  the  Parties  secured  only  51  seats  with  34.22  per  cent  of  the 
votes.  The  vote  for  Union  was  less  than  that  garnered  by  its  individual  partners  the 
previous  year.  Yet  an  alliance  commanding  over  one-third  of  the  votes  had  been  left 
with  less  than  one  sixth  of  the  seats.  EDA  polled  9.55  per  cent  of  the  vote  but  failed  to 
secure  the  election  of  any  of  its  candidates.  The  Populist  Party  won  only  1.05  per  cent  of 
however,  was  that  the  existence  of  the  government  was  based  on  coalitions  of  the  centre  powers  and  that 
left  the  cabinet  exposed  to  making  and  unmaking  of  alliances.  See  also  f.  52. 
61  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO/10  1803  R101  14/9,  Peake  to  Eden,  2  December  1952; 
Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K61.  ipara  Kai  BovAcvTiKtq,  pp.  108-109. 152 
the  votes  and  no  seats.  The  Parliament  was  rounded  out  by  two  deputies  from  minor 
parties. 
62 
The  new  electoral  law  had  achieved  its  stated  purpose.  It  had  produced  a 
government  with  clear  parliamentary  majority.  Papagos'  triumph  paved  the  way  towards 
the  formation  of  the  first  post-war  stable,  single-party,  government.  Papagos  had 
managed  to  appeal  to  all  n  on-communist  f  orces.  T  he  R  ally  w  as  i  ndeed  w  orthy  ofi  ts 
name.  It  was  to  go  on  to  enjoy  eleven  uninterrupted  years  of  rule.  Greek  politics  after 
November  1952  was  quite  different  to  that  in  the  post-war  years.  Papagos  would  stay  in 
power  until  his  death  in  1955.  Yet  even  the  passing  of  the  Rally's  charismatic  founder 
did  not  dent  its  electoral  prospects.  Renamed  the  National  Radical  Union  (ERE)  it 
remained  the  party  of  government  under  Papagos'  successor,  Konstantine  KaramanliS.  63 
Papagos'  victory  came  about  because  of  changes  in  Greek  politics.  The 
communists  and  their  surrogates  had  lost  all  but  a  hard  core  of  support.  The  politicians 
of  the  Right,  Centre  and  soft  Left  had  discredited  themselves  by  their  behaviour  during 
and  after  the  civil  war.  The  King  had  been  unable  to  rally  a  royal  party.  Papagos, 
however,  was  a  royalist  whatever  his  disagreements  with  Paul.  At  least  the  victory  of  the 
Rally  can  be  said  to  have  secured  respect  and  a  degree  of  influence  for  the  Palace.  The 
62  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO/101800  R1017/49,  Galsworthy  to  Bames,  26  November 
1952.  Nikolakopoulos,  Parties  and  Parliamentary  Elections-K6,  upara  Kai  Bov)xvTiKtq,  pp.  108-109; 
Clogg,  Parties  and  Elections  in  Greece,  p.  3  1. 
63  The  establishment  of  the  Rally's  majority  became  a  matter  of  controversy.  Papagiamopoulos,  notes 
that  it  was  the  result  of  Papagos  himself  and  his  strong  administrative  capacities.  Papagiannopoulos,  Field 
Marshal  A.  Papagos-XTpaT6pvqq  AU&v6poq  Hardyoc,  pp.  480-486;  Left-wing  historian  Dafnis,  writes 
that  Papagos  brought  totalitarianism  by  supporting  exclusively  the  new  post-war  bourgeois.  Dafnis  quoted 
in  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  Tov  Eyýp6Ato,  p.  524.  Another  pro  left-wing  Greek  historian 
Linardatos  writes  that  Papagos  enjoyed  the  support  of  the  Americans,  who  brought  him  to  power. 
Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7rO  TOv  Ep(p0io,  p.  524.  Stefanidis  also  supports  that  Papagos  was  the  result 
of  American  'overt  intervention'.  In  Stefanidis,  The  United  States,  Great  Britain  and  Greece,  p.  229. 
Giannoulopoulos  suggests  that  Papagos  succeeded  because  he  managed  to  change  the  political  scenery  of 
the  Right  since  the  elections  of  September  195  1.  In  Giannoulopoulos,  Post-  War  World-0  Mera7ro)xu1K6q 
K6apoq,  p.  300.  It  has  been  supported  that  the  Rally's  success  lay  in  supporting  the  agrarian  population. 
History  of  the  Greek  Nation-Io-ropid  TovWqv=6  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  183.  In  fact,  one  can  not  ignore 
that  the  prominent  characteristic  of  the  majority  system  is  the  security  of  strong  government  in  terms  of 
parliamentary  majority  and  stable  single  party  formations.  In  this  light,  the  case  of  the  Rally  was  the 
typical  consequence  following  the  new  law.  The  Rally's  administration  fitted  the  allies'  policy  in  that  it 
secured  a  strong,  right-wing  cabinet  to  govern  a  four-year  term  and  make  Greece  part  of  the  system  of 
Western  security  and  integrated  member  of  NATO. 153 
one  institution  of  state  that  had  enhanced  its  reputation  was  the  Anny.  It  had  provided 
Papagos'  springboard  into  power.  It  benefited  greatly  from  his  elevation.  The  IDEA 
officers  who  had  been  demobilised  as  a  result  of  the  coup  of  30  May  1951  were 
reinstated  in  their  offices.  Some  were  appointed  to  key  positions  in  the  Greek 
government.  A.  Natsinas,  a  prominent  IDEA  officer,  for  instance,  became  the  head  of 
the  newly  created  Greek  Government  Information  Service  (KYP).  64  The  final  piece  in 
the  p  olitical  j  igsaw,  itis  true,  had  been  put  in  place  by  the  United  States.  Peurifoy's 
decisive  intervention  had  undermined  resistance  to  the  electoral  law.  Even  under  the 
previous  electoral  law,  however,  the  Rally  would  have  emerged  as  overwhelmingly  the 
strongest  party.  The  new  system  that  the  Americans  had  insisted  on  nevertheless  was  a 
key  element  in  the  system's  enduring  stability.  This  is  a  long  way  from  saying  that  the 
Rally  was  the  creation  or  even  the  puppet  of  the  western  allies.  After  the  elections  Sir 
Charles  Peake  wrote  that  he  and  Peurifoy  were  'delighted'  by  the  result.  Yet  both  they 
and  their  predecessors  had  attempted  to  use  their  influence  to  obviate  the  need  for  the 
Papagos  solution.  Their  preferred  solution  had  been  always  been  a  stable  coalition 
goverranent  of  the  Centre.  But  the  Centre  would  not  hold;  things  repeatedly  fell  apart. 
The  Anglo-American  influence  on  Papagos'  victory  was  of  decisive  importance.  They 
had  merely  made  it  clear  that  they  would  no  longer  help  either  politicians  or  the  Palace 
in  their  attempts  to  thwart  the  clear  will  of  the  Greek  people.  Eventually,  it  was  the  new 
electoral  law,  which  made  the  allies'  expectations  true. 
"History  ofthe  Greek  Nation-IoTopid  Tov  WIIVIK06  EOvovq,  vol.  16,  p.  184;  Th.  Veremis,  '  The 
Military',  Featherston,  Katsoudas  (eds),  Political  Change  in  Greece,  pp.  218-219. 154 
VI  Greece's  Accession  to  NATO:  1952 
Greece  and  NATO's  Southern  Flank 
One  result  of  the  Korean  War  was  that  measures  to  secure  Europe  and  the 
Middle  East  against  Communism  became  even  more  important  to  the  western  allies. 
According  to  a  NSC  paper  dated  6  February  1951  Greece  constituted  'a  symbol  of  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  effectively  assist  nations  threatened  with  communist 
domination'.  '  George  McGhee,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Near  East,  South 
Asia  and  Africa  wrote  to  Acheson  that  if  the  West  was  to  make  wartime  use  of  the 
Middle  East  oil,  bases  and  manpower,  further  political  and  military  action  was 
required.  2  In  consequence,  thoughts  turned  to  ways  in  which  both  Greece  and  Turkey, 
with  whom  it  had  been  twinned  in  such  deliberations  since  the  Truman  doctrine,  might 
be  strengthened.  3  In  the  American  conception  Greece  constituted  the  linchpin  between 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East.  These  two  areas  the  Americans  regarded  as  being 
1  FRUS  (1951):  5,451-461:  NSC  103,  'The  Position  of  the  US  with  Respect  to  Greece',  6  February  1951; 
Documents  of  the  NSC  1947-1977,  NSC  103,  'The  Position  of  the  US  with  Respect  to  Greece',  6 
February  195  1,  Reel  3,  Frame  005  5.  This  also  coupled  with  the  American  Foreign  policy  for  raising 
military  expenditures  by  January  1950  and  NSC  68  later  on  in  September.  In  December  1950  as  a  result  of 
the  Korean  War,  the  rearmament  efforts  and  the  US  reinforcements  to  Europe,  D.  Eisenhower  was 
appointed  as  the  first  Supreme  Allied  Commander  Europe  (SACEUR).  On  2  April  1951  Supreme 
Headquarters  Allied  Powers  Europe  (SHAPE)  was  created  in  Paris,  under  Eisenhower  within  the  context 
of  the  employment  of  American  troops  in  Europe. 
2  McGhee,  The  US-Turkish-NA  TO,  p.  79.  McGhee  was  American  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Near 
East,  South  Asia  and  Africa  since  8  June  1949  and  American  Ambassador  to  Turkey  and  Chief  of  the 
United  States  Aim  Mission  (T)  from  December  1951  to  19  June  1953. 
'  According  to  some  historians  Turkey  was  the  key  issue  in  bringing  the  Americans  closer  to  the  south- 
eastern  Mediterranean  area.  McGhee  suggests  that  the  Americans  wanted  to  expand  American  control  to 
the  Straits.  McGhee,  The  US-Turkish-NA  TO  Middle  East  Connection,  pp.  74-76;  M.  P.  Leffler,  'Strategy, 
Diplomacy  and  the  Cold  War:  the  United  States,  Turkey  and  NATO,  1945-1952',  Journal  ofAmerican 
History,  vol.  7  1,  no  4  (1985),  823.  Leffler  emphasises  the  American  interest  in  including  Turkey  and 
Greece  into  NATO  as  a  result  of  the  rise  of  nationalism  in  the  Middle  East  and  Turkey's  fear  of  neutrality 
in  case  of  general  Soviet  attack.  Leffler,  A  Preponderance,  p.  425.  Couloumbis  attributes  the  inclusion 
into  NATO  to  the  rapid  American  global  ascendancy.  Coulournbis,  Greek  Political  Reaction  to  Americans 
and  NATO,  p.  19.  Kuniholm.  estimates  that  the  invitation  to  Turkey  and  Greece  to  join  NATO  was  not  the 
effect  of  the  Korean  War,  but  the  struggle  for  power  in  the  Near  East  policies  against  Soviet  ventures,  as 
outlined  by  1946.  Kunihohn,  The  Origins  of  the  Cold  War  in  the  Near  East,  p.  425.  Nevertheless,  despite 
the  fear  of  Turkish  neutrality,  the  actual  treaty  of  Turkish  and  Greek  admission  into  NATO  was  vague  on 
that  point.  So  the  use  of  Turkey's  land  and  manpower  seemed  to  be  more  realistic  motivation. 155 
interdependent  in  both  peacetime  and  war.  4  Greek  governments  had  long  wanted  Greece 
to  become  fully-fledged  member  of  NATO.  The  prime  objective  of  the  Greek 
governments'  foreign  policy  had  always  been  the  securing  of  western  military 
assistance.  In  spring  195  1,  the  Greek  Prime  Minister,  Venizelos,  made  a  petition  for 
extending  Greece's  role  to  a  full  NATO  member.  The  reason  for  this  call  was  the 
protection  of  Greece  against  a  probable  Soviet  attack.  The  experience  of  the  civil  war 
and  the  escalation  of  the  Cold  War  had  made  the  communist  threat  a  vivid  danger.  5  In 
1951  their  requests  began  to  be  taken  seriously.  Nevertheless  the  internal  politics  of 
NATO  meant  that  the  road  to  Greek  membership  was  not  entirely  straightforward. 
In  February  1951  the  United  States  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  began  lobbying  for 
enhanced  Greek  military  strength.  They  suggested  that  the  manpower  ceiling  for  the 
Greek  armed  forces  should  be  raised  by  one-third  to  164,000  men.  These  increases  and 
more  general  support  for  the  Greek  army  would  be  financed  by  increased  American  aid.  6 
On  8  March  195  1,  Admiral  Carney,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Allied  Forces  in 
Southern  Europe,  suggested  that  all  the  countries  of  the  Northern  Mediterranean  should 
be  considered  as  parts  of  the  Supreme  Allied  Commander  Europe's  right  flank.  Dwight 
Eisenhower,  Supreme  Allied  Commander  Europe  (SACEUR)  also  favoured  the 
enlargement  of  his  European  Command.  As  a  result,  on  30A  pril  195  1,  T  ruman  a  nd 
Acheson  agreed  that  the  accession  of  Greece  and  Turkey  into  NATO  should  become  the 
openly-expressed  policy  of  the  American  administration.  7 
4  FRUS  (1951):  5,451-461:  S.  Everett  Gleason  (Acting  Executive  Secretary  of  the  NSQNCS  report,  6 
February  195  1;  Documents  of  the  NSC  1947-1977,  NSC  ION  1,  'The  Position  of  the  US  With  Respect  to 
Greece',  14  February  195  1,  Reel  3,  Frame  0070. 
5FRUS  (1951):  3,508-510:  Peurifoy  to  Acheson,  13  April  1951. 
6  FRUS  (1951):  5,50-60,70:  Conference  of  Middle  Eastern  Chiefs  of  Mission,  Istanbul,  14-21  February, 
195  1;  Documents  of  the  Joint  Chief  of  Staff  (thereafter  JCS),  JCS  1798/58,  Additional  Military  Aid  to 
Greece,  15  February  1951,  Reel  4,  Frame  0015;  McGhee,  The  US-Turkish-NATO  Middle  East 
Connection,  pp.  78-85. 
7  FRUS  (1951):  3,479485:  Carney  to  Eisenhower,  8  March  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  3,501-505:  Acheson  to 
Marshall,  24  March  195  1.  Eisenhower  in  early  195  0  had  become  Supreme  Allied  Commander  Europe 
(SACEUR).  The  Supreme  Headquarters  Allied  Powers  Europe  (SHAPE)  had  its  political  headquarters  in 
Paris.  The  regional  southern  European  command  headquarters  in  Naples  was  directly  subordinate  to  the 156 
The  British  were  also  interested  in  incorporating  Greece  and  Turkey  into  NATO. 
On  17  May  1951  British  policy,  as  outlined  by  the  Foreign  Secretary,  Herbert  Morrison, 
was  targeted  at  associating  Turkey  with  the  defence  of  Middle  East.  8  This  association 
would,  it  was  hoped,  extend  American  military  commitments  into  the  Eastern 
Mediterranean.  Britain  saw  NATO's  enlargement  to  include  Greece  and  Turkey  as  a 
possible  means  to  deal  with  the  Anglo-Egyptian  impasse  of  British  rights  over  Suez. 
The  Middle  East  Command  that  the  British  had  long  wanted  to  form  might  prove  more 
palatable  to  the  British  if  it  was  linked  to  NATO.  Consequently  Morrison  was  inclined 
to  support  Greece's  application  for  NATO  membership.  9  The  British  Minister  of 
Defence,  Emmanuel  Shinwell,  came  to  much  the  same  conclusion.  Shinwell  emphasised 
the  strategic  importance  of  Greece  against  'enemy  forces'  and  the  importance  of  the 
American  commitment  to  defend  the  area.  The  military  presence  of  NATO,  he  argued, 
would  deter  the  Soviet  threat  from  entering  the  Eastern  Mediterranean.  '  0 
When  the  Cabinet  discussed  the  proposals  presented  by  Morrison  and  Shinwell 
their  major  concern  was  no  longer  the  principle  of  Greek  membership  into  NATO  -  its 
desirability  was  conceded.  What  really  concerned  the  British  was  the  question  of 
command  arrangements  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  Chiefs  of  Staff  argued  that  Greece 
and  Turkey  should  not  be  a  part  of  Eisenhower's  command  but  instead  should  join  a 
British  Supreme  Allied  Commander  Middle  East  (SACME).  Ideally  the  putative  Middle 
East  Command  would  be  linked  to  NATO  and  the  American  Sixth  Fleet  Commander 
SACEUR.  The  expansion  of  the  regional  planning  groups  with  supreme  allied  commands  showed  the 
massive  defence  structure  undertaken  by  the  American  military  aid  by  early  1950. 
8  FRUS  (1951):  5,104-106:  informal  United  States-United  Kingdom  discussions,  2  April  195  1;  PUBLIC 
RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  129/45,  CP  (51)  130,  memorandum  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  Admission  of  Greece  and  Turkey  to  NATO,  17  May  195  1. 
9  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  129/45,  CP  (51)  132,  'Strategic  Importance  of  Greece 
and  Turkey',  17  May  195  1;  HC  Deb,  195  1,  vol.  488,  col.  198,30  May  195  1;  E.  Athanassopoulou, 
Turkey-Anglo-American  Security  Interests  1945-1952  (London,  2000),  pp.  207-211. 
10  PU13LIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  21/1967,  CP  (51)  132,  note  by  the  Minister  of 
Defence,  'Turkey  and  Greece  and  NATO',  17  May  195  1;  CAB  129/45,  CP  (51)  132,  'Strategic 
Importance  of  Greece  and  Turkey',  17  May  195  1. 157 
would  be  under  SACME.  11 
This  plan  faced  obvious  difficulties.  Neither  Greece  nor  Turkey  was  willing  to 
place  their  forces  under  British  command  either  in  the  Mediterranean  or  the  Middle 
East.  Both  countries  wanted  their  forces  to  report  to  a  United  States  general  and  be  part 
of  the  NATO  European  army.  12  Their  primary  thought  was  of  American  beneficence. 
Political  leaders  were  convinced  that  in  order  to  support  their  general  in  Europe  the 
United  States  would  loosen  the  purse  strings.  Although  Marshall  Aid  was  drawing  to  a 
close  Greece  could  expect  new  ports  and  airports  as  the  first  stage  of  an  American 
reconstruction  of  their  infrastructure!  3  The  Greek  military  too  were  keen  to  prioritise 
the  American  connection.  A  round  of  military  talks  was  held  in  Athens  and  Ankara 
under  General  Bradley  (Joint  Chiefs  of  Stafo,  Field  Marshal  Slim  (Commander  of  the 
hnperial  General  Stafo  and  their  colleague  French  General  Licheres  in  October  1951. 
According  to  Bradley's  report  the  Greek  Chiefs  of  General  Staff  wanted  to  place  their 
forces  under  Eisenhower's  command.  They  believed  that  the  inclusion  of  Greek  ground 
forces  in  SACEUR's  southern  command  would  turn  Greece  into  the  master  in  the 
Balkan  theatre  in  terms  of  military  power  and  prestige.  The  Royal  Hellenic  Navy,  the 
Greeks  argued,  should  be  under  the  command  of  the  Sixth  Fleet.  14  They  opposed  the 
alternatives  favoured  by  the  British  -  the  inclusion  of  the  Aegean  and  the  islands  within 
the  Middle  East  Command,  the  Greek  Navy  under  the  control  of  the  British  Supreme 
Commander  for  the  Middle  East  and  a  separate  command  for  the  Greek  and  Turkish 
"  PU13LIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  4/43,  COS  (51)  84,  COS  Committee  meeting,  21 
May  1951;  DEFE  5/31,  COS  (51)  309,  COS  Committee  meeting,  28  May  1951.  For  an  account  of  the 
culmination  and  failure  of  MEC  see  Devereux,  The  Formulation  ofBritish  Defence,  pp.  55-64. 
12  Harris,  Troubled  Alliance,  pp.  42-46.  On  these  lines  it  also  supported  that  Turkey  was  willing  to  play 
the  Middle  Eastern  role  asked  by  the  West  as  soon  as  Turkey  became  a  NATO  member.  In,  F.  Ahmad, 
The  Turkish  Experiment  in  Democracy,  1950-1975  (London,  1977),  p.  392.  Nevertheless,  neither  Turkey 
nor  Greece  did  join  such  an  organisation  of  collective  security  as  Middle  East  Defence  Organisation  or 
Middle  East  Command,  which  anyway  was  shelved  by  1953  in  the  light  of  NATO  and  the  Baghdad  Pact, 
ratified  two  years  later. 
13  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  128  23/19,  CC  5(51),  8  November  195  1.  G.  McGhee, 
Envoy  to  the  Middle  World  (New  York,  1983),  p.  218. 
14  FRUS  (1951):  3,594-595:  Peurifoy  to  Acheson,  12  October  195  1;  Grigoropoulos,  Field  Marshal  A. 158 
forces  under  a  British  general.  15 
Neither  would  the  Americans  accept  British  predominance  in  an  area  where  the 
main  naval  and  air  strength  was  provided  by  the  USAF  and  the  USN.  Carney  was 
appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  United  States  Naval  Forces  in  the  Eastern 
Atlantic  and  the  Mediterranean  to  support  Eisenhower  not  to  divide  American  power  in 
the  Mediterranean  and  Europe.  16  The  most  that  the  Americans  were  willing  to  concede 
was  a  suggestion,  never  acted  on,  that  Turkey  might  co-operate  in  the  defence  of  the 
Middle  E  ast  S  upreme  Command  under  a  British  Supreme  Commander  whilst  Greece 
would  come  under  SACEUR's  command  but  be  linked  with  Middle  East  Command 
headquafters. 
17 
In  reality  the  manoeuvres  surrounding  Greece  and  Turkey's  relationship  to 
NATO  increasingly  tended  towards  the  extrusion  of  British  interests.  The  British  might 
applaud  the  overall  concept  but  when  they  expressed  concerns  about  details  they  were 
overruled.  18  The  decision  to  accept  Greece  and  Turkey  into  NATO  was  finally  taken  at 
Papagos-Erpar6pXIq  AM&v6poq  ffax6yoq,  pp.  475-477. 
15  FRUS  (1951):  3,713-714:  Middle  East  Command  and  Place  of  Turkey  and  Greece  in  the  NATO 
Command  Set-up,  23  November  195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95129 
RI  051/3,  Eden  to  Peake,  14  December  195  1. 
15FRUS  (1951):  3,613-616:  Peurifoy  to  Acheson,  28  December  1951.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE, 
KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  5/33,  COS  (51)  567,  Field  Marshal  W. Slim,  4  October  1951;  FRUS  (1951):  3,594- 
595:  Peurifoy  to  Acheson,  12  October  195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  128, 
23/19,  CC  (51)  5,  Conclusions  of  Cabinet  meeting,  8  November  195  1;  From  n-dd-October,  the  Egyptian 
Parliament  voted  bills  to  evacuate  the  British  troops  from  Egypt  and  abolish  the  British  rule  in  Sudan, 
which  acknowledged  its  unity  with  Egypt.  Cyprus  was  the  site  of  the  British  Middle  East  command 
headquarters  in  Middle  East.  Devereux  gives  a  detail  analysis  of  the  MEC  plans,  however,  he  omits  the 
European  dimension  of  British  security  considerations. 
16  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  129,  CP  (51)  130,  Memorandum  by  Morrison, 
'Admission  of  Greece  and  Turkey  to  the  NAT',  17  May  195  1.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO), 
CAB  13  1/10,  DO  (51)  18,  Cabinet  Defence  Committee,  2  July  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  3,475-486:  8  March 
1951;  FRUS  (1951):  3,551-552:  Draft  Memorandum  Prepared  by  John  Ferguson  of  the  Policy  Planning 
Staff,  6  July  1951. 
17  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  13  1  /10,  DO  (51)  18,  Minutes  of  the  Cabinet  Defence 
Committee,  2  July  1951;  FRUS  (1951):  3,551-554:  Command  in  the  Eastern  Mediterranean  and  Middle 
East,  6  July  195  1. 
18  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/11923  R262,  Wright,  British  Embassy  in  London, 
to  G.  W.  Harrison,  Northern  Department-Foreign  Office,  Admission  of  Greece  and  Turkey,  3  September 
195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  CAB  128,29/54,  CM60  (5  1),  minutes  of  Cabinet 
meeting,  27  September  195  1. 159 
the  Ottawa  conference  on  22  October  1951.19  The  Greek  liberal  and  conservative  world 
welcomed  the  news.  Advantages  of  Greece's  inclusion  into  NATO  revolved  around  the 
military  and  economic  benefits.  It  was  also  estimated  that  public  expenses  for  defence 
would  be  decreased  by  approximately  fifty  per  cent  whereas  financial  assistance  would 
increase  by  $  100-200  million  per  year.  There  were  drawbacks  involved  as  well 
including  fear  from  all  perspectives  of  political  circles  of  high  expenditure  on 
armaments  to  be  imposed  to  Greece.  Naturally,  however,  advantages  compensated  for 
all  disadvantages.  20 
Despite  agreements,  the  new  Conservative  government  of  Winston  Churchill 
kept  plugging  away  at  the  command  issue.  21  They  enjoyed  little  more  success  than  their 
Labour  predecessors.  The  formal  inclusion  of  Greece  in  NATO  was  ratified  at  the 
Lisbon  meeting  in  February  1952.  On  15  February  1952,  the  Military  Committee  of  the 
19  Norway,  Denmark  and  the  Netherlands  expressed  reservations  on  NATO's  enlargement  to  non- 
Northern  countries  on  conditions  of  geographical  proximity,  political  organisation,  culture  and  religion  in 
the  case  of  Turkey.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/11923  R262,  Wright,  British 
Embassy  in  London,  to  G.  W.  Harrison,  Northern  Department-Foreign  Office,  Admission  of  Greece  and 
Turkey,  3  September  1951 
20  Grigoropoulos,  From  the  Top  of  the  Hill-  A7ro  r1v  KopvV4  Tov  A6rov,  pp.  514,521-522;  The  Left,  as 
expected,  came  out  against  NATO  alliance  for  the  latter  deliberately  dissuaded  Greece  from  smoothing  or 
enlarging  its  relations  with  Bulgaria  and  Albania,  which  led  to  maintaining  tension  in  the  Balkans. 
Couloumbis,  Greek  Political  Reactions  to  American  and  NA  TO  Influences,  pp.  34-4  1;  Valinakis, 
Introduction  to  the  Greek  Foreign  Policy-Eiaaycoy4  oTIv  EUqviký  E&rcplKý  17011TIKý  ,  p.  50.  Major 
General  Andrew  Siapkaras,  Greek  Army,  'The  Importance  of  Greece  to  NATO',  Military  Review,  August 
(1961),  90-97.  The  author  notes  that  Greece  was  accepted  into  NATO  because  it  suited  western  standards. 
Siapkaras'  argument  should  be  treated  with  caution  because  he  overestimates  Greece's  importance  on  a 
national  and  international  level,  especially  vis  a  vis  Turkey.  Siapkaras'  report,  however,  is  important 
because  it  is  one  of  the  few  documents  of  Greek  officials  on  Greece's  perceptions  towards  NATO.  The 
archives  of  the  Greek  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  on  NATO  are  still  restricted  for  research.  From  another 
point  of  view,  Lt.  Col.  Edward  R.  Wainhouse,  writes  that  the  only  valuable  element  Greece  possessed  for 
a  foreign  power  was  its  geographic  position.  Wainhouse,  'Guerrilla  War  in  Greece',  in  Osanka  (ed.  ), 
Modern  Guerrilla  Warfare,  pp.  217-227.  Both  authors,  however,  have  presented  the  two  opposite  sides  of 
the  matter.  In  practice,  a  series  of  bilateral  policies  and  necessities  had  brought  all  parts  together. 
21  FRUS  (1952-1954):  9,168-170:  'Middle  East  Command',  4  January  1952;  FRUS  (1952-1954):  6,774- 
777:  Third  formal  meeting  of  President  Truman  and  Prime  Minister  Churchill,  8  January  1952;  PUBLIC 
RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  5/36,  COS  (52)  11,3  January  1952.  FRUS  (1951):  5,257-264: 
NSC  r  eport,  27D  ecernber  195  1;  The  Greek  historians  tend  to  acquire  an  American  point  of  view  and 
support  that  'Churchill's  government  marked  the  disintegration  oft  he  e  rnpire',  L  inardatos,  From  Civil 
War-  A7ro  rov  Ep(pQo,  p.  353.  Accordingly,  1947  and  thereafter  signified  the  'change  of  guard'  from 
Britain  to  the  US  in  sustaining  the  lifeline  of  pro-Western  Greece,  whereas  the  formation  of  NATO  was 
the  vivid  proof  of  American  predominance.  Th.  Veremis,  'The  Military',  in  Featherestone  and  Katsoudas 
(eds.  ),  Political  Change  in  Greece,  p.  217;  Tsoucalas,  The  Greek  Tragedy  (London,  1969),  p.  109. 
However,  Britain  deserves  to  be  given  credits  for  putting  the  foundations  of  American  assistance. 
Moreover,  Britain  had  a  secondary  but  important  role  in  NATO  command  arrangements. 160 
North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  Standing  Group  agreed  to  include  Greek  and 
Turkish  ground  armed  forces  in  Eisenhower's  general  command  and  specifically  under 
Admiral  Carney's  (CINCSOUTH)  command.  A  Greek  and  a  Turkish  general  would 
control  their  countries'  respective  land  forces.  Each  would  report  directly  to  Carney.  The 
air  forces  of  both  Greece  and  Turkey  would  be  placed  under  an  American  commander, 
who  w  ould  bea  ppointed  byA  dmiral  C  amey.  22  The  British  could  do  little  other  than 
consent  to  this  arrangement.  The  only  concession  they  won  was  a  promise  to  link  the 
Greek  and  Turkish  navies  to  the  British  naval  commander  in  the  Mediterranean  in  his 
Middle  East  Command  role.  Yet  even  this  promise  was  fairly  meaningless.  The  exact 
nature  of  this  linkage  was  not  clarified.  It  most  certainly  did  not  mean  direct  command. 
In  any  case  Middle  East  Command  did  not  yet  exist  and  no  one  could  accurately  predict 
when  it  would.  NATO  was  the  real  game.  In  the  end  a  compromise  was  devised  to 
create  a  separate  Eastern  Mediterranean  Command  under  Admiral  Carney.  This  new 
Commander-in-Chief  for  the  Mediterranean  (CINCMED)  would  have  his  headquarters 
in  Malta.  On  18  December  1952,  the  naval  forces  of  Greece  and  Turkey  were  placed 
under  the  authority  of  Admiral  Louis  Mountbatten,  who  was  serving  under  Carney's 
command  and  the  Sixth  Fleet.  23 
The  British  did  not  fare  much  better  when  it  came  to  the  details  of  Greek 
military  affairs.  Greece's  inclusion  in  NATO  made  a  rethink  of  the  size,  shape  and  role 
of  its  anned  forces  inevitable.  During  the  fiscal  year  1952-1953  the  Greeks  tate  was 
estimated  to  be  devoting  forty-nine  per  cent  of  its  budget  to  defence,  as  opposed  to  the 
22  FRUS  (1952-1954):  5,178-179:  North  Atlantic  Committee  session,  Lisbon,  26  February  1952; 
PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101818  R1192/12,  communiqut  by  HMG  to  the 
Royal  Hellenic  Government,  29  February  1952;  Cmd.  8489  Protocol  Regarding  the  Accession  of  Greece 
and  Turkey  into  NATO  (London,  1952);  McGhee,  The  US-Turkey,  p.  102;  Harris,  Troubled  Alliance,  p. 
44. 
23  FRUS  (1952-1954):  5,352:  Acheson  to  Truman,  17  December  1952;  McGhee,  The  VS-Turkish-NA  TO, 
p.  102.  Command  Arrangements  as  well  as  naval  British  presence  in  the  Mediterranean  are  also  discussed 
in  E.  J.  Grove,  Vanguard  to  Trident  (London,  1987),  pp.  104,153-164.  G.  Tsitsopoulos,  'Oi 
EUjvoTovPKtKtq  Agi)vTuctq  I:  Xtact;  1945-1987'  (The  Greek-Turkish  Defence  Relations  1945-1987)  in 
A.  Alexandris,  Th.  Veremis,  P.  Kasakos,  V.  Koufoudalds,  Ch.  Rasakis,  G.  Tsitsopoulos  (eds.  )  Greek- 161 
thirty  per  cent  spent  by  Britain.  Moreover  in  March  1952  Greece  was  estimated  to  have 
numerically  the  largest  army  in  relation  to  its  population  of  all  NATO  member-states.  24 
As  a  result  a  debate  about  the  so-called  'defence  burden'  arose  between  the  Greeks,  the 
British  and  the  Americans.  Like  the  discussions  over  command  arrangements  the 
defence  burden  issue  suggested  that  the  Greeks  were  looking  to  the  Americans  rather 
than  the  British  to  shape  the  future.  Yet  the  efforts  the  British  made  to  influence  these 
discussions  highlights  the  fact  that  they  had  not  lost  an  interest  in  Greek  affairs.  25 
The  Defence  Burden  Debate 
Kartalis,  the  Greek  Minister  of  Co-ordination  was  detennined  to  extract  further 
allocations  of  cash  from  the  Americans  to  cover  the  disproportionate  amount  of 
government  expenditure  dedicated  to  defence.  During  the  civil  war  military  expenditure 
had  doubled  from  its  pre-war  levels.  By  1952,  however,  the  civil  war  had  been  over  for 
three  years  and  there  was  little  danger  of  a  recrudescence  of  a  Communist  military 
threat.  Officials  in  Washington  began  to  suggest  that  the  bloated  Greek  defence 
establishment  could  be  reduced  without  endangering  either  Greece's  stability  or  its  role 
in  the  Western  alliance.  These  proposals  were  met  with  fierce  resistance  in  Greece  itself. 
Not  only  did  the  Greek  government  object  to  its  loss  of  subsidies  but  so  too  did  the  US 
embassy  and  the  economic  mission.  26 
In  May  1952  formal  discussions  on  the  defence  burden  were  launched  in  Athens. 
George  Mavros,  the  Greek  Deputy  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  met  with  Admiral  Carney 
and  the  American  Commanding  Officers  in  Greece.  The  Americans  proposed  cuts  in  the 
Turkish  Relations  1923-1987-  Oi  EUjV0T0VPK1Kýq  EX&SIq  1923-1987,  (Athens,  1988),  p.  182. 
"  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  rov  Eyrblzo,  pp.  455-457. 
25  For  an  account  of  the  left-wing  historiography  of  Greece  in  N.  Koulouris,  Greek  Bibliography  of  the 
Civil  War-EUqvwý  BiflAioyparia  Tov  EuVvAiov  HoAtpov;  D.  Haralampes,  Army  and  Political  Power- 
F-rpaT6q  Kai  HoAiriq  Eýovaia  (Athens,  1985). 
26  B.  Sweet-Escott,  Greece:  A  Political  and  Economic  Survey  (Oxford,  1954),  p.  158;  FRUS  (1952-1954): 
1,546-547:  On  Military  Assistance  and  Defence  Support  to  Greece,  18  August  1952;  McNeill,  The 
Metamorphosis  of  Greece  since  WWII,  p.  232;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO 162 
Greek  defence  budget.  The  Greek  negotiators  responded  with  the  warning  that  any 
reduction  in  the  size  of  the  armed  forces  would  undermine  morale.  A  discontented  army 
would  threaten  the  new-found  domestic  and  international  stability  that  the  two  countries 
had  been  working  to  achieve.  Lieutenant  General  Grigoropoulos,  the  Chief  of  the  Greek 
General  Staff,  persistently  resisted  every  attempt  of  the  government  to  curtail  the 
military  budget,  let  alone  the  size  of  the  Greek  national  forces.  Carney  was  not 
impressed.  He  thought  that  the  Greeks'  insistence  on  maintaining  all  their  military 
programmes  was  tantamount  to  graft.  The  Greeks  were  gold-plating  every  military 
request  for  their  own  glorification.  Little  military  or  political  damage  would  be  done,  in 
Carney's  view,  if  the  Greek  military  was  reduced  to  a  realistic  establishment. 
Ambassador  Peurifoy,  however,  sided  with  the  Greek  point  of  view.  He  was  not  as 
sanguine  as  the  NATO  commander  about  the  underlying  stability  in  Greece.  Carney  saw 
an  oversized  and  inefficient  military.  Peurifoy  with  his  intimate  knowledge  of  recent 
events  knew  how  important  it  was  to  keep  the  Greek  generals  sweet  -  even  at  the  cost  of 
some  expensive  military  toys.  Faced  with  Peurifoy's  opposition  Carney  proposed  a 
compromise:  the  tables  of  establishment  of  the  Greek  forces  should  be  kept  the  same  but 
units  should  be  reduced  to  smaller  regular  cadres  that  could  be  reinforced  at  times  of 
criSiS. 
27 
The  Americans,  however,  were  not  the  only  ones  interested  in  the  defence 
burden  issue.  There  were  Anglo-Greek  talks  on  the  same  issue.  As  a  result  of  the 
Mediterranean  command  arrangement  discussions  a  number  of  high-ranking  British 
delegations  visited  Athens  during  the  course  of  1952.  Each  discussed  expenditure  as 
well  as  command.  In  May  1952  Admiral  Carney  was  not  the  only  NATO  commander  in 
Athens.  The  Deputy  Supreme  Commander,  Lord  Montgomery,  arrived  also. 
371/101816  RI  102/5,  Peake  to  Eden,  2  September  1952. 
27  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A7ro  Tov  EyrUio,  pp.  456-457. 163 
Montgomery  was  typically  outspoken.  He  thought  it  ridiculous  that  Greece  was 
spending  forty-five  per  cent  of  its  national  budget  on  defence  and  said  so,  openly.  His 
solution  was  the  same  as  Camey's:  the  Greeks  should  aim  to  create  small  but  well- 
equipped  armed  forces  with  a  well-trained  reserve  ready  for  emergencies.  Montgomery, 
of  course,  went  further  in  his  criticisms  than  his  NATO  colleague.  He  said  directly  what 
many  British,  American  and  NATO  officials  thought:  Greece  was  playing  on  a  now 
non-existent  Communist  threat  to  justify  over-expenditure  and  an  unnecessary 
repressive  political  system.  He  argued  that  Plastiras  was  on  the  right  lines:  leniency 
rather  than  repression  was  the'route  to  long-term  stability.  As  Montgomery  put  it  'the 
true  bulwark  against  Communism  was  an  affluent  citizen  who  trusted  their  leaders 
rather  than  prison  bars'.  29 
Lord  Mountbatten,  operating  as  a  dual-hatted  NATO  and  British  Commander, 
visited  Athens  in  July  1952.  He  too  supported  Carney  and  Montgomery's  call  for 
smaller  armed  forces.  Mountbatten  argued  that  since  war  was  not  imminent  the  NATO 
countries  should  concentrate  on  safeguarding  their  economic  and  political  stability. 
Montgomery  himself  returned  to  the  charge  in  September  1952  in  a  memorandum  that 
suggested  present  levels  of  expenditure  on  Greek  armed  forces  were  wasteful  of  both 
NATO  and  Greece's  limited  resources.  29 
The  fact  is  that  it  was  a  British  Field  Marshal,  albeit  one  operating  in  a  NATO 
role,  who  was  the  least  diplomatic  critic  of  Greek  policy,  antagonised  the  Greek 
government  and  created  afroideur  in  relations.  The  right-wing  press  were  particularly 
outraged  that  Montgomery  had  gone  out  of  his  way  to  praise  Plastiras  rather  than 
Papagos.  Grigoropoulos,  the  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff,  complained  that 
Montgomery's  suggestions  caused  confusion  and  undermined  the  efforts  of  the  Greek 
28  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101794  RIO  13/11,  Peake  to  Foreign  Office,  21 
May  1952;  Grigiropoulos,  From  the  Top  of  the  Hill-  A=  Tjv  Kopv(p4  rov  A6ýpov,  pp.  517-518.  29  Grigoropoulos,  From  the  Top  of  the  Hill-  A=  vIv  Kopv(p4  Tou  A6(pov,  pp.  518-519. 164 
General  Staff  to  improve  its  performance.  The  American  embassy  was  worried  enough 
to  persuade  Montgomery  to  'clarify'  his  remarks  in  a  fashion  that  was  less  offensive  to 
Greek  sensibilities.  30 
Montgomery  and  the  other  British,  American  and  NATO  commanders  were  only 
speaking  the  truth,  however.  The  financial  situation  of  Greece  w  as  i  ndccd  p  oor.  T  he 
nation  remained  an  underdeveloped  country  with  limited  productive  capacity.  Despite 
infusions  of  American  aid  the  unstable  and  weak  Greek  governments  of  the  post-civil 
war  period  had  shown  little  aptitude  for  economic  management.  On  4  April  1952,  for 
instance,  Kartalis  drew  a  gloomy  picture  of  the  Greek  economy.  Inflation  was  a  constant 
problem  in  the  financial  sphere.  Yet  this  was  merely  the  symptom  of  underlying 
structural  weaknesses.  Industrial  investment  was  dangerously  low.  Even  more 
fundamentally  agricultural  productivity  was  very  poor.  Wages  remained  at  roughly  the 
same  levels  as  in  1951,  national  income  increased  by  only  1.5  percent  and  counter- 
inflationary  measures  in  1951  had  brought  a  marginal  monetary  stabilisation.  3  1  The 
Greeks  were  not  very  good  at  their  core  economic  activities. 
Plastiras  made  a  limited  attempt  to  deal  with  these  criticisms.  In  September  1952 
he  announced  that  compulsory  military  service  would  be  reduced  in  length  by  one-third, 
from  thirty-six  to  twenty-four  months.  This  change  would  bring  Greece  into  line  with 
the  other  European  members  of  NATO  most  of  whom  maintained  a  two-year  term  of 
military  conscription.  The  reduction  of  the  length  of  military  service  was  -  supposedly  - 
designed  to  alleviate  the  problems  of  the  government's  finances  by  saving  an  estimated 
500  million  drachmae.  In  fact  this  was  a  sleight  of  hand.  The  expected  military 
expenditure  for  the  fiscal  year  1952-1953  remained  at  the  same  levels  of  approximately 
two  and  a  half  billion  drachmae  as  the  previous  year.  32  The  Greek  government  wanted  to. 
30  Linardatos,  From  Civil  War-  A=  Tov  Ep(p6Aio,  p.  455. 
31  Ibid.,  p.  448;  B.  Sweet  Escott,  Greece:  A  Political  and  Economic  Survey,  p.  48. 
32  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101816  R1102/5,  Peakc  to  Eden,  2  September 165 
give  the  impression  that  they  were  responding  to  allied  demands.  In  reality  they  were 
planning  to  continue  to  spend  beyond  their  means  in  the  expectation  that  the  Americans 
would  finance  their  spendthrift  plans  under  the  cover  of  NATO  solidarity.  Plastiras  also 
had  a  more  pressing  political  rationale  for  this  announcement  -  he  hoped  it  would  boost 
his  popularity  in  the  forthcoming  general  elections.  His  gambit  failed  utterly.  It  remains 
true,  however,  that  there  was  now  a  consensus  amongst  the  Greek  political  and  military 
elite.  They  regarded  Greece's  entry  into  NATO  as  a  triumph.  It  was  a  victory  that 
obviated  structural  reforms  in  the  economy  or  indeed  rational  economic  management  of 
any  kind.  NATO  for  the  Greeks  was  a  valuable  constant. 
The  British  Military  Mission  and  the  NA  TO  Framework 
At  the  highest  levels  of  command  the  British  were  losing  out.  Once  the 
Communist  threat  had  receded  politico-military  relations  were  reduced  much  more  to  a 
simple  financial  transaction.  This  was  the  kind  of  transaction  in  which  the  British  could 
not  hope  to  compete  with  the  Americans.  At  a  lower  level,  however,  there  was  a  period 
of  transition.  British  military  personnel  were  still  embedded  within  the  Greek  system. 
Following  the  end  of  the  civil  war  both  the  British  Military  Mission  and  the  Joint 
United  States  Aid  to  Greece  (JUSMAG)  had  decided  to  reduce  their  presence  in  Greece. 
The  official  task  of  both  missions  was  to  advise  and  assist  the  Greek  General  Staff  in 
33 
maintaining  the  national  forces  as  an  effective  westernised  army.  Both  the  British  and 
1952. 
33  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/904,  Report  by  Brigadier  G.  D Browne,  BMM  in 
Athens,  November  1950-June  1951.  Within  this  context,  the  JCS  decided  to  provide  additional  military 
aid  to  Greece.  In  fact,  as  a  result  of  the  Korean  War  and  the  American  policy  of  containing  the 
communists,  the  ceiling  strength  for  the  Greek  military  establishment  was  set  to  94,700  to  be  attained  by 
31  December  1950;  with  the  distribution  of  personnel:  80,000  Army,  8,500  Navy,  6,200  Air  Force.  On  15 
September  1950,  the  JCS  approved  a  fiu-ther  ceiling  increase  for  the  Greek  armed  force  of  164,400: 
147,000  for  the  Army,  10,000  Navy,  7,400  for  the  Greek  Air  Force.  Similarly,  on  15  February  1951  the 
NSC  approved  that  the  United  States  should  undertake  to  maintain  internal  security  in  Greece,  repelling 
any  attempt  of  communist  attack  and  finally  bear  an  increasing  percentage  of  the  Greek  economic  burden. 
Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues:  Section  1,  US  Military  Assistance,  JCS  1798/58,29 166 
the  Americans  engaged,  however,  in  more  direct  aid.  They  continued  to  lead 
'intelligence  gathering'  patrols  in  the  border  areas. 
The  post-civil  war  objectives  of  the  British  Military  Missions  in  Greece  had  been 
set  out  on  13  June  1950.  Their  first  task  of  'clearing  the  ground"  was  all  but 
accomplished  with  the  end  of  the  civil  war.  The  emphasis  shifted  therefore  to  the  second 
task  -  'building  the  house'  as  it  was  called.  This  involved  the  creation  of  self-sufficient 
armed  forces,  which  in  future,  would  be  able  to  operate  without  constant  guidance  from 
British  and  American  military  advisers.  For  the  British  this  transformation  was  to  come 
about  as  much  through  professionalisation  as  it  was  through  re-equipment.  34  The  British 
set  up  Basic  Training  Centres  all  over  the  country,  Training  Establishments  in  Staff 
College,  Specialist  Training  Centres,  Army  Schools,  Corps  Schools.  These  centres 
functioned  under  joint  British  and  Greek  command.  The  training  centres  replaced  the 
old  method  of  training  whereby  conscripts  were  called  up  directly  into  units.  In  the 
aftermath  of  the  civil  war,  therefore,  the  average  Greek  soldier  was  much  more  likely  to 
come  into  direct  contact  with  British  soldiers  and  British  training  methods.  The  British 
also  introduced  a  more  formal  system  for  officer  selection  and  promotion.  This 
'scientific'  method  was  to  replace  the  haphazard  'patronage'  system  that  had  operated 
up  until  then.  It  is  remarkably  important  that  from  the  1950s  onwards  the  majority  of 
officers  were  academy  graduates.  35 
At  the  apex  of  the  new  system  were  two  institutions.  The  War  College  prepared 
a  small  cadre  of  the  most  effective  officers  for  future  high  military  command.  War 
September  195  1,  Reel  IV,  Frame  003  8. 
34  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  32/15547,  Report  on  The  Work  of  the  BMM  (Greece), 
by  Major  General  C.  D.  Packard,  13  June  1950;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/908, 
A  History  of  the  BMM  1945-1952;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101818 
RI  192/23,  A  History  of  the  BMM(G)  1945-1952. 
35  PU13LIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  32/15547,  History  of  the  BMM(G)  1945-1952,13 
June  1950;  Greek  Amy  Headquarters,  IoTopia  Opyavcbmm;  rov  EUIVIK06  ETparo6  -History  of  the 
Organisation  of  the  Greek  Amy  (Athens,  Dept.  of  Army  History  Publication,  1957)  cited  from 
Kourvetaris,  'The  Greek  Army  Officer  Corps  Its  Professionalism  and  Political  Interventionism',  in 
Janowitz,  Van  Doom  (eds.  ),  On  Military  Intervention,  pp.  170-190. 167 
College  graduates  were  eligible  to  attend  the  National  Defence  School,  which  brought 
them  together  with  civil  servants  and  politicians.  Here  a  future  nexus  for  civil-military 
relations  and  national  leadership  was  to  be  created.  The  products  of  these  institutions 
came  to  dominate  military  affairs  in  the  post-civil  war  period.  British  officers  were 
involved  in  setting  up  this  higher  training  system.  The  Americans  were  also  influential 
at  this  level.  Selective  officers  were  also  trained  at  training  courses  in  the  United  States 
within  the  JUSMAPG  context.  Nevertheless  it  can  be  seen  that  British  procedures  and 
patterns  of  thought  had  been  inculcated  in  the  Greek  military  at  all  levels.  36  By  the  very 
nature  of  a  hierarchical  military  establishment  these  influences,  once  implanted,  would 
last  for  a  generation. 
The  success  of  the  joint  British  and  American  undertaking  to  re-organise  the 
Greek  Army  consisted  not  only  in  the  final  defeat  of  the  insurgents  but  also  in  the 
introduction  of  military  professional  education  and  training  of  the  national  forces.  This 
was  reflected  in  the  acceptance  of  the  status  of  Greek  officers  arnong  their  fellow  NATO 
members.  37  After  1949  the  Greek  armed  forces  became,  relative  to  their  past,  a  less 
politicised  organisation  modelled  on  other  western  armies.  38  This  transformation  should 
36  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/  895,  Major  General  E.  E.  Down  report,  June 
1947-November  1949;  WO  32/15547,  History  of  the  BMM  1945-1952.  Table  of  the  Army  General  Staff, 
3  rd  Office  of  Education  of  the  Officers,  Athens,  cited  in  Kourvetaris,  'The  Greek  Army  Officer  Corps',  in 
Janowitz,  Van  Doom  (eds.  ),  On  Military  Intervention,  p.  17  1.  The  training  of  the  local  national  armies 
with  the  aim  to  make  them  capable  of  defending  their  nation  was  a  typical  task  undertaken  by  both  the 
BMM  and  JUSMAG.  Training  centres  and  training  officers  operated  in  particular  areas  of  interests  world 
wide  as  well  as  one  of  the  most  critical  aspects  of  foreign  involvement  in  a  country.  An  American  mission 
operated  in  Vietnam  from  the  beginning  of  1954  to  support  United  States  involvement  in  Southeast  Asia. 
See:  J.  L.  Collins  (ed.  ),  The  Development  and  Training  of  the  South  Vietnamese  Amy  1950-1972 
(Washington,  1986). 
37  Greek  Army  Headquarters,  IoTopla  OMavcbacco;  Tov  E.  UlvIK06  ZTparo6  -History  of  the  Organisation 
of  the  Greek  Amy  (Athens,  Dept.  of  Army  History  Publication,  1957)  cited  from  Kourvetaris,  'The  Greek 
Army  Officer  Corps  Its  Professionalism  and  Political  Interventionism',  in  Janowitz,  Van  Doom  (eds.  ),  On 
Military  Intervention,  pp.  155-201. 
3'  The  Greek  army  was  a  highly  politicised  corps,  which  from  the  inter-war  years  had  attempted  a  number 
of  coups  and  counter-coups:  1922,1926,1933,1935  and  1943.  After  the  end  of  the  civil  war,  not  only  did 
it  develop  professional  self-image,  but  also  a  coherent  ideological  identity:  keep  itself  out  of  politics, 
defend  stability  and  peace  in  Greece  and  prevent  communists  from  seizing  power  again.  There  is  also  the 
view  that  the  Greek  officers  began  to  stage  autonomous  coup  d'itats  between  the  two  great  wars-a  period 
of  a  general  parliamentary  crisis  in  Greece.  Most  inter-war  coups,  however,  sought  to  replace  one  civilian 
order  with  another  rather  than  permanently  hand  over  the  government  to  the  army.  In  this  light,  only  the 
coup  of  April  1967  constituted  a  direct  intervention  of  the  army  into  politics,  when  the  military  flite 168 
not  be  overstated,  of  course.  As  the  American  historian  William  McNeill  observed  'a 
professional  corps  of  officers',  approximately  15,000  strong,  had  become,  in  their  own 
eyes,  the  'special  guardian'  of  Greece.  39  A  certain  metastasis  (transformation)  did  occur. 
Yet  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  Greek  forces  became  a  depersonalised  and  non-politicised 
corps.  Western  norms  were  present  in  the  dominant  value  system  but  they  were  often 
relegated  to  a  second  or  subsidiary  level  . 
40  Nevertheless,  the  British  Military  Mission 
and  Joint  United  States  Military  Advisory  Group  did  give  the  Greek  national  forces  a 
more  professional  self-image. 
British  influence  was  far  from  negligible  during  the  transitional  period  between 
the  end  of  the  civil  war  and  Greece's  entry  into  NATO.  Nevertheless,  Greece's  inclusion 
into  NATO  resulted  in  the  British  decision  to  withdraw  its  Air,  Army  and  Police 
missions  . 
41  D.  F.  Murray  of  the  Southern  Department  of  the  Foreign  Office,  explained 
that  if  Greece  joined  NATO  under  Admiral  Carney's  command,  'there  would  seem  to  be 
little  purpose  in  retaining  dwindling  British  Missions'  in  Greece.  42  According  to  the  Air 
Commander,  British  Military  Mission  to  Greece,  the  RAF  Mission  'will  be  negligible 
and  barely  worth  considering'.  He  concluded  that  the  mission  should  be  run  down  and 
its  duties  handed  over  to  the  Americans.  43  The  Americans  themselves  were  happy  with 
this  arrangement.  The  Chief  of  the  JUSMAG  to  Greece  Major  General  Frederick  (who 
managed  a  dominant  state  apparatus.  For  a  general  account  of  the  role  of  the  military  in  Greek  politics, 
see  Th.  Veremis,  The  Military  in  Greek  Politics  (London,  1997).  The  author  suggests  that  the  change  of 
military  attitude  occurred  in  the  1980s  with  the  prevalence  of  populism  under  the  socialist  government. 
39  McNeill,  The  Metamorphosis  of  Greece  since  WWII,  pp.  97-98. 
40  According  to  the  eminent  statesman,  Panayiotis  Kanellopoulos,  who  served  as  Minister  of  Defence  in 
several  post-war  cabinets,  IDEA  members  succeeded  promotions  and  vital  appointments  through  the 
1950s  and  1960s.  The  most  important  of  these  appointments  was  the  choice  of  General  Kardamakis  as 
Head  of  the  General  Staff.  P.  Kanellopoulos,  Historical  Essays-IaropiKj&,  d0K1Pia  (Athens,  1975),  pp.  26- 
44. 
41  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95157  RI  64  1,  minute  by  Murray,  8  November 
1951,21  December  195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  PREM  11/914,  Report  on'Future 
of  British  Service  Missions  in  Greece',  21  November  195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO), 
WO  216/473,  Notes  from  General  Perowne,  25  March  1952;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO), 
WO  216/473,  W.  S.  Slim  report,  18  April  1952. 
42  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95141  RI  192/15,  D.  F  Murray,  15  August  195  1. 
43  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95141  RI  192/15,  memorandum  by  R.  Barnes,  23 
August  195  1;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  AIR  20/8439,  D.  G  Lewis-  Commanding  RAF 169 
had  succeeded  Jenkins  in  May  195  1)  believed  that  the  British  Military  Mission  in 
Greece  had  outlived  its  usefulness  and  should  be  dissolved  by  mutual  agreement.  The 
American  Ambassador  in  Greece,  Peurifoy,  saw  no  advantages  in  retaining  the  British 
Military  Mission.  He  noted  that  the  British  should  'withdraw  voluntarily  at  the  time  of 
final  adjustment  of  command  relationship  in  Eastern  Mediterranean'.  The  Joint  Chiefs 
of  Staff  concluded  that  the  withdrawal  of  the!  British  military  mission  would  have  no 
adverse  impact  on  the  efficiency  of  the  Greek  armed  forces.  They  noted  that  those 
functions  not  taken  over  by  the  Americans  would  be  filled  by  a  small  number  British 
liaison-advisor  officers  left  behind.  44  In  early  January  1952,  thirteen  British  police 
officers,  for  instance,  would  remain  at  Gendarmerie  training  schools.  45  The  strength  of 
the  RAF  Mission  was  reduced  to  3  junior  officers:  one  Air  Attacht  and  two  assistants, 
one  of  ýv  hom  w  ould  bec  oncerned  s  olely  w  ith  q  uestions  ofs  upply  f  or  t  he  G  reek  A  ir 
Force  and  detached  permanently  to  work  with  the  American  Mission.  The  other  would 
be  appointed  to  the  British  embassy  in  Athens.  46  Army  officers  would  remain  affiliated 
to  JUSMAG(G)  that  remained  in  Greece  under  Major  General  Charles  Hart.  The 
executive  responsibility  for  the  remaining  British  officers  would  also  be  transferred  to 
the  Chief  of  JUSMAG.  47  On  29  February  1952,  General  Perowne  announced  formally 
that  the  missions  would  cease  to  exist  on  30  April  1952  'having  accomplished'  their 
duties  and  being  replaced  by  NATO's  services.  48 
Mission  in  Greece,  7  September  195  1. 
44  Records  of  the  JCS,  Part  2,  Strategic  Issues:  Section  1,  US  Military  Assistance,  JCS  1798/59,23  August 
195  1,  Reel  IV,  Frame  0038;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/96551  Wul  1923/272, 
Ottawa  Meeting,  17  September  195  1. 
45  PUBLIC  p  'ECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101830  WG  1643/1,  Report  by  J.  C.  A  Roper, 
British  Embassy  to  Athens,  5  January  1952. 
46  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/101818  WG  1192/2,  D.  F.  Murray,  10  January 
1952. 
47  PUBLIC  RECOp 
'D  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/906,  Major  General  Commander  LECM  Perowne, 
29  February  1952;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  216/473,  S.  Venizelos  to  General 
Perowne,  26  April  1952.  Churchill  College  Archives,  Cambridge,  Noel  Baker  Papers,  4/350,12  May 
1952,  press  cutting  without  title. 
48  Brigadier  G.  P.  Hobbs  is  a  typical  intelligence  officer,  who  worked  in  Greece  as  Chief  Staff  Officer, 
BMM(G)  1942-1947,  Colonel  of  Liaison  1947-1949,  Military  Attacht  in  Athens  1954-1957.  Major 
General  H.  L.  Boatner,  JUSMAG  (G)  on  18  January  1955  noted  Hobbs  as  'leading  figure'  in  the  British 170 
The  British  Naval  Mission,  however,  proved  an  exception.  Britain  intended  to 
remain  a  significant  naval  power  in  the  Mediterranean.  'Showing  the  Rag'  in  the 
Mediterranean  was  the  symbol  of  British  naval  power.  In  the  purely  Greek  context  they 
took  a  close  and  continuing  interest  in  naval  conununications  between  Cyprus  and  the 
Greek  mainland  . 
49The  British  Naval  Mission  was  to  continue  to  'assist  in  the  defence  of 
the  Middle  East  and  fight  alongside  the  British  Mediterranean  Fleet'  despite  the 
50 
presence  of  the  United  States  Sixth  Fleet  in  the  Aegean  and  the  Mediterranean  basin. 
The  British  Naval  Mission  only  came  to  end  on  15  October  1955,  when  it  was  decided 
that  its  head  Admiral  Selby  would  not  be  replaced.  According  to  the  official  statement 
the  reason  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Mission  was  financial 
. 
51  Admiral  Selbyhimself 
noted,  however,  that  other  considerations  lay  behind  the  decision  to  'wind  up'  the 
mission  and  turn  its  functions  to  a  lower  ranking  British  Naval  Attacht.  By  1955  the 
Greek  government  was  no  longer  subordinating  the  question  of  Cyprus  to  the  need  to 
integrate  in  the  western  alliance.  Instead  they  were  consciously  whipping  up  anti-British 
feeling  over  Cyprus.  In  addition  a  new  American  Commander  in  the  Mediterranean, 
Espionage  Service  with  the  aim  to  maintain  Greece  under  the  British  influence.  King's  College  London 
Archives,  Liddell  Hart  Centre  for  Military  Archives,  Brig.  G.  P.  Hobbs  Papers,  16/1-13  NID. 
49  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  ADM  1/237  15,  Report  of  Head  of  British  Naval  Mission, 
1-5/1952;  FO  371/95141  RI  192/15,  memorandum  by  D.  F  Murray,  28  August  195  1. 
50  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95141  RI  192/15,  minute  by  Cheetman-Foreign 
Office,  20  September  195  1;  FO  371/95141  RI  192/2  1,  minute  by  Morrison,  22  November  195  1.  PUBLIC 
RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  ADM  1/23538,  M0193/52,22  January  1952;  FO  371/95141  RI  192/15, 
meeting  in  Foreign  Office  on  Service  Missions,  28  August  1952;  ADM  116/6330,24  October  1955. 
National  Library  of  Scotland,  Rear  Admiral  Robert  Kirk  Dickson  Papers,  Head  of  the  BNM  in  Athens 
1949-1951,  MS  13587  (207-214),  30  September  1949,13  October  1951.  Accordingly,  it  was  claimed  that 
the  Greek  Navy  had  90  British  vessels,  including  6  submarines,  but  only  42  American  vessels  and  a  high 
proportion  of  the  largest  ships  were  British.  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  371/95141 
RI  192/15,  Cheetrnan-Foreign  Office  to  Parker  H.  -Ministry  of  Defence,  20  September  195  1.  There  is  also 
the  reason  that  the  British  withdrew  their  Air,  Army  and  Police  Missions  for  economic  reasons  while  they 
kept  their  Naval  Mission  in  Greece  with  the  aim  of  linking  the  Greek  and  Turkish  naval  forces  to  MEC 
through  a  British  Allied  Naval  Commander  for  the  Mediterranean.  In  Stefanidis,  The  United  States,  Great 
Britain  and  Greece,  p.  10  1.  This  latter  version,  however,  does  not  explain  the  timing  the  Mission 
withdrew  in  October  1955  when  both  Greece  and  Turkey  were  already  under  NATO's  command. 
Moreover  the  missions  were  not  so  numerous  to  be  an  unbearable  cost. 
51  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  ADM  1/23538,  M0193/52,  Report  of  Head  of  BNM(G) 
Rear  Admiral  Smith  (1951-1953),  22  January  1952;  The  Times,  15  October  1955;  PUBLIC  RECORD 
OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  PREM  11/914,  Ward-Head  of  Southern  Department  1955-  to  H.  Caccia-Private 
Secretary,  24  October  1955;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  ADM  116/6330,  M370/18/55, 
Report  on  Future  of  BNM  (G),  25  October  1955. 171 
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Admiral  Fechteler  'did  not  want  us  [the  British]  . 
According  to  the  agreement  between 
the  Foreign  Office,  the  Admiralty  and  the  Greek  authorities  the  Mission  would  remain 
on  a  'dormant  basis'  to  'keep  an  eye"  on  the  Mediterranean  area  and  provide  Britain 
with  a  naval  listening  post.  53 
UNSCOB  and  Balkan  Cold  War  Policy 
It  should  be  noted  in  passing  that  a  further  symbol  of  residual  British  influence 
was  disbanded  in  1952.  As  far  back  as  January  1947  an  ad  hoc  United  Nations 
Committee  had  arrived  in  Greece  to  investigate  the  accusations  of  the  Greek 
government  that  its  northern  neighbours  were  assisting  the  Communists,  by  providing 
shelter,  supplies,  military  equipment  and  economic  assistance.  54  The  Committee 
consisted  of  eleven  members  of  whom  Britain  was  one.  The  Committee  was  succeeded 
by  UNSCOB  (United  Nations  Special  Committee  on  the  Balkans)  whose  formation  was 
55 
mandated  by  the  General  Assembly  on  21  October  1947.  Its  base  was  Salonika  and  its 
mission  was  to  mediating  and  reconciling  between  the  four  neighbouring  countries  of 
Greece;  Yugoslavia,  Bulgaria,  Albania  and  Romania  that  directly  supported  the  Greek 
communis  s. 
56 
52  King's  College  London  Archives,  Liddell  Hart  Centre  for  Military  Archives,  Rear  Admiral  Selby 
Papers,  GB  99  KCLMA  Selby.  Rear  Admiral  Selby  was  Head  of  BNM(G)  1953-1955.  Of  all  the 
alternatives  the  most  convincing  seem  to  be  the  strengthening  of  the  presence  of  NATO  and  Americas' 
wedominance. 
3  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  ADM  116/6330,  Rear  Admiral  W.  H.  Selby,  18  October 
1955,24  October  1955,30  December  1955;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  PREM  11/914, 
24  October  1955. 
54  The  driving  force  behind  America's  motivation  to  send  the  UN  committee  was  the  typical  Cold  War 
suspicion  of  Soviet  expansionism.  The  British  had  hoped  by  1945  that  the  UN  would  reinforce  their  role 
in  the  area.  DBPO:  1,102,  Sargent,  II  July  1945. 
55  FRUS  (1947):  5,865-889:  Marshall  to  Austin  (US  Representative  at  the  United  Nations),  June- 
September  1947;  A.  Nachmani,  International  Intervention  in  the  Greek  Civil  War:  The  United  Nations 
Special  Committee  on  the  Balkans.  1947-1952  (New  York,  1990);  The  conunittee  consisted  of  Britain, 
US,  Soviet  Union,  France,  China,  Belgium,  Syria,  Poland,  Colombia,  Australia  and  Brazil.  UNSCOB  was 
a  western  product.  An  unarmed  observer  operation  rather  than  a  peacekeeping  force  of  the  type 
subsequently  deployed  by  the  United  Nations  in  the  Sinai,  Gaza  Strip,  Congo,  Cyprus,  Golan  Heights, 
Lebanon  and  elsewhere  to  serve  western  intelligence  needs.  H.  N.  Howard,  'Greece  and  its  Balkan 
Neighbours  (1948-1949):  The  United  Nations  Attempts  at  Conciliation',  Balkan  Studies  7  (1966),  3. 
56  United  Nations  Resolution,  Security  Council,  Series  11,1946-1947,  Reports  on  Communist  Activities,  p. 
3  8.  United  Nations  Resolution,  General  Assembly,  Series  I,  Reports  on  30  September,  21  October,  3 172 
Greece's  inclusion  into  NATO  called  the  necessity  of  the  United  Nations  Special 
Committee  on  the  Balkans  into  question.  UNSCOB's  mandate  had  been  renewed  since 
the  end  of  the  civil  war  because  it  had  some  marginal  usefulness  in  intelligence 
gathering.  During  1951  it  was  called  on  to  counter  Cominform  propaganda  in  the 
Balkans.  On  many  occasions  the  committee  had  undertaken  to  repudiate  Cominfonn 
propaganda  in  the  Balkans.  The  governments  of  Albania  and  Yugoslavia  accommodated 
the  large  number  of  Greek  armed  communist  refugees,  who  had  escaped  to  these 
countries  in  1949.  The  Greek  Communist  'Free  Greece'  radio  station  continued  to 
operate  from  Romanian  territory,  transmitting  instructions  to  the  so-called  'fighters'  of 
the  movement.  The  Special  Committee  assembled  evidence  to  demonstrate  that 
Communist  states  were  continuing  to  aid  the  KKE.  The  committee's  annual  report  to  the 
sixth  United  Nations  general  assembly  claimed  that  tension  persisted  in  the  Balkans 
fermented  by  former  'guerrillas'  who  threatened  'the  political  and  territorial  integrity  of 
Greece'.  57  However,  UNSCOB's  Cold  War  functions  changed  with  NATO's 
enlargement.  Although  the  Western  Allies  were  still  concerned  about  Soviet  intentions 
the  Americans  reckoned  that  the  admission  of  Greece  into  NATO  provided  a  deterrent 
much  stronger  than  any  body  of  observers.  As  a  result,  in  October  1951  they  proposed 
the  dissolution  of  UNSCOB.  The  intelligence  part  of  its  mission  would  be  performed  by 
an  ad  hoc  sub-commission  of  the  Peace  Observation  Committee  (POC)  under  the 
United  Nations  auspices.  A  small  observer  group  of  10-15  persons  would  be  located  in 
58  Greece  to  keep  a  watch  on  the  Greek  borders  with  Albania  and  Bulgaria.  The  British 
supported  the  Peace  Observation  Committee  proposal.  The  Greek  government  accepted 
November  1947,  pp.  203-205;  YearBook  of  the  United  Nations,  1947-1948,21  October  1947,  pp.  298- 
302;  YearBook  of  the  United  Nations,  1948-1949,  October  1948-July  1949,  pp.  245-256;  Howard, 
'Greece  and  its  Balkan  Neighbours  1948-1949:  The  United  Nations  Attempts  at  Conciliation',  Balkan 
Studies  7  (1966),  1-26. 
57  FRUS  (1951):  5,453:  Staff  Study  by  the  NSC  'The  Position  of  the  US  With  Respect  to  Greece',  6 
February  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  5,493-498:  Report  of  the  UNSCOB,  'Conclusions',  15  August  195  1. 
58  FRUS  (1951):  5,515-516:  Memorandum  by  the  director  of  the  office  of  Greek,  Turkish  and  Iranian 173 
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it  in  November  195  1.  UNSCOB  was  dissolved  in  February  1952. 
It  was  Greece's  entry  into  NATO  in  1952  rather  than  the  Truman  Doctrine  of 
1947  that  marked  a  turning  point  in  Anglo-Greek  relations.  In  the  period  between  1947 
and  1952  Britain  remained  an  important  player  in  Greek  political  and  military  affairs. 
The  British  provided  ag  reat  d  eal  ofp  ractical  h  elp  tot  he  G  reeks  inm  ilitary  m  atters. 
Even  in  politics  the  British  retained  some  influence,  not  least  because  of  their 
relationship  with  the  monarchy.  In  theory  it  benefited  the  Greek  government  to  have  two 
rather  than  one  friendly  power  working  with  it.  Yet,  since  the  British  almost  always 
sided  with  the  Americans,  this  advantage  seemed  by  1952  to  be  a  wasting  practical 
asset.  It  made  little  sense  for  the  Greeks  to  align  themselves  with  the  British  in  debates 
about  NATO  command  arrangements.  As  the  Communist  menace  faded  so  too  did  fears 
of  American  hegemony.  The  Greeks  wanted  American  money  rather  than  British  brains. 
Affairs  (Rountree)  to  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Near  Eastern,  South  Asian  and  African  Affairs 
(McGhee),  19  October  195  1;  FRUS  (1951):  2,514:  Acheson  to  Truman,  21  November  195  1. 
59  FRUS  (1951):  5,516:  note  2  without  name,  20  November  195  1.  Kousoulas,  Revolution  and  Defeat,  pp. 
184-187;  Details  on  the  negotiations  on  the  Balkan  alliance  are  to  be  found  in  John  Iatrides,  Balkan 
Triangle:  Birth  and  Decline  of  an  Alliance  Across  Ideological  Boundaries  (The  Hague,  1968). 174 
Conclusion 
This  study  has  attempted  to  deconstruct  a  number  of  myths  connected  with 
Anglo-Greek  relations  in  the  1940s  and  early  1950s.  Both  the  traditional  and  revisionist 
historiography  on  Greek  history  tends  to  assume  that  1947  brought  about  a  British 
withdrawal  from  Greece  that  resulted  from  Britain's  post-war  financial  difficulties.  In 
fact  both  countries  sought  to  maintain  close  bilateral  relations  for  five  years  after  the 
British  note  of  February  1947  signalled  the  end  of  military  aid.  The  British  army  did  not 
withdraw  from  Greece  until  1951.  The  British  Military  Mission  remained  involved  with 
the  National  Army  until  1952.  In  the  short-term  the  American  take-over  of  the  Greek 
financial  burden  did  not  undermine  British  policy  towards  Greece.  On  the  contrary, 
Britain's  position  was  strengthened  by  America's  backing. 
The  subject  of  Anglo-Greek  relations  in  the  late  1940s  is  a  complex  one.  It  was 
deeply  affected  by  the  Second  World  War,  the  Greek  civil  war  and  the  Cold  War.  Each 
tended  to  push  the  British  and  the  Greeks  together  rather  than  apart.  The  relationship  of 
the  two  countries  was  based  on  common  interests  and  bilateral  security  concerns.  It  was 
the  relationship  of  a  great  power  and  a  small  and  relatively  poor  country.  The  Greek 
governments  looked  to  Britain  as  the  power  with  the  long-term  traditional  policy  in  the 
region  and  a  well-established  objective  to  keep  Greece  within  a  British  sphere  of 
influence.  The  British  governments  sought  to  maintain  Greece  as  a  buffer  state  to  secure 
their  routes  to  the  Middle  East,  and  later  on,  to  secure  Europe's  borders  from  possible 
Soviet  expansion. 
The  KKE  thought  of  the  British  'monarcho-fascists'  as  its  main  enemies  and  the 
main  obstacle  to  its  seizure  of  power.  The  Party  accused  the  British  of  provoking  the 
civil  war  in  Greece  by  supporting  undemocratic  Greek  governments  and  theirwhite 
terror'.  In  their  turn  the  British  were  convinced  that  the  KKE  intended  to  use  EAM  as  a 175 
springboard  for  seizing  power  and  subjugating  Greece  to  Stalinism.  British  policy  on 
Greece  was  strongly  influenced  by  the  mounting  evidence  of  Soviet  expansionism  in  the 
Balkans  and  the  Middle  East. 
British  policy  towards  Greece  was  formulated  on  the  premise  that  it  was 
necessary  to  have  a  regime  in  power  that  would  accommodate  British  interests  in  the 
area.  The  first  prerequisite  for  the  establishment  of  such  regime  was  the  defeat  of  the 
insurgency.  The  second  objective  was  the  establishment  of  a  broad-based  government 
that  would  be  acceptable  to  the  majority  of  the  Greek  population.  British  aims  during 
the  years  under  examination  remained  relatively  constant. 
The  implementation  of  British  policy,  however,  revolved  around  a  complicated 
policy  of  intervention.  Bevin  blended  intervention  and  non-intervention  throughout  the 
years  under  examination.  The  Labour  foreign  policy  enjoyed  a  high  degree  of  bipartisan 
support.  Professional  diplomats  too  understood  that  the  Labour  Foreign  Secretary  was 
pursuing  traditional  British  interests.  The  Permanent  Under-Secretary  at  the  Foreign 
Office,  Sir  Orme  Sargent,  asserted  in  November  1945,  for  instance,  that  the  new 
government  would  maintain  the  Greek  commitment  but  by  'other  and  more  discreet 
methods'.  The  Labour  cabinet  was  committed  to  the  ideals  of  'anti-imperial'  policy  and 
'non-intervention'.  '  They  had  to  modulate  the  rhetoric  surrounding  their  policy  rather 
than  its  reality,  however.  The  most  spectacular  British  intervention  in  the  civil  war  had 
occurred  under  the  wartime  coalition  when,  during  the  'December  Events',  Churchill 
had  ordered  that  British  troops  treat  Athens  as  a  'conquered  city'.  2  As  a  result  of 
Churchill's  decisive  action  his  successors  could  afford  to  be  more  discreet.  The  British 
Army  guaranteed  Greece's  territorial  integrity  rather  than  engaging  in  combat 
operations.  The  British  troops  who  did  go  into  combat  were  involved  in  directing  and 
1  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  FO  800/276/GRE/45/10:  Sargent  Papers,  Sargent  to  Leepcr, 
9  November  1945. 
2  Churchill,  The  Second  World  War,  vol.  6,  p.  252. 176 
assisting  Greek  counter-insurgency  operations.  These  operations  by  their  very  nature 
tended  to  cloud  the  degree  of  British  involvement  not  least  because  they  took  place  in 
remote  areas  where  few  journalists  could  be  found.  The  Labour  government  followed 
the  pattern  of  intervention  as  'oscillating'  intervention.  If  at  all  possible  Britain  would 
stand  at  one  remove  from  the  civil  struggle.  It  would,  however,  intervene  both  militarily 
and  politically  at  times  of  crisis  only  to  withdraw  once  more  once  the  crisis  had  passed. 
The  trust  that  the  Greek  government  put  in  the  guarantee  of  its  survival,  provided  by 
Britain,  was  underlined  by  the  right-wing  Vice-Premier  and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Tsaldaris,  even  as  the  Truman  Doctrine  was  promulgated. 
It  would  be  correct  to  characterise  British  and  American  policy  towards  Greece 
as  moving  along  parallel  paths.  Even  before  the  crisis  of  February  and  March  1947  the 
United  States  had  decided  that  it  needed  to  become  more  militarily  involved  in  the 
Mediterranean  region.  The  British  did  not  lure  the  Americans  in.  Rather  they  provided  a 
good  opportunity  for  the  Truman  administration  to  launch  their  new  policy  in  public. 
This  parallel  development  of  policy  explains  why,  on  the  whole,  Anglo-American  co- 
operation  in  Greece  was  so  amicable.  Neither  side  felt  it  was  being  'used'. 
During  the  course  of  1948,  however,  with  the  appointment  of  General  James 
Van  Fleet,  the  United  States  consolidated  their  supremacy  over  the  British  in  Greece. 
This  does  not  imply  that  the  British  presence  was  not  important,  but  that  the  Americans 
became  the  leading  power  in  this  collaboration.  Each  power  maintained  its  own  military 
missions  acting  in  Greece  with  separate  roles.  In  1949  the  Joint  Chiefs  of  Staff  urged  the 
White  House  to  maintain  its  'predominant  position'  and  to  be  nothing  less  than  the 
4senior  partner'  in  a  4senior-junior'  arrangement  with  Britain.  The  Americans  wanted  to 
maintain  control  over  military  assistance  and  'hold  in  predominant  position  on  all 
3  YrIHPEY.  IA  Il:  TOPIKOY  APXEIOY-SERVICE  OF  HISTORICAL  ARCHIVE,  ATHENS  (YIA),  1947, 
46.1,21502,  Avagopdrou  TcyakSdpq  iipo;  To  rEY,,  18  MaPTIOU  1947  (Tsaldaris'  Report  to  GES,  18 
March  1947). 177 
fronts'.  4  This,  however,  does  not  suggest  that  there  were  serious  clashes  between  the 
two  allies  in  Greece.  Whatever  the  surface  disagreements  might  be,  the  correlation  of 
interests  between  Britain  and  the  United  States  ran  deep,  and,  in  the  end,  the  two 
countries  were  always  prepared  to  support  each  other. 
The  Greek  civil  war  was  a  complex  military  struggle.  During  its  final  two  years 
the  nature  of  the  armed  struggle  itself  was  transformed  from  guerrilla  to  semi- 
conventional  warfare.  Guerrilla  activities  in  the  mountains  were  combined  with 
conventional  operations  aimed  at  capturing  cities.  It  was  never  a  purely  military 
struggle.  Both  sides  were  fighting  for  the  'hearts  and  minds'  of  the  civilian  population. 
The  KKE  used  its  yiajka  network  to  organise  the  Party's  activities  whilst  the  Greek 
government  created  a  number  of  civil  guard  organisations  to  fight  the  Democratic  Army 
defenders.  This  type  of  warfare  demanded  sophisticated  counter-insurgency  operations 
from  the  National  Army.  They  were  not  well  prepared  to  carry  out  such  operations.  They 
lacked  strategic  imagination,  tactical  savvy  and  the  willingness  to  engage  the  enemy 
more  closely.  Each  of  the  missing  components  had  to  be  inculcated  by  foreign  military 
advisers.  In  the  end,  however,  the  war  was  one  between  Greeks.  The  British  and  the 
Americans  could  teach  the  National  Army  how  to  win  the  war  but  the  government 
forces  themselves  had  to  win  the  victory.  It  says  much  for  the  skill  and  diplomacy  of 
these  advisers  that  they  were  able  to  motivate  the  Greek  armed  forces  to  the  point  where 
they  could  fight  the  war  so  competently.  It  is  pointless  to  characterise  the  government 
forces  as  'puppets'  of  foreign  powers,  whether  Britain  or  America.  If  they  had  deserved 
this  epithet  then  the  war  would  never  have  been  won.  5 
The  British  Military  Mission  comprised  of  army,  air,  navy  and  police  divisions 
to  train  forces  in  its  respective  areas  of  interests.  The  British  counter-insurgency  role  in 
4  FRUS  (1949):  6,453,455:  Van  Fleet  to  Department  of  Army,  7  November  1949. 
5  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  202/892,  WO 
Instructions  for  the  formation  of  the  National  Army,  June  1945;  McNeill,  The  Greek  Dilemma,  p.  189. 178 
Greece  remained  active  throughout  the  civil  war  until  the  final  defeat  of  the  Democratic 
Army  in  October  1949.  After  1947  American  formations  further  reinforced  the  National 
Army's  fight  against  the  insurgents.  JUSMAPG  too  was  divided  into  three  divisions  - 
army,  air,  and  navy.  Tasks  were  divided  between  the  BMM  and  JUSMAPG.  The  British 
Military  Mission  continued  its  training  duties;  JUSMAPG  provided  operational  advice 
and  supplies.  Naturally  the  relationship  between  the  two  allied  missions  was  not  always 
easy.  Yet  the  Anglo-American  partnership  not  only  trained  the  National  Army  to  a  state 
in  which  it  could  defeat  the  Communists,  but  made  it  a  full  and  effective  part  of  NATO. 
The  Greek  counter-insurgency  operations  symbolised  the  determination  of  the 
West  to  contain  communism.  Britain's  counter-insurgency  effort  in  Greece  was  crucial. 
It  was  the  British  Chiefs  of  Staff  who  first  introduced  the  three-stage  strategy  of  'clear- 
and-hold'  in  January  1947.  This  strategy  called  for  and  established  a  framework  for 
military,  political  and  intelligence  co-operation  that  lay  at  the  root  of  future  successeS.  6 
The  strategy  necessitated  the  retraining  and  re-organisation  of  the  security  forces  by 
British  units,  instruction  teams,  and  intelligence  officers.  The  American  'staggered 
offence'  strategy  applied  after  Van  Fleet's  arrival  involved  these  political  and  military 
practises.  Moreover  the  British  role  was  crucial  in  terms  of  air  power.  Air  supplies  and 
equipment,  RAF  personnel  and  RHAF  training  improved  the  RHAF's  levels  of 
performance.  Air  raids  were  of  decisive  importance  against  the  Democratic  Army 
defenders,  who  lacked  any  air  cover.  7  Many  of  the  techniques  developed  by  the  British 
in  Greece  were  applied  elsewhere  by  both  the  British  themselves  and  by  the  Americans! 
'  The  fist  stage  was  the  reorganisation  of  security  forces.  The  second  was  propaganda  organisation  to 
counter  balance  yiaika  and  the  third  militarily  'clear'  areas.  Papagos,  'Guerrilla  warfare'  in  Osank-a  (ed.  ), 
Modern  Guerrilla  Warfare,  p.  236;  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  WO  261/637,  BMM  (G), 
On  New  Training  Team,  30  January  1947. 
7  PUBLIC  RECORD  OFFICE,  KEW  (PRO),  DEFE  5/8,  COS  (48)  129,22  October  1948;  rENIK0 
EnITEAEIO  ETPATOY/AIEYGYNEH  ILTOPIAL  XTPATOY-GENERAL  STAFF/  DIRECTORATE 
OF  HISTORY  OF  THE  ARMY,  ATHENS  (  rEVAII),  10  12/A/6,  Avaqopdrou  AvTtaTpdqyou 
rc(opyiou  nanaycwpytou,  27  Oicrwpptou  1948  (Report  by  Lt.  Gen.  G.  Papageorgiou,  27  October  1948). 
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The  British  role  in  Greek  politics  was  equally  creative.  British  diplomats 
consistently  aimed  at  the  creation  of  a  stable  coalition  of  the  Centre.  In  politics  Britain 
backed  a  coalition  of  the  Centre  with  the  aim  of  creating  a  stable  government.  In  one 
sense  the  British  were  as  successful  in  politics  as  they  were  in  war.  They  managed  to 
keep  the  whole  democratic  show  on  the  road.  The  KKE  and  its  front  organisations  could 
never  gain  enough  purchase  on  the  political  system  to  fatally  undermine  the  governance 
of  Greece.  In  the  end,  however,  British  policy  was  undennined  by  unreliability  of  all  the 
anti-communist  p  oliticians  a  nd  p  arties.  T  he  d  ream  ofas  table  c  oalition  o,  f  the  Centre 
was  undermined  by  their  inability  to  co-operate. 
For  Greece  itself,  the  negative  effects  of  the  civil  war  were  evident  for  years  to 
follow.  Political  rivalry  between  the  Right  and  the  Left,  between  monarchists  and 
republicans  continued  to  divide  the  people.  Concentration  carnps  and  political  seclusion 
followed  the  communist  identity  during  the  decades  that  followed.  The  KKE  remained 
illegal  for  almost  thirty-five  years. 
The  King  and  the  royal  Court  were  a  constant  destabilising  factor  in  politics.  The 
Palace  exploited,  for  its  own  political  interests,  the  fragmentation  of  Greek  political 
forces  and  the  willingness  of  certain  politicians  -  such  as  Sofocles  Venizelos  -  to  bow 
to  royal  demands  for  parliamentary  support.  By  1950,  IDEA  had  gradually  establishcd 
its  loyalty  to  Papagos  and  had  become  the  rallying  point  of  officers  whose  professional 
ambitions  were  frustrated  by  the  clients  of  the  Court.  The  British  tried  to  steer  and 
restrain  King  Paul.  British  representatives  treated  the  emergence  of  Papagos  into  politics 
with  s  ome  s  cepticism.  Itw  as  o  nly  w  hen  itb  ecame  c  lear  t  hat  Papagos  did  not  plan  a 
dictatorship  that  they  swung  their  support  behind  him.  The  triumph  of  Papagos  suggests 
that  just  as  in  military  affairs  Greek  politicians  went  their  own  way.  They  too  were  to  a 
great  extend  independent  of  the  Allied  powers. 180 
Appendices 
Appendix  A:  Principal  Characters 
A.  I  Main  Participants 
Acheson  Dean,  US  Secretary  of  State,  1949-1953. 
Agnidis  Th.  Greek  Ambassador  in  London,  acting  in  1947-1949. 
Alexander  A.  V.,  S  ecretary  ofS  tate  for  D  efence  int  he  B  ritish  L  abour  Cabinet,  1946- 
1950. 
Attlee  Clement,  Prime  Minister  of  the  British  Labour  government  1945-1951. 
Bernes  J.  F,  US  Secretary  of  State  until  1947. 
Bevin  Ernest,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  British  Labour  administration, 
1945-1950. 
Browne  G.  D.,  Brigadier,  Commander  BMM(G)  November  195  O-June  195  1. 
Churchill  Winston  Spencer,  British  Prime  Minister  and  Minister  of  Defence,  1940- 
1945;  Prime  Minister  October  195  1  -April  195  5. 
Crawford,  General  Kenneth,  Commander,  British  Land  Forces,  Greece,  1946-1947. 
Cripps  Stafford,  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  in  the  British  Labour  cabinet,  1947-1950. 
Dalton  Hugh,  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  in  the  British  Labour  cabinet,  1945-1947. 
Dendrournis  Vassilis,  Greek  Ambassador  to  Washington  from  1950. 
Dickson  R.  K.,  Rear  Admiral,  Head  of  the  BNM(G),  1949-195  1. 
Down  Ernest  E.,  Major  General,  Commander  BMM(G)  1948-1949. 
Eden  Anthony,  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  British  National 
Government,  1940-1945;  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Conservative  cabinet,  195  1. 
1955. 
Eisenhower  Dwight  D.,  General  Secretary  of  the  Army,  Supreme  Commander,  Allicd 
Powers,  Europe  (SACEUR). 
Forrestal  James,  Secretary  of  Defence,  1947-1949. 
Frederick,  Major  General  Robert,  Chief  of  the  JUSMAG  (G)  from  May  195  1. 
George  II,  King  of  the  Hellenes,  Succeeded  to  throne,  1922;  Abdicated,  1924;  Recalled 
by  plebiscite,  1935;  Fled  from  Greece  after  German  invasion,  1941;  Recalled  by 
plebiscite,  1946.  Died  in  I  April  1947.  Succeeded  by  his  brother  Paul. 
Gonatas  Stylianos,  General,  Member  of  the  Revolutionary  Committee  and  Premier, 
1922;  Founded  National  Liberal  Party,  1945;  Minister  of  Public  Works  and 
Reconstruction  in  Cabinet  of  Tsaldaris,  Apr.  1946-Jan.  1947. 
Grady  Henry,  US  Ambassador  to  Greece,  July  1948-  March  1951;  Chief  US  Mission 181 
(G). 
Grigoropoulos,  Lieutenant,  General  Theodoros,  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff, 
March-May  195  1;  Head  of  Greek  National  Defence  Council  from  June  195  1. 
Griswold  Dwight,  Chief  of  US  Mission  in  Greece  1947-1948. 
Hobbs  Godfrey,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  October  1944-February  1945  served  in  Greece  in 
the  BMM.  March  1947-December  1949,  as  Colonel,  served  as  associate  between  Greek 
General  Staff  and  the  BMM.  During  1954-1957,  Brigadier,  was  appointed  military 
attacht  during  negotiations  over  Cyprus. 
Ioannidis  Ioannis,  Member  of  the  KKE  Politburo. 
Jenkins,  Major  General  Reuben  E.,  Chief  of  the  JUSMAG  (G),  1950. 
Kanellopoulos  Panayiotis,  Professor  of  Sociology,  Prime  Minister  November  1945; 
Leader  of  the  National  Radical  Union,  acting  Minister  in  all  cabinets,  joined  Papagos's 
Greek  Rally  on  6  August  195  1. 
Kiousopoulos  Dimitris,  Public  Prosecutor,  PM  of  the  caretaker  government  October 
1952-  November  1952. 
Kirk  Alexander,  US  Ambassador  to  Greece,  1941-1943. 
Kopr616  Fuad,  Turkish  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Lascelles  Daniel,  Counsellor  of  the  British  Embassy  in  Athens,  1945-1947. 
Leeper  Rex,  British  Ambassador  to  Greece,  1941-1946. 
Lovett  Robert  A.,  Deputy  secretary  of  Defence  until  Sept.  195  1;  Secretary  of  Defence. 
Livesay  William,  General,  Director  of  USAGG  June  1947;  JUSMAPG  late  1947. 
Macmillan  Harold,  British  Resident  Minister  at  Allied  Headquarters  in  North-Wcst 
Africa,  accompanied  the  Allied  Headquarters  to  Italy  as  Acting  President  of  the  Allied 
Commission  in  Italy,  mediator  between  parties  in  Greece  in  the  Greek  civil  war. 
MacVeagh  Lincoln,  US  Ambassador  to  Greece,  1933-1941,1943-1948. 
Marshall  George,  US  Secretary  of  State,  1947-1949. 
Maximos  Dimitrios,  Governor  of  National  Bank  of  Greece;  Prime  Minister,  January 
August  1947. 
Melas  Leo,  Greek  Ambassador  in  London  195  1. 
McGhee  George,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Near  East,  S.  Asian,  and  African 
Affairs  from  October  1949;  Ambassador  to  Turkey  from  December  195  1. 
Montgomery  B  ernard,  F  ield  M  arshal,  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  1946-1948, 
Chairman  of  Western  European  Committee  1948-1951,  Deputy  Supreme  Allied 
Commander  Europe  1951-1958. 
Morrison  Herbert,  British  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  1951 
Mountbatten  Louis,  Admiral  (British  Navy),  Commander-in-Chief  for  Eastcm 182 
Mediterranean. 
Myers  Edward  C.  W.,  'Eddie',  Colonel,  Brigadier,  Commander  BMM  (G)  1942-1943. 
Norton  Sir  Clifford,  Succeeded  Leeper  as  British  Ambassador  in  Athens,  March  1946- 
October  1951. 
Papagos  Field  Marshal  Alexandros,  Greek  C-in-C  of  the  armed  forces,  1941,1949. 
Premier  November  1952-1955. 
Papandreou  George,  Joined  Venizelist  movement  in  Thessaloniki  (Salonika),  1916; 
Prime  Minister,  Apr.  -Dec.  1944;  Minister  of  the  Interior  in  Cabinet  of  Maximos, 
January  1947;  Deputy  PM,  Minister  of  Co-ordination  and  Minister  of  Religion  and 
National  Education,  until  July  1951. 
Packard,  Major  General  Sir  Charles  Douglas,  Commander  BMM  1949-1951;  Chief  of 
Staff,  General  Headquarters,  Middle  East  Land  Forces,  1951-1953. 
Patterson  Jefferson,  US  Representative  on  the  UN  Special  Committee  on  the  Balkans. 
Partsalidis  Dimitrios,  Member  of  the  KKE  Politburo. 
Peake  Charles,  British  Ambassador  in  Athens  from  195  1. 
Perowne  LECM,  Major  General  Commander  BMM(G)  June  195  1  -April  1952. 
Peurifoy  John  E.,  US  Ambassador  to  Greece  and  Chief  of  American  Mission  for  Aid  to 
Greece  from  March  1951 
Plastiras  Nicolaos,  General,  President  of  the  Revolutionary  Committee,  1922-1923; 
Launched  abortive  coup  d'  itat,  1933;  Premier,  Jan-  Apr  1945,  April  1950-August  1950, 
Sept.  1951-  October  1952. 
Politis  Athanasios  G.,  Greek  Ambassador  to  the  US. 
Porter  William  J.,  Office  of  Greek,  Turkish,  Iranian  Affairs,  Department  of  State. 
Rawlins,  Major  General  Steward,  Head  of  the  BMM  in  Athens,  1945-1948. 
Sakellariou,  Vice  Admiral  Alexander,  Greek  Minister  of  National  Defencc  from 
Oct.  195  1. 
Sargent  Sir  Orme,  Under-Secretary  of  the  Southern  Department  of  the  British  Foreign 
Office  until  1946;  Permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  1946-1949. 
Scobie  Ronald,  Lieutenant-General,  Commander  BMM  (G)  1944-1945. 
Siantos  Georgios,  Member  of  the  KKE  Politburo. 
Sofoulis  Themistocles,  Leader  of  the  Liberal  Party-,  PM  November  1945-March  1946, 
September  1947-  June  1949. 
Selby  W.  H.,  Admiral,  Head  of  the  BNM(G),  1951-1955. 
Truman  Harry,  Succeeded  Roosevelt  as  President  of  the  US,  1945-1952. 
Tsaldaris  Konstantine,  co-leader  of  the  Populist  Party,  1945-1946;  Leader  of  the 183 
Populist  Party,  1946;  Premier  and  Foreign  Minister  1946-1947;  Deputy  Premier  and 
Foreign  Minister  1947-1949;  Vice-President  in  Venizelos's  cabinet  Sept.  1950. 
Tsakalotos  Thrasyvoulos,  Lieutenant  General,  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff,  from 
June  1951. 
Tsouderos  Emmanuel,  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  Greece,  1931-1939;  Premier  of 
government  in  exile,  1941-1944;  Minister  of  Co-ordination  in  Cabinet  of  Sofoulis. 
Vafeiadis  Marcos,  Member  of  the  KKE  Central  Committee,  1942;  Chief  ELAS 
Commander  inM  acedonia  d  uring  t  he  S  econd  W  orld  W  ar;  0  rganised  t  he  D  emocratic 
Army  1947;  Commander  of  the  Democratic  Army  December  1947  to  January  1949. 
VanFleet,  Lieutenant  General  James  A.,  USA  former  Director,  Joint  US  Military 
Advisory  and  Planning  Group  in  Greece,  1948-1950. 
Venizelos  Sofocles,  Son  of  Eleflierios  Venizelos;  Premier,  Apr  1944;  Founded  Liberal 
Party,  1946;  Vice-Premier  in  Cabinet  of  Maximos,  January  1947;  Greek  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  October  195  1-  October  1952. 
Ventiris,  Lieutenant  General  Konstantine,  Chief  of  the  Greek  General  Staff  February 
1947;  Inspector  General  of  the  NA  February  1948;  Commander  of  SHDM  May  1949. 
Woodhouse  Chris,  Major,  Commander  BMM(G)  1943-1944;  Second  Secretary  in 
embassy  in  Athens,  1945. 
Yost  Charles  W.,  Minister  at  the  American  embassy  in  Athens.  1951-1954. 
Zahariadis  Nicolaos,  Installed  by  Comintern  as  Secretary  of  the  Central  Committee  of 
the  KKE,  1931;  General  Secretary,  1935;  Leader  of  KKE  after  1945;  Expelled  from  the 
Party,  1956. 184 
Appendix  B:  Greek  Governments  1944-1952 
B.  I  Chronological  Table  of  Goverrunents 
October  1944-  January  1945:  George  Papandreou. 
January  1945-  April  1945:  Nicolaos  Plastiras. 
April  1945-Octobcr  1945:  Petros  Voulgaris. 
November  1945-Novcmbcr  1945:  Panayiotis  Kanellopoulos. 
November  1945-March  1946:  Themistocles  Sofoulis. 
Elections  31  March  1946  (proportional  representation) 
March  1946-  January  1947:  Panayis  Tsaldaris. 
January  1947-  September  1947:  Dimitrios  Maximos. 
September  1947-June  1949:  Themistocles  Sofoulis.  (Sofoulis  died.  ) 
June  1949-January  1950:  Alexander  Diomidis  caretaker  government. 
January  1950-March  1950:  John  Theotokis  caretaker  government. 
Elections  5  March  1950  (proportional  representation) 
March  1950-April  1950:  Sofocles  Venizelos. 
April  1950-August  1950:  Nicolaos  Plastiras. 
August  1950-September  1951:  Sofocles  Venizelos. 
Elections  9  September  1951  (reinforced  proportional  representation) 
September  1951-October  1952:  Nicolaos  Plastiras. 
October  1952-November  1952:  caretaker  Dimitrios  Kiousopoulos. 
Elections  16  November  1952  (majority  system) 
November  1952:  Alexander  Papagos 185 
Appendix  C:  The  Electoral  Systems 
C.  1  The  Electoral  Systems 
The  first  two  post-war  elections  in  Greece  on  31  March  1946  and  5  March  1950 
were  held  under  the  system  of  proportional  representation  similarly  to  the  electoral 
system  of  1936.  The  1946  election,  due  to  the  decision  of  the  KKE  to  abstain,  had 
produced  the  closest  correlation  between  the  number  of  votes  cast  for  a  given  party  and 
its  proportion  of  seats  in  Parliament  and  a  relatively  stable  and  strong  majority  to 
govem.  The  system  was  tested  in  1950,  with  greater  number  of  parties  to  participate.  It 
resulted  in  weak  correspondence  between  the  share  of  votes  cast  and  the  share  of  scats 
received.  No  party  managed  to  receive  a  strong  majority  to  govern  and  coalitions  of  the 
Centre  were  formed. 
As  a  result  of  the  unstable  coalitions  during  1950  and  1951  new  election  would 
be  conducted  under  a  new  electoral  system  of  reinforced  proportional  representation  on 
9  September  195  1.  The  aim  was  to  limit  the  number  of  parties  elected  in  Parliament  and 
form  stronger  coalitions  or  alliances.  Participation  in  Parliament  was  restricted  to  the 
three  parties  with  the  largest  share  of  votes,  subject  to  a  seventeen  per  cent  minimum  for 
single  parties  and  a  twenty  per  cent  minimum  for  parties  in  alliance.  Only  nine  partics 
contested  the  1951  election.  Yet,  no  single  party  managed  to  win  a  workable  majority  of 
seats.  Therefore,  still  weak  coalitions  of  the  Centre  were  formed,  which  wcre  vulncrable 
to  making  and  dissolving  alliances. 
The  lesson  to  draw  so  far  was  that  a  further  change  in  the  electoral  systcm  was 
needed  if  a  strong  cabinet  was  at  last  to  be  formed.  This  was  a  debate  between  the  right 
and  left-wing  parties.  The  right-wing  parties  supported  the  new  simple  majority  system, 
which  coupled  with  the  American  will;  whereas  Prime  Minister  Plastiras  publicly  sidcd 
against.  Nonetheless,  the  majority  system  was  adopted  on  12  September  1952  to  be 186 
applied  to  the  election  on  16  November  1952.  Only  two  parties  were  now  represented  in 
Parliament,  the  Greek  Rally  and  the  Union  of  the  Parties,  which  was  a  coalition  of  the 
three  Centre  parties.  The  majority  system  gave  a  strong  majority  to  Papagos'  Party.  The 
Greek  Rally  with  49  per  cent  share  of  votes  resulted  in  and  82  per  cent  share  of  seats  in 
the  House  and  thus  a  single  party  formed  a  government. 197 
Appendix  D:  Maps 
D.  1  Map  of  Greece 
Source:  O'Ballance,  Yhe  Greek  Civil  War,  1944-1949,  London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1966. 188 
D.  2  The  Map  of  Athens  during  the  December  Events 
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Appendix  E:  Table 
E.  1  Democratic  Army  Combatant  Strength  in  Greece,  1946-1949 
Date  Total 
March  1946  2,500 
June  1946  3,000 
July  1946  4,000 
August  5,500 
1946 
October  6,000 
1946 
December  9,285 
1946 
Early  1947  11,390 
March  1947  13,000 
April  1947  14,250 
Summer  18,000 
1947 
September 
1947  13,610 
October  17,000 
1947 
November 
1947  19,420 
December 
1947  20,350 
January  22,250 
1948 
February  24,140 
1948 
March  1948  25,000 
April  1948  26,210 
May  1948  25,610 
June  1948  23,300 
July  1948  24,180 
August  21,100 
1948 
September 
1948  23,720 
October  25,480 
1948 
November 
1948  25,000 
December 
Central 
Greece, 
Peloponnes  Crete, 
e  Islands 
400  8,140 
3,000 
1,000  9,450 
3,000  8,800 
2,500  4,940 
3,300  1,720 
Epirus  Eastern 
Western  Macedonia 
Macedonia  Western 
Thrace 
1,700 
8,500 
1,150 
5,000 
9,450  5,100 
10,400  4,010 
10,490  6,250 
13,080  6,900 195 
1948  24,000  3,300  1,620  11,080  8,000 
January  23,210  3,000  2,020  10,390  7,800 
1949 
February  24,090  1,600  5,370  11,120  6,000 
1949 
March  1949  21,810  1,000  7,780  7,250  5,780 
April  1949  19,820  100  4,830  9,750  5,140 
May  1949  20,240  50  5,650  9,880  4,660 
June  1949  18,270  130  2,840  11,280  4,660 
July  1949  17,635  80  1,270  12,855  3,430 
August  10,105  0  1,735  5,610  2,760 
1949 
September 
1949  3,580  0  1,490  590  1,500 
October  1,910 
1949 
Source:  Based  on  JUSMAPG,  Greek  General  Staff,  and  US  Military  Attacht-Greece 
reports  and  other  sources.  Cited  in  Shrader,  The  Withered  Vine,  p.  111. 196 
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